School district advised to comply with the Commissioner’s regulations as to staffing or obtain approval for an alternate staffing arrangement
Sharon Kennedy-Frost And United Federation Of Teachers, Local 2, American Federation Of Teachers, AFL-CIO, Decisions of the Commissioner of Education 16,130
A number of a library media specialist [LMS] employed by the New York City Department of Education and their collective bargaining representative contended that the Department failed to comply with the staffing requirements set forth in §91.2 of the Commissioner’s regulations.
The Department’s defense: it was in “substantial compliance with the regulation” and thus its actions were legal, proper, and reasonable.
However, said the Commissioner, the Department admitted to being only “substantial” compliance with the regulation and the record reflects that they have failed to staff certain secondary schools with the required number of personnel or provide an alternative staffing arrangement approved by the Commissioner. The Commissioner then “advised” the Department to either [1] staff its schools appropriately or [2] obtain the Commissioner’s approval for an alternate arrangement as provided in §91.2 of the Commissioner’s regulations.
The Commissioner’s decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume50/d16130.htm
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Summaries of, and commentaries on, selected court and administrative decisions and related matters affecting public employers and employees in New York State in particular and possibly in other jurisdictions in general.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE [AI] IS NOT USED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN PREPARING NYPPL SUMMARIES OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Sep 9, 2010
Alcoholism as a defense in a disciplinary action
Alcoholism as a defense in a disciplinary action
Murolo v Safir, Appellate Division, 246 A.D.2d 653, Leave to appeal denied, 91 N.Y.2d 813
In McEniry v Landi, 84 NY2d 554, the Court of Appeals said that alcoholism qualifies as a disability within the meaning of the State’s Human Rights Law [Section 292.21, Executive Law]. A New York City firefighter, David Murolo, challenged his disciplinary dismissal by contending his misconduct was caused by an alcohol abuse problem that he had overcome. He claimed that his firing violated the Human Rights Law, citing the McEniry decision.
Disciplinary action began after Murolo called in a false alarm. While his fellow firefighters were responding to the false alarm, Murolo took $223 of “communal money” from the station house. After admitting at a disciplinary hearing that he had called in the false alarm and had taken the money, Murolo testified that:
1. He had been drinking heavily prior to the incident and “was not thinking straight.”
2. He had entered a counseling program for his alcohol problem as directed by the Department and had begun to attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.
The hearing officer determined that his status as a recovering alcoholic did not shield him from discipline for misconduct and recommended his termination. The Commissioner adopted the hearing officer’s recommendation.
Although a Supreme Court justice accepted Murolo’s argument and remanded the case to the Commissioner for the imposition of a lesser penalty, the Appellate Division disagreed and reinstated the Commissioner’s original determination.
The Appellate Division distinguished the situation in McEniry from Murolo’s.
In McEniry the issue was whether alcoholism prevented the officer from satisfactorily performing his duties. The Court of Appeals held that if an individual establishes a prima facie case that his discharged was based on his or her alcoholism, the burden shifts to the employer to show either that (1) the employee was not disabled by alcoholism, (2) there was an alcoholism disability but no reasonable accommodation was possible or (3) there an alcoholism disability but termination was for other reasons than behavior stemming from alcoholism.
Murolo v Safir, Appellate Division, 246 A.D.2d 653, Leave to appeal denied, 91 N.Y.2d 813
In McEniry v Landi, 84 NY2d 554, the Court of Appeals said that alcoholism qualifies as a disability within the meaning of the State’s Human Rights Law [Section 292.21, Executive Law]. A New York City firefighter, David Murolo, challenged his disciplinary dismissal by contending his misconduct was caused by an alcohol abuse problem that he had overcome. He claimed that his firing violated the Human Rights Law, citing the McEniry decision.
Disciplinary action began after Murolo called in a false alarm. While his fellow firefighters were responding to the false alarm, Murolo took $223 of “communal money” from the station house. After admitting at a disciplinary hearing that he had called in the false alarm and had taken the money, Murolo testified that:
1. He had been drinking heavily prior to the incident and “was not thinking straight.”
2. He had entered a counseling program for his alcohol problem as directed by the Department and had begun to attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.
The hearing officer determined that his status as a recovering alcoholic did not shield him from discipline for misconduct and recommended his termination. The Commissioner adopted the hearing officer’s recommendation.
Although a Supreme Court justice accepted Murolo’s argument and remanded the case to the Commissioner for the imposition of a lesser penalty, the Appellate Division disagreed and reinstated the Commissioner’s original determination.
The Appellate Division distinguished the situation in McEniry from Murolo’s.
In McEniry the issue was whether alcoholism prevented the officer from satisfactorily performing his duties. The Court of Appeals held that if an individual establishes a prima facie case that his discharged was based on his or her alcoholism, the burden shifts to the employer to show either that (1) the employee was not disabled by alcoholism, (2) there was an alcoholism disability but no reasonable accommodation was possible or (3) there an alcoholism disability but termination was for other reasons than behavior stemming from alcoholism.
Determining the compensation of the officers of a town
Determining the compensation of the officers of a town
Taney v Town of Waterloo, NYS App. Div., 245 A.D.2d 1079, Motion for leave to appeal denied, 91 N.Y.2d 957
Although a Town Board may determine the compensation to be paid a Town Justice, its decision to pay its justices at different rates may raise a federal “equal protection” issue. The Taney decision is an example of such a situation.
After Alfred C. Taney was reelected Waterloo Town Justice in 1996, the Town Board voted to reduce his salary from $8,975 to $1,200. It kept the salary being paid to its other Town Justice, who was then in the middle of his term of office, at $8,975. In 1997, the Town Board again considered the compensation being paid to its Town Justices. Taney’s salary was kept at $1,200; the salary of the other Town Justice’s was increased 3 percent. Taney filed a suit pursuant to Article 78 [Article 78, Civil Practice Law and Rules], contending that the Board’s actions violated his Constitutional rights under 42 USC 1983.
Seneca County Supreme Court Justice Harvey decided that Board’s 1997 salary determinations were arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of its discretion. The Court directed the Board to set Taney’s 1997 salary at “a fair and equitable amount.”
On appeal the Appellate Division commented that, pursuant to Section 27 of the Town Law, a Town Board has the power to set the salaries of its Town Justices and it is not obligated to pay all justices the same rate of compensation. Accordingly, the Court concluded that “there is nothing illegal per se in the Town Board’s 1997 decision to pay [Taney] a salary different from the other Town Justice [and] the amount of that salary is a decision left to the sound discretion of elected Town officials, who ordinarily should not be second-guessed.”
