Civil deputy sheriff should not have to wait to be harmed before being given weapon and firearms training

Civil deputy sheriff should not have to wait to be harmed before being given weapon and firearms training

Mtr. of Monroe County Deputy Sheriffs Assoc.; Arbitration Award, PERB Case A200-439

Monroe County and the Monroe County Deputy Sheriffs Association submitted the following issue to PERB Arbitrator James A. Gross: Whether the Monroe County Sheriff's Office created an unusual work condition by failing to provide firearms and proper training in connection with firearms for the Civil Bureau.

Holding that the Sheriff's Office did, in fact, create an unusual work condition by failing to provide civil deputy sheriffs with firearms and training, Arbitrator Gross directed that Monroe County “provide firearms to civil deputies when they perform their duties.”

The parties apparently conceded that the grievance, as presented to the arbitrator, was subject to the contract grievance procedure pursuant to Article 36.2.1. of the collective bargaining agreement. Article 36.2.1 set out the definition of a grievance and provides as follows:

A grievance shall be defined as any claimed violation of a specific provision of this agreement, or any matter that relates to employee health and safety.

The County argued that “the issuance of weapons does not comply with the duties and functions of non-criminal civil deputies position [sic]” and that its civil deputies are not performing police functions. The County also maintained that there was no evidence that any civil deputy had been injured performing his or her duties “for at least 30 years” as a result of his or her performing civil deputy sheriff duties.

The Association contended that the civil deputies should carry a weapon because they are perceived to be law enforcement personnel and displayed badges. According to the Association:

1. A badge is recognized as a police presence; and

2. Any person identified as a law enforcement officer is automatically in a high-risk situation either by becoming a target for hostility or by being drawn into hostile and dangerous situations involving others.

Arbitrator Gross ruled that the County violated Article 36.2.1 by failing to provide firearms to its civil deputy sheriffs. 

After considering the testimony of witnesses, the arbitrator's concluded that:It would be irresponsible to deny these Civil Deputies the equipment they need to meet the greatest threats to their safety simply because no Civil Deputy in Monroe County has been killed or seriously injured in the performance of their duties - as has happened elsewhere in New York State. No person should have to wait to be harmed before being given adequate protection.

Using an employee personnel files to determine an appropriate disciplinary penalty

Using an employee personnel files to determine an appropriate disciplinary penalty

Bigelow v Trustees of the Village of Gouverneur, 63 NY2d 470

Perhaps the leading case concerning the use of an employee's personnel records in disciplinary procedures is the Court of Appeals’ decision in Bigelow v Trustees of the Village of Gouverneur

In Bigelow, the Court of Appeals held that if a civil service employee is found guilty of misconduct, a public employer may consider material included in the employee's personnel files in determining the appropriate sanction.

The employee, however, must first be advised of the information in his or her personnel record that the appointing authority will consider in determining the penalty and then must be given an opportunity to submit a written response concerning that information.

Individual serving in major nontenured policy-making or advisory position ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits upon separation

Individual serving in major nontenured policy-making or advisory position ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits upon separation

Fromer v Commissioner of Labor, 286 AD2d 816

The critical issue in this aspect of the litigation brought by Howard A. Fromer in his effort to obtain unemployment insurance benefits was his employment status with the now abolished State Energy Office: was he an independent officer of the agency?

The Appellate Division, Third Department, sustained a ruling by the Unemployment Insurance Appeals board holding that Fromer was not eligible for unemployment insurance benefits following his termination when his position was abolished. Fromer had served as general counsel to the State Energy Office from October 1988 until it was abolished on March 31, 1995.

The reason for Fromer's disqualification for benefits: The Board determined that Fromer served in a major nontenured policymaking or advisory position. Accordingly, he was “statutorily excluded” for such benefits by Labor Law Section 565(2)(e).

Earlier the Appellate Division had remanded the case to the Board for it to consider Fromer's argument that because he was a veteran within the meaning of Section 75 of the Civil Service Law, he was entitled to benefits [268 AD2d 707]. In considering this issue, the Board concluded that Fromer was an independent officer and, therefore, he was not entitled to limited tenure under Section 75. Fromer again appealed.

The Appellate Division again sustained the Board's determination, ruling that the protection afforded by Section 75 does not extend to those who hold “the position of private secretary, cashier or deputy of any official or department.” This listing, said the court, has been judicially interpreted to include independent officers, citing O'Day v Yeager, 308 NY 580.

Quoting from O'Day, the court commented that in determining whether a particular person is an independent officer, “[n]o automatic rule, no definitive signpost, is at hand, for it may fairly be said that each case must be decided upon its own facts.”

The court rejected Fromer's argument that because there was no statutory provision creating the position of general counsel for the Energy Office, there was no support for the Board's finding that he was an independent officer. It said that “[c]reation of the office by statute is a guide and not the sine qua non of whether a civil service position is independent.”

The Appellate Division said the record demonstrated that Fromer's position with the Energy Office was not that of a subordinate employee and that all of his duties and responsibilities required a high degree of initiative and independent thought and judgment.

Workers' Compensation Law benefits not available for “mental injury” resulting from an employer’s lawful personnel actions

Workers' Compensation Law benefits not available for “mental injury” resulting from an employer’s lawful personnel actions

Matter of Veeder v New York State Police Dept., 2011 NY Slip Op 05921, Appellate Division, Third Department

The widow of a Division of State Police forensic scientist, Donna Veeder, filed an application for workers' compensation death benefits, claiming that her husband became depressed and committed suicide as a result of actions she alleged were taken against him by the Division in the course of an investigation of her late husband’s performance of his duties.

The Workers' Compensation Law Board affirmed, concluding that Workers' Compensation Law §2(7)* barred the claim since the Division's actions were made in good faith and were the result of "a lawful personnel decision involving an investigation and potential disciplinary action."

Veeder appealed contending that that §2(7) was inapplicable because her husband had committed suicide and thus his injuries cannot be "solely mental."

The Appellate Division rejected this argument, explaining that “The unrefuted psychiatric evidence contained in the record, as well as the suicide letters, make clear that decedent's suicide was predominantly the product of the depression and stress he experienced from the employer's inquiry” into his performance of his duties. Accordingly, if work-related stress is not compensable under Workers' Compensation Law §2(7), “it necessarily follows that any physical injury that resulted therefrom cannot be compensable either.”

Considering Veeder’s argument that the Division’s actions in this case were not undertaken in the context of a "disciplinary action" within the meaning of the statute, the Appellate Division decided that Board's finding lacks substantial evidence in the record.

The court noted that there was “unequivocally” testimony that “there was no disciplinary action underway during the inquiry” and that the purpose of the meetings was to review the procedures employed by Veeder’s late husband “in conducting the testing and to look into ways for the laboratory to improve its testing methods.”

As the Board, having found the Division's actions to constitute a "disciplinary action" under Workers' Compensation Law §2(7), it did not reach the employer's alternative argument that its actions in that regard could also be deemed an evaluation of decedent's work under the statute, and that the stress experienced by decedent was no greater than that normally encountered in the work environment.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division vacated the Board’s determination and remanded the matter to it “for resolution of these issues.”

* Workers' Compensation Law §2(7) provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he terms 'injury' and 'personal injury' shall not include an injury which is solely mental and is based on workrelated stress if such mental injury is a direct consequence of a lawful personnel decision involving a disciplinary action, work evaluation, job transfer, demotion, or termination taken in good faith by the employer"

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_05921.htm