ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE [AI] IS NOT USED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN PREPARING NYPPL SUMMARIES OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS

March 25, 2013

Employee terminated for having submitted a false application for a mortgage


Employee terminated for having submitted a false application for a mortgage
Kim v Kelly, 2013 NY Slip Op 01905, Appellate Division, First Department

The Appellate Division affirmed the termination of a New York City police officer by the Police Commissioner after the officer was found to have submitted a false mortgage application.

Finding that there was substantial evidence showing that the officer had “falsely listed a company that [the officer] did not work for as his sole source of income, and falsely listed a New Jersey address as his primary residence,” the court said there was no basis to disturb the credibility determinations of the Hearing Officer.

As to the penalty imposed, dismissal from his position, the court, citing Kelly v Safir, 96 NY2d, 32, said that termination did not shock its sense of fairness as the Commissioner "is accountable to the public for the integrity of the Department."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_01905.htm

March 23, 2013

Selected reports and information published by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli


Selected reports and information published by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli
Issued during the week of March 18-24, 2013 [Click on the caption to access the full report]

DiNapoli: PepsiCo to Disclose Lobbying and Trade Association Ties

PepsiCo, a global food and beverage company with annual revenues of $60 billion, has agreed to fully disclose all of its direct lobbying and contributions made to trade associations as well as funds paid to grassroots lobbying and tax-exempt organizations that write and endorse model legislation, according to New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli. In response to the agreement, DiNapoli withdrew a shareholder resolution calling for disclosure of shareholder money spent on lobbying and other political spending.


SEC Action Puts Caterpillar Resolution on Sudan up for Shareholder Vote

The New York State Common Retirement Fund’s shareholder resolution calling upon Caterpillar Inc. to take steps to ensure that the company’s foreign subsidiaries are not doing business with the government of Sudan will go before shareholders on June 12, New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced Thursday. Caterpillar had attempted to block the resolution from appearing on its shareholder proxy statement to be voted upon at its annual meeting by petitioningthe Securities and Exchange Commission to allow its exclusion from the meeting agenda.


DiNapoli: Tax Collections Declined in February; Budget Must Reflect Realistic Revenue Expectations

Total tax collections trailed the latest projections in the amended Executive Budget Financial Plan released last month, according to the February cash reportreleased Wednesday by State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli. Tax collections through February totaled $59.9 billion, 2.6 percent higher than the same period a year ago although collections in the month of February were 5.6 percent lower than collections for the same period last year.


Comptroller DiNapoli Releases Municipal Audits

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced his office completed audits of


the Town of Newstead; and,

the Town of Stratford.

March 21, 2013

A party is permitted to introduce updated records as evidence upon the resumption of an administrative hearing if an opportunity to respond to such records is provided


A party is permitted to introduce updated records as evidence upon the resumption of an administrative hearing if an opportunity to respond to such records is provided
Coleman v Rhea, 2013 NY Slip Op 01783, Appellate Division, First Department

In resolving this Article 78 petition one of the issues considered by the Appellate Division was whether there was “substantial evidence” to support an administrative determination made after a hearing.

The petitioner, Wanda Coleman, claimed that her right to due process was violated when the hearing officer permitted the New York City Housing Authority [NYCHA] to submit an updated ledger into evidence when an administrative hearing was resumed.

The Appellate Division disagreed, explaining that Coleman was free to testify regarding the updated ledger and the hearing officer kept the hearing record open post-hearing to give Coleman a full opportunity to respond to the updated information.

Indeed, said the court, Coleman had availed herself of this opportunity by submitting documentary evidence. Further, the court ruled that the hearing officer had not violated NYCHA's relevant internal administrative procedures in so doing.

A second issue concerned a procedural matter.

The Appellate Division noted that Supreme Court had denied Coleman’s Article 78 petition seeking to annul NYCHA’s administrative determination. The Appellate Division, however, “unanimously reversed” Supreme Court’s ruling on the law and treated the petition as one transferred to it for a de novo review.

Coleman’s petition, said the court, raised an issue of substantial evidence, and thus, the proceeding should have been transferred to this Court pursuant to CPLR §7804(g). Accordingly, the Appellate Division considered the substantial evidence issue de novo and decided all issues presented as if the proceeding had been properly transferred to it by Supreme Court in the first instance.