Nevertheless, the Appellate Division rejected the Board’s argument that Taney’s $1,200 salary was consistent with the salaries of Town Justices in other towns and that Taney was not given a raise in 1997 because of his reduced caseload.
Technical issues figured prominently in the decision. While “the determination of a Town Justice’s salary ... is properly the subject of a CPLR article 78 proceeding,” the Appellate Division held that:
1. The merits of the Board’s 1996 decision were not properly before the lower court because the Statute of Limitations for filing an Article 78 petition challenging the Board’s 1996 action had expired; and
2. The lower court should have considered Taney’s allegations concerning the Constitutionality of the Board’s 1996 action as the controlling “three-year Statute of Limitations with respect to the 42 USC 1983 cause of action ... has not expired.”
Accordingly, said the Court, “whether [Taney’s] constitutional rights were violated by the [Board’s] 1996 salary determination may be litigated in the context of that cause of action,” citing Benjamin v Town of Fenton, 892 F Supp 64.
Taney v Town of Waterloo, NYS App. Div., 245 A.D.2d 1079, Motion for leave to appeal denied, 91 N.Y.2d 957
Although a Town Board may determine the compensation to be paid a Town Justice, its decision to pay its justices at different rates may raise a federal “equal protection” issue. The Taney decision is an example of such a situation.
After Alfred C. Taney was reelected Waterloo Town Justice in 1996, the Town Board voted to reduce his salary from $8,975 to $1,200. It kept the salary being paid to its other Town Justice, who was then in the middle of his term of office, at $8,975. In 1997, the Town Board again considered the compensation being paid to its Town Justices. Taney’s salary was kept at $1,200; the salary of the other Town Justice’s was increased 3 percent. Taney filed a suit pursuant to Article 78 [Article 78, Civil Practice Law and Rules], contending that the Board’s actions violated his Constitutional rights under 42 USC 1983.
Seneca County Supreme Court Justice Harvey decided that Board’s 1997 salary determinations were arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of its discretion. The Court directed the Board to set Taney’s 1997 salary at “a fair and equitable amount.”
On appeal the Appellate Division commented that, pursuant to Section 27 of the Town Law, a Town Board has the power to set the salaries of its Town Justices and it is not obligated to pay all justices the same rate of compensation. Accordingly, the Court concluded that “there is nothing illegal per se in the Town Board’s 1997 decision to pay [Taney] a salary different from the other Town Justice [and] the amount of that salary is a decision left to the sound discretion of elected Town officials, who ordinarily should not be second-guessed.”
Nevertheless, the Appellate Division rejected the Board’s argument that Taney’s $1,200 salary was consistent with the salaries of Town Justices in other towns and that Taney was not given a raise in 1997 because of his reduced caseload.
Technical issues figured prominently in the decision. While “the determination of a Town Justice’s salary ... is properly the subject of a CPLR article 78 proceeding,” the Appellate Division held that:
1. The merits of the Board’s 1996 decision were not properly before the lower court because the Statute of Limitations for filing an Article 78 petition challenging the Board’s 1996 action had expired; and
2. The lower court should have considered Taney’s allegations concerning the Constitutionality of the Board’s 1996 action as the controlling “three-year Statute of Limitations with respect to the 42 USC 1983 cause of action ... has not expired.”
Accordingly, said the Court, “whether [Taney’s] constitutional rights were violated by the [Board’s] 1996 salary determination may be litigated in the context of that cause of action,” citing Benjamin v Town of Fenton, 892 F Supp 64.
Determining the compensation of the officers of a town
Determining the compensation of the officers of a town
Taney v Town of Waterloo, NYS App. Div., 245 A.D.2d 1079, Motion for leave to appeal denied, 91 N.Y.2d 957
Although a Town Board may determine the compensation to be paid a Town Justice, its decision to pay its justices at different rates may raise a federal “equal protection” issue. The Taney decision is an example of such a situation.
After Alfred C. Taney was reelected Waterloo Town Justice in 1996, the Town Board voted to reduce his salary from $8,975 to $1,200. It kept the salary being paid to its other Town Justice, who was then in the middle of his term of office, at $8,975. In 1997, the Town Board again considered the compensation being paid to its Town Justices. Taney’s salary was kept at $1,200; the salary of the other Town Justice’s was increased 3 percent. Taney filed a suit pursuant to Article 78 [Article 78, Civil Practice Law and Rules], contending that the Board’s actions violated his Constitutional rights under 42 USC 1983.
Seneca County Supreme Court Justice Harvey decided that Board’s 1997 salary determinations were arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of its discretion. The Court directed the Board to set Taney’s 1997 salary at “a fair and equitable amount.”
On appeal the Appellate Division commented that, pursuant to Section 27 of the Town Law, a Town Board has the power to set the salaries of its Town Justices and it is not obligated to pay all justices the same rate of compensation. Accordingly, the Court concluded that “there is nothing illegal per se in the Town Board’s 1997 decision to pay [Taney] a salary different from the other Town Justice [and] the amount of that salary is a decision left to the sound discretion of elected Town officials, who ordinarily should not be second-guessed.”
Nevertheless, the Appellate Division rejected the Board’s argument that Taney’s $1,200 salary was consistent with the salaries of Town Justices in other towns and that Taney was not given a raise in 1997 because of his reduced caseload.
Technical issues figured prominently in the decision. While “the determination of a Town Justice’s salary ... is properly the subject of a CPLR article 78 proceeding,” the Appellate Division held that:
1. The merits of the Board’s 1996 decision were not properly before the lower court because the Statute of Limitations for filing an Article 78 petition challenging the Board’s 1996 action had expired; and
2. The lower court should have considered Taney’s allegations concerning the Constitutionality of the Board’s 1996 action as the controlling “three-year Statute of Limitations with respect to the 42 USC 1983 cause of action ... has not expired.”
Accordingly, said the Court, “whether [Taney’s] constitutional rights were violated by the [Board’s] 1996 salary determination may be litigated in the context of that cause of action,” citing Benjamin v Town of Fenton, 892 F Supp 64.
Taney v Town of Waterloo, NYS App. Div., 245 A.D.2d 1079, Motion for leave to appeal denied, 91 N.Y.2d 957
Although a Town Board may determine the compensation to be paid a Town Justice, its decision to pay its justices at different rates may raise a federal “equal protection” issue. The Taney decision is an example of such a situation.
