In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR Article 78 to review a determination of the New York City Department of Education [DOE] which denied the Petitioner's request for a religious exemption from a COVID-19 vaccine mandate, DOE appealed an order of the Supreme Court which:
1. Granted the Plaintiff's petition;
2. Directed that the Petitioner be reinstated to her full employment status; and
3. Awarded the Petitioner $90,555.63 in back pay; and
4. Awarded the Petitioner $31,095 in attorneys' fees.
In response to the COVID-19 epidemic the New York City Commissioner of Health and Mental Hygiene issued a mandate requiring all DOE employees to provide proof of COVID-19 vaccination. Such mandate was subsequently amended to provide that [nothing] in this [mandate] shall be construed to prohibit any reasonable accommodations otherwise required by law."
Pursuant to an arbitration award between DOE and the Petitioner's union Petitioner was placed on leave without pay while remaining eligible for health benefits and "given the option to comply with the vaccine mandate, retire, resign, or remain on unpaid leave with health benefits until September 6, 2022". Petitioner elected to extend her leave without pay through September 6, 2022 and signed a release and waiver to that effect which provided, in part, "I understand that if I have not returned by September 6, 2022, I shall be deemed to have voluntarily resigned and knowingly waive my rights to challenge such resignation."
On August 19, 2022, Petitioner submitted a request for a religious exemption from the vaccine mandate which DOE denied Petitioner's request, finding that her application failed to meet the criteria for a religious-based accommodation. The denial did not mention the waiver.
Petitioner remained on leave without pay and retained her health benefits through September 6, 2022 but as she did not return to work by September 6, 2022, DOE deemed that, pursuant to the terms of the waiver and the arbitration award, she had voluntarily resigned as of September 6, 2022.
Subsequently Petitioner commenced the instant proceeding pursuant to CPLR Article 78, challenging DOE's denial of her request for a religious exemption and seeking reinstatement to her position as a teacher and an award of back pay and attorneys' fees. Supreme Court the petition be granted and that the Petitioner be reinstated to her full employment status. In addition Supreme Court found:
a. Petitioner was entitled to a religious exemption from the vaccine mandate; and
b. Awarded Petitioner the principal of sum of $90,555.63 in back pay; and
c. The sum of $31,095 in attorneys' fees.
DOE appealed from both the Supreme Court's order and the judgment.
The Appellate Division held that DOE's appeal from the order must be dismissed "as no appeal lies as of right from an intermediate order entered in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 [citing CPLR 5701[b][1])] and any possibility of taking a direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of the judgment in the proceeding."
Although DOE contended that the waiver expressly precludes the Petitioner's claims in this proceeding and, therefore, the proceeding should have been dismissed, the Appellate Division opined that "The waiver at issue is a contract, and its construction is governed by contract law [and] A court's fundamental objective in interpreting a contract is to determine the parties' intent from the language employed and to fulfill their reasonable expectations".
However, as acknowledged by DOE, the Appellate Division observed Petitioner's "contractual promise not to challenge her resignation was not a waiver of her right to seek an accommodation", and thus it follows that Petitioner did waive her right to seek a religious exemption.
The Appellate Division explained "The clear terms of the waiver, as premised on the arbitration award, permitted the [Petitioner] to comply with the vaccine mandate and return to work by September 6, 2022. One way to comply with the vaccine mandate was for the [Petitioner] to get vaccinated. Another was to successfully obtain a religious exemption and reasonable accommodation" and the amendment to the vaccine mandate earlier noted did not bar individual from seeking reasonable accommodations.
Noting that had Petitioner had successfully obtained an exemption and concomitant accommodation during the applicable time period, she would have been in compliance with the vaccine mandate and been able to return to work. In the words of the Appellate Division, "contrary to DOE's position, the waiver did not preclude this proceeding to challenge DOE's denial of the [Petitioner's] request for a religious exemption".
In its appeal DOE did not challenge the Supreme Court's determination that DOE's denial of the petitioner's request for a religious exemption was arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, as per Supreme Court's determination, prior to September 6, 2022, the Petitioner was entitled to a religious exemption from the vaccine mandate, and DOE does not contest that determination on this appeal. Accordingly, the Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's determination in this regard.
However, the Appellate Division further held that because an award of attorneys' fees was not authorized by an agreement between the parties, by statute, or by court rule, "the Supreme Court improperly awarded attorneys' fees to the [Petitioner]."
Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.