Recent ruling by the Appellate Division concerning alleged unlawful discrimination

Recent ruling by the Appellate Division concerning alleged unlawful discrimination

Browne v Board of Educ, 2014 NY Slip Op 07465, Appellate Division, Second Department

Matter of Katz (Commissioner of Labor), 2014 NY Slip Op 07556, Appellate Division, Third Department

The Browne decision:

This decision by the Appellate Division illustrates the shifting of a party’s “burden of going forward” in litigating a complaint alleging unlawful discrimination.

Robert Browne attempted to recover damages for alleged employment discrimination on the basis of gender in violation of Executive Law §296.

The New York City Board of Education [Department] appalled so much of an order of the Supreme Court that denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action in which Browne alleged employment discrimination based on gender.

The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling explaining that Browne, in opposing the Board’s “prima facie showing that there was a legitimate, raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the Department’s explanation was false, misleading, or incomplete, and thus, a pretext for discrimination.

Accordingly, said the court, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the Department’s motion for summary judgment dismissing Browne’s first cause of action, which alleged employment discrimination based on gender.

The Appellate Division also noted that the Department, by failing to raise collateral estoppel as an affirmative defense to Browne’s cause of action alleging employment discrimination either in its pre-answer motion to dismiss or in its answer, waived it, citing CPLR §3211[a][5],[e].

The Katz decision:

The Katz decision by the Appellate Division demonstrates a difficulty that resulted from an individual submitting his or her resignation from the position based on what the court characterized as the employee's “perceived  religious harassment” without first giving the employer an opportunity to investigate the matter.

Roberta B. Katzbegan working for an organization that provides vocational services for persons with disabilities and was being trained to assume the position of director of accounting.

Prior to accepting the job, Katz received the employer's assurance that her religious practices would be accommodated permitting her to leave work at 2:45 p.m. on Friday, December 7, 2012. Her trainer scheduled a meeting on that date from 2:00 p.m. until 3:00 p.m., but told claimant that she could leave at 2:45 p.m. At 2:40 p.m. the trainer told Katz that she needed her to prepare a computer-generated report.

Katz told the trainer she could not complete the report within five minutes and the trainer agreed to prepare it herself. The trainer then asked Katz to log on to her computer to get a password the trainer needed to do the report. At 2:50 p.m. the trainer told Katz to leave.

Katz did not report to work the following Monday, but resigned from her position due to what she perceived was religious harassment.

Katz applied for unemployment insurance benefits and ultimately the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ruled that she was disqualified from receiving such benefits because she had voluntarily left her employment without good cause. Katz appealed the Board's ruling.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s determination explaining regardless of the  “inappropriateness of the trainer's actions,” Katz resigned from her position without affording the employer an opportunity to investigate the matter or take corrective action.

Noting that Katz had emailed the employer announcing her resignation the Sunday after the incident and before she even discussed it with the employer's human resources manager, the court ruled that under these circumstances substantial evidence supported the Board's finding that Katz had voluntarily left her employment without good cause.

The Browne decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2014/2014_07465.htm

The Katz decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2014/2014_07556.htm

The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board is bound by the disciplinary arbitrator's factual findings regarding the employee’s misconduct

The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board held bound by the disciplinary arbitrator's factual findings regarding the employee’s misconduct 

2014 NY Slip Op 07414, Appellate Division, Third Department

A NYC Transit Authority [Authority] train operator [Operator] was served with disciplinary charges. Following a full evidentiary arbitration hearing conducted under the collective bargaining agreement, Operator was terminated.

Operator applied for unemployment insurance benefits and the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, noting that it was bound by the factual findings of the arbitrator, conducted an "independent evaluation” as to whether Operator’s behavior constituted disqualifying misconduct for the purposes of unemployment insurance.

The Board, however, found that Operator’s behavior leading to the Authority’s filing disciplinary charges did not constitute “disqualifying misconduct” within the meaning of the Unemployment Insurance Law and approved his claim for unemployment insurance benefits.

The Appellate Division reversed the Board’s determination.

The court explained that "While the Board was free to make 'independent additional factual findings' and draw its own independent conclusion as to whether [Operator’s] behavior rose to the level of disqualifying misconduct for purposes of entitlement to unemployment insurance benefits, it was also bound by the [arbitrator's] 'factual findings regarding [Operator’s] conduct and [her] conclusion' that claimant had" committed serious violations of safety rules.

In this instance the arbitrator found that Operator had committed “grave violations of the employer's policies that had endangered the safety of his passengers, violations that were rendered even more egregious by the fact that he had previously been disciplined for similar conduct.”

In contrast, said the court, the Board “inexplicably found that [Operator] had ‘substantially complied with’ the [Authority’s] policies and made no effort to consider [Operator’s] behavior within the context of his prior disciplinary history."

Accordingly the Appellate Division ruled that the Board improperly contradicted factual findings of the arbitrator and remitted the matter to the Board for it to "reconsider upon appropriate findings."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2014/2014_07414.htm
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If a settlement or award includes a payment only the part constituting reimbursement for lost wages is included in determining the employee’s retirement allowance

If a settlement or award includes a payment only the part constituting reimbursement for lost wages is included in determining the employee’s retirement allowance
2014 NY Slip Op 07412, Appellate Division, Third Department

In 2006 a grievance brought by the union on behalf of a teacher [Teacher] who was not selected for a coaching position was settled with the school district. The settlement included a payment in the amount of $9,500 for “lost wages” as the result of Teacher not being given a coaching position.

This 2006 settlement award was included in the calculation of Teacher's final average salary for retirement purposes by the New York State Teachers' Retirement System [TRS].