After Alfred C. Taney was reelected Waterloo Town Justice in 1996, the Town Board voted to reduce his salary from $8,975 to $1,200. It kept the salary being paid to its other Town Justice, who was then in the middle of his term of office, at $8,975. In 1997, the Town Board again considered the compensation being paid to its Town Justices. Taney’s salary was kept at $1,200; the salary of the other Town Justice’s was increased 3 percent. Taney filed a suit pursuant to Article 78 [Article 78, Civil Practice Law and Rules], contending that the Board’s actions violated his Constitutional rights under 42 USC 1983.
Seneca County Supreme Court Justice Harvey decided that Board’s 1997 salary determinations were arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of its discretion. The Court directed the Board to set Taney’s 1997 salary at “a fair and equitable amount.”
On appeal the Appellate Division commented that, pursuant to Section 27 of the Town Law, a Town Board has the power to set the salaries of its Town Justices and it is not obligated to pay all justices the same rate of compensation. Accordingly, the Court concluded that “there is nothing illegal per se in the Town Board’s 1997 decision to pay [Taney] a salary different from the other Town Justice [and] the amount of that salary is a decision left to the sound discretion of elected Town officials, who ordinarily should not be second-guessed.”
Nevertheless, the Appellate Division rejected the Board’s argument that Taney’s $1,200 salary was consistent with the salaries of Town Justices in other towns and that Taney was not given a raise in 1997 because of his reduced caseload.
Technical issues figured prominently in the decision. While “the determination of a Town Justice’s salary ... is properly the subject of a CPLR article 78 proceeding,” the Appellate Division held that:
1. The merits of the Board’s 1996 decision were not properly before the lower court because the Statute of Limitations for filing an Article 78 petition challenging the Board’s 1996 action had expired; and
2. The lower court should have considered Taney’s allegations concerning the Constitutionality of the Board’s 1996 action as the controlling “three-year Statute of Limitations with respect to the 42 USC 1983 cause of action ... has not expired.”
Accordingly, said the Court, “whether [Taney’s] constitutional rights were violated by the [Board’s] 1996 salary determination may be litigated in the context of that cause of action,” citing Benjamin v Town of Fenton, 892 F Supp 64.
Public entities are immune from negligence claims arising out of the performance of its governmental functions absent proof of a special relationship
Public entities are immune from negligence claims arising out of the performance of its governmental functions absent proof of a special relationship
Zeitlin v NYC Board of Education, NYS Supreme Court [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports]
Pupils assaulting teachers has become an occupational hazard in a number of school districts. What is a school district’s liability if a student assaults a teacher?
In the Zeitlin case New York State Supreme Court Justice Solomon considered a schoolteacher’s demand for compensatory and punitive damages based on his school district’s alleged failure to protect him from student assaults.
Citing Miller v State of New York, 62 NY2d 506, Justice Solomon described the basic law in such situations as follows:
Public entities are immune from negligence claims arising out of the performance of their governmental functions unless the injured person establishes a special relationship with that entity underlying a specific duty to protect that individual and reliance on the performance of that duty by the individual.
What is involved in establishing such a “specific duty?” According to the ruling, such a duty comes into being only where all four of the following elements are satisfied:
1. Assumption: An assumption by a municipality or municipal agency, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured;
2. Knowledge: Knowledge on the part of the municipality’s agents that inaction could lead to harm;
3. Direct Contact: Direct contact between the municipality’s agents and the injured party; and
4. Justifiable reliance: The injured party’s justifiable reliance on the municipality’s undertaking.
In the Zeitlin case the Court concluded that although providing security against physical attack from third parties was a governmental function, “Zeitlin fails to meet the first element [assumption] of a claimed special duty of protection and for that reason alone, his claim must fail” and dismissed his complaint. In other words, Zeitlin was unable to demonstrate a critical element -- that the District has assumed any responsibility for his safety at the work site.
This “four element” test is not usually applied in cases involving the safety of students, however. As the Appellate Division said in Foster v New Berlin Central School District, 246 AD2d 880, “school districts are under a duty to adequately supervise students in their care and will be liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision.”
Zeitlin v NYC Board of Education, NYS Supreme Court [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports]
Pupils assaulting teachers has become an occupational hazard in a number of school districts. What is a school district’s liability if a student assaults a teacher?
In the Zeitlin case New York State Supreme Court Justice Solomon considered a schoolteacher’s demand for compensatory and punitive damages based on his school district’s alleged failure to protect him from student assaults.
Citing Miller v State of New York, 62 NY2d 506, Justice Solomon described the basic law in such situations as follows:
Public entities are immune from negligence claims arising out of the performance of their governmental functions unless the injured person establishes a special relationship with that entity underlying a specific duty to protect that individual and reliance on the performance of that duty by the individual.
What is involved in establishing such a “specific duty?” According to the ruling, such a duty comes into being only where all four of the following elements are satisfied:
1. Assumption: An assumption by a municipality or municipal agency, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured;
2. Knowledge: Knowledge on the part of the municipality’s agents that inaction could lead to harm;
3. Direct Contact: Direct contact between the municipality’s agents and the injured party; and
4. Justifiable reliance: The injured party’s justifiable reliance on the municipality’s undertaking.
In the Zeitlin case the Court concluded that although providing security against physical attack from third parties was a governmental function, “Zeitlin fails to meet the first element [assumption] of a claimed special duty of protection and for that reason alone, his claim must fail” and dismissed his complaint. In other words, Zeitlin was unable to demonstrate a critical element -- that the District has assumed any responsibility for his safety at the work site.
This “four element” test is not usually applied in cases involving the safety of students, however. As the Appellate Division said in Foster v New Berlin Central School District, 246 AD2d 880, “school districts are under a duty to adequately supervise students in their care and will be liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision.”
Unit exclusivity
Unit exclusivity
CSEA and Warrensburg CSD, 30 PERB 3056
Suffolk Co Corrections Officers Assoc v PERB, App. Div., 246 A.D.2d 660
Exclusivity is an important issue to a collective bargaining unit. It sets out those tasks that may be performed only by unit members to the exclusion of all others. An employer violates its duty to negotiate under Section 209-a.1(d) of the Civil Service Law if it unilaterally transfers work “established and maintained exclusively by a collective bargaining unit” to non-unit workers.
In the Warrensburg case, CSEA Local 857 charged that the Warrensburg Central School District violated Section 209-a.1(d) when it assigned chaperoning duties at plays and concerts to employees represented by the Warrensburg Teachers Association [Association], a different negotiating unit.
