A reasonable penalty under the circumstances is to be imposed on an employee found guilty of disciplinary charges

In this case the Appellate Division applied the lesson set out in the Court of Appeals' decision in Pell v Board of Educucation of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale and Mamaroneck, 34 NY2d 222, typically referred to as the Pell Doctrine: the disciplinary penalty imposed on a individual found guilty of disciplinary charges must be proportionate to the offense.

The School Board [Board] filed disciplinary charges against one of its employees, a custodial worker, pursuant to §75 of the Civil Service Law alleging incompetence and misconduct. The hearing officer found the employee [Petitioner] guilty of incompetence, insubordination, and misconduct and recommended that the Petitioner be terminated from his position. The Board accepted the hearing officer's findings and recommendation and terminated Petitioner.

Petitioner appealed and the Appellate Divisions, noted that its review of an administrative determination in an employee disciplinary proceeding made after a hearing pursuant to §75 of the Civil Service Law is limited to considering whether the Board's determination "was supported by substantial evidence."*

The Appellate Division concluded that there was substantial evidence in the record supporting the determination that the Petitioner was guilty of incompetence, insubordination, and misconduct. The court's decision reports that "The record indicates, inter alia, that [Petitioner] discovered a knife and pepper spray under a radiator and left them there for approximately three hours knowing that there were students and other staff in the building, and that the [Petitioner] gave two students $25 each after betting that one of the students would win in a basketball game against the other."

Citing Branam v Simons, 300 AD2d 973, the court said that although "a finding of incompetence ... only requires evidence of some dereliction or neglect of duty," in light of all the circumstances, including the Petitioner's length of service and lack of a prior disciplinary record, "the penalty of termination was so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness."**.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division granted Petitioner's appeal "to the extent that so much of the determination as terminated the petitioner's employment is annulled" and remanded the matter to the Board "for the imposition of a lesser penalty."

* The court opined that "Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant proof as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion or ultimate fact." 

** Here the Appellate Division refers to the decision of the Court of Appeals in Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Scarsdale and Mamaroneck, 34 NY2d 222.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

 

Accepting the benefits of a settlement agreement deemed ratification and "not lightly cast aside" by the courts

A Village police officer [Officer] was involved in an off-duty accident that rendered him paralyzed from the waist down. Officer filed a notice of claim alleging that the Village discriminated against him after he became disabled. Approximately nine months later, Officer executed a settlement agreement [Agreement] pursuant to which he agreed to withdraw his notice of claim and waive his right to assert certain claims against the Village in exchange for certain benefits, including remaining employed as a police officer for three years until 2016, when his pension rights would vest. The Agreement also provided that Officer would be eligible to continue to be employed by the Village in a different capacity at a reduced rate of pay.

Officer worked in a transitional light-duty police officer position beyond the 2016 deadline established in the Agreement.  In March 2019, however, the Village informed the plaintiff that it would be enforcing the terms of the settlement agreement and instructed him to resign as a police officer as of April 1, 2019. The Village invited Officer to apply for certain lower-paying light duty positions in accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement.

In June 2019, Officer commenced an action to set the Agreement aside. Supreme Court granted a cross-motion to dismiss the complaint, holding that Officer's complaint was subject to dismissal based on Officer's ratification of the Agreement. Subsequent efforts by Officer to vacate the agreement and obtain other relief proved fruitless and ultimately the various efforts made by Officer to set the Agreement aside were considered by the Appellate Division.

The Appellate Division, citing Hallock v State of New York, 64 NY2d 224, said that "Stipulations of settlement between parties are binding contracts enforceable by the court and, as such, they are favored and [are] 'not lightly cast aside' ... especially where, as here, the party seeking to set aside the stipulation was represented by counsel."

Noting that Officer "accepted the benefits of the settlement agreement" continuing to work as a police officer for the Village from 2013 through early 2019, three years beyond the end date he bargained for and did not seek to set aside the Agreement on any of the grounds raised in his complaint at any point before commencing [the instant] action in 2019, the Appellate Division held that the Village was "entitled to dismissal of the complaint on the ground that [Officer] ratified the settlement agreement."

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Workers' Compensation Board required to address the issues raised by a Claimant for workers' compensation benefits in an administrative appeal to the Board

The Workers' Compensation Board, [Board] found that where, as here, a claim for workers' compensation benefits "was never indexed," the provisions of Workers' Compensation Law §25(2)(b) are inapplicable and ruled that the employer did not file an untimely notice of controversy. Claimant's subsequent application for reconsideration was denied. Claimant appealed the Board's decision.

The Appellate Division held that although the Board concluded that Workers' Compensation Law §25(2)(b) is inapplicable given that the claim was never indexed, the Board did not address the related issue raised upon administrative appeal that the employer's initial FROI-00 form was a binding acceptance of the claim.* Further, said the court, the Board provided "no reasoning or basis for its determination that the notice of controversy was timely filed." 

This, said the Appellate Division , precluded "a meaningful appellate review by this Court".

Citing  Matter of Sequino v Sears Holdings, 206 AD3d 1408 and Matter of Ippolito v NYC Tr. Auth., 203 AD3d 1360, the Appellate Division reversed the Board's decision, concluding that the matter must be remitted to the Board for it "to satisfy its obligation to address the issues raised by claimant on administrative appeal and provide a detailed explanation for its determination."

* Claimant contended that the employer's initial FROI-00 form indicated "L — With Liability" and should be deemed a binding acceptance of the claim with liability. The Appellate Division's decision notes that 12 NYCRR 300.37(c) "dispenses with the need for indexing where a claim is accepted".

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.