Petitioner, a not-for-profit corporation, made a request
pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law ([FOIL (Public Officers Law Article 6)] seeking "information for each Jefferson County employee who is currently
employed in a position covered by a collective bargaining agreement with
CSEA/AFSCME Local 1000" including the employee's name, gender, public office
address and certain other employment information. The
The Appellate
Division opined that although "FOIL is to be liberally construed and its
exemptions narrowly interpreted so that the public is granted maximum access to
the records of government," the exemptions contained within FOIL must
"be given their natural and obvious meaning where such interpretation is
consistent with the legislative intent and with the general purpose and
manifest policy underlying FOIL ... When presented with a question of statutory
interpretation, a court's primary consideration is to ascertain and give effect
to the intention of the [l]egislature".
Noting that the term "solicitation" is not defined
in the Public Officers Law, the Appellate Division agreed with the County
Administrator that, under the circumstances, Petitioner's FOIL request was for solicitation
purposes within the meaning of Public Officers Law §89(2)(b)(iii).
"Solicitation" is a word of "ordinary
import," and thus it should be given its "usual and commonly
understood meaning" (see Nadkos, Inc., 34 NY3d at 7). Black's Law Dictionary
defines "solicitation" as "[t]he act or an instance of
requesting or seeking to obtain something; a request or petition," and
also defines the term as "[a]n attempt or effort to gain business"
(Black's Law Dictionary [12th ed 2024], solicitation). Merriam-Webster defines
"solicit" as, inter alia, "to make petition to," "to
approach with a request or plea," or "to urge"
(Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, solicit).
The Appellate Division, noting that Plaintiff' states in
its brief on appeal that it "contacts public employees for the purposes of
its educational mission through a project that it calls Opt-Out [from
membership in an employee organization] Today". Finding no indication that Plaintiff
"intends to use the names to, for example, expose governmental abuses or
evaluate governmental activities" and "[if] anything, it is
precisely because no governmental purpose is served by public
disclosure of this information that section 87(2)(b)'s privacy exemption
falls squarely within FOIL's statutory scheme".
Accordingly, the Appellate Division held that Supreme Court
"erred in concluding that the statutory privacy exemption under Public
Officers Law §89(2)(b)(iii) does not apply" and concluded that Supreme
Court should have dismissed the petition on that basis and modified Supreme
Court's judgment.
Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.