The District contended that under a memorandum of understanding, members of the Teachers Association had “the right of first refusal in chaperoning all school events.”
PERB sustained its administrative law judge’s finding that District administrators regularly served in a chaperoning capacity at these events and thus CSEA did not have exclusivity with respect to performing such duties.
PERB said that collective bargaining agreements between the Association and the District dating back to 1982 specifically covered “chaperoning duties and rights,” while Local 857 agreements were silent with respect to such activities.
PERB rejected Local 857’s argument that it had “exclusivity” with respect to concerts conducted at the high school while Association members regularly chaperoned elementary school concerts, commenting that “the location of a concert, being unrelated to chaperoning duties, cannot form any discernible boundary within which to test exclusivity.”
A similar case involved the Suffolk County Court, First District, located in Hauppauge, which employed 18 correction officers who were responsible for the care and custody of detainees being held there.
In 1992 the Court was moved to Central Islip from Hauppauge and the 18 correction officers were reassigned to the Suffolk County Maximum Security facility in Riverhead. Deputy sheriffs were assigned to take care of the detainees at the Court’s Central Islip facility.
The Suffolk County Correction Officers Association [SCCOA], filed an improper practice charge against the County with PERB, contending that the County’s unilateral transferring the responsibility for District Court detainees to deputy sheriffs violated Section 201.a[1](d) and (e) of the Civil Service Law. SCCOA argued that the Taylor Law required that “prior negotiations” be undertaken before such a change could be implemented.
A PERB administrative law judge [ALJ] determined that SCCOA did not prove that its unit members had previously performed the duties reassigned to the deputy sheriffs exclusively. After PERB affirmed the ALJ’s ruling, SCCOA appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed PERB’s determination.
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CSEA and Warrensburg CSD, 30 PERB 3056
Suffolk Co Corrections Officers Assoc v PERB, App. Div., 246 A.D.2d 660
Exclusivity is an important issue to a collective bargaining unit. It sets out those tasks that may be performed only by unit members to the exclusion of all others. An employer violates its duty to negotiate under Section 209-a.1(d) of the Civil Service Law if it unilaterally transfers work “established and maintained exclusively by a collective bargaining unit” to non-unit workers.
In the Warrensburg case, CSEA Local 857 charged that the Warrensburg Central School District violated Section 209-a.1(d) when it assigned chaperoning duties at plays and concerts to employees represented by the Warrensburg Teachers Association [Association], a different negotiating unit.
The District contended that under a memorandum of understanding, members of the Teachers Association had “the right of first refusal in chaperoning all school events.”
PERB sustained its administrative law judge’s finding that District administrators regularly served in a chaperoning capacity at these events and thus CSEA did not have exclusivity with respect to performing such duties.
PERB said that collective bargaining agreements between the Association and the District dating back to 1982 specifically covered “chaperoning duties and rights,” while Local 857 agreements were silent with respect to such activities.
PERB rejected Local 857’s argument that it had “exclusivity” with respect to concerts conducted at the high school while Association members regularly chaperoned elementary school concerts, commenting that “the location of a concert, being unrelated to chaperoning duties, cannot form any discernible boundary within which to test exclusivity.”
A similar case involved the Suffolk County Court, First District, located in Hauppauge, which employed 18 correction officers who were responsible for the care and custody of detainees being held there.
In 1992 the Court was moved to Central Islip from Hauppauge and the 18 correction officers were reassigned to the Suffolk County Maximum Security facility in Riverhead. Deputy sheriffs were assigned to take care of the detainees at the Court’s Central Islip facility.
The Suffolk County Correction Officers Association [SCCOA], filed an improper practice charge against the County with PERB, contending that the County’s unilateral transferring the responsibility for District Court detainees to deputy sheriffs violated Section 201.a[1](d) and (e) of the Civil Service Law. SCCOA argued that the Taylor Law required that “prior negotiations” be undertaken before such a change could be implemented.
A PERB administrative law judge [ALJ] determined that SCCOA did not prove that its unit members had previously performed the duties reassigned to the deputy sheriffs exclusively. After PERB affirmed the ALJ’s ruling, SCCOA appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed PERB’s determination.
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Sep 8, 2010
Court vacates hearing officer’s disciplinary determination after finding that it was arbitrary and capricious
Court vacates hearing officer’s disciplinary determination after finding that it was arbitrary and capricious
Trupiano v Meadow Union Free School Dist., 2010 NY Slip Op 32264(U), August 10, 2010, Supreme Court, Nassau County, Judge: Michele M. Woodard [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports]
From September 2004 through March 2007, the East Meadow UFSD teachers engaged in numerous activities to protest the fact that they did not have a successor collective bargaining agreement in place,* including picketing the School District's school buildings.
East Meadow, pursuant to Education Law §3020-a, preferred disciplinary charges on one of its teachers, Gina Trupiano, alleging that Trupiano “intentionally created a health and safety risk by purposefully situating her vehicle alongside the curb … in order to preclude children from being dropped off at curbside. The action resulted in children being dropped off in the middle of the street which resulted in an otherwise avoidable and unnecessary health and safety hazard.”
Hearing Officer Howard C. Edelman found that although Trupiano “did not knowingly and purposely park her vehicle alongside the curb … he concluded that by doing so, Trupiano "created a safety hazard to children” and sustained the charge. The penalty imposed: Trupiano received a counseling memo as the penalty.
Judge Woodward vacated the hearing officer’s award, finding that, in this instance, the Hearing Officer s decision that Trupiano is culpable of the charge preferred against her is not "amply supported by the evidence."
In the words of the court, “While the Hearing Officer s decision is indeed thoughtful, the irony is that the Hearing Officer therein repeatedly acknowledges that Trupiano broke no laws on March 2, 2007, was engaged in a constitutionally protected form of free speech and that she "obviously... did not wish harm to any child."
Accordingly, the court ruled that the disciplinary determination was "arbitrary or capricious."
* The terms and conditions addressing mandatory subjects of collective bargaining set out in the expired collective bargaining agreement are continued in effect pending the successor agreement in accordance with PERB’s so-called “Triborough Doctrine” promulgated in 1972.
