An employee of a BOCES is a State employee for the purposes Public Officers Law §17 when performing his or her duties under the supervision of the State Education Department

An employee of a BOCES is a State employee for the purposes Public Officers Law §17 when performing his or her duties under the supervision of the State Education Department

Formal Opinions of the Attorney General, 2013-F1

The Attorney General advised Richard J. Trautwein, Esq., State Education Department Counsel & Deputy Commissioner for Legal Affairs, that a member of the staff of a BOCES district superintendent who is serving as an integrity officer under the supervision of State Education Department is eligible for state-provided defense and indemnification in accordance with the provisions of Public Officers Law §17 in the event he or she is sued as the result of an act or an omission flowing from the performance of his or her official duties under such supervision. 

In the opinion of the Attorney General, “… an integrity officer who is a member of the district superintendent's staff also is in the service of the State when performing these duties.” Accordingly, the Attorney General explained, such personnel are eligible for defense and indemnification pursuant to Public Officers Law §17 in the event the individual is sued as the result of his or her investigating test security breaches on behalf of the State.

Subdivision 3 of §17, in pertinent part, provides that: “The state shall indemnify and save harmless its employees in the amount of any judgment obtained against such employees in any state or federal court, or in the amount of any settlement of a claim, or shall pay such judgment or settlement; provided, that the act or omission from which such judgment or settlement arose occurred while the employee was acting within the scope of his public employment or duties; the duty to indemnify and save harmless or pay prescribed by this subdivision shall not arise where the injury or damage resulted from intentional wrongdoing on the part of the employee."

The text of the opinion is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/opinion/2013-f1_pw.pdf

Tenure by estoppel, tenure by acquisition, tenure by default

Tenure by estoppel, tenure by acquisition, tenure by default, tenure by inaction

Brown v Board of Educ. of the Mahopac Cent. Sch. Dist., 2013 NY Slip Op 51026(U), Supreme Court, Putnam County [Not selected for publications in the Official Reports]

Tenure by estoppel, tenure by acquisition, tenure by default, tenure by inaction. All four terms describe the result of the failure of an appointing authority to act that results in a probationary employee obtaining tenure by operation of law because he or she was not lawfully terminated on or before the last day of his or her original, or extended, probationary period.*

As the Court of Appeals held in McManus v Hempstead Union Free School District, 87 NY2d 183, a  probationary administrator or teacher employed by a school district or a BOCES may attain tenure by estoppel when the appointing authority continues the teacher or administrator in service after failing to take the administrative action required by law to either grant or deny the individual tenure prior to the expiration of the administrator’s or teacher’s probationary term.

In this CPLR Article 78 proceeding Maura Ann Brown sought, among other things, reinstatement to her teaching position with the Mahopac Central School District based her contention she had attained tenure by estoppel and thus could not be summarily terminated from her postion.

The issue before State Supreme Court Judge Lewis Jay Lubell in this third appearance before the court:  the propriety of the school district’s recalculation of Brown’s Education Law §3012(3) probationary period end date “as directed and guided by the Court in its Decisions and Orders of March 19, 2012, and October 25, 2012”** which, in the words of the court, were “thoroughly set forth in this Court's prior two Decisions and Orders.”

The court’s conclusion: "… the Administrative Recalculation of [Brown’s] Education Law §3012(3) probationary period end date was undertaken in a manner and reaches a result that is legally insupportable and is contrary to the legal conclusions reached and directives clearly enunciated by this Court in its March and October 2012 Decisions and Orders directing remand for purposes of recalculation." Judge Lubell pointed out that the Administrative Recalculation results in a probation end date that coincided with Brown’s termination date, January 21, 2011. Brown needed just one additional date of service time to prevail on her tenure by estoppel argument, which, said the court, “she has easily established.”

Judge Lubell said the Administrative Recalculation did not properly account for his “unequivocal determination that ‘[the school district is] bound by the originally established and thereafter repeatedly reasserted June 30, 2010 probationary period end-date . . . . from [which] . . . any properly attributed extension of the probationary period must be calculated.’"

The court ruled that “it is June 30, 2010 from which to calculate [Brown’s] probationary end date….” The school district apparently “ignore the June 30th date in favor of September 2, 2010.” Accordingly, said Judge Lubell, “Upon properly accounting for the sixty-four day period from June 30th to September 2, 2010, [Brown’s] recalculated probationary end-date falls well before her termination date, i.e., the date needed by [Brown] to prevail on her tenure by estoppel argument.”

The Administrative Recalculation, said the court, “employs a ‘workday-for-workday’ methodology which is in contravention of this Court's interpretation of the methodology used in Maras v Schenectady CSD, 275 AD2d 551, wherein the Appellate Division ruled as follows:

Clearly, it was error for [the Schenectady City School District] to extend petitioner's probationary period beyond September 12, 1998 - "the period of time petitioner was absent from school in excess of her contractually allotted sick days. While respondents possess the authority to exclude from the computation of petitioner's three-year probationary period any noncontractual absences [citations omitted], they have no authority to exclude those absences provided for by contract, i.e., petitioner's 20 days of sick leave, five days of personal time and five days of medical leave that fell on school-wide vacation days. Indeed, Education Law §2509(7) expressly prohibits extension of an employee's probationary period by adding thereto contractually bargained for sick or personal leave days or school-wide vacation days.

