Governor Cuomo’s letter to the Chancellor of the Board of Regents regarding performance evaluations for teachers

Governor Cuomo’s letter to the Chancellor of the Board of Regents regarding performance evaluations for teachers

Source: Office of the Governor

On May 13, 2011 Governor Andrew M. Cuomo sent the following letter to the Chancellor of the Board of Regents Merryl Tisch regarding changes needed to improve and accelerate performance evaluations for teachers.

The Governor's full letter is as follows:

Dear Chancellor Tisch:

Performance is the key to education. It's not about how much we spend, but the results that matter. As data show our education spending hasn't resulted in performance. New York schools spend 71 percent more than the national average, yet rank only 40^th in graduation rates and 34^th in the nation in the percentage of adults who have a high school diploma or the equivalent.

We must focus on measures and accountability. That is why the State Education Department's ("SED") current process to develop a teacher and principal evaluation system is critically important. We not only need a strong evaluation system that will improve the performance of our children, but also to support our educators so they can continually develop and improve. Our goal should be to have the best system of evaluation in the nation, yet our proposed system falls short of other states, such as Colorado and Tennessee.

What SED establishes today will have a lasting effect for decades to come so it is imperative it's done correctly. The current Draft Regulations for Teacher and Principal Evaluation ("Draft Regulations") that were recently issued, however, need revision if we are to implement a system that will be the building blocks to greater performance in our education system.

Although there are a number of details in need of improvement, we recommend SED make the following comprehensive changes:

· Increase the percentage of statewide objective data, like measuring student growth on statewide test scores, used to evaluate teacher performance; · Impose rigorous classroom observation and other subjective measures standards on school districts when evaluating teacher performance; · Require a positive teacher evaluation rating be given only when the teacher receives a combined positive rating on both subjective and objective measures, such as student growth on statewide tests; and, · Accelerate the implementation of the evaluation system.

These are discussed in more detail below and, if implemented, will greatly strengthen the evaluation process.

· First, remove the explicit language prohibiting the same measure of student growth on state assessments from being used for locally-selected assessment measures and state measures simultaneously

The Draft Regulations explicitly bar a school district from using the same measure of student growth on the same assessment for both the state assessment subcomponent and the locally-selected measures subcomponent. We believe such a prohibition is unnecessarily restrictive because it precludes a school district from using the objective state-developed growth measure for the locally-selected measures.

The Draft Regulations should be amended to permit the same student growth measure be used for the state assessment and locally-selected measures. By removing this prohibition in the Draft Regulations, up to 40 percent of the total score could be based on objective student growth measures on state tests—a percentage that is closer to many other states.

This change would ensure that greater balance is struck between using objective teacher evaluation measures, such as statewide testing, and subjective teacher evaluation measures, such as classroom observation. Given that the subjective measures have far greater weight under the evaluation process system, it is imperative that the Draft Regulations adopted do not explicitly reduce the types of objective assessments, such as growth on state tests, available to be used.

· Second, impose additional standards on school districts to improve the 60 percent of locally-developed rubric requirements, such as the observation process, to make evaluations more rigorous

The Draft Regulations must be strengthened and better defined to make the 60 percent subjective criteria to evaluate teachers more valuable. Already, New York is an outlier as compared to other states in that it requires more weight be given to subjective measures when rating teachers. Therefore, it is critical that the Draft Regulations include greater precision and impose clear standards.

For example, under the Draft Regulations, half of the 60 percent of the locally-developed rubric must be based on classroom observation. Studies have shown that a rigorous evaluation program based on classroom observation is a significant component in promoting student achievement growth. As such, the classroom observation requirement should be increased from half to at least 40 percent of the 60 percent total of the locally-developed rubric.

Moreover, the Draft Regulations should establish baseline standards to make classroom observation a more meaningful measure. At a minimum it is vital that the Draft Regulations require multiple annual observations and include criteria for using third party observers.

· Third, require a positive teacher evaluation rating be given only when the teacher receives a combined positive rating on both subjective and objective measures, such as student growth on statewide tests

As was discussed above, under the Draft Regulations, objective measurements (e.g. state assessments) have lower weight than subjective measurements to evaluate teachers. In addition, there is no guarantee that objective measures have much meaning in the currently proposed scoring bands. In essence, a teacher could receive a positive rating, such as "developing", based only on subjective teacher evaluation measures.