The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/pdfs/2010/2010_32264.pdf
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If you are interested in learning more about disciplinary procedures involving public officers and employees, please click here:
http://thedisciplinebook.blogspot.com/
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Trupiano v Meadow Union Free School Dist., 2010 NY Slip Op 32264(U), August 10, 2010, Supreme Court, Nassau County, Judge: Michele M. Woodard [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports]
From September 2004 through March 2007, the East Meadow UFSD teachers engaged in numerous activities to protest the fact that they did not have a successor collective bargaining agreement in place,* including picketing the School District's school buildings.
East Meadow, pursuant to Education Law §3020-a, preferred disciplinary charges on one of its teachers, Gina Trupiano, alleging that Trupiano “intentionally created a health and safety risk by purposefully situating her vehicle alongside the curb … in order to preclude children from being dropped off at curbside. The action resulted in children being dropped off in the middle of the street which resulted in an otherwise avoidable and unnecessary health and safety hazard.”
Hearing Officer Howard C. Edelman found that although Trupiano “did not knowingly and purposely park her vehicle alongside the curb … he concluded that by doing so, Trupiano "created a safety hazard to children” and sustained the charge. The penalty imposed: Trupiano received a counseling memo as the penalty.
Judge Woodward vacated the hearing officer’s award, finding that, in this instance, the Hearing Officer s decision that Trupiano is culpable of the charge preferred against her is not "amply supported by the evidence."
In the words of the court, “While the Hearing Officer s decision is indeed thoughtful, the irony is that the Hearing Officer therein repeatedly acknowledges that Trupiano broke no laws on March 2, 2007, was engaged in a constitutionally protected form of free speech and that she "obviously... did not wish harm to any child."
Accordingly, the court ruled that the disciplinary determination was "arbitrary or capricious."
* The terms and conditions addressing mandatory subjects of collective bargaining set out in the expired collective bargaining agreement are continued in effect pending the successor agreement in accordance with PERB’s so-called “Triborough Doctrine” promulgated in 1972.
The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/pdfs/2010/2010_32264.pdf
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If you are interested in learning more about disciplinary procedures involving public officers and employees, please click here:
http://thedisciplinebook.blogspot.com/
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Some procedural basics in perfecting an appeal to the Commissioner of Education
Some procedural basics in perfecting an appeal to the Commissioner of Education
Kathleen Vendel, et al., v the Board of Education of the Marion Central School District, Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision #16,134
The decision of the Commissioner of Education in Vendel sets out a number of procedural elements that must be satisfied in order to perfect an appeal to the Commissioner. Significantly, a party's failure to comply with one or more of these requirements could prove fatal to the Commissioner's considering the merits of the appeal.
Some 100 residents of the Marion Central School District appealed the School Board decision concerning the public's participation at board meetings. The Board had adopted a policy limiting non-members of the Board interested in speaking at its meetings to three minutes. Also in Vendel's submission to the Commissioner was an appeal involving "certain interactions with the community” by the Board and an application seeking “the removal of various individuals” from the Board.
The Commissioner dismissed Vendel's appeal and application without considering the merits of the allegations, explaining:
1. The individuals filing an appeal must have standing. An individual may not maintain an appeal pursuant to Education Law §310 unless aggrieved in the sense that he or she has suffered personal damage or injury to his or her civil, personal or property rights. Merely having status as a resident and a taxpayer in a school district is not sufficient to confer standing to challenge school board policies.
Except with respect to Vendel’s allegations concerning alleged harassment, said the Commissioner, “there has been no showing that any of the petitioners are personally aggrieved by the board policy or actions complained of.” The appeal, therefore, was dismissed for lack of standing, except with respect to Vendel’s claims relating to the harassment complaint.
2. Verification of the appeal. The appeal was defective as “neither the petition nor petitioners’ reply are properly verified.”
The Commissioner noted that 8 NYCRR §275.5 of the Commissioner's Regulations require all pleadings in an appeal to the Commissioner be verified.*
3. Failure to name a necessary party. To the extent that the petition seeks removal of individual board members petitioners have failed to join them as parties.
The Commissioner pointed out that a party whose rights would be adversely affected by a determination of an appeal in favor of a petitioner is a necessary party and must be joined as such.**
4. Jurisdiction of the Commissioner. As to the “propriety of the actions of the Trooper” in the course of events leading to the appeal, the Commissioner said that the Trooper is not an officer or employee of the School District and thus is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Education.
5. Statute of limitations to file an appeal. The Commissioner commented that the petitioners challenge any actions in relation to the July 13, 2009 board meeting but was not commenced until September 1, 2009.
Citing 8 NYCRR §275.16, the Commissioner said that “An appeal to the Commissioner must be commenced within 30 days from the making of the decision or the performance of the act complained of, unless any delay is excused by the Commissioner for good cause shown.”
The Commissioner did make one observation concerning one of the issues presented by Vendel “for the benefit of the parties” -participation of individuals at board meetings.
Regarding taxpayers and residents of a school district participating in board meetings, the Commissioner said that a board of education should, whenever possible and appropriate, consider public input on matters under consideration. However, the Commissioner also noted that a school board has the right to control the agenda at board meetings and “there is no statutory mandate that requires a board to permit public input at its meetings.”
* The affidavit of verification was stated to have been made “on the oath of Carol Moranz” but was signed by Vendel. Moranz was not a petitioner in this appeal and the Commissioner’s regulations require the petition to be verified under oath of at least one of the petitioners (see 8 NYCRR §275.5).
** Joinder requires that an individual be clearly named as a respondent in the caption and served with a copy of the notice of petition and the petition so as to inform the individual that he or she should respond to the petition and enter a defense.
The Commissioner’s decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume50/d16134.htm
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Kathleen Vendel, et al., v the Board of Education of the Marion Central School District, Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision #16,134
The decision of the Commissioner of Education in Vendel sets out a number of procedural elements that must be satisfied in order to perfect an appeal to the Commissioner. Significantly, a party's failure to comply with one or more of these requirements could prove fatal to the Commissioner's considering the merits of the appeal.
Some 100 residents of the Marion Central School District appealed the School Board decision concerning the public's participation at board meetings. The Board had adopted a policy limiting non-members of the Board interested in speaking at its meetings to three minutes. Also in Vendel's submission to the Commissioner was an appeal involving "certain interactions with the community” by the Board and an application seeking “the removal of various individuals” from the Board.
The Commissioner dismissed Vendel's appeal and application without considering the merits of the allegations, explaining:
1. The individuals filing an appeal must have standing. An individual may not maintain an appeal pursuant to Education Law §310 unless aggrieved in the sense that he or she has suffered personal damage or injury to his or her civil, personal or property rights. Merely having status as a resident and a taxpayer in a school district is not sufficient to confer standing to challenge school board policies.