In sum, said Judge Lubell, the court in Maras permitted an extension of Maras’ probationary period by the actual number of workdays her medical leave exceeded her paid contractual leave time, excluding any medical leave which otherwise fell on school-wide breaks or vacation days (for a total of eleven days) and which, in any event, extended petitioner's probationary period by a corresponding number of consecutive calendar days, not "workdays" as respondents would have it; thus arriving at a new probation period end date of September 12, 1998.

The bottom line: Judge Lubell held the Brown completed her three year period of Education Law §3012(3) probation well before her January 21, 2011, termination date and granted her motion to strike and dismiss the school district's Administrative Recalculation.

The court then granted summary judgment in her favor on her claim of tenure by estoppel, which tenure by estoppel matured “prior to the school district’s termination of her employment on January 21, 2011,”

Accordingly, the court directed Brown’s reinstatement to her former position as a tenured teacher effective January 21, 2011, “together with an award of back-pay, reimbursement of all employment benefits, including but not limited to medical, retirement and pension contributions, and other compensatory damages to which she may be entitled and in an amount to be determined at a damages hearing” before Judge Lubell to be held at a later date.

One exception to the general rule applied for the purpose of determining if an individual has attained tenure by estoppel is set out in Mendez v Valenti, 101 AD2d 612. In Mendez the Appellate Division ruled that as long as the termination of a probationer [in the classified service] is effected within a reasonable time after the end of his or her maximum period of probation, such as set to coincide with the end of the next payroll period, the courts will not deem the individual to have obtained tenure by estoppel because of his or her continuation on the payroll following the last day of his or her probationary period.

Stated another way, the appointing authority has until the last day of the individual's probationary period to decide whether to retain the employee, extend the employee's probationary period, or to terminate the employee from his or her position. Although the effective date of the employee's removal from the payroll may occur after this date, the required notice of the termination must be delivered to the employee before close of business on the last day of his or her probationary period.

* Military Law §243.9 [with respect to public employees other than teachers] and Military Law §243.9-a, [with respect to teachers] provide certain rights to such an employee entering military service before the end of his or her probationary period upon his or her return to his or her former position.

** See, also, Matter of Brown v Board of Educ. of the Mahopac Cent. School Dist., 32 Misc 3d 370, at http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_21182.htm

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_51026.htm

A retiree is not affected by post-retirement collective bargaining negotiations concerning health insurance contributions absent specific contract language to that effect in place at the time of his or her retirement

A retiree is not affected by post-retirement collective bargaining negotiations concerning  health insurance contributions absent specific contract language to that effect in place at the time of his or her retirement

Warner v Board of Educ., Cobleskill- Richmondville Cent. Sch. Dist., Warner v Board of Educ., Cobleskill- Richmondville Cent. Sch. Dist., Appellate Division, Third Department

Samuel T. Warner, on behalf of himself and other former school administrators who retired from the Cobleskill-Richmondville Central School District [Warner] sued the District in this combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment contending that the District had breached its contractual obligations as a result of its reducing the District's share of the cost of the premium it paid towards Warner’s health insurance coverage.

The relevant provision in the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) in effect from July 1993 to June 2003 provided:

"Individuals who retire during the term of the contract shall be covered at the rate of 100 percent of the charge for individual coverage and 75 percent of the charge for dependent coverage, as applicable. Employees hired after July 1, 1976 shall be required to satisfy ten (10) years of service in order to be eligible to continue the health insurance program in retirement as offered by the District."

According to the Appellate Division’s decision, successive CBAs in effect from July 2003 to June 2009 contained nearly identical language regarding the rate and eligibility for retiree health insurance coverage.

In June 2009, the Association and the District agreed to a CBA for the July 2009 through June 2012 CBA that provided that employees who retire during the 2010-2011 or 2011-2012 school year would receive health insurance coverage at the rate of 84% of the charge for individual or dependent coverage as the “District’s contribution,” while those who retire during the 2009-2010 school year would continue to receive the rates of 100% for individual coverage and 75% for dependent coverage as the “District’s contribution.”

In March 2010, Warner received a letter from the District stating that, "[a]s of July 1, 2010, the rate of contribution for both eligible active and eligible retired [Association] employees shall be 16% of the charge for individual and dependent coverage." He filed a combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR Article 78 and action for declaratory judgment alleging seeking, among other things, a declaration that District is obligated to contribute to the cost of his health insurance throughout his retirement.

Supreme Court granted Warner’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the plain language of the CBAs unambiguously obligated the District to provide lifetime health insurance coverage for those bargaining unit members who retired prior to the 2010-2011 school year at a rate of 100% for individuals and 75% for dependents. The District appealed.