Other states, such as Delaware and Rhode Island, require "effective" ratings in both the subjective and objective testing measures in order for a teacher or principal to receive an overall "effective" rating. No such requirement exists under the Draft Regulations and therefore diminishes the weight given to objective measurements in the evaluation process. Therefore, at a minimum, the scoring bands should be adjusted to give greater weight to the objective measures by not allowing a positive rating based on subjective measures alone. As an alternative, it is recommended that a teacher or principal be rated "effective" in both objective and subjective categories in order to receive an overall "effective" or "highly effective" rating.

· Fourth, accelerate the timetable of implementing the evaluation system

I appreciate your assistance in accelerating the process so the evaluation system could be implemented for all teachers prior to the full implementation deadline of the 2012-13 school year. However, we must make sure that school districts begin the process in an expeditious manner. Endless implementation delays will hamper our ability to ensure our children are getting the best education, because a system not implemented is of no use.

Since SED has articulated the criteria for implementing the entire teacher and principal evaluation system, schools districts should fully implement the teacher and principal evaluation system for the 2011-12 school year and therefore the Draft Regulations should authorize school districts to do so.

Finally, my Administration will aggressively seek to incentivize schools districts to implement the evaluation system expeditiously. Therefore, only those districts that actually perform, and implement the teacher and principal evaluation system, would be eligible for the Executive's School Performance Incentive Program—a $500 million program—that I included in the Executive Budget. School districts would potentially lose millions of dollars on state awards for failure to implement the system quickly.

We must not squander the opportunity to set the right course and make New York a leader in evaluating performance in our education system. If done correctly we will revive our education system to ensure students perform better and succeed in their future careers. The recommendations above will help set the course. Now is our chance to make New York a leader in education performance.

Sincerely,
Andrew M. Cuomo
Governor

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction and the doctrine of the exhaustion of administrative remedies considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction and the doctrine of the exhaustion of administrative remedies considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court
Matter of Neumann v Wyandanch Union Free School Dist., 2011 NY Slip Op 03859, Appellate Division, Second Department 

Sally Neumann sued the Wyandanch Union Free School District for its alleged breach of her employment contract. Supreme Court’s dismissal of Neumann’s breach of contract action. Neumann also claimed that she had attained tenure by estoppel as “Director of Technology” with the school district

Neumann, was employed by Wyandanch as its "Director of Technology" in November 2004. She was later transferred to the position of "Assistant Superintendent for Curriculum and Technology." In September 2008 the District assigned her to the position of "Assistant Director for Curriculum and Technology."

The collective bargaining agreement between the District and the Wyandanch Administrators Association provided that "Director" positions were eligible for tenure and represented by the Association, but the "Assistant Superintendent" position was nontenured and excluded from Association membership.

In July 2008, Neumann had entered into an employment contract with the District for her third year of employment as Assistant Superintendent. The contract provided that the "terms and conditions of employment" not otherwise addressed in the contract were incorporated from the collective bargaining agreement. Under the collective bargaining agreement, claims relating to its terms were subject to a mandatory grievance process.

In September 2008, following her assignment to the "Assistant Director for Curriculum and Technology" position, the District reduced Neumann's salary to $135,706. In November 2008, the District abolished Neumann's position, and no longer paid her a salary after that date.

Neumann commenced a hybrid CPLR article 78 proceeding and plenary action seeking a judgment declaring that she had acquired tenure by estoppel as a Director based in part on her service in the Assistant Superintendent position. She also sought damages based on the District's alleged breach of contract when it reduced and finally ceased to pay her the salary provided for in the July 2008 employment agreement.

The Supreme Court, relying on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, dismissed Neumann’s action claiming she had acquired tenure by estoppel and directed her to raise her tenure claim before the Commissioner of Education. The court also dismissed her claim alleging breach of contract.

Addressing "The doctrine of primary jurisdiction,” the court explained that the doctrine provides that where the courts and an administrative agency have concurrent jurisdiction over a dispute involving issues beyond the conventional experience of judges . . . the court will stay its hand until the agency has applied its expertise to the salient questions," citing Flacke v Onondaga Landfill Sys., 69 NY2d 355. Further, said the court, "The doctrine . . . applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body. In such situations “the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its views.'"

In contrast, where the determination does not require the special competence of an administrative agency, the doctrine does not apply.

In this instance the Appellate Division ruled that the interpretation and enforcement of Neumann's employment agreement was not within the Commissioner of Education's specialized knowledge and experience. Rather its interpretation and enforcement depends on common-law contract rules that lie within the purview of the judiciary. Accordingly, said the court, Supreme Court’s dismissal of Neumann’s cause of action alleging breach of contract under color of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction was improper and the Supreme Court should have retained jurisdiction to decide that cause of action.