Except with respect to Vendel’s allegations concerning alleged harassment, said the Commissioner, “there has been no showing that any of the petitioners are personally aggrieved by the board policy or actions complained of.” The appeal, therefore, was dismissed for lack of standing, except with respect to Vendel’s claims relating to the harassment complaint.
2. Verification of the appeal. The appeal was defective as “neither the petition nor petitioners’ reply are properly verified.”
The Commissioner noted that 8 NYCRR §275.5 of the Commissioner's Regulations require all pleadings in an appeal to the Commissioner be verified.*
3. Failure to name a necessary party. To the extent that the petition seeks removal of individual board members petitioners have failed to join them as parties.
The Commissioner pointed out that a party whose rights would be adversely affected by a determination of an appeal in favor of a petitioner is a necessary party and must be joined as such.**
4. Jurisdiction of the Commissioner. As to the “propriety of the actions of the Trooper” in the course of events leading to the appeal, the Commissioner said that the Trooper is not an officer or employee of the School District and thus is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Education.
5. Statute of limitations to file an appeal. The Commissioner commented that the petitioners challenge any actions in relation to the July 13, 2009 board meeting but was not commenced until September 1, 2009.
Citing 8 NYCRR §275.16, the Commissioner said that “An appeal to the Commissioner must be commenced within 30 days from the making of the decision or the performance of the act complained of, unless any delay is excused by the Commissioner for good cause shown.”
The Commissioner did make one observation concerning one of the issues presented by Vendel “for the benefit of the parties” -participation of individuals at board meetings.
Regarding taxpayers and residents of a school district participating in board meetings, the Commissioner said that a board of education should, whenever possible and appropriate, consider public input on matters under consideration. However, the Commissioner also noted that a school board has the right to control the agenda at board meetings and “there is no statutory mandate that requires a board to permit public input at its meetings.”
* The affidavit of verification was stated to have been made “on the oath of Carol Moranz” but was signed by Vendel. Moranz was not a petitioner in this appeal and the Commissioner’s regulations require the petition to be verified under oath of at least one of the petitioners (see 8 NYCRR §275.5).
** Joinder requires that an individual be clearly named as a respondent in the caption and served with a copy of the notice of petition and the petition so as to inform the individual that he or she should respond to the petition and enter a defense.
The Commissioner’s decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume50/d16134.htm
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Full evidentiary hearing required before discontinuing GML Section 207-a benefits
Full evidentiary hearing required before discontinuing GML Section 207-a benefits
Giorgio v Bucci, Appellate Division, 246 A.D.2d 711, Motion to appeal denied, 91 N.Y.2d 814
Thomas Giorgio, a Binghamton firefighter, began receiving disability benefits pursuant to Section 207-a effective January 13, 1996 based on his claim of a work-related injury on that date. On May 23, 1996 Binghamton told Giorgio that his benefits were being terminated, alleging that there was “newly discovered evidence that his condition predated the January 13, 1996 incident.”
Giorgio sued, but withdrew that action when the City agreed to continue his benefits and give him a “pre-termination hearing.” The City upheld the original decision to deny him Section 207-a benefits on the grounds that Giorgio’s injury was not the result of a work-related incident. Again Giorgio sued, seeking reinstatement to the payroll, restoration of his leave credits and a declaration that the administrative procedure used by the City was unconstitutional.
On the merits of Giorgio’s “due process claims,” the Appellate Division said that he had been denied “the right to a full evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of his benefits.” Why? Because, said the Court, Giorgio had not been allowed to confront and cross-examine witnesses or to offer evidence on his own behalf.
The lesson here is that when an employer holds a hearing to determine whether Section 207-a [and, presumably, Section 207-c] benefits should be discontinued, it must be a full evidentiary hearing, complying with all the requirements of administrative due process.
Giorgio v Bucci, Appellate Division, 246 A.D.2d 711, Motion to appeal denied, 91 N.Y.2d 814
Thomas Giorgio, a Binghamton firefighter, began receiving disability benefits pursuant to Section 207-a effective January 13, 1996 based on his claim of a work-related injury on that date. On May 23, 1996 Binghamton told Giorgio that his benefits were being terminated, alleging that there was “newly discovered evidence that his condition predated the January 13, 1996 incident.”
Giorgio sued, but withdrew that action when the City agreed to continue his benefits and give him a “pre-termination hearing.” The City upheld the original decision to deny him Section 207-a benefits on the grounds that Giorgio’s injury was not the result of a work-related incident. Again Giorgio sued, seeking reinstatement to the payroll, restoration of his leave credits and a declaration that the administrative procedure used by the City was unconstitutional.
On the merits of Giorgio’s “due process claims,” the Appellate Division said that he had been denied “the right to a full evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of his benefits.” Why? Because, said the Court, Giorgio had not been allowed to confront and cross-examine witnesses or to offer evidence on his own behalf.
The lesson here is that when an employer holds a hearing to determine whether Section 207-a [and, presumably, Section 207-c] benefits should be discontinued, it must be a full evidentiary hearing, complying with all the requirements of administrative due process.
Claiming drug abuse as a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act
Claiming drug abuse as a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act
D’Amico v Bruno, CA2, 132 F.3d 145
Vito D’Amico, a New York City firefighter, complained that the Department violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (an anti-discrimination law that applies to federally-funded employers) when it dismissed him from his position with the Fire Department of the City of New York (NYFD) because of his use of illegal drugs. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the federal district court’s dismissal of D’Amico charges. In so doing the Court set out a comprehensive summary of the various factors considered by the federal courts in such cases.
D’Amico joined NYFD in 1982. In April 1988, D’Amico was arrested for assault, possession of a controlled substance, and resisting arrest. Following this arrest, the NYFD referred D’Amico to counseling within the NYFD.
In September 1988, the NYFD received an anonymous letter accusing D’Amico of using and selling cocaine. NYFD ordered D’Amico to submit to a urine test on December 13, 1988. D’Amico tested positive for cocaine and NYFD suspended him without pay. The suspension was lifted in January 1989, pending the outcome of disciplinary action taken against him. D’Amico, meanwhile, had entered an inpatient drug treatment program on April 17, 1989, which it was reported that he had successfully completed on May 15, 1989.