The Appellate Division then confirmed NYCHA’s administrative determination as supported by substantial evidence and denied Coleman’s petition, dismissing the proceeding.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_01783.htm

March 20, 2013

If a past practice involving a mandatory subject of negotiation is established the Taylor Law bars the employer from unilaterally discontinuing that practice


If a past practice involving a mandatory subject of negotiation is established the Taylor Law bars the employer from unilaterally discontinuing that practice
Town of Islip v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 2013 NY Slip Op 01562, Appellate Division, Second Department

The Public Employment Relations Board [PERB] affirmed a decision of its administrative law judge that found, after a hearing, that an improper practice charge filed by Local 237, International Brotherhood of Teamsters and United Public Service Employees Union, violated Civil Service Law §209-a(1)(d).

The genesis of Local 237 filing an improper practice charge with PERB was the Town’s unilaterally discontinued an alleged past practice involving the use of Town vehicles by certain unit members to commute. PERB directed the Town to reinstate the practice and to "make whole unit employees for the extra expenses incurred as a result of the unilateral withdrawal of the vehicle assignments, if any, together with interest at the maximum legal rate."

The Town had contended that the practice violated its Code of Ethics and Financial Disclosure Law which, in pertinent part, provided that "[n]o officer or employee shall request or permit the use of Town-owned vehicles, equipment, material or property for personal convenience or profit, except when such services are available to the public generally or are provided as municipal policy for the use of such officer or employee in the conduct of official business. In addition, the Town had a written policy concerning the use of Town vehicles.

According to the decision “For at least 15 years prior to 2007, the policy was frequently ignored with respect to assignments of Town vehicles for permanent use. In late 2007, the Town and a union representing certain Town employees were negotiating two new collective bargaining agreements. In the course of negotiations the Town proposed a provision concerning employee use of Town vehicles, but then withdrew its proposal, contending that the permanent use of Town-owned vehicles was not a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.

When negotiations were at an impasse in early 2008 on various issues, the Town Board passed a resolution limiting the assignment of "take-home" vehicles. As a result of this action approximately 45 unit members lost their assignments of Town vehicles for their permanent use.

The two unions then representing the affected employees filed an improper practice charge with the PERB contending that the long-extant practice of assigning Town vehicles for permanent use to persons who did not qualify for them under the Town's written policy had given rise to a "past practice" as an economic benefit. Thus, argued the unions, “Any change in that practice … was a 'mandatory' subject of collective bargaining, and the Town's change in policy constituted an improper employment practice."

A PERB administrative law judge determined that the longstanding practice of assigning Town vehicles to employees for permanent use constituted a past practice regarding the terms and conditions of employment, notwithstanding that those permanent assignments were in conflict with the Town's written policy. The Town was directed to restore the vehicles to the employees and compensate the employees for the period during which they were without the vehicles. PERB, in its final determination, affirmed the administrative law judge's decision.

The Appellate Division sustained PERB’s decision, explaining that under the Taylor Law a public employer is obligated to negotiate in good faith with the bargaining representative of its current employees regarding the "terms and conditions of employment" and the failure to do so constitutes an improper employment practice.

Further, said the court, pursuant to this duty to negotiate, where a past practice between a public employer and its current employees is established involving a mandatory subject of negotiation, the Taylor Law bars the employer from discontinuing that practice without prior negotiation, citing Aeneas McDonald Police Benevolent Assn. v City of Geneva, 92 NY2d 326.

As PERB's determination was "made as a result of a hearing held, and at which evidence was taken, pursuant to direction by law," the Appellate Division said that it must determine whether PERB's decision was supported by "substantial evidence." In addition, in light of certain of the Town's contentions,* the Court said that it must also inquire whether the determination "was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion."

The Appellate Division’s conclusions:

1. The PERB's determination was not affected by an error of law, as the Town could be required to collectively bargain over the issue. The court explained that the Town government was responsible for administering the Ethics Code and for managing its vehicle fleet. Yet, as substantial evidence in the record established, the Town frequently and openly ignored that Code and its policy for managing its vehicle fleet, only to contend later that the Code allowed it to act unilaterally in taking the vehicles away from the employees who had been permanently provided with them. PERB, said the court, was not required to give more effect to the Town Ethics Code than the Town itself gave to it.

2. For similar reasons, the Appellate Division ruled that it cannot be said as a matter of law that it is unreasonable for employees to rely on the administering authority's interpretation and implementation of its policy and Ethics Code. Consequently, the PERB's determination was not affected by an error of law, was not arbitrary and capricious, did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

In the words of the court, “The evidence in the record supported the PERB's determination that the assignment of Town vehicles to the affected employees for permanent use was unequivocal and continued uninterrupted for a period of time which, under the circumstances, created a reasonable expectation among the affected unit employees that the practice would continue.

