Retirement System denies petitioner's application for accidental disability retirement benefits after determining that the incident was not an "accident" within the meaning of the New York State Retirement and Social Security Law

In this appeal the Court of Appeals sustained the judgment of the Appellate Division holding that "Substantial evidence supports the [New York State and Local Employees' Retirement System's (NYSLERS)] determination" that the applicant for accidental disability retirement [ADR] benefits. The court further noted that New York State case law "makes clear, an incident caused by 'a risk inherent in the petitioner's regular [job] duties' is not an accident for purposes of ADR benefits".

Petitioner, a former police officer, was injured when, on routine patrol. Petitioner testified that the hole had been dug for a sewer line on the property involved and that he knew at the time that the house was under construction. The Retirement System had denied Petitioner's application for ADR on the ground that the incident was not an "accident" within the meaning of Retirement and Social Security Law §363 because it "resulted from a risk inherent in petitioner's job".

In the words of the Court of Appeals, "in determining whether an accident occurred, [NYSLRS] considered the duties of Petitioner's particular employment", and whether the incident was caused by "an inherent risk of [those] regular duties".

On this record the Court of Appeals said it concluded that NYSLRS "reasonabl[y] and plausibl[y]" determined that Petitioner's risk of being injured by an unseen hazard while investigating a potential crime in the dark "was inherent in his ordinary job duties" and affirmed the Appellate Division's judgment sustaining NYSLRS' determination.

Click HERE to access the Court of Appeals' decision posted on the Internet.

School District's plan to install solar panels on school property found consistent with a condition in a deed requiring that the property be used for school purposes

In 1957, the Rockland County Council Inc., Boy Scouts of America [Boy Scouts] sold a parcel of real property located in the Town of Stony Point to the Board of Education of Union Free School District No. 5 of the Town of Stony Point [UFSD No, 5]. 

In 2020, the North Rockland Central School District [NRCSD], "the alleged successor" in interest to UFSD No, 5, began collecting proposals for the installation of a solar panel array on a portion of said real property. The Greater Hudson Valley Council of Boy Scouts [Plaintiff], successor to Boy Scouts, challenged using the property to install solar panels contending that the deed selling the property contained a provision, stating in pertinent part, that in the event the subject property was at any time no longer to be used for school purposes, the [Boy Scouts] would have the option of repurchasing a certain portion of the property for the price of $1,000 per acre.

In 2021, the Plaintiff, as successor in interest to Boy Scouts, commenced an action for a judgment declaring that NRCSD's plan to install the solar panels violated the deed because it was inconsistent with the provision mandating that [1] the property be used for school purposes, and [2] requiring the School District to sell the property to the Plaintiff for the price of $1,000 per acre. The complaint also sought monetary damages based on the same alleged violation of the deed.

NRCSD moved, pursuant to CPLR 3211(a), to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint. Supreme Court, among other things, granted NRCSD motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint and Plaintiff appealed the Supreme Court's ruling. 

The Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court's decision, explaining:

1. "On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), the court must accept all facts as alleged in the pleading to be true, accord the plaintiff the benefit of every favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory";

2. "Where evidentiary material is submitted and considered on a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), and the motion is not converted into one for summary judgment, the question becomes whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, not whether the plaintiff has stated one and, unless it has been shown that a material fact as claimed by the plaintiff to be one is not a fact at all and unless it can be said that no significant dispute exists regarding it, dismissal should not eventuate"; and

3. "[U]pon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, a court may reach the merits of a properly pleaded cause of action for a declaratory judgment where no questions of fact are presented [by the controversy]. Under such circumstances, the motion to dismiss the cause of action for failure to state a cause of action should be treated as one seeking a declaration in [the] defendant's favor and treated accordingly".

Here, opined the Appellate Division, Supreme Court properly determined that NRCSD was entitled to a judgment declaring that its proposed use of the property does not violate the deed, and properly granted that branch of NRCSD's motion to dismiss so much of the complaint as sought monetary damages. NRCSD, said the court, "is authorized to provide, among other things, "fuel ... and other necessaries for the use of said schools", citing Education Law §1709[14], and demonstrated that "it planned to install solar panels in accordance with the 'K-Solar' program to generate energy for school purposes".

Accordingly, the Appellate Division ruled that Supreme Court had "properly determined that no issue of fact regarding the use of the property for school purposes was presented" and remitted the matter to the Supreme Court for entry of a judgment declaring that NRCSD's proposed use of the property does not violate a condition in the deed requiring that the property be used for school purposes.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Courts sustain retirement system's determination placing member transferring into its system in its Tier 6

Supreme Court denied Plaintiff's petition seeking to annul the determination of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority [MTA] and the MTA Defined Benefit Pension Plan [MTADBPP] placing Plaintiff in Tier 6 in the MTACBPP. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, without costs.

MTA had denied Plaintiff, an officer with the MTA Police Department, pension credit for his prior nonuniformed service as a traffic enforcement agent with the New York City Police Department [NYPD]. 

Citing Matter of Peckham v Calogero, 12 NY3d 424, the Appellate Division found that MTA's decision had a "rational basis", noting that letters from the New York City Police Pension Fund [NYCPPF] show that Plaintiff became a member of the NYCPPF when he joined the NYPD as a uniformed police officer on January 9, 2013 and the MTADBPP plan classifies members who joined MTADBPP on or after April 1, 2012, as Tier 6. 

The Appellate Division opined that the MTADBPP reasonably interpreted the provision in issue to include Plaintiff's service as a uniformed officer but exclude his nonuniformed service as a traffic enforcement agent with NYPD. 

Noting that NYPD had credited Plaintiff's nonuniformed service and granted him Tier 2 status in the NYCPPF, the Appellate Division observed that Plaintiff cited no statute or provision of the MTADBPP "requiring MTA to do the same".

Further, explained the court, Retirement and Social Security Law §645 does not apply in this instance because MYADBPP is not among the enumerated "public retirement system[s]" between which the statute authorizes the cross-honoring of a member's membership starting date.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.