Application seeking the removal of an employee of a School District

Application seeking the removal of an employee of a School District

Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision No. 17,274

A resident and taxpayer of the school district petitioned the Commissioner of Education to remove the school district's physical education director and/or athletic director pursuant to §135.4 of the Commissioner’s regulations. 

The Commissioner denied the taxpayer's application, explaining that the Commissioner lacks the authority to grant the relief requested as the individual targeted for removal is an employee, not an officer subject to removal under Education Law §306. 

In the words of the Commissioner: "I lack jurisdiction to do so.  Education Law §306 authorizes the Commissioner to remove school officers under appropriate circumstances.  For purposes of §306, "school officers" include trustees, members of boards of education, clerks, collectors, treasurers, district superintendents, or "other school officer[s]."  An athletic director, however, is a school district employee, not a school officer, and is thus not subject to removal under Education Law §306."

Addressing a number of fatal procedural defects, the Commissioner noted that even if the targeted individual were a school officer subject to her jurisdiction under Education Law §306 the defective notice of petition submitted by the taxpayer would warrant denial of the application. 

The Commissioner further explained that the notice accompanying a removal application must specifically advise a school officer that an application is being made for his or her removal from office. In this case, the petitioner failed to give such notice and, instead, used the notice prescribed under 8 NCYRR §275.11(a) for appeals brought pursuant to Education Law §310. 

Further, said the Commissioner, "A notice of petition which fails to contain the language required by the Commissioner’s regulation is fatally defective and does not secure jurisdiction over the intended respondent. It is the notice of petition that alerts a party to the fact that he or she is the subject of removal proceedings, and the failure to comply with 8 NYCRR §277.1(b) necessarily results in a jurisdictional failure and requires dismissal."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume57/d17274

Failing to file a timely cause of action bars applying court ordered salary adjustments retroactively

Failing to file a timely cause of action bars applying court ordered salary adjustments retroactively

Quirk v Lippman, 2017 NY Slip Op 08732, Appellate Division, First Department 

The genesis of this action was the Court of Appeals order in O'Neill v Pfau in 2011.*

In O'Neill a group of Suffolk County court officers challenged an administrative order issued in January 2004 that reclassified various court officers' employment titles, affecting their compensation, and an administrative order issued December 22, 2004, that made an upward salary adjustment to those titles, retroactive to January 2004.

The petitioners argued that the effect of applying the December 2004 order retroactively would be to deprive them of a year of continuous service credit to which they otherwise would be entitled.

On April 6, 2005, the court officers received pay checks reflecting the salary adjustments ordered in December 2004, without continuous service credit.

In this decision the Appellate Division considered the issue of demands for retroactive salary adjustments and "prospective relief.

NYSCOA member on whose behalf this action was initiated also had received their first "retroactive" paycheck 2004. They initiated this Article 78 action in January 2015, at which time the four-month statute of limitations had run "long before they commenced this proceeding."

Addressing the merits of the claim, the Appellate Division said "A cause of action challenging an administrative body's payment of salary or pay adjustments accrues when the individual  receives a check or salary payment reflecting the relevant administrative order.

The Appellate Division held that NYSCOA's time-barred claims may not be revived by recourse to equal protection principles and "no toll that exists 'solely to enable aggrieved parties to sit on their existing rights pending the outcome of an early challenge brought by others.'"

Further, said the court, as NYSCOA in this action brought this proceeding nearly 10 years after the four-month statute of limitations had begun to run, it had no more timely cause of action for "prospective" relief than it had for the retroactive pay adjustment NYSCOA sought.

In the words of the court: "Indeed, there is no legal basis for a distinction between "prospective" and "retroactive" relief here. In failing to challenge the administrative order in a timely fashion, NYSCOA  petitioners waived any right to the benefit of legal review of the December [2004} order, whatever its implications for the future."

*  O'Neill v Pfau (31 Misc 3d 184 [Sup Ct, Suffolk County 2011], affd as modified 101 AD3d 731 [2d Dept 2012], affd 23 NY3d 993.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:           

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2017/2017_08732.htm

Disclosure of a police officer's disciplinary files are protected by Civil Rights Law §50-a

Disclosure of a police officer's disciplinary files are protected by Civil Rights Law §50-a

Doe v New York City Police Dept., 2017 NY Slip Op 08734, Appellate Division, First Department

"John Doe," a former New York City Police Officer, sued the New York City Police Department seeking to recover damages arising from alleged harassment on the job due to his sexual orientation. Supreme Court rejected Doe's demand for a further deposition of one of his coworkers, a police officer, and the disclosure of the disciplinary files of that officer and another employee of the police department.

Supreme Court denied Doe's requests.

Considering Doe's appeal, the Appellate Division sustained the Supreme Court's decision, explaining that a "police officer's disciplinary files are protected by Civil Rights Law §50-a ... and [Doe] failed to provide a clear showing of facts sufficient to warrant even an in camera review of those records.

§50-a, in pertinent part, provides that " All personnel records used to evaluate performance toward continued employment or promotion, under the control of any police agency or department of the state or any political subdivision thereof including authorities or agencies maintaining police forces ... shall be considered confidential and not subject to inspection or review without the express written consent of such police officer, firefighter, firefighter/paramedic, correction officer or peace officer within the department of corrections and community supervision or probation department except as may be mandated by lawful court order.

With respect to obtaining a court order, §50-a further provides that "Prior to issuing such court order the judge must review all such requests and give interested parties the opportunity to be heard. No such order shall issue without a clear showing of facts sufficient to warrant the judge to request records for review [and] after such hearing, the judge concludes there is a sufficient basis he [or she] shall sign an order requiring that the personnel records in question be sealed and sent directly to him [or her]" for review and to make a determination as to whether the records are relevant and material in the action before him. Upon such a finding the court shall make those parts of the record found to be relevant and material available to the persons so requesting."

Further, the Appellate Division noted that "Discovery of the disciplinary file of the other police department employee was not warranted, as she was not similarly situated with [Doe]  and thus is not comparable for the purpose of showing discrimination.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2017/2017_08734.htm