“The assignment of Town vehicles by Town officials to nonqualifying employees was done openly and without any indication to the employees that it was other than legitimate. The payroll office was notified to deduct a certain amount from the employees' paychecks to account for the value of the benefit. Moreover, the practice continued unabated for many years.

“Consequently, the Appellate Division ruled that PERB properly determined that the assignment of vehicles to the affected employees for permanent use constituted a past practice as to a term or condition of employment, and that the Town engaged in an improper practice by refusing to engage in collective bargaining as to a change to that term or condition.”

* The Town claimed that as its Ethics Code forbids the use of Town vehicles in violation of Town policy, the Town could not be forced to engage in collective bargaining over the issue. In addition, the Town argued that, as a matter of law, the employees could not have a reasonable expectation that the assignment of Town vehicles for permanent use would continue, because such an assignment of vehicles violated the Town Ethics Code. 

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

March 19, 2013

Petition seeking to remove a public office from his or her position pursuant to Public Officers Law §36 must be served in accordance with the rules of the Appellate Division having jurisdiction


Petition seeking to remove a public office from his or her position pursuant to Public Officers Law §36 must be served in accordance with the rules of the Appellate Division having jurisdiction
Nielsen v Hafner, 2013 NY Slip Op 01555, Appellate Division, Second Department

§36 of the Public Officers Law provides for the removal of a town, village, improvement district or fire district officer, other than a justice of the peace, for misconduct, maladministration, malfeasance or malversation in office.

Any citizen resident in the jurisdiction, or the appropriate district attorney, may file a §36 applicationseeking the removal of such an officer with the Appellate Division in the appropriate judicial department. §36 provides that a copy of the application and the charges upon which the application will be made must be served on the officer at least 8 days prior to such filing.

Karen Nielsen initiated an action seeking a court order to remove Bruce Hafner from public office in Cold Spring Harbor, Town of Huntington, Suffolk County, pursuant to Public Officers Law §36 with the Appellate Division.

Nielsen also filed a petition pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules with the Appellate Division seeking an order to compel Hafner to resign as Fire Commissioner of the Cold Spring Harbor Fire District.

Hafner asked the Appellate Division to dismiss Nielsen’s petition filed pursuant to Public Officers Law §36 on the ground that it was not properly served upon him. The court agreed and granted Hafner’s motion to the extent that it sought relief pursuant to Public Officers Law §36, indicating that the petition was not properly served in accordance with the Court’s rules as set out in 22 NYCRR 670.18.*

Turning to Nielsen’s Article 78 petition seeking a court order compelling Hafner to resign from his office of Fire Commissioner, the Appellate Division dismissed this branch of the action as well, explaining it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider the Article 78 petition filed by Nielsen.

* The rules of the Appellate Division, Second Department provide that a special proceeding pursuant to Public Officers Law §36 “shall be commenced by the filing of a petition in the office of the clerk … pursuant to CPLR 304. Service of the petition with a notice of petition or order to show cause shall be made in accordance with CPLR 306-b on at least 20 days' notice to the respondent.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_01555.htm

CAUTION

Subsequent court and administrative rulings, or changes to laws, rules and regulations may have modified or clarified or vacated or reversed the information and, or, decisions summarized in NYPPL. For example, New York State Department of Civil Service's Advisory Memorandum 24-08 reflects changes required as the result of certain amendments to §72 of the New York State Civil Service Law to take effect January 1, 2025 [See Chapter 306 of the Laws of 2024]. Advisory Memorandum 24-08 in PDF format is posted on the Internet at https://www.cs.ny.gov/ssd/pdf/AM24-08Combined.pdf. Accordingly, the information and case summaries should be Shepardized® or otherwise checked to make certain that the most recent information is being considered by the reader.
THE MATERIAL ON THIS WEBSITE IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. AGAIN, CHANGES IN LAWS, RULES, REGULATIONS AND NEW COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS MAY AFFECT THE ACCURACY OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THIS LAWBLOG. THE MATERIAL PRESENTED IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE AND THE USE OF ANY MATERIAL POSTED ON THIS WEBSITE, OR CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING SUCH MATERIAL, DOES NOT CREATE AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP.
NYPPL Blogger Harvey Randall served as Principal Attorney, New York State Department of Civil Service; Director of Personnel, SUNY Central Administration; Director of Research, Governor’s Office of Employee Relations; and Staff Judge Advocate General, New York Guard. Consistent with the Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations, the material posted to this blog is presented with the understanding that neither the publisher nor NYPPL and, or, its staff and contributors are providing legal advice to the reader and in the event legal or other expert assistance is needed, the reader is urged to seek such advice from a knowledgeable professional.
New York Public Personnel Law. Email: publications@nycap.rr.com