The Appellate Division commenced its review by noting that “A written agreement that is clear and complete on its face must be enforced according to the plain meaning of its terms” and that “Extrinsic evidence may be considered to discern the parties' intent only if the contract is ambiguous, which is a question of law for the court to resolve.”

In determining whether an ambiguity exists, said the court, the entire contract must be examined and consider the relation of the parties and the circumstances under which it was executed. “Particular words should be considered, not as if isolated from the context, but in the light of the obligation as a whole and the intention of the parties as manifested thereby."

The Appellate Division said that considering the CBAs as a whole and in accordance with these principles, it found no ambiguity, pointing out that pursuant to the CBAs in effect at the time Warner and his co-plaintiffs retired, an employee who had completed 10 years of service was entitled to health insurance coverage "in retirement." In order to receive that coverage at a rate of 100% per individual and 75% per dependent, the only requirement was that the individual "retire during the term of the contract."

Despite the District’s argument to the contrary, the court said that “nothing in the provisions at issue suggests that the coverage was limited to the time period of the CBA in effect at the time of an individual's retirement.”

Significantly, the Appellate Division pointed out that Warner and his co-plaintiffs, as retirees are not involved in subsequent collective bargaining negotiations and that "it is logical to assume [from the absence of any such durational language] that the bargaining unit intended to insulate retirees from losing important insurance rights during subsequent negotiations by using language in each and every contract which fixed their rights to coverage as of the time they retired."

Accordingly, the Appellate Division concluded that the CBAs at issue “unambiguously provide lifetime health insurance coverage to [Warner and his co-plaintiffs] pursuant to the terms of the CBA in effect at the time of their retirement, and therefore consideration of the extrinsic evidence submitted is unnecessary. Further, notes the opinion, were the court to have found that there was an ambiguity, the extrinsic evidence introduced to aid in the construction of the CBAs fully supports the interpretation proffered by Warner and his co-plaintiffs.

The court then ruled that Supreme Court had properly award summary judgment to Warner.

The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_05032.htm

Board member’s defeat in an election to the board renders appeal seeking his or her removal from the board moot

Board member’s defeat in an election to the board renders appeal seeking his or her removal from the board moot

Decisions of the Commissioner of Education # 16,468

The Board of Education asked the Commissioner of Education to remove one of its members from the board, alleging the board member had breach of fiduciary duties and violations of district policies.

The board member denied the allegations. The Commissioner, however, dismissed the Board complaint without addressing its merits.

Subsequent to its filing its complaint, the board submitted an affidavit from its superintendent stating that board member “was defeated in [the] school board election and is no longer a member of the board."

Accordingly, the Commissioner ruled that the Board’s application to remove the member was moot and dismissed it, explaining that "the Commissioner will only decide matters in actual controversy and will not render a decision on a state of facts which no longer exist or which subsequent events have laid to rest.”

The Commissioner’s decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume52/documents/d16468.pdf

The State’s State Fire Prevention and Building Code Council to meet on July 16th 2013

The State’s State Fire Prevention and Building Code Council to meet on July 16^th 2013

Source: New York State Department of State

The New York Department of State’s State Fire Prevention and Building Code Council will hold a public meeting of the Council on Tuesday, July 16^th, 2013 at 10:00 a.m.at the Department of State, 99 Washington Avenue in Albany, 123 William Street in NYC, and 65 Court Street in Buffalo. 

The meeting will be held via videoconferencing to discuss a number of topics, including more restrictive local standards and the next Uniform Code and Energy Code Adoption update.

The public is welcome to attend the meeting at any of the locations listed below:

Albany:

Department of State

99 Washington Avenue (Commerce Plaza)

5^th Floor, Room 505

Albany, NY

New York City

123 William Street

20^th Floor, Executive Conference Room

New York, NY

Buffalo, New York:

65 Court Street

Room 208

Buffalo, NY

Selected reports and information published by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli

Selected reports and information published by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli

Issued during the week ending July 6, 2013 [Click on text highlighted in bold to access the full report] 


DiNapoli: ESDC Needs to Better Monitor Foreign Offices

The Empire State Development Corp. needs to set clear performance standards to determine if its remaining four foreign offices are fulfilling their missions and bolstering New York’s economy through overseas business and investment, according to an audit released July 1, 2013 by State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli.

DiNapoli: Westchester Special Education Provider Overcharged Taxpayers $800,000

The Westchester School for Special Children overcharged taxpayers by more than $800,000 over a four–year period, and engaged in questionable business transactions with companies connected to board members and executives, according to an audit released Wednesday by New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli. The findings of the audit are under review by the Office of the Attorney General. Legislation that would improve oversight of preschool special education by mandating audits of every provider was recently passed by the legislature.

DiNapoli Returns Record $347 Million in Unclaimed Funds to Rightful Owners

A record amount of unclaimed funds, totaling $347 million, were paid out to individuals and organizations in the state’s last fiscal year, according to State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli. This new record surpasses the previous year by $33 million. Currently, there is $12.5 billion in lost or forgotten money that is still waiting to be claimed.