Teacher was not appointed to a coaching position for either of the next two school years.  The union again filed a grievance on behalf of Teacher and again the matter was settled. A 2011 settlement “memorandum of understanding [MOU]” provided for an awarded of $11,220.* This amount constituted the stipends that Teacher would have been paid had he been appointed to a coaching position for both school years.

Teacher then asked TRS to recalculate his three-year final average salary to include the 2011 settlement payment provided by the MOU and to adjust his retirement allowance accordingly. TRS determined that because the payment provided pursuant to the 2011 MOU was not part of Teacher‘s regular compensation it could not be included in the final computation of his retirement benefit.

Teacher sued TRS seeking a court order annulling its decision, arguing that TRS’s decision was arbitrary and capricious in light of its previous inclusion of the 2006 settlement payment in its computation of his final average salary.

Supreme Court dismissed Teacher’s petition and he appealed that ruling to the Appellate Division.

The Appellate Division noted that a TRS member's final average salary is based on his or her highest average annual regular salary that was earned over any three consecutive years of service prior to retirement but shall exclude, among other things, "payments which are not part of the salary base."

TRS had explained that it had included the payment made to Teacher pursuant to the 2006 stipulation as the MOU reflected an acknowledgment by the school district that it had violated an existing collective bargaining agreement when it denied Teacher's coaching application on the ground that he was unqualified and gave the positions to teachers with less seniority. In addition, the 2006 settlement confirm that Teacher was indeed eligible to assume the coaching positions.

However, TRS pointed out that the 2011 MOU settling Teacher's subsequent grievances “did not concede, in any manner, that the denial of Teacher ‘s coaching applications for the 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 school years had resulted in any contractual violations….” In fact, said TRS, the 2011 MOU reiterated the school district's assertion that Teacher "was unqualified for the coaching position at issue."

The Appellate Division said that the fact that the school district opted to pay Teacher in exchange for a complete settlement of his claims against it does not create a basis to find that Teacher was eligible for the coaching appointments. Accordingly, the court found that the MOU settlement payment did not constituted compensation that Teacher would have earned and thus TRS was correct in excluding the 2011 settlement payment in its calculation of Teacher’s final average salary.

Finding that TRS’s determination, which was rendered without a hearing, was rational and not arbitrary and capricious, the Appellate Division declined to disturbed it.

* The Appellate Division observed that “Although the MOU states that the $11,220 settlement amount constitutes the stipends of $5,605 that Teacher would have been paid if appointed to a coaching position during each of the two school years for which he applied, the annual stipend amounts actually total $11,210.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2014/2014_07412.htm

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Removal of a public officer from his or her office

Removal of a public officer from his or her office

Kalodukas v Berentsen, 2014 NY Slip Op 07406, Appellate Division, Third Department

Glenda Kalodukas and other citizen residents of the Village of Bloomingburg in Sullivan County [Kalodukas], filed a petition in the Appellate Division pursuant to Public Officers Law §36* seeking to have the Appellate Division remove Mark Berentsen from his position of Mayor of the Village, alleging, among other things, that he violated General Municipal Law Article 18.**

Berentsen asked the court to dismiss the petition arguing, among other things, that the proceeding was moot in view of the fact that he was unsuccessful in his bid for reelection and no longer held the office of Mayor. The Appellate Division agreed and dismissed Kalodukas’ petition.

The court explained §36 of the Public Officers Law provides, as relevant in this action, that a village officer may be removed from office for "misconduct, maladministration, malfeasance or malversation in office." As Berentsen had lost his bid for reelection and no longer helds the public office from which Kalodukas sought to have him removed, the Appellate Division said that “the proceeding is undoubtedly moot.” 

In addition, the court addressed Kalodukas’ argument that the petition was not moot because Berentsen’s removal would prevent him from holding public office in the future. The Appellate Division, in a footnote, said that findings against an official in a removal proceeding pursuant to §36 of the Public Officers Law would not a bar his or her subsequent election to public office.***

* Such an application for removal may be made to the appellate division by any citizen resident of such town, village, improvement district or fire district, or by the district attorney of the county, in which such town, village or district is located. The officer is to given at least eight days notice and a copy of the charge[s] upon which the application will be made must be served with such notice.

** Article 18 is captioned “Conflicts of Interest of Municipal Officers and Employees”

*** In contrast, the court noted that Article VI, § 22 [h] of the State Constitution “A judge or justice removed by the [C]ourt of [A]ppeals shall be ineligible to hold other judicial office."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2014/2014_07406.htm

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Reporting compensation and reimbursement for expenses paid to election workers

Reporting compensation and reimbursement for expenses paid to election workers

Source: Internal Revenue Service bulletin

Election workers are individuals hired by government entities to perform services at polling places in connection with national, state and local elections.

An election worker may be referred to by other terms and titles, for example, poll worker, moderator, machine tender, checker, ballot clerk, voting official, polling place manager, absentee ballot counter or deputy head moderator. These workers may be employed by the government entity exclusively for election work, or may work in other capacities as well.

Election worker compensation is includible in income and may be treated as wages for social security and Medicare (FICA) tax purposes.

Election workers may be compensated by a set fee per day or a stipend for the election period. The election period may include attending training or meetings prior to and after the election. 

Election workers may also be reimbursed for their mileage or other expenses. To be excludable from wages, expense reimbursements must be made under an accountable plan.

For additional information, go to http://www.irs.gov/Government-Entities/Federal,-State-&-Local-Governments/Election-Workers-Reporting-and-Withholding