A request seeking permission to delay filing an appeal with the Commissioner of Education must be timely filed

A request seeking permission to delay filing an appeal with the Commissioner of Education must be timely filed
M.H. v Santiago Taveras, Interim-Acting Deputy Chancellor for Teaching and Learning of the New York City Department of Education, Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision No. 16,097

M.H., a tenured New York City teacher, appealed the denial of her objections to unsatisfactory performance ratings by the Interim-Acting Deputy Chancellor to the Commissioner of Education.

Rejecting M.H.’s appeal as untimely notwithstanding the representation that the delay in filing the appeal was due to personal illness, the Commissioner explained:

1. An appeal to the Commissioner must be commenced within 30 days from the making of the decision or the performance of the act complained of unless any delay is excused by the Commissioner for good cause shown and to be timely, a request to have the delay excused must be commenced within 30 days of receiving the administrative determination.

2. When the record does not indicate when petitioner actually received the determination, the date of receipt is calculated by affording the usual five days for mailing, excluding Sundays and holidays.

3. Neither illness nor ignorance of the appeal process is a valid excuse for the late commencement of an appeal.

The decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume50/d16097.htm

Canceling COBRA coverage

Canceling COBRA coverage
Geissal v Moore Medical Corp., USSC, 524 U.S. 74

If an employer discovers that an individual participating in its health insurance plan under COBRA is also covered as a dependent under a different health insurance plan, may it cancel his or her coverage?

It all depends on the date on which the individual’s coverage as a dependent in the other plan took effect.

According the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in the Geissal case, the employer may not cancel its coverage if the individual was covered as a dependent under the other plan before he or she made the COBRA election.

The court noted that 29 USC 1162(2)(D)(i) allows the employer to cancel an individual’s COBRA participation in its health plan only if the individual became covered as a dependent in the other plan after making his or her COBRA election and then only if the new plan does not exclude “pre-existing conditions.”

The Geissal case involved an employee who was covered under both his employer’s health insurance plan and as a dependent under his spouse’s health insurance plan at the time he was terminated from employment and made a timely election to continue in the employer’s group health plan as provided by COBRA.

The fact that both plans provided similar coverages was held irrelevant. The high court decided that because Geissal was covered by his wife’s policy as a dependent before he elected COBRA, his former employer could not cut off his participation in its plan even though the benefits in both plans were essentially the same.

In other cases involving the discontinuation of COBRA coverage by employers on the basis of “alternate coverage as a dependent,” some U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal had applied a “significant gap” test. These courts held that continued coverage under COBRA was available to an eligible employee only if there was a “significant gap” between the individual’s COBRA benefits and the benefits available to the individual under his or her spouse’s plan. Eligibility for continuation of COBRA coverage based on such a distinction was rejected by the Supreme Court.

Unemployment Insurance Board may apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to reject an individual’s application for benefits

Unemployment Insurance Board may apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to reject an individual’s application for benefits
Obafemi v Comm. of Labor, Appellate Division, 250 A.D.2d 905

Suppose an employee who has been dismissed from his or her position following a disciplinary hearing applies for unemployment insurance benefits. May the Unemployment Insurance Board deny unemployment insurance benefits on the doctrine of “collateral estoppel?”

The doctrine of collateral estoppel allows a court or administrative body to apply the judgment in a earlier action in a subsequent action based on the same events but brought as a different “cause of action,” thereby obviating the need for a new hearing.

Disciplinary charges were filed against Thkikuma D. Obafemi, a toll collector, alleging that he was discourteous to customers. The arbitrator had found Obafemi guilty of being rude to a customer despite prior warnings to refrain from such inappropriate behavior. The penalty imposed was dismissal.

Following his termination Obafemi applied for unemployment insurance benefits. When the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board ruled that he was disqualified for such benefits because he was terminated for misconduct, he appealed. Obafemi claimed that he was not given a hearing as to his eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits. The Appellate Division dismissed his appeal, commenting that the board could give “collateral estoppel” effect to the findings of the arbitrator. After all, the court said, Obafemi had been given a “full and fair opportunity” to litigate the issue of his misconduct at the arbitration hearing.

In another unemployment insurance case, Joyce v Commissioner of Labor, 250 A.D.2d 901, the Appellate Division said that the Unemployment Insurance Board had substantial evidence that Stephen M. Joyce had voluntarily left his employment with the U.S. Postal Service without good cause.

Joyce was directed to leave work after an outburst during which he shouted racist remarks. The Postal Service’s psychiatrist found Joyce “not fit for duty” and advised him to seek “outside psychiatric treatment.” Joyce was also told that he could not return to work until he obtained treatment. Joyce told the Service that he was unwilling to seek outside psychiatric treatment.

The Court agreed with the Board, pointing out that “it is well settled that when a claimant fails to take a step that is reasonably required as a prerequisite to continued employment, the claimant will be deemed to have left his [or her] employment without good cause.”