Determining if a demand to arbitrate an alleged violation of a term or condition set out in a collective bargaining agreement is viable

Teamsters Local 445 [Union] filed a demand for arbitration of a grievance against the Village alleging that the Village breached the parties' collective bargaining agreement [CBA] by deducting a certain amount from each paycheck of an individual in the relevant collective bargaining unit for health insurance costs.

The Supreme Court granted the Village's petition to permanently stay arbitration on the ground that the claim sought to be arbitrated was barred by the four-month statute of limitations applicable to CPLR Article 78 proceedings. The Appellate Division held that the "principal issues raised on this appeal are (1) whether the underlying claim is in the nature seeking review of an administrative determination or in the nature of breach of contract, and (2) if the latter, whether the claim is predicated on a single breach or a series of breaches that occurred with each paycheck.

The court determined that the nature of the claim is breach of contract and that the claim is predicated on a series of independent alleged breaches. The Appellate Division opined that as "the statute of limitations began anew as to each breach," it found that the claim to be arbitrated was not wholly time-barred and modified the Supreme Court's order to "permanently stay so much of the grievance as was not time-barred and granting the Union's cross-motion to the extent of compelling arbitration of so much of the grievance as was not time-barred."

As to the issue concerning whether a grievance is arbitrable, the Appellate Division, explained that the court must follow a two-part test* in making that determination:  

1. The court considers "whether there is any statutory, constitutional or public policy prohibition against arbitration of the grievance". If no prohibition against arbitrating exists; then

2. The court examines the CBA "to determine if the parties have agreed to arbitrate the dispute at issue.

Finding no constitutional, statutory, or public policy provision prohibiting the arbitration of the dispute at issue in this matter, the Appellate Division said with respect to determining whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute, "the merits of the grievance are not the courts' concern. Even an apparent weakness of the claimed grievance is not a factor in the court's threshold determination. It is the arbitrator who weighs the merits of the claim."

In making that determination, "A court ... should merely determine whether there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the CBA. If there is none, the issue, as a matter of law, is not arbitrable.

In the event the there is such a "reasonable relationship", the court should rule the matter arbitrable, and the arbitrator will then make "a more exacting interpretation of the precise scope of the substantive provisions of the CBA, and whether the subject matter of the dispute fits within them".

The Appellate Division noted that "The plain terms of the CBA define a grievance to include a claimed violation of the CBA and provide that the Union may seek arbitration so long as it complied with the other steps of the grievance process". Such compliance was not in dispute in the instant appeal.

Here, however, the Village contended "that the matter is not arbitrable because the Union improperly amended the grievance in its demand for arbitration." The Appellate Division, however, said "the precise scope of the substantive provisions of the CBA, and whether the subject matter of the dispute fits within them," is for the arbitrator to determine, citing  Matter of Board of Educ. of Watertown City School Dist. [Watertown Educ. Assn.], 93 NY2d at 143. Accordingly, the Appellate Division held that Supreme Court properly concluded that the subject demand for arbitration should not be stayed on the ground that a valid agreement to arbitrate was not made.

* See Matter of City of Johnstown [Johnstown Police Benevolent Assn.], 99 NY2d 273.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli reports that a former town clerk pled guilty to stealing almost $4,000 from the Town of Lincoln

On February 2, 2024, New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli, Chenango County District Attorney Michael Ferrarese, and the New York State Police announced the plea and sentence of Amy Becker, former Clerk for the Town of Lincoln, for stealing nearly $4,000 from the Town. The plea was the result of a joint investigation between Comptroller DiNapoli’s Office, the Chenango County District Attorney’s Office, and the New York State Police. As part of the plea agreement she paid full restitution in the amount of $3,869.

“Ms. Becker abused her position by taking funds paid to her town and making them her own,” DiNapoli said. “Those in public service have a responsibility to act in taxpayers’ interests, not line their own pockets. I thank District Attorney Ferrarese and the New York State Police for their partnership in making sure she will be held accountable.”