DiNapoli Releases Bond Calendar for Third Quarter

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli on July 2, 2013 announced a tentative schedule for the planned public sale of obligations for the state, New York City, and their major public authorities during the third quarter of 2013.

Comptroller DiNapoli Releases Municipal Audits

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced Tuesday, July 2, 2013, that his office completed audits of:

the Village of Albion;

the Bloomingburg Fire Company #1;

Cattaraugus County;

the Town of Dunkirk;

the Town of Hamden;

the City of Hudson;

the Killawog Fire District;

the City of Rochester;

the Town of Seneca Falls; and,

the Town of Wappinger.

Comptroller DiNapoli Releases Audits

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced Monday, July 1, 2013, the following audits have been issued:

the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision;

the Department of Environmental Conservation;

the New York State Health Insurance Program; and,

Statewide Travel Audits of the Department of Labor;

the Office of Mental Health; and,

the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision.

Comptroller DiNapoli Releases School Audits

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli Tuesday announced that his office completed audits of:

the South Country Central School District; and,

the Watervliet City School District.

A $12,500 fine imposed as the disciplinary penalty held shocking to one's sense of fairness and reduced to $1,250

A $12,500 fine imposed as the disciplinary penalty held shocking to one's sense of fairness and reduced to $1,250

2013 NY Slip Op 04278, Appellate Division, First Department

An arbitrator found a New York City Department of Education teacher guilty certain charges filed against her pursuant to Education Law §3020-a and imposed a fine of $12,500.

Supreme Court denied the teacher’s CPLR Article 75 petition* seeking to vacate the award and confirmed the arbitrator’s decision and penalty imposed. The teacher appealed.

The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court’s ruling “on the law” only as to the fine imposed, reducing the fine to $1,250. 

The court said that the arbitrator found that the teacher was negligent in dealing with a stray kitten in her backyard rather than guilty of “intentional misconduct” as charged by the Department. Further, the arbitrator found that the teacher had “a 15 year unblemished record” and the conduct for which she was charged was completely unrelated to her professional work.

The Appellate Division found that the fine imposed, $12,500, was so “disproportionate to the offense, in the light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness” and reduce it accordingly.

The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_04278.htm

Federal regulation did not preempt employer’s obligation to collectively bargain a new employer policy in this instance

Federal regulation did not preempt employer’s obligation to collectively bargain a new employer policy in this instance

City of New York v Board of Collective Bargaining of the City of N.Y., 2013 NY Slip Op 04887, Appellate Division, First Department

The City of New York filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 in an effort to annul a decision by the Board of Collective Bargaining of the City of New York granting the union’s improper practice petition.

Supreme Court denied the City’s petition and granted the Board’s motion to dismiss the action. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s rulings.

The City had claimed that “federal regulations” permitted its Department of Transportation [DOT] to unilaterally require an employee to submit a doctor's "fit for duty" statement following his or her absence from work for three or more days. The Appellate Division concluded that the City’s reliance on federal regulation in this instance was misplaced and did not preempt its obligation to collectively bargain requiring those employees absent from work for three or more days to produce a physician’s statement of “fitness.”

The court also rejected the City’s argument that it was “absolved from bargaining on ‘public policy’ grounds based on DOT’s mission of providing safety in the ferry system.”

The Appellate Division explained that there was nothing in the record to establish that the rule unilaterally imposed by DOT would substantially further its core mission of “safety in the ferry system.” In addition, said the court, there was nothing in the record that demonstrated any need for the new requirement unilaterally imposed by DOT sufficient to outweigh its adverse impact on the collectively-bargained rights of the employees to whom it would apply.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_04887.htm

The top ten “employment law” LawBlogs for the month of June 2013 as reported by Justia

The top ten “employment law” LawBlogs for the month of June 2013 as reported by Justia

Justia surveys 5,326 LawBlogs in 74 subcategories*.

Defero Law [Feed]

Community of UK legal bloggers.

Last Updated: July 2, 2013 

http://www.deferolaw.com/profiles/blog/list?promoted=1

Adjunct Law Prof Blog [Feed]

Focuses on issues of interest to adjunct law professors, including labor law, employment law, employee benefits law and education law issues. By Adjunct Law Professor Mitchell H. Rubinstein.

Last Updated: June 30, 2013 

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/adjunctprofs/

New York Public Personnel Law [Feed]

Provides summary and commentary on selected court and administrative decisions and related matters affecting public employers and employees in New York State. By Harvey Randall Esq.

Last Updated: July 2, 2013 

http://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/ 

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Covers arbitration, disability, employment discrimination, labor law, public employment law and workplace safety. By Professors Richard Bales, Jeffrey M. Hirsch and Marcia L. McCormick.

Last Updated: July 1, 2013 

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/

JOTWELL - The Journal of Things We Like (Lots) [Feed]

Edited by University of Miami School of Law Professor Michael Froomkin, The Journal of Things We Like (Lots)–JOTWELL–invites law professors to join us in filling a telling gap in legal scholarship by creating a space where legal academics will go to identify, celebrate, and discuss the best new legal scholarship.

