Plaintiff, an individual earlier employed by the defendant [School District] commenced an action seeking, among other things, damages based on allegations that School District had violated the New York State's Human Rights Law [Executive Law §290 et seq.] by engaging in age discrimination and had violated Article 1, §8 of the New York State Constitution by retaliating against Plaintiff for, among other things, complaining about failures to follow certain safety precautions.
Prior to the commencement of the instant action School District had terminated Plaintiff, which action was challenged by Plaintiff's union filing a grievance on his behalf. In the arbitration that followed the arbitrator concluded that School District had just cause to terminate Plaintiff.
However, while the arbitration was pending, Plaintiff commenced the instant action in Supreme Court. Prior to discovery, School District moved for, among other things, summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's amended complaint. In support of its motion, School District contended that Plaintiff's claims were collaterally estopped as a result of the arbitration award. Supreme Court agreed with School District and granted its motion insofar as it sought summary judgment.
Plaintiff appealed the Supreme Court's judgment dismissing Plaintiff's amended complaint, which judgment was reverse by the Appellate Division.
The Appellate Division explained that Supreme Court "erred in granting the motion to the extent that it sought summary judgment based upon the application of collateral estoppel", observing that "It is well settled that there are 'but two necessary requirements for the invocation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel';
1. "There must be an identity of issue which has necessarily been decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action; and
2. "There must have been a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling."
In the words of the Appellate Division, "The party seeking to invoke [the doctrine of] collateral estoppel has the burden of showing the identity of the issue, while the party trying to avoid application of the doctrine must establish the lack of a full and fair opportunity to litigate".
The Appellate Division opined that School District failed to establish the "identity of issue" necessary for application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel inasmuch as "the arbitration proceeding concerned whether the allegedly unlawful actions by [the School District] violated the collective bargaining agreement between [the] union and the [School District]" and did not address Plaintiff's claims of discrimination or retaliation.
The Appellate Division then reversed the Supreme Court's judgment, denied the School District's motion, and reinstated Plaintiff's amended complaint.
Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.