Teamsters Local 445 [Union] filed a demand for arbitration of a grievance against the Village alleging that the Village breached the parties' collective bargaining agreement [CBA] by deducting a certain amount from each paycheck of an individual in the relevant collective bargaining unit for health insurance costs.
The Supreme Court granted the Village's petition to permanently stay arbitration on the ground that the claim sought to be arbitrated was barred by the four-month statute of limitations applicable to CPLR Article 78 proceedings. The Appellate Division held that the "principal issues raised on this appeal are (1) whether the underlying claim is in the nature seeking review of an administrative determination or in the nature of breach of contract, and (2) if the latter, whether the claim is predicated on a single breach or a series of breaches that occurred with each paycheck.
The court determined that the nature of the claim is breach of contract and that the claim is predicated on a series of independent alleged breaches. The Appellate Division opined that as "the statute of limitations began anew as to each breach," it found that the claim to be arbitrated was not wholly time-barred and modified the Supreme Court's order to "permanently stay so much of the grievance as was not time-barred and granting the Union's cross-motion to the extent of compelling arbitration of so much of the grievance as was not time-barred."
As to the issue concerning whether a grievance is arbitrable, the Appellate Division, explained that the court must follow a two-part test* in making that determination:
1. The court considers "whether there is any statutory, constitutional or public policy prohibition against arbitration of the grievance". If no prohibition against arbitrating exists; then
2. The court examines the CBA "to determine if the parties have agreed to arbitrate the dispute at issue.
Finding no constitutional, statutory, or public policy provision prohibiting the arbitration of the dispute at issue in this matter, the Appellate Division said with respect to determining whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute, "the merits of the grievance are not the courts' concern. Even an apparent weakness of the claimed grievance is not a factor in the court's threshold determination. It is the arbitrator who weighs the merits of the claim."
In making that determination, "A court ... should merely determine whether there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the CBA. If there is none, the issue, as a matter of law, is not arbitrable.
In the event the there is such a "reasonable relationship", the court should rule the matter arbitrable, and the arbitrator will then make "a more exacting interpretation of the precise scope of the substantive provisions of the CBA, and whether the subject matter of the dispute fits within them".
The Appellate Division noted that "The plain terms of the CBA define a grievance to include a claimed violation of the CBA and provide that the Union may seek arbitration so long as it complied with the other steps of the grievance process". Such compliance was not in dispute in the instant appeal.
Here, however, the Village contended "that the matter is not arbitrable because the Union improperly amended the grievance in its demand for arbitration." The Appellate Division, however, said "the precise scope of the substantive provisions of the CBA, and whether the subject matter of the dispute fits within them," is for the arbitrator to determine, citing Matter of Board of Educ. of Watertown City School Dist. [Watertown Educ. Assn.], 93 NY2d at 143. Accordingly, the Appellate Division held that Supreme Court properly concluded that the subject demand for arbitration should not be stayed on the ground that a valid agreement to arbitrate was not made.
* See Matter of City of Johnstown [Johnstown Police Benevolent Assn.], 99 NY2d 273.
Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.