A correction officer [CO] was employed at a Department of Corrections and Community Supervision [DOCCS] Correctional Facility [Facility]. A co-worker [Teacher] at the Facility complained that she was subjected to unwelcome and increasingly disturbing romantic advances by CO. CO's unwelcome behavior continued after Teacher told CO that she was offended and wrote him a letter directing him "to stop bothering her".
After it became apparent that DOCCS officials were not taking action to resolve Teacher's repeated complaints about CO's conduct, Teacher obtained an order of protection against CO. CO was later arrested for violating the order.
The stress of CO's ongoing behavior caused Teacher to develop physical and mental problems and at her physician's direction she discontinued working at the Facility. Teacher never returned to work at the Facility, and was subsequently terminated by DOCCS.
Teacher then commenced an action in the US District Court against CO, the State of New York, DOCCS and two Facility officials she alleged had failed to address her complaints about CO's conduct. Teacher also alleged that she had been subjected to unlawful discrimination, a hostile work environment, sexual harassment and suffered retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC §1983 and Executive Law §296.
A jury found CO liable and awarded Teacher compensatory and punitive damages. Ultimately Teacher obtained a judgment against CO in the amount of $2,880,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000 in punitive damages.
CO appealed the judgment but the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. In so doing, the Second Circuit observed that the award of noneconomic and punitive damages against CO was supported by proof of his "egregious conduct, including sending [Teacher] threatening messages, making unwanted advances after she asked him to stop, filing a false complaint accusing her of an inappropriate relationship with an inmate, and violating an order of protection".
CO then requested that he be indemnified by the State for the judgment amount. Supreme Court granted the State Defendants' motion, which it deemed a motion for summary judgment, and dismissed CO's petition/complaint. CO appealed the Supreme Court's decision.
The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court's ruling, opining although "Public Officers Law §17(3)(a) provides that the State shall indemnify its employees for a judgment or settlement provided that the act or omission which was the subject of the judgment or settlement occurred while the employee was acting within the scope of his [or her] public employment or duties," that duty does not extend to cases in which "the injury or damage resulted from intentional wrongdoing on the part of the employee", citing Matter of Spitz v Coughlin, 128 AD2d 281, and Hubbard v New York State Off. of Mental Health, Cent. N.Y. Psychiatric Ctr., 192 AD3d 1586.
In the words of the court: "There is no doubt that "intentional acts of sexual harassment ... [are] not within the scope of [an individual's] employment and [do] not advance the [State's] interests", citing Town of Somers v Titan Indem. Co., 289 AD2d 563, at 564 and Grasso v Schenectady County Pub. Lib., 30 AD3d 814. To the minimal extent that [CO] attempts to claim that his behavior toward [Teacher] did not constitute intentional wrongdoing, the jury that found him liable for that behavior disagreed. The record therefore reflects that the jury necessarily determined that [CO's] wrongdoing was intentional, and he is now collaterally estopped from arguing otherwise. Thus, as the [State and the other named respondents] demonstrated that a rational basis existed for the determination that [CO] was not entitled to indemnification, and [CO] did not raise a material question of fact in response, Supreme Court properly granted summary judgment to the [State and the named Respondents]."
Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.