OATH Administrative Law Judge Ray Fleischhacker presided over the disciplinary hearing held on June 23, 1989 and found D’Amico guilty of 4 of the 5 charges filed against him. The Commissioner accepted the ALJ’s findings and recommendations and terminated D’Amico effective September 5, 1989. The Commissioner said that “[i]n light of the grave responsibilities entrusted to a firefighter, [D’Amico’s] continued employment with the Fire Department presents a significant risk, both to the general public and to his fellow firefighters.”
Under the Rehabilitation Act, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case. In a case where the employer relies on the plaintiff’s handicap as the reason for the adverse employment decision, the employer may rebut the inference that the handicap was improperly taken into account by going forward with evidence that the handicap is relevant to qualifications for the position.
The plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is qualified for the position despite his or her disability.
D’Amico had to establish a prima facie case by proving that: (1) he is an individual with a disability; (2) he was otherwise qualified for a position; (3) he was denied that position on the basis of his disability, and (4) NYFD receives federal funds.
Although it was conceded that D’Amico satisfied items (3) and (4), NYFD contended that D’Amico was neither an “individual with a disability,” nor “otherwise qualified” to be a firefighter.
Substance abuse is a recognized disability for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act, and an employer may violate the Act by taking an adverse employment action against an employee who has overcome past substance abuse problems but the term “individual with a disability” does not include an individual who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs.
According to the Circuit Court, the critical issue was whether D’Amico was a “current substance abuser” is the time of his discharge. The court said the actual date of discharge was not critical but serves “rather as a guidepost from which to determine whether the employer acted with justification.” The Court defined a “current substance abuser” as an individual whose substance abuse problem is severe and recent enough that the employer is justified in believing that the employee is unable to perform the essential duties of his job.
The employer must therefore evaluate (1) the level of responsibility entrusted to the employee, (2) the employer’s applicable job and performance requirements, (3) the level of competence ordinarily required to perform the task in question, and (4) the employee’s past performance record. Further, it must consider both the type of position for which the plaintiff claims to be otherwise qualified and the consequences of a potential mishap.
The Circuit Court pointed out with approval that in DiPompo v West Point Military Academy, 770 F. Supp. 887, Federal District Court Judge Michael B. Mukasey said “[W]hat may be a reasonable risk for a postal worker ... whose job generally does not pose great hazards to those who perform it or to the public they serve, is not necessarily a reasonable risk for a firefighter, whose job is defined at almost every turn by the potential for disaster to himself and others.”
Concluding that D’Amico’s history of cocaine addiction, together with the NYFD’s judgment as to the possibility of, and the risks inherent in, a relapse, the Circuit Court said that NYFD was justified in terminating D’Amico’s employment as a firefighter.
D’Amico v Bruno, CA2, 132 F.3d 145
Vito D’Amico, a New York City firefighter, complained that the Department violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (an anti-discrimination law that applies to federally-funded employers) when it dismissed him from his position with the Fire Department of the City of New York (NYFD) because of his use of illegal drugs. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the federal district court’s dismissal of D’Amico charges. In so doing the Court set out a comprehensive summary of the various factors considered by the federal courts in such cases.
D’Amico joined NYFD in 1982. In April 1988, D’Amico was arrested for assault, possession of a controlled substance, and resisting arrest. Following this arrest, the NYFD referred D’Amico to counseling within the NYFD.
In September 1988, the NYFD received an anonymous letter accusing D’Amico of using and selling cocaine. NYFD ordered D’Amico to submit to a urine test on December 13, 1988. D’Amico tested positive for cocaine and NYFD suspended him without pay. The suspension was lifted in January 1989, pending the outcome of disciplinary action taken against him. D’Amico, meanwhile, had entered an inpatient drug treatment program on April 17, 1989, which it was reported that he had successfully completed on May 15, 1989.
OATH Administrative Law Judge Ray Fleischhacker presided over the disciplinary hearing held on June 23, 1989 and found D’Amico guilty of 4 of the 5 charges filed against him. The Commissioner accepted the ALJ’s findings and recommendations and terminated D’Amico effective September 5, 1989. The Commissioner said that “[i]n light of the grave responsibilities entrusted to a firefighter, [D’Amico’s] continued employment with the Fire Department presents a significant risk, both to the general public and to his fellow firefighters.”
Under the Rehabilitation Act, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case. In a case where the employer relies on the plaintiff’s handicap as the reason for the adverse employment decision, the employer may rebut the inference that the handicap was improperly taken into account by going forward with evidence that the handicap is relevant to qualifications for the position.
The plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is qualified for the position despite his or her disability.
D’Amico had to establish a prima facie case by proving that: (1) he is an individual with a disability; (2) he was otherwise qualified for a position; (3) he was denied that position on the basis of his disability, and (4) NYFD receives federal funds.
Although it was conceded that D’Amico satisfied items (3) and (4), NYFD contended that D’Amico was neither an “individual with a disability,” nor “otherwise qualified” to be a firefighter.
Substance abuse is a recognized disability for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act, and an employer may violate the Act by taking an adverse employment action against an employee who has overcome past substance abuse problems but the term “individual with a disability” does not include an individual who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs.
According to the Circuit Court, the critical issue was whether D’Amico was a “current substance abuser” is the time of his discharge. The court said the actual date of discharge was not critical but serves “rather as a guidepost from which to determine whether the employer acted with justification.” The Court defined a “current substance abuser” as an individual whose substance abuse problem is severe and recent enough that the employer is justified in believing that the employee is unable to perform the essential duties of his job.
The employer must therefore evaluate (1) the level of responsibility entrusted to the employee, (2) the employer’s applicable job and performance requirements, (3) the level of competence ordinarily required to perform the task in question, and (4) the employee’s past performance record. Further, it must consider both the type of position for which the plaintiff claims to be otherwise qualified and the consequences of a potential mishap.
The Circuit Court pointed out with approval that in DiPompo v West Point Military Academy, 770 F. Supp. 887, Federal District Court Judge Michael B. Mukasey said “[W]hat may be a reasonable risk for a postal worker ... whose job generally does not pose great hazards to those who perform it or to the public they serve, is not necessarily a reasonable risk for a firefighter, whose job is defined at almost every turn by the potential for disaster to himself and others.”
Concluding that D’Amico’s history of cocaine addiction, together with the NYFD’s judgment as to the possibility of, and the risks inherent in, a relapse, the Circuit Court said that NYFD was justified in terminating D’Amico’s employment as a firefighter.
Sep 7, 2010
Removing a public officer of a town from his or her position
Removing a public officer of a town from his or her position
Public Officers Law Section 36
Unhappy with their Town Supervisor, a number of residents of a town wrote to New York Governor David Paterson and asked him to remove the official from office.