Last Updated: July 1, 2013 

http://jotwell.com/

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Covers employment law, personal injury and family law issues related to Texas and federal law.

Last Updated: July 2, 2013 -

http://kielichlawfirm.com/blog

Restaurant Worker News Blog [Feed]

Covers employment law issues in the restaurant industry. By Berke-Weiss & Pechman LLP.

Last Updated: June 27, 2013 

http://waiterpay.com/blog/

ERISA Lawyer Blog [Feed]

Covers employeee benefits, ERISA, and employment law. By Stanley D. Baum.

Last Updated: July 2, 2013 

http://www.erisalawyerblog.com/

Impact Litigation Journal [Feed]

Provides commentary and analysis about legal issues relating to class actions and other representative litigation in the areas of consumer and employment law. By Initiative Legal Group APC.

Last Updated: July 1, 2013 

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Employment & Labor Insider [Feed]

Discusses timely issues in labor and employment law and human resources from management's perspective, with subjects ranging from discrimination to employee handbooks and religious accommodations. By Constangy, Brooks & Smith, LLP.

Last Updated: June 28, 2013 

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The Doctrine of Legislative Equivalency controls when abolishing positions in a layoff situation

The Doctrine of Legislative Equivalency controls when abolishing positions in a layoff situation

Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc. v County of Orange, 2013 NY Slip Op 04798, Appellate Division, Second Department

In this action a number of employees challenged their termination from their respective positions with the County of Orange.

The Appellate Division, reversed a Supreme Court ruling dismissing the Article 78 petition filed by these individuals “on the law” and the County’s decision to terminate the employees was remitted to the Supreme Court, Orange County, for a determination of all the benefits those individuals “would have been entitled to had they remained employed for the period from October 29, 2010, to December 31, 2010, and for a calculation of the principal sum of back pay to be awarded to those [these individuals] in accordance herewith and thereafter for the entry of an appropriate amended judgment.”

The genesis of this case was a direction of the County Executive of Orange County to send letters “to 39 civil service employees notifying them that they were being laid off effective October 29, 2010, for economic reasons” and, indeed, on December 2, 2010, the Orange County Legislature passed a budget for the 2011 fiscal year*that did not provide funding for the positions held by these 39 “laid off” employees.

The employees were advised that their names would be placed on a preferred eligible list pursuant to a provision in their collective bargaining agreement, which pertained to "abolished" positions. Subsequently the employees were advised that their names had been placed on the preferred eligible list "[i]n accordance with §81 of Civil Service Law."

Citing Torre v County of Nassau, 86 NY2d 421, the Appellate Division explained that the doctrine of "[l]egislative equivalency requires that a position created by a legislative act can only be abolished by correlative legislative act."**

The court explained, the Orange County Charter and Orange County Administrative Code vests in the Orange County Legislature sole authority to "establish or abolish positions of employment and titles thereof." However, the County Legislature had not taken any action to abolish the relevant positions at the time the County Executive terminated the subject employees' employment.

Although the Orange County Charter and Orange County Administrative Code give the County Executive the authority to "supervise, direct and control and administer all departments," they do not give the County Executive the authority to terminate the employment of civil service employees without a proper abolition of the positions by the County Legislature in accordance with the doctrine of legislative equivalency.

Further, said the court, the County Charter does not authorize the County Executive to undertake any "remedial action" constituting unilateral modification to the budget and, or, abolition of legislatively created positions.

The bottom line: The County Executive did not have the authority to terminate the subject employees' employment for economic reasons, effective October 29, 2010. Thus, the court concluded, those individuals that were “laid off” effective October 29, 2010, are entitled to back pay, and presumably benefits, to which they would have been entitled had they remained County employees for the period from October 29, 2010, to December 31, 2010.

* Presumably the budget was to take effect January 1, 2011 and by not providing for the funding of the relevant positions, the Legislature was deemed to have “abolished them.”

** The Attorney General has opined that there must be an actual and lawful abolishment of a position in order to lawfully remove an employee from his or her position pursuant to §§80 and 80-a (1976 Opinions of the Attorney General 7; see, also, O'Reilly v Nedelka, 212 A.D.2d 714).

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_04798.htm

_____________________________

The Layoff, Preferred List and Reinstatement Manual - a 645-page e-book reviewing the relevant laws, rules and regulations, and selected court and administrative decisions. For more information click on  http://nylayoff.blogspot.com/

_____________________________

National Labor Relations Board to determine if the National Labor Relations Act preempts the Taylor Law in certain situations involving employees of charter schools

National Labor Relations Board to determine if the National Labor Relations Act preempts the Taylor Law in certain situations involving employees of charter schools
Buffalo United Charter Sch. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., Council of Sch. Supervisors & Adm'rs, Local 1, AFSA, 2013 NY Slip Op 04163, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

The issue presented in this appeal: Did PERB properly exercised jurisdiction over two collective bargaining matters at issue involving “charter schools?”

Supreme Court had determined that PERB properly exercised jurisdiction over the two collective bargaining matters. The Appellate Division, however, disagreed with the lower court’s ruling.

