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Matter of Timperio v Bronx-Lebanon Hosp. |
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2024 NY Slip Op 02723 |
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Decided on |
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Court of Appeals |
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Halligan |
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Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431. |
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports. |
Decided on
No. 46
[*1]Justin Timperio, Respondent,
v
Bronx-Lebanon Hospital et al., Appellants. Workers' Compensation Board,
Appellant.
Sarah L. Rosenbluth, for appellant New York State Workers Compensation Board.
Caryn L. Lilling, for appellants Bronx-Lebanon Hospital et al.
Arnold N. Kriss, for respondent Justin Timperio.
HALLIGAN, J.
In this appeal, we clarify the operation of the rebuttable presumption set forth in Workers' Compensation Law § 21 (1), which provides that when an injury arises in the course of a worker's employment, it is presumed to arise out of that worker's employment and therefore is compensable, absent substantial evidence to the contrary. In cases involving assaults that occur at work, a lack of evidence as to the motivation for the assault does not rebut that presumption. Thus, the presumption applied and was unrebutted here, and the Appellate Division's contrary conclusion was error.
I.
On
BLH notified the Workers'
Compensation Board (WCB) of Timperio's injuries in July 2017. The hospital
subsequently requested an administrative decision from the WCB to establish a
claim under the Workers' Compensation Law (WCL) and enter awards. While the
matter was proceeding before a Workers' Compensation Law Judge (WCLJ), Timperio
filed a negligence action in federal court against BLH and the store that sold
The Appellate Division
reversed (203 AD3d 179, 184-185 [3d
II.
Determinations by the WCB must be upheld where they are supported by substantial evidence in the record (see Matter of Zamora v New York Neurologic Assoc., 19 NY3d 186, 192-193 [2012]). Workers' Compensation Law § 21 (1) provides that "[i]n any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this chapter, it shall be presumed in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary . . . [t]hat the claim comes within the provision of this chapter."
We have previously addressed the operation of this presumption in several cases involving workplace assaults. Less than a decade after enactment of WCL § 21 (1), we considered the case of a "dairyman's chauffeur" who, while driving his employer's car and delivering cheese, was randomly stabbed by an "insane man" who "stabbed any one near him" (Katz v Kadans & Co., 232 NY 420, 421 [1922]). We concluded that because the chauffeur was "sent into the street on his [employer]'s business" and then injured from "exposure to the risks of the street," the injury "necessarily [arose] out of his employment" and therefore was compensable (id.). Decades later, we affirmed a compensation award to an employee assaulted by a man "he had never previously seen," because under the WCL § 21 (1) presumption, "[w]hen an injury is sustained in the course of employment it will be presumed, as a matter of law, that it did arise out [*2]of the employment" (Slade v Perkins, 42 AD2d 667, 668 [1973], affd 33 NY2d 988 [1974]). More recently, we reiterated the same principle in Matter of Rosen v First Manhattan Bank (84 NY2d 856, 857 [1994]).
As stated in WCL § 21 (1) and recognized by this Court, the presumption is rebuttable by "substantial evidence" establishing that it was not the workplace itself that exposed the employee to harm. But where the assault occurs in the course of employment and there is no evidence as to its motivation, the presumption is triggered and is not rebutted (see McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 64, Workmen's Compensation Law § 21 at 143 [1922 ed] [explaining the presumption of WCL § 21 (1) is "sufficient in a close or evenly balanced case to turn the scale in favor of the employee. And where there is no substantial evidence to overcome the presumption an award will be made"]). Once it has been established that an employee was assaulted "in the course of" employment, the presumption—unless rebutted—obviates the need for an affirmative showing that the assault arose "out of" the employment.
The Appellate Division
essentially inverted
This reading accords with the
text of WCL § 21 (1) and the purpose of the WCL, which is to " 'protect[ ]
work[ers] and their dependents from want in case of injury' on the job" (Johannesen
v
Here, it is undisputed that
the assault occurred in the course of Mr. Timperio's employment, thereby
triggering the WCL § 21 (1) presumption. It is also undisputed that the record
includes no evidence of the motivation for the assault or any indication of a
prior relationship between the assailant and the claimant;
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, and the decision of the Workers' Compensation Board reinstated.
Order reversed, with costs, and decision of the Workers' Compensation Board reinstated. Opinion by Judge Halligan. Chief Judge Wilson and Judges Rivera, Garcia, Singas, Cannataro and Troutman concur.
Decided
Footnotes
Footnote
1: A different WCLJ had found Timperio's injuries compensable in
an initial proceeding that neither Timperio nor his counsel attended. That
decision was vacated due to Timperio's absence, and the September 2020
proceeding followed.
Footnote
2: Where, as here, an employer or its carrier has filed a Workers'
Compensation Law claim on behalf of an employee, requested an administrative
determination on the claim, and opposed claimant's arguments that no workers'
compensation award should be made, the employer and its carrier are aggrieved
by an Appellate Division order reversing an award in claimant's favor and
dismissing the claim. To the extent Matter of Parks v Weaver (14
NY2d 546 [1964]) provides to the contrary, it should not be followed.