As to the School District’s argument that Neumann’s dismissal was nevertheless proper because she was required to exhaust her administrative remedies by submitting the matter to the grievance procedure mandated under the collective bargaining agreement, the Appellate Division said that “the clear terms of [Neumann’s employment agreement and relevant provisions of the collective bargaining agreement” indicate that Association’s grievance remedies were not available to Neumann with respect to her cause of action alleging breach of contract.

Consequently, Neumann was entitled to seek judicial review directly, and thus her cause of action breach of contract should not have been dismissed.

The decision is posted on the Internet at: 

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_03859.htm

Employee’s dismissal for “excessive absenteeism” failed to survive judicial scrutiny where such absences were authorized by the employer and properly documented

Employee’s dismissal for “excessive absenteeism” failed to survive judicial scrutiny where such absences were authorized by the employer and properly documented 

Matter of Iarocci v Incorporated Vil. of W. Haverstraw, 2011 NY Slip Op 50794(U), Supreme Court, Rockland County, Judge Alfred J. Weiner [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports.] 

Michael Iarocci was served with disciplinary charges pursuant to §75 Civil Service. He was found guilty a pattern of excessive absences over an 18-month period.* 

Iarocci contended that his absences were all for valid reasons and that his termination was contrary to law and was arbitrary and capricious. The Village, on the other hand, argued that Iarocci’s “excessive absences” made him unreliable and, therefore, incompetent to perform his duties. 

The §75 Hearing Officer found there was "...substantial evidence to support the charge of incompetence based upon [Iarocci’s] excessive absences but that [his] absences did not affect the morale of the department to the extent that it was ... asserted in conclusory fashion by the witnesses who testified."  The Hearing Officer recommended that Iarocci be suspended for a period of 90 days without pay and that upon his return placed on disciplinary probationary for an appropriate period of time.

West Haverstraw accepted the findings of the Hearing Officer but imposed the penalty of dismissal.

Iarocci appealed that Judge Weiner said that the issue before him was whether the penalty of termination was "so disproportionate as to shock one's sense of fairness?" 

Citing Matter of Featherstone v. Franco, 95 NY2d 550, Judge Weiner said that “Judicial review of an administrative penalty is limited to whether the measure or mode of penalty of discipline imposed constitutes an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.” Further, the court observed, in Pell v Board of Education, 34 NY2d 222, the Court of Appeals set out the standard for determining the appropriate penalty is whether the punishment imposed is "...so disproportionate to the offense, in light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness." 

Judge Weiner then set out a number of decision in which courts have upheld the termination of a public employee found guilty of “excessive absence” including McKinnon v. Board of Educ. of North Bellmore Union Free School Dist. 273 AD2d 240, Alston v. Morgan 245 AD2d 287, and Romano v. Town Bd. of Town of Colonie, 200 AD2d 934.

Here, however, the record indicated that Iarocci had received authorization from his employer for his absences, followed the appropriate call-in procedures and obtained appropriate medical documentation when necessary. Further, the court found that he was never warned about his excessive absences or charged with insubordination or other misconduct. 

Other mitigating circumstances considered by Judge Weiner included Iarocci employment for ten years and no prior disciplinary problems; his frequent absences commenced only began after he had gallbladder surgery and later suffered an employment related back injury; and his promotion from Motor Equipment Operator I to Motor Equipment Operator II by West Haverstraw. 

Distinguishing Iarocci’s situation from the facts underlying the several cases in which termination has been imposed for excessive absenteeism, Judge Weiner noted that “When absenteeism has been authorized by an employer and properly documented according to procedure, termination for excessive absenteeism has not been imposed upon an employee unless it was coupled with more aggravating factors, including insubordination, [following] progressive discipline and other incidents of poor performance at work.”

Rulling that penalty of termination imposed upon Iarocci by West Haverstraw was  “disproportionate to the offense charged …” Judge Weiner said that the Town “should have given due weight to mitigating factors when deciding the appropriate penalty to impose.”

Annulling the penalty of dismissal, Judge Weiner remanded the matter to the Village Board “for the imposition of a penalty other than termination.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_50794.htm

A series of annual appointments as an educator may not result in tenure by estoppel

A series of annual appointments as an educator may not result in tenure by estoppel

Mohr v Salamanca City School District, 267 A.D.2d 983

Seniority is one of the critical elements in determining the retention of an employee in layoff situations. Such seniority, however, is a function of having tenure with the individual’s employer, as the Mohr case demonstrates. As Mohr demonstrates, tenure is attained as a result of being continued in service after completing a probationary period and not simply completing a series of annual appointments.