The Appellate Division decided that as the two collective bargaining matters at issue "arguably" fall within the scope of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Accordingly, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has primary jurisdiction "to determine in the first instance" whether its jurisdiction preempts PERB's jurisdiction.

Thus, “under the circumstances of this case, and in the interest of judicial economy,” the Appellate Division decided to defer consideration of the case pending a determination by the NLRB as to whether the NLRA applies to the collective bargaining matters herein at issue and thus preempts PERB's jurisdiction.

N.B. Subdivision 3 of §2854 of the State Education Law, in pertinent part, addresses the impact of Article 14 of the Civil Service Law [the Taylor Law] with respect to employees of charter schools.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_04163.htm

Bipartisan Moreland Act Commission formed by Governor Cuomo to investigate public corruption

Bipartisan Moreland Act Commission formed by Governor Cuomo to investigate public corruption

Source: Office of the Governor

On July 2, 2013, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo announced the formation of the “Commission to Investigate Public Corruption” pursuant to the Moreland Act [Executive Law §6*] and Executive Law §63(8)** to probe systemic public corruption and the appearance of such corruption in state government, political campaigns and elections in New York State.

Attorney General Eric Schneiderman announced he will appoint the members of the Commission as Deputy Attorneys General,*** giving the Commission broad-based authority to investigate all matters that “involve public peace, public safety, and public justice.”

Under the Executive Order, the Commission will also have the power to subpoena and examine witnesses under oath as well as subpoena any necessary records. The Governor’s action follows several recent proven and alleged incidents of corruption and misconduct by public officials that have shown that current laws are inadequate and reforms are necessary to guard against abuses, ensure accountability in government, address the need for reform in our campaign finance laws, and restore the public’s confidence and trust in state government and state elections.

The Commission to Investigate Public Corruption will be tasked with thoroughly reviewing the adequacy of existing state laws, regulations and procedures involving unethical and unlawful misconduct by public officials, and the electoral process and campaign finance laws. The Commission will also examine whether existing laws have been fairly and vigorously enforced, and what changes must be made to such enforcement. During the Commission’s investigation, it will also review recent instances of reported misconduct by officials to determine causes and adequacy of laws and enforcement tools to more effectively prevent and punish this kind of misconduct in the future. The Commission is directed to make recommendations to toughen and improve existing laws and procedures.

Areas where the Commission will focus its investigation include but are not limited to:

*  Criminal statutes for corruption and misconduct by public officials, such as bribery laws

*  Campaign financing including but not limited to contribution limits and other restrictions; disclosure of third-party contributions and expenditures; and the effectiveness of existing campaign finance laws.

* Compliance of outside organizations and persons with existing lobbying laws, including but not limited to organizations engaged in lobbying and other efforts to influence public policies and elections, and the effectiveness of such laws.

* Adequacy and enforcement of the State’s election laws and electoral process including: the structure and composition of the State and County Boards of Elections, the Board of Elections’ enforcement, and the effectiveness of and compliance with existing election laws.

During its investigation, the Commission is mandated to promptly communicate any evidence of violations of existing law to the appropriate law enforcement agencies, including the Attorney General. In such cases, the State Police will make jurisdictional referrals to the Attorney General where appropriate.

The Commission will issue a preliminary report on its initial findings and recommendations by December 1, 2013.

The Commission’s Co-Chairs are Kathleen Rice, William J. Fitzpatrick, and Milton L. Williams, Jr.,

Ms. Rice became the Nassau County District Attorney in 2006. Rice served as an Assistant United States Attorney in Philadelphia. Rice began her career as a prosecutor in the Brooklyn District Attorney’s Office, where she prosecuted cases of domestic violence, sexual assault and armed robbery, and later, murder cases. D.A. Rice is a graduate of the Catholic University of America and Touro Law School.

Mr. Fitzpatrick has served as Onondaga County's District Attorney [D.A.] for the past 28 years. Prior to serving as D.A., he was a defense attorney. In 2007 D.A. Fitzpatrick was appointed as the New York State representative to the National District Attorney's Association, and he was elected Secretary in 2011. In 2010, New York State Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman appointed D.A. Fitzpatrick to the New York State Permanent Sentencing Commission. He is a graduate of Syracuse University and Syracuse University Law School.

Mr. Williams, Jr. is a partner in the law firm Vladeck, Waldman, Elias & Engelhard as a partner in January 2009. Prior to joining the firm, Mr. Williams was a Deputy General Counsel and the Chief Compliance Officer at Time Inc. Before working at Time, Mr. Williams was in private practice, and served as an Assistant United States Attorney in the Southern District of New York. Prior to becoming a federal prosecutor, Mr. Williams was an Assistant District Attorney in the New York County District Attorney’s Office. He is a graduate of Amherst College and the University of Michigan Law School in Ann Arbor.