According to a newspaper report,* Governor Paterson’s attorney, Peter J. Kiernan, Esq., advised the residents that “state law only provides the governor with power to remove some town officials, and town supervisors aren’t on the list.”
In any event, with respect to the removal of a town officer from his or her public office, §36 of the Public Officers Law, in pertinent part, provides as follows:
Any town… officer, except a justice of the peace, may be removed from office by the supreme court for any misconduct, maladministration, malfeasance or malversation in office. An application for such removal may be made by any citizen resident of such town … or by the district attorney of the county in which such town … is located, and shall be made to the appellate division of the supreme court held within the judicial department embracing such town …. Such application shall be made upon notice to such officer of not less than eight days, and a copy of the charges upon which the application will be made must be served with such notice.
If you are interested in learning more about disciplinary procedures involving public officers and employees, please click here:
http://thedisciplinebook.blogspot.com/
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Public Officers Law Section 36
Unhappy with their Town Supervisor, a number of residents of a town wrote to New York Governor David Paterson and asked him to remove the official from office.
According to a newspaper report,* Governor Paterson’s attorney, Peter J. Kiernan, Esq., advised the residents that “state law only provides the governor with power to remove some town officials, and town supervisors aren’t on the list.”
In any event, with respect to the removal of a town officer from his or her public office, §36 of the Public Officers Law, in pertinent part, provides as follows:
Any town… officer, except a justice of the peace, may be removed from office by the supreme court for any misconduct, maladministration, malfeasance or malversation in office. An application for such removal may be made by any citizen resident of such town … or by the district attorney of the county in which such town … is located, and shall be made to the appellate division of the supreme court held within the judicial department embracing such town …. Such application shall be made upon notice to such officer of not less than eight days, and a copy of the charges upon which the application will be made must be served with such notice.
* Schenectady Gazette, Saturday, September 4, 2010
============================================If you are interested in learning more about disciplinary procedures involving public officers and employees, please click here:
http://thedisciplinebook.blogspot.com/
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Employment-at-will status may be tempered by provisions in the employer’s policy manual or personnel handbook under certain conditions
Employment-at-will status may be tempered by provisions in the employer’s policy manual or personnel handbook under certain conditions
Pearce v Clinton Community College, 246 A.D.2d 775
New York State is an “employment-at-will” state. This means that unless there is some statutory or contractual right to due process, an employee may be terminated without notice and a hearing.
However, sometimes courts will deem the contents of an employer’s policy manual or personnel handbook a “contract” insofar as processing the termination of an employee is concerned. Lisa J. Pearce attempted to persuade the Appellate Division that the Clinton County Community College’s [CCC] Policy and Procedures Manual [Manual] was part of the employment contract between her and CCC following her termination by the College.
Pearce signed a letter appointing her assistant bursar at CCC for the period October 18, 1995 through August 31, 1996. According to the ruling, this position was “within the category of management confidential personnel.” Aside from some details concerning fringe benefits, Pearce’s letter of appointment did not include any statements concerning any other “terms and conditions of employment.”
About four months later CCC terminated Pearce. Pearce was awarded unemployment insurance benefits based on a finding by Workers’ Compensation that she “was discharged for incompetence and failure to meet the standards of her payroll specialist position.”
Subsequently Pearce sued CCC, contending that it had wrongfully terminated her and that it had “breached her contract” with respect to certain provisions in the Manual. Was the Manual part of Pearce’s contract of employment? The Appellate Division decided that it was not part of any contract of employment between the parties.
Further, while the Manual indicated that CCC “generally endorses progressive discipline” and provides that “management confidential personnel” may receive annual performance reviews, the Court commented that there was nothing in the Manual setting out a policy with respect to a termination for cause prior to the completion of a specified term of employment.
The Court decided that: (1) The letter of appointment was sufficiently specific to constitute a contract between the parties; (2) CCC’s Policy and Procedures Manual was not “engrafted upon this contract;” and (3) “it is only where a plaintiff can show the existence of an express written agreement limiting the employer’s right to summarily terminate an employee that the principles governing employment at will are inapplicable”. Accordingly, the Court sustained the Supreme Court’s order denying her motion for partial summary judgment.
Pearce v Clinton Community College, 246 A.D.2d 775
New York State is an “employment-at-will” state. This means that unless there is some statutory or contractual right to due process, an employee may be terminated without notice and a hearing.
However, sometimes courts will deem the contents of an employer’s policy manual or personnel handbook a “contract” insofar as processing the termination of an employee is concerned. Lisa J. Pearce attempted to persuade the Appellate Division that the Clinton County Community College’s [CCC] Policy and Procedures Manual [Manual] was part of the employment contract between her and CCC following her termination by the College.
Pearce signed a letter appointing her assistant bursar at CCC for the period October 18, 1995 through August 31, 1996. According to the ruling, this position was “within the category of management confidential personnel.” Aside from some details concerning fringe benefits, Pearce’s letter of appointment did not include any statements concerning any other “terms and conditions of employment.”
About four months later CCC terminated Pearce. Pearce was awarded unemployment insurance benefits based on a finding by Workers’ Compensation that she “was discharged for incompetence and failure to meet the standards of her payroll specialist position.”
Subsequently Pearce sued CCC, contending that it had wrongfully terminated her and that it had “breached her contract” with respect to certain provisions in the Manual. Was the Manual part of Pearce’s contract of employment? The Appellate Division decided that it was not part of any contract of employment between the parties.
Further, while the Manual indicated that CCC “generally endorses progressive discipline” and provides that “management confidential personnel” may receive annual performance reviews, the Court commented that there was nothing in the Manual setting out a policy with respect to a termination for cause prior to the completion of a specified term of employment.
The Court decided that: (1) The letter of appointment was sufficiently specific to constitute a contract between the parties; (2) CCC’s Policy and Procedures Manual was not “engrafted upon this contract;” and (3) “it is only where a plaintiff can show the existence of an express written agreement limiting the employer’s right to summarily terminate an employee that the principles governing employment at will are inapplicable”. Accordingly, the Court sustained the Supreme Court’s order denying her motion for partial summary judgment.
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NYPPL Publisher Harvey Randall served as Principal Attorney, New York State Department of Civil Service; Director of Personnel, SUNY Central Administration; Director of Research, Governor’s Office of Employee Relations; and Staff Judge Advocate General, New York Guard.
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