Computerized monitoring system records deemed substantial evidence of guilt in a disciplinary proceeding

Computerized monitoring system records deemed substantial evidence of guilt in a disciplinary proceeding

2015 NY Slip Op 03919, Appellate Division, First Department

An employee [Petitioner] was found guilty of the disciplinary charges filed against him alleging that he failed to follow standard that resulted in an injury to an individual using an “out of service” building elevator. Both elevators in the building were “in inspection mode and not in service when the injury occurred”

The penalty imposed: termination of the Petitioner from his position.

Petitioner filed an Article 78 action challenging the appointing authority’s decision and the penalty imposed. The Appellate Division, citing Pell v Board of Educ. of Union Free School Dist. No. 1, 34 NY2d 222, sustained the appointing authority’s decision.

The court explained that substantial evidence in the record supported the appointing officer’s action. The evidence in the record included:

1. The applicable written standard safety measures to be undertaken during elevator repair and/or outages, i.e., the appropriate and necessary warning notice had not been posted by Petitioner

2. Evidence that both elevators being out of service at the same time warranted the standard safety measures of posting out-of-service notices at the elevator banks and securing the elevators so that the public could not use them;

3. Evidence that Petitioner failed to follow these standard procedures;

4. A computerized elevator monitoring system printout and testimony interpreting the data; and

5. Recorded 911 calls.

The Appellate Division explained that notwithstanding Petitioner's arguments to the contrary, the hearing record contained substantial evidence supporting the appointing authority’s decision finding Petitioner [1] guilty of the charges filed against him and [2] the penalty imposed.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_03919.htm

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Applying the doctrine of estoppel against a governmental entity

Applying the doctrine of estoppel against a governmental entity

2015 NY Slip Op 02551, Appellate Division, Third Department

In Owens v McGuire, 121 AD2d 292, the Appellate Division said that the doctrine of estoppel can only be applied “against a governmental entity if failure to apply the doctrine would defeat a right legally and rightfully obtained.”

In 2004 representatives of the New York State and Local Retirement System [System] told an individual [Member] that he was eligible to receive member service credit in the System for his employment with the Legal Aid Society of Westchester County from 1973 to 1975.

In January 2011, Member filed an application for a retirement allowance. However the System then determined that the Legal Aid Society was not a participating employer in the Retirement System and thus Member was not entitled to member service credit for the period during which he served with the Legal Aid Society. Member, seeking a reversal of the System’s determination, requested, and was given a hearing

In the course of the hearing a number of Retirement System employees testified that the Legal Aid Society was not a participating employer and the Hearing Officer denied Member's application for member service credit for the period during which he was employed by the Legal Aid Society. The Comptroller adopted the hearing officer’s ruling and Member appealed.

The Appellate Division sustained the Comptroller’s decision, explaining that a “petitioner has the burden of proof to establish his [or her] entitlement to retirement [member] service credit.” Here, noted the court, Member had testified that he had no evidence that the Legal Aid Society was ever a participating employer in the Retirement System.

Accordingly, said the court, inasmuch as the record reflects that Member was not employed by a participating employer during the period in question, the Comptroller’s denial of the retirement service credit was supported by substantial evidence.

Member had also contended that the System was estopped from denying the retirement member service credit based on the earlier misinformation provided to him by employees of the Retirement System. The court disagreed and rejected this branch of Member’s appeal.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_02551.htm

The absence of the individual who rated the employee unsatisfactory from the administrative hearing may be cured by the testimony of a superior who also observed and rated the employee’s performance

The absence of the individual who rated the employee unsatisfactory from the administrative hearing may be cured by the testimony of a superior who also observed and rated the employee’s performance

2015 NY Slip Op 03787, Appellate Division, First Department

Supreme Court denied a teacher’s [Teacher] petition seeking to annul the appointing authority’s sustaining unsatisfactory rating given Teacher for the school year in question.

Teacher appealed but the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s determination.

Teacher had contended that the appointing authority had “violated Department of Education Bylaw §4.3.3,” alleging that the assistant principal responsible for three of the four unsatisfactory observation reports was not present at the administrative hearing at which Teacher had challenged the performance rating he had received.

The Appellate Division first addressed a procedural issue – was Teacher’s complaint with respect to the absence of the assistance principal from the hearing ripe for the court’s review. It decided that Teacher’s claim regarding the absence of the assistant principal “was unpreserved” as Teacher did not raise this issue before the agency, citing Seitelman v Lavine, 36 NY2d 165 and thus could not be considered in this appeal.