New York State Police Acting Superintendent Steven G. James said, “Ms. Becker abused her position in a place of trust to concoct a devious scheme and steal funds from the town. The New York State Police will not tolerate those who misuse their position as a public servant to profit at the expense of taxpayers. I commend our State Police investigators for their outstanding work and thank the Comptroller’s Office and the Chenango County District Attorney’s Office for their partnership in solving this case.”

Becker, 54, pled guilty to petit larceny. She served as the town clerk of Lincoln from 2018 to 2022. During that time, she accepted payments for the town, including fees for marriage licenses, death certificates, and the dog pound, and was responsible for recording and depositing all funds.

During an audit of the town, DiNapoli’s office found a cash shortage. An ensuing investigation found that Becker failed to report $3,869 in cash deposits and, instead, embezzled the money for her personal use.

Becker pleaded guilty before Judge Stephanie Palmer in the Town of Lenox Court. She was ordered to, and paid, full restitution in the amount of $3,869 and received a one year conditional discharge.

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Since taking office in 2007, DiNapoli has committed to fighting public corruption and encourages the public to help fight fraud and abuse. New Yorkers can report allegations of fraud involving taxpayer money by calling the toll-free Fraud Hotline at 1-888-672-4555, by filing a complaint online at investigations@osc.ny.gov, or by mailing a complaint to: Office of the State Comptroller, Division of Investigations, 8th Floor, 110 State St., Albany, NY 12236.

 

An administrative determination denying an employee's application for benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-c annulled because it was not supported by substantial evidence

A detective sergeant [Employee] contracted COVID-19 at work. As the result of a positive test for COVID-19 the County Department of Health ordered Employee to "quarantine/isolate for 10 days" and Employee was subsequently hospitalized from August 21, 2021 through August 28, 2021. Employee applied for benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-c [207-c], but County Director of Risk Management [Director] Employee's application as untimely pursuant to local law. Employee's request for reconsideration was denied and ultimately a hearing held pursuant to local law and the parties' collective bargaining agreement.

The Hearing Officer recommended the Director sustain the denial of Employee's application for207-c benefits on the basis that he failed to timely file his application and failed to show good cause to excuse the untimely filing. Director issued a determination adopting the Hearing Officer's recommendation in its entirety and Employee's collective bargaining representative commenced a CPLR Article 78 proceeding challenging the Director's determination.

The Appellate Division noting §207-c requires certain municipal employers to continue to pay salary or wages to police officers who sustain a disability in the course of their employment, indicated that "The statute is remedial in nature and intended to provide a benefit to law enforcement personnel and, as such, is to be construed liberally in favor of such personnel". Further, the court opined while 207-c does not provide a procedure for applying for benefits thereunder, a benefits application process may be the subject of collective bargaining and/or local law, "Judicial review of an administrative determination made after a hearing at which evidence is taken pursuant to direction of law is limited to a consideration of whether that determination was supported by substantial evidence upon the whole record".

In the words of the court, "As relevant here [the County Code] requires, among other things, applications for benefits under General Municipal Law §207-c to be made 'within 10 days from the date of the incident alleged to have given rise to the claim of disability or illness, or from the time such condition is discovered, whichever date is later.' The [Director] may excuse the failure to file the application within this [10]-day period upon a showing of good cause."

The Director had determined that the employee's September 17 application was untimely because it was not made within 10 days of his alleged work-related incident of August 9. Under the circumstances, the Appellate Division held that it was improper for the Director to use August 9, 2021 as the incident date that commenced the 10-day period within which Employee was required to file his application for benefits as Employee's application "clearly stated that he was informed on September 9, 2021 about his lung damage stemming from his contraction of COVID-19, and it was on this date that [Employee] first discovered the disability ... that gave rise to his claim and application for benefits."

The Appellate Division found that Employee made his application was made within 10 days of September 9, 2021, and, accordingly, "the Director's determination denying his application for benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-c is not supported by substantial evidence and must be annulled."

The matter was remanded to the County's Director of Risk Management "for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision."

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.