Termination for inability to produce proof of possession of a required license or certificate is not a dismissal in the nature of discipline

Termination for inability to produce proof of possession of a required license or certificate is not a dismissal in the nature of discipline
Matter of Cravatta v New York State Dept. of Transp., 2010 NY Slip Op 06952, decided on October 1, 2010, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

Michael J. Cravatta, a Highway Maintenance Worker with the NYS Department of Transportation, was required to possess a valid New York State Class B Commercial Drivers License [CDL] as a condition of his employment by the Department.

When Cravatta’s CDL was suspended, the Department terminated his employment without his being given a pre-termination hearing.

Cravatta sued and Supreme Court granted his petition seeking to annul the determination terminating him from his position. Transportation appealed the lower court’s ruling.

The Appellate Division, stating that “Supreme Court erred …,” reversed the lower court “on the law” and dismissed Cravatta’s petition in its entirety.

The court said that as Cravatta was “required to maintain” a CDL, he was properly terminated after his CDL was suspended because he lacked one of the credentials required for his position.

Further, said the court, “Cravatta's termination was not disciplinary in nature and thus was subject to neither the arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement nor the provisions of Civil Service Law §75,” citing Matter of New York State Off. of Children & Family Servs. v Lanterman, 14 NY3d 275.

NYPPL Comment: Courts have viewed employees who lack licenses as being “unqualified,” in contrast to being “incompetent,” to perform the duties of the position. Indeed, it could be argued that the employer has no alternative, as it could be considered unlawful to permit an unlicensed individual to perform the duties for which a license is required.

Although the loss of a required drivers license if frequently the basis for an employee being summarily terminated, the loss of an attorney’s license to practice law or the expiration of a temporary permit to teach would also result such action.

All that appears to be necessary in such cases is for the appointing authority to make some reasonable inquiry to determine if the employee may lawfully perform the duties of the position and provide the individual a reasonable opportunity to produce a valid license or certificate.

Essentially, the courts have held that where an individual is required to hold a valid license in order to perform the duties of the position and the employee losses the required license or it expires, the individual cannot be allowed to perform the duties of the position.

This proposition was explored by the Appellate Division in Martin ex rel Lekkas, 86 AD2d 712.

Lekkas, an Assistant Clinical Physician had been permanently appointed to a position in the Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities,. He was subsequently terminated from his position without notice or hearing because he did not obtain the required license to practice medicine in New York State issued by the Education Department (Education Law Section 8522).*

The Appellate Division affirmed a lower court ruling that Lekkas’ termination was unlawful.

The court explained that although it was lawful to summarily discharge an employee without notice and hearing if the worker is unable to produce his or her required license, this could be done only if the duties being performed required the possession of the license.

According to the record, Lekkas was performing administrative duties rather than “practicing medicine.” As he was not engaged in the practice of medicine, Lekkas was not “unqualified” with respect to performing his administrative duties without the license that would have been otherwise required had he been engaged in the practice of medicine.

* The issue arose after the Education Law was amended to require persons previously appointed as physicians to obtain a license to practice medicine. Lekkas had been appointed to the position Assistant Clinical Physician prior to the amendment but had not obtained a New York State license to practice medicine within the prescribed time period.

The Cravatta decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_06952.htm
NYPPL