The members of the Commission are J. Patrick Barrett, Richard Briffault, Daniel J. Castleman, Derek P. Champagne, Eric Corngold, Kathleen B. Hogan, Nancy Hoppock, Seymour W. James, Jr., David Javdan, Robert Johnson, David R. Jones, Lance Liebman, Joanne M. Mahoney, Gerald F. Mollen, Makau W. Mutua, Benito Romano, Frank A. Sedita III, P. David Soares, Kristy Sprague, Betty Weinberg Ellerin, Peter L. Zimroth,  and Thomas P. Zugibe.

The Commission’s staff includes Regina Calcaterra, Executive Director; Danya Perry, Chief of Investigations; Kelly Donovan, Chief Counsel; and John Amodeo, Legislative Director

Special advisors to the Commission include Joseph A. D'Amico, Superintendent of the New York State Police; Raymond W. Kelly, Police Commissioner of the City of New York; and Barbara Bartoletti, Legislative Director for the League of Women Voters of New York.

Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney for New York County from 1975 to 2009, will serve as Special Counsel to the Commission.

* §6 of the Executive Law provides that “The governor is authorized at any time, either in person or by one or more persons appointed by him for the purpose, to examine and investigate the management and affairs of any department, board, bureau or commission of the state. The governor and the persons so appointed by him are empowered to subpoena and enforce the attendance of witnesses, to administer oaths and examine witnesses under oath and to require the production of any books or papers deemed relevant or material. Whenever any person so appointed shall not be regularly in the service of the state his compensation for such services shall be fixed by the governor, and said compensation and all necessary expenses of such examinations and investigations shall be paid from the treasury out of any appropriations made for the purpose upon the order of the governor and the audit and warrant of the comptroller.

 “Notwithstanding any inconsistent provision of any general, special or local law, charter, administrative code or other statute, service rendered by a person appointed by the governor pursuant to this section shall not constitute or be deemed state service or re-entry into state service under the civil service law, the retirement and social security law or under any charter, administrative code, or other general, special or local law relating to a state or municipal retirement or pension system so as to suspend, impair or otherwise affect or interfere with the pension or retirement status, rights, privileges and benefits of such person under any such system or to interfere with the right of such person or his beneficiary to receive any pension or annuity benefits or death benefits by reason of the selection of any option under any such system.”

** §63 of the Executive Law sets out the general duties of the “attorney-general.”

*** All members of the Commission are attorneys licensed to practice in New York State as are a number of the members of the Special Advisers to the Commission and a numbers of those serving on the Commission's staff
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Employee eligible for Workers’ Compensation benefits after suffering a psychic injury that was found to be employment related and not in the nature of discipline

Employee eligible for Workers’ Compensation benefits after suffering a psychic injury that was found to be employment related and not in the nature of discipline
2013 NY Slip Op 04861, Appellate Division, Third Department

The Employer appealed a decision of the Workers' Compensation Board that ruled that employee had sustained a compensable injury in the course of her employment.

The basic facts:

1. The employer required employee to frequently travel between her office and New York City and the employer paid her travel and lodging expenses.

2. The Inspector General investigated an anonymous complaint regarding the employee’s travel and determined that she had committed no wrongdoing, but referred the matter to the Comptroller to assess the tax implications of the employer's travel reimbursement practices.

3. The Comptroller determined that to correct the employer'sreimbursement practices that violated Internal Revenue Service rules the employee should be deemed to have earned over $100,000 in additional income as a result of those practices and that the employee was responsible for paying back taxes and penalties on that amount.

4. Upon learning of the Comptroller's findings the employee “incurred a psychic injury” and applied for workers' compensation benefits.

5. The Workers' Compensation Board rejected the argument advanced by the employer and its workers' compensation carrier that her claim was barred by Workers' Compensation Law §2 (7).

6. Workers' Compensation Law §2 (7) provides that the term "injury" and "personal injury" for the purposes of the Workers' Compensation Law "mean only accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of employment and such disease or infection as may naturally and unavoidably result therefrom. The terms "injury" and "personal injury" shall not include an injury which is solely mental and is based on workrelated stress if such mental injury is a direct consequence of a lawful personnel decision involving a disciplinary action, work evaluation, job transfer, demotion, or termination taken in good faith by the employer."

The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s determination, explaining that in contrast to the employee suffering psychic injury stemming from work-related stress that was "a direct consequence of a lawful personnel decision [by the appointing authority] involving a disciplinary action, work evaluation, job transfer, demotion, or termination taken in good faith by the employer," the review of the employer’s travel “reimbursement practices,” was not "aimed at" her and thus substantial evidence supports the Board's determination that the employee’s resulting mental injury was not the direct consequence of a disciplinary action or work evaluation.*

In addition, the court said it would not disturb the Board's determination that the stress that the employee experienced was greater than that generally experienced by similarly situated workers in a normal work environment as that factual finding was also supported by substantial evidence. Here, said the Appellate Division, the stress from being advised that “she was responsible for taxes and penalties on over $100,000 of imputed income due to her employer's mistaken reimbursement practices, with no wrongdoing on her own part, along with her knowledge that she was not financially in a position to handle that substantial liability, was not a normal occurrence in the workplace and exceeded the typical stress associated with claimant's position.”**

* Judge Egan dissented from the majority opinion, noting that in his view, and notwithstanding the fact that such investigation ultimately did not culminate in disciplinary charges being lodged against employee, the employee’s workers' compensation claim has its genesis in — and is the "direct consequence [of] a lawful personnel decision involving a disciplinary action … taken in good faith by the employer."