Not withstanding the rejection of Teacher’s challenge on procedural grounds, the court said that regardless of the failure of Teacher to preserve the matter for the purpose of appeal, the record showed that the appointing authority’s determination had a rational basis as it was supported by the testimony of the school principal, who conducted a formal observation of Teacher’s performance and reached the same conclusions as the assistant principal.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_03787.htm

An employee injured on the job may sue for injuries he or she subsequently suffered while being transported to a hospital for treatment for his or her job related injuries

An employee injured on the job may sue for injuries he or she subsequently suffered while being  transported to a hospital for treatment for his or her job related injuries

2015 NY Slip Op 03506, Appellate Division, Second Department

A correction officer [Officer] sustained an injury in the course of his employment at a New York City corrections facility.  While Officer was being transported in a New York City Fire Department ambulance to a local hospital, the ambulance was involved in a motor vehicle accident. 

Officer applied for workers' compensation benefits for the injuries he sustained in the prison. In addition, Officer filed a lawsuit against, among others, the City of New York, the New York City Fire Department and the ambulance driver [Defendants] seeking damages for the injuries he allegedly sustained as a result of the motor vehicle accident that  occurred while he was being transported to the hospital.

Supreme Court denied Defendants’ motions to {1] amend its answer “to add an affirmative defense based on the exclusivity of the Workers' Compensation Law,” and [2] for summary judgment “dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them.” 

Defendants appealed but the Appellate Division sustained the Supreme Court’s ruling.

While "In general, workers compensation benefits are the exclusive remedy of an employee against an employer for any damages sustained from injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment," the Appellate Division said that even if a plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits, he or she is not precluded from commencing a separate action based on subsequent negligent conduct to recover damages for injuries causally related to the initial on-the-job injury, "but which did not arise out of or in the course of the plaintiff's employment.”

The Appellate Division found that such was the case in this action, explaining that notwithstanding Officer’s filing a claim for workers' compensation benefits for the injuries he sustained “on the job,” he was not precluded from commencing a separate action to recover for damages he allegedly suffered that were “caused by separate injuries that occurred outside the scope of his employment” – i.e., in the course of his being transported to a hospital by ambulance. 

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_03506.htm

A police department may not be liable injuries caused by a police officer if the officer was not acting "within the scope of his or her employment and in furtherance of the employer's business."

A police department may not be liable injuries caused by a police officer if the officer was not acting "within the scope of his or her employment and in furtherance of the employer's business."

2015 NY Slip Op 03496, Appellate Division, Second Department

Among the defendants in this wrongful death action involving a police officer [Officer] were Officer’s employers: the Town Police Department and Town [Defendants]. 

The complaint alleged that Officer was handling his "off-duty handgun" when it went off and killed his friend, the deceased victim [Victim]. The Administrator of Victim’s estate and family members sued the Defendants, alleging, in relevant part, that Defendants were liable for the Victim’s death because Defendants were negligent in the hiring, retention, and supervision” of Officer. It was also claimed that the Defendant's were "vicariously liable" for Victim’s death pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Supreme Court denied Defendants’ motions to dismiss them from the action “for failure to state a cause of action.” Defendants appealed. The Appellate Division ruled that Supreme Court should have granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint as to them.

As to the Administrator’s “negligent hiring, retention and supervision” claims, the Appellate Division explained that a necessary element of this cause of action is that the "employer knew or should have known of the employee's propensity for the conduct which caused the injury." 

Here, said the Appellate Division, the evidentiary material submitted by Administrator failed to demonstrate that Defendants were guilty of the alleged “negligent hiring, retention, or supervision” of Officer.

Addressing that part of  Administrator’s compliant that alleged Defendants were vicariously liable pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior, the Appellate Division said that the doctrine of respondeat superior requires a showing that alleged wrongdoing committed by the employer’s employee occurred while that employee was acting “within the scope of employment and in furtherance of the employer's business."

The Appellate Division found that although Administrator’s complaint “generally alleged” that Officer was acting within the scope of his employment and in furtherance of the Defendant’s' purpose, the fact alleged by Administrator was “not a fact at all” and “no significant dispute exists regarding it.”  Again, said the Appellate Division, the Supreme Court “should have granted” Defendants’ motion to dismiss the part of Administrator’s cause of action.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_03496.htm