Distinguishing between a "mandatory referendum" and an "advisory referendum" when seeking voter approval of a proposed local law

The Council of the City of Rochester (Council) adopted Local Law No. 4 of 2019  [Local Law] to amend the City Charter. The Local Law provided the holding of a referendum for the November 2019 general election that, if adopted, would:

1. Remove the Board of Education of the Rochester City School District [Board] Commissioners from a list of "Elective officers";

2. Remove the members of the Boards' term of office from City Charter; and

3. Discontinue providing for the "Salaries of School Board members."

The referendum further provided that the Local Law would take effect only after both approval by [a] an affirmative vote of "a majority of qualified electors" voting on the referendum and [b] the enactment of appropriate enabling amendments to the Education Law.

The Board initiated a CPLR Article 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the Local Law was invalid and that the referendum would be void as constituting an "advisory referendum." The Board also asked the court to issue a permanent injunction barring the City from placing the referendum on the November ballot.

Supreme Court granted the relief sought by the Board, holding that the State "unequivocally occupies the entire field of public education, thus preempting the Local Law and rendering the referendum impermissibly advisory." Declaring that the Local Law was a "void advisory referendum," the court issued a permanent injunction barring the advisory referendum from being included on the ballot for the November general election.

The City appealed the Supreme Court's ruling but the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court's decision. Citing Mills v Sweeney, 219 NY 213, decided in 1916, the Appellate Division explained that any local law that "[a]bolishes an elective office" or "reduces the salary of an elective officer during his [or her] term of office" is subject to the approval of a mandatory referendum.*

In contrast, said the court, an "advisory referendum," that is a referendum that lacks legal effect or consequence, is not permitted in the absence of express constitutional or statutory authority providing for such a referendum.

As the Local Law conditioned its effectiveness on subsequent action by the New York State Legislature, the Appellate Division said that this stipulation "strips the referendum of any binding legal effect" and thus is "impermissibly advisory."

In addition, the Appellate Division observed that Supreme Court "correctly noted" that a local government may not legislate in areas "where the State has evidenced its intent to occupy the field" and it is well established that the State has preempted local action in the field of public education.** 

The Appellate Division then unanimously affirmed the Supreme Court's judgment, without costs.

* See Municipal Home Rule Law §23[2][e].

** See New York State Constitution Articles IX §3[a][1] and Article XI, §1; Education Law.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2019/2019_06449.htm

Recent Decisions issued by Administrative Law Judges of the New York City Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings

Below are summaries of recent OATH Administrative Law Judge's decisions.  To ascertain whether the ALJs' recommendations were adopted by the appointing authority please call OATH's calendar unit at 1-844-628-4692.

Worker alleged to be under the influence of drugs while on duty

OATH Index No. 1530/19

A worker, who was found unconscious at work, was charged with possessing and being under the influence of drugs while on duty and being absent without leave. Administrative Law Judge Ingrid M. Addison sustained the charges that the employee was under the influence of drugs while on duty but dismissed the absence charge.

Termination of the worker’s employment was recommended by the appointing authority, but because the employee’s problems appeared to have started following a line of duty injury, Judge Addison suggested that the appointing authority consider placing the individual on a leave of absence to allow him to return when fully rehabilitated.

The appointing authority adopted Judge Addison's findings and recommendation.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://archive.citylaw.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/17/oath/19_cases/19-1530.pdf

Special officer alleged to have used excessive force against a client

OATH Index No. 2742/18

A special officer [SO] was charged with using excessive force against a client at a New York City job center. The charges filed against the officer alleged that he kicked the client hard in the face and pulled the client’s arm when the client was already held in a prone position on the floor by several other officers. SO denied the charges filed against him.

In the course of a four-day trial, the appointing authority offered seven witnesses and SO offered three. ALJ Noel R. Garcia credited the appointing authority’s witnesses, found that SO guilty of serious misconduct, and recommended termination of his employment. 

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://archive.citylaw.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/17/oath/18_cases/18-2742.pdf

Employee charge with targeting a co-worker with inappropriate, aggressive and threatening language 

OATH Index No. 1863/19

An employee was charged with twice accosting a fellow employee and addressing  inappropriate, aggressive and threatening language to the co-worker.

During trial the appointing authority presented the testimony of four employees. Testifying on her own behalf, the charged employee denied having used any inappropriate or aggressive language.

ALJ Addison found the appointing authority’s witnesses credible and sustained the charges. Considering the charged employee’s long service with the agency,  Judge Addison recommended a penalty of 40 days’ suspension without pay, "with credit for time served."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://archive.citylaw.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/17/oath/19_cases/19-1863.pdf

Motion seeking the recusal of the Supreme Court Justice presiding over a CPLR Article 75 action

Petitioner [Employer] commenced this proceeding in Supreme Court pursuant to CPLR Article 75 to vacate an arbitration award that concluded that Employer had improperly terminated the employment of member of the negotiating unit represented by the employee organization [Union]. 

Supreme Court granted the Employer's petition and vacated the arbitration award. The Union and the terminated employee  then asked [1] the Supreme Court Justice who had presided over this Article 75 action to recuse herself; and [2] an order to vacate the order and judgment earlier issued by her. The Justice denied the motion. 

Mandatory disqualification of a Supreme Court Justice pursuant to Judiciary Law §14 is required where the trial judge presiding over any claim is "related by consanguinity or affinity to any party to the controversy within the sixth degree."* 

The Appellate Division explained that the record did not show that any person related to the challenged Supreme Court Justice was a party to Article 75 proceeding and thus mandatory disqualification pursuant to Judiciary Law §14 was not required

Turning to the Code of Judicial Conduct Canon, 3(E)(1)(d)(i), which concerns a judge recusing himself or herself as a matter of the exercise of his or her discretion, the Appellate Division said that this provision addresses a judge decision to decline "self-disqualification" or reject a motion to do so.

As to the question of discretionary recusal, the Appellate Division again agreed with the Supreme Court Justice's denial of the motion seeking her recusal based on alleged impropriety or bias. The Appellate Division's decision notes that in the absence of a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law §14, "the determination concerning a motion seeking recusal based on alleged impropriety, bias, or prejudice is within the discretion and the personal conscience of the court." 

Such recusal, opined the Appellate Division, as a matter of due process, "is required only where there exists a direct, personal, substantial or pecuniary interest in reaching a particular conclusion, or where a clash in judicial roles is seen to exist." 

Accordingly, said the court, the denial of a recusal motion will constitute an improvident exercise of discretion only where the moving party puts forth demonstrable proof of the judge's bias or prejudgment and here there was no evidence in the record demonstrating that  the Supreme Court Justice had any improper interest in the outcome of the Article 75 proceeding or harbored actual bias against the Union or its member so as to warrant the conclusion that her denial of their recusal request was an improvident exercise of discretion.

* "First cousins twice removed" constitute the sixth degree of consanguinity.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2019/2019_06391.htm

[See, also, http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2019/2019_06402.htm]