Advancing a "qualified immunity defense" in a motion for summary judgment

In this action the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, considered the court's scope of jurisdiction in an appeal challenging a federal district court's denial of a defendant's motion for summary judgment that relied on the defendant's claim of qualified immunity. Further, citing Bolmer v. Oliveira, 594 F.3d 134*, the court noted that  such rulings "are immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine".

In the event a plaintiff shows facts making out a violation of a constitutional right, the Circuit Court said a defendant may establish the affirmative defense of qualified immunity by demonstrating that [1] the right was not clearly established or [2] even if the right was clearly established, it was objectively reasonable for the [defendant] to believe the conduct at issue was lawful.”

In this action the relevant defendants did not dispute the first requirement — that the right was clearly established — and addressed only the second requirement, arguing that no reasonable jury could conclude that they acted unreasonably.

Confining its review to the question presented, the Circuit Court conclude that the federal district court properly denied the motion seeking qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage. The Circuit Court explained that viewing the pretrial record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, "there is a genuine factual dispute that bears on whether it was objectively reasonable for [the relevant respondents] to believe their actions were lawful."

In the words of the Circuit Court, “[W]here, as here, specific intent is actually an element of the plaintiff’s claim as defined by clearly established law, it can never be objectively reasonable for a government official to act with the intent that is prohibited by law.”

If the relevant defendants intended to dismiss Plaintiff in retaliation for allegedly participating in a political campaign, their actions were objectively unreasonable. Although the relevant defendants "argued before the district court, and argue again on appeal," that they believed that Plaintiff campaigned on Department time and that this was a legitimate reason for the firing, the Circuit Court opined that "even if there were a legitimate reason to fire [Plaintiff], in order to avoid liability for First Amendment retaliation, [the relevant defendants] would need to “show that [they] would have taken the same adverse action” — that is, they would have fired [Plaintiff] "in the absence of the protected speech."

The Circuit Court concluded that the district court did not err in its determination that the relevant defendants “ha[d] not met their burden of showing that a ‘reasonable jury would have to find by a preponderance of the evidence’ that they would have terminated [Plaintiff] even absent [her] protected speech ....” 

Further, the Circuit Court said "Nothing in the record suggests that [the relevant defendants] were required to fire an employee for campaigning during work hours; they had allegedly declined to do so on a prior occasion", opining that the relevant defendants "could not show that they would have taken the same decision regardless of an impermissible motive when the [relevant defendants] had the discretion not to take an adverse action". Accordingly, said the Circuit Court, a jury could conclude that the relevant defendants acted with retaliatory intent and fired [Plaintiff] when they would not otherwise have done so and in such a case, "they would not be entitled to qualified immunity."

* The Circuit Court, citing Dallas Aerospace, Inc. v. CIS Air 4 Corp., 352 F.3d 775, also observed that "[when] ruling on a summary judgment motion the district court must construe the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant.”

Click HERE to access the Second Circuit's decision posted on the Internet.