Brian Mohr was appointed as a teacher’s aide in Salamanca’s Bilingual Education Program in 1978. He was reappointed annually to that position until 1982 when he was appointed as a Title VII funded Bilingual Resource Teacher [BFT] for one year.

In determining seniority for the purposes of a layoff, the District found that Mohr, the least senior teacher, and he was terminated. Mohr sued, contending that because of his earlier service with the district, he was not the least senior teacher in his tenure area. Mohr argued that he had acquired tenure by estoppel as a teacher as a result of his service with the district from 1987 through and including 1992. He claimed that this entitled him to “bump” a teacher in the Seneca Language/Iroquois Culture tenure area with less seniority or, alternatively, to be placed on the preferred list for employment in “similar positions”.

The Appellate Division said “Supreme Court properly rejected those contentions.”

According to the decision, although an individual who completes his or her probationary period may attain tenure by estoppel, Mohr had not been appointed to a “tenure track” position until 1993. Each of Mohr’s pre-1993 employments by the district was dependent on the district’s receiving grant funds. As Mohr had been employed under a series of one-year contracts rather than for a “probationary term,” the court said that he could not, and did not, attain tenure by estoppel. This meant that Mohr could not “bump” a teacher with less service with the district.

In Yastion v Mills, 229 A.D.2d 775, the Appellate Division held that a teacher may work on a year-to-year contractual basis and never acquire tenure even after three years of service. Orange-Ulster BOCES had appointed Yastion to a federally funded position and his annual employment contracts specifically indicated that “tenure does not apply to this position.”

Mohr was no more successful with his claim that he should be placed on a preferred list. The Appellate Division said that “it is well settled that a teacher is entitled to be placed on a preferred eligible list if he or she is certified in the same or a similar tenure area.”

Pointing out that Mohr was not certified to teach in the Elementary Education or a similar tenure area, the court said that while he held a permit that was the equivalent of certification to teach Seneca Language/Iroquois Culture, “the closest tenure area to Seneca Language/Iroquois Culture is the foreign languages tenure area, which, said the court, applies to seventh grade and above, not to the elementary grades.” Accordingly, the Appellate Division dismissed this branch of his appeal as well, holding that Mohr was not “entitled to placement on a preferred eligibility list.”

An appeal of an arbitration award must be perfected within the controlling statute of limitations

An appeal of an arbitration award must be perfected within the controlling statute of limitations

Rodriguez v NYC Transit Authority, 269 A.D.2d 600, Motion for appeal denied, 96 N.Y.2d 704

Hermino Rodriguez was dismissed from his position of cleaner with the New York City Transit Authority after being found guilty of disciplinary charges by a tripartite arbitration board.

Objecting to his termination, Rodriguez filed an Article 78 petition. A State Supreme Court judge vacated the arbitration award and directed the Authority to reinstate Rodriguez to his former position with back salary.

Find anything wrong with this? The Appellate Division did and overturned the lower court’s ruling.

In the words of the Appellate Division, “[c]ontrary to the Supreme Court’s determination, the only proper proceeding to seek review of the arbitrators’ decision in this case would be pursuant to CPLR [Civil Practice Law and Rules] Article 75...” not Article 78.

In addition, Section 7510 of the CPLR has a relatively short statute of limitation. The motion to vacate the arbitration award must be filed within 90 days of the receipt of the arbitrators’ decision.*

Rodriguez received a copy of the arbitration award affirming his termination on July 24, 1997. He filed his Article 78 petition, which was not heard until November 15, 1997. By that time it was too late for him to file an Article 75 petition.

While the Supreme Court justice treated Rodriguez’s Article 78 proceeding as an application pursuant to Article 75 of the CPLR, which he could do, the court did not have the power to extend the Statute of Limitations controlling the filing Article 75 actions.

The point here is that Rodriguez could have filed his motion to vacate the arbitration award within 90 days of his receiving the determination even if he had already filed an Article 78 action. The fact that he had started an Article 78 action, however, did not toll the running of the statute of limitations applicable in an Article 75 pro­ceeding.

* Education law Section 2030-a.5 provides an even shorter statute of limitations for challenging an adverse  disciplinary arbitration award – 10 days: Section 3020-a.5 Appeal. Not later than ten days after receipt of the hearing officer’s decision, the employee or the employing board may make an application to the New York state supreme court to vacate or modify the decision of the hearing officer pursuant to section seven thousand five hundred eleven of the civil practice law and rules. The court's review shall be limited to the grounds set forth in such section. The hearing panel's determination shall be deemed to be final for the purpose of such proceeding. In no case shall the filing or the pendency of an appeal delay the implementation of the decision of the hearing officer.