** In a press release dated July 1, 2013, the State Comptroller reported that auditors examined the travel costs of another Albany-based Department employee whose long-term assignment to a New York City work location resulted in travel costs exceeding $100,000. Auditors examined $156,124 in travel costs associated with this employee's assignment, finding there was a lack of documentation to establish whether the official station of the selected employee was in the best interest of the state. The release also stated that the Department “may also have incorrectly failed to report taxable travel expenses to federal and state taxing authorities for 2010 and 2011.”  The matter is still being examined by the Comptroller's office to determine if further corrective action is needed. The Comptrollers report has been posted on the Internet at: http://osc.state.ny.us/audits/allaudits/093013/12s75.pdf 

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_04861.htm

Taxpayer’s challenge to the Village’s establishment of a service awards program for volunteer firefighters dismissed “for lack of standing”

Taxpayer’s challenge to the Village’s establishment of a service awards program for volunteer firefighters dismissed “for lack of standing”
Davidson v Village of Penn Yan, 2013 NY Slip Op 04151, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

Wayne Davidson challenged the Village Board of Trustees of Village of Penn Yan (the Board) establishment of a service awards program for volunteer firefighters pursuant to General Municipal Law Article 11-A.

§216 of GML Article 11-a provides, in pertinent part, for the establishment of “service award programs for volunteer firefighters of political subdivisions of the state and for volunteer firefighters other than of political subdivisions of the state. Such service award program may be adopted only by resolution of the governing board of a political subdivision, “receiving the affirmative vote of at least sixty percent of the governing board of the political subdivision having control of the fire departments and fire companies, and the approval of a mandatory referendum authorizing the adopting of the program by the eligible voters within such political subdivision.”*

Supreme Court granted the Board’s motions and dismissed Davidson’s petitions. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling, explaining that Davidson failed to demonstrate that he is personally aggrieved by the Board's actions inasmuch as he did not establish that he "sustained special damage, different in kind and degree from the community generally."

While the court stated that “the doctrine of common-law taxpayer standing . . . would excuse such lack of personal aggrievement,” the doctrine requires a petitioner to establish that the failure to accord such standing “would be in effect to erect an impenetrable barrier to any judicial scrutiny of [the Board's] action." Anderson, said the Appellate Division, had not made such a showing.

* The full text of §216 is posted on the Internet at: http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us/LAWSSEAF.cgi?QUERYTYPE=LAWS+&QUERYDATA=$$GMU216$$@TXGMU0216+&LIST=LAW+&BROWSER=BROWSER+&TOKEN=00241127+&TARGET=VIEW

The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_04151.htm

Although individual acts of misconduct might not warrant termination of the individual, when considered in total dismissal could be the appropriate penalty to be impose

Although individual acts of misconduct might not warrant termination of the individual, when considered in total dismissal could be the appropriate penalty to be impose

2013 NY Slip Op 04414, Appellate Division, Third Department

The Fire District’s Board of Fire Commissioners served one of members of the Fire Department with disciplinary charges pursuant to General Municipal Law §209-l which in pertinent part, provides for Removal of volunteer officers and volunteer members of fire departments for incompetence or misconduct.

Subdivision 5 of §209-l states that a member of the fire department [1] suspend a volunteer firefighter after charges are filed and pending disposition of the charges and [2] after the hearing may remove such person or may suspend him or her for a period of time not to exceed one year if he or she is found guilty of one or more of the charges served upon him or her.

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§209-l further provides that “The provisions of this section shall not affect the right of members of any fire company to remove a volunteer officer or voluntary member of such company for failure to comply with the constitution and by-laws of such company.”

The Board of Fire Commissioner filed charges against one of the volunteer firefighters alleging that the volunteer [1] had engaged in misconduct, including violations of the Fire Department's bylaws and code of conduct. A hearing was conducted and the Hearing Officer found the volunteer guilty of the charges and recommended that he [1] be expelled from membership in the Fire Department and [2] removed from his position as an officer of the Fire Company.

The Board of Fire Commissioners adopted the Hearing Officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law and expelled the volunteer from the Fire Department and removed him from the office he had held.

In response to the individual’s challenge to the Board’s action the Appellate Division said that its determination that the individual was guilty of misconduct was supported by substantial evidence, noting that the Hearing Officer described volunteer's conduct as "persistently, repeatedly, intentionally, willfully, and incorrigibly insubordinate" based on the testimony of witnesses and the volunteer’s personnel records with the Fire Department.

Citing Matter of Kelly v Safir, 96 NY2d 32, the Appellate Division, noting that the volunteer’s acts of misconduct might not, individually, warrant expulsion from the Fire Department, said that “considering his conduct as a whole, we do not find the penalty of expulsion to be so disproportionate to the disciplinary charges as to be shocking to our sense of fairness.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_04414.htm