ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE [AI] IS NOT USED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN PREPARING NYPPL SUMMARIES OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS

February 07, 2018

The Freedom of Information Law does not require an agency to formulate a final determination in the event there is none in existence

The Freedom of Information Law does not require an agency to prepare a "final determination" in the event there is none in existence 
Correction Officers' Benevolent Assn. v New York City Dept. of Corr., 2018 NY Slip Op 00522, Appellate Division, First Department

Supreme Court denied the Correction Officers' Benevolent Association [COBA] petition to compel the New York City Department of Corrections [Corrections] to produce all information pertaining to Correction's decision not to promote the individual petitioners from Correction Officer to Correction Captain it sought in its Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request.

The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court's ruling, explaining that Corrections had met  its burden of "articulating a particularized and specific justification for denying access" to the requested documents on the grounds that the documents were exempt from disclosure as nonfinal intra-agency materials that "are entirely advisory in nature and rendered only to aid the actual decision-maker[s]"

The court rejected COBA's argument that the requested documents are "effectively the final documents because there are no later documents providing reasons for the failures to promote, other than the conclusory notification letters that the candidates were passed over."

Noting that Corrections admitted that the decision makers considered the requested documents in determining whom to promote, it stated that no documents exist encapsulating the final decision, other than the notice it provided to COBA.

Finding that there was no statutory basis to look beyond Correction's representation the Appellate Division the Appellate Division, citing Kheel v Ravitch, 93 AD2d 422, 430 [1st Dept 1983], affd 62 NY2d 1, noted that FOIL does not require agencies "to formulate a final determination where none exists."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

February 06, 2018

There is no public policy bar to arbitrating a grievance concerning compensation to be paid to employees performing duties that constitute "out-of-title" work

There is no public policy bar to arbitrating a grievance concerning compensation to be paid to employees performing duties that constitute "out-of-title" work
Matter of City of Watertown (Watertown Professional Firefighters' Assn. Local 191), 2018 NY Slip Op 00743, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

In its grievance and demand for arbitration, Watertown Professional Firefighters' Assn. Local 191 [Local 191] alleged that the City of Watertown [Watertown] violated the parties' collective bargaining agreement [CBA] with respect to the assignment and compensation of firefighters who performed out-of-title work as Acting Captains. Supreme Court denied Watertown's Article 75 petition to permanently stay the arbitration of Local 191's grievance.

The Appellate Division sustained Supreme Court's ruling, rejecting Watertown's claim that that arbitration of the grievance was contrary to public policy and, or, certain provisions of Watertown's City Charter with respect to the authority of the City Manager in such matters.

As a general proposition, said the court, arbitration of an out-of-title work dispute is not contrary to public policy, citing County of Rockland v Rockland County Unit of Rockland County Local of Civ. Serv. Empls. Assn., 74 AD2d 812, affd for reasons stated 53 NY2d 741]

Further, the Appellate Division opined that arbitration of the out-of-title work dispute was not inconsistent with the authority of the City Manager to approve expenditures of Watertown's funds or to act as administrative head of the Watertown Fire Department.

Concluding that the parties agreed to arbitrate contract grievances, the Appellate Division ruled that the dispute concerning out-of-title work "is reasonably related to the general subject matter of the CBA."

In so doing, the court rejected Watertown's argument that the arbitration of the out-of-title work grievance should be stayed because compensation for such work falls within the meaning of salary,' which is expressly excluded from the CBA's definition of grievance.'"

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

February 05, 2018

Summarily removing public officers and employees from their positions


Summarily removing public officers and employees from their positions
PHH Corporation v Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, USCA, District of Columbia Circuit, Docket #15-1177

Except in instances where the appointment and removal process of a public officer or employee is set by federal or state law, it is "black letter law" that the power of appointment implies the power of removal.[1]In such cases the individual is characterized as serving at the pleasure of the appointing authority and thus may be summarily terminated from his or her position, provided, however, such termination is not based on factors that would otherwise constitute unlawful discrimination on the part of the appointing authority or otherwise constitute a violation of the Constitution of the United States or a state's constitution or a federal or state law, rule or regulation. Indeed, some instances an officer or employee "serving at will" may be terminated because of his or her political affiliation.[2]

In the event a public officer or employee is appointed for a fixed term of office, may such an individual be summarily removed from his or her position by the appointing authority? Typically, such an officer or employee may only be removed for cause, after notice and hearing.[3]

In PHH Corp. v Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the US Circuit Court, District of Columbia Circuit, concluded that a federal administrator appointed for a fixed term of office may only be removed for cause after notice and hearing. The Circuit Court ruled that the structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau [CFPB] is constitutional and that its director[4]can be terminated by the President only for cause.

In a split-decision, the majority of the court held, in pertinent part, that:

1. "Congress established the independent CFPB to curb fraud and promote transparency in consumer loans, home mortgages, personal credit cards, and retail banking."[5] 

2. "The Supreme Court eighty years ago[6] sustained the constitutionality of the independent Federal Trade Commission, a consumer -protection financial regulator with powers analogous to those of the CFPB."

3. "In doing so, the Supreme Court approved the very means of independence Congress used here: protection of agency leadership from at-will removal by the President. The Court has since reaffirmed and built on that precedent, and Congress has embraced and relied on it in designing independent agencies . We follow that precedent here to hold that the parallel provision of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act shielding the Director of the CFPB from removal without cause is consistent with Article II."

In the words of the Circuit Court of Appeals:

"Applying binding Supreme Court precedent, we see no constitutional defect in the statute preventing the President from firing the CFPB Director without cause. We thus uphold Congress’s choice."   

As NYPPL noted that with respect to summarily terminating the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, federal law provides that:

"(b) Effective with respect to any individual appointment by the Effective date ... after June 1,1973, the term of service of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall be ten years [emphasis supplied]. A Director may not serve more than one ten-year term. The provisions of subsections (a) through (c) of section 8335 of title 5, United States Code, shall apply to any individual appointed under this section.". 

Removal of a public officer having a fixed term of office is not unknown in New York State. For example, §36 of the State's Public Officer Law provided for the removal of town, village, improvement district or fire district officer by court whereby:

"Any town, village, improvement district or fire district officer, except a justice of the peace, may be removed from office by the supreme court for any misconduct, maladministration, malfeasance or malversation in office. An application for such removal may be made by any citizen resident of such town, village, improvement district or fire district or by the district attorney of the county in which such town, village or district is located, and shall be made to the appellate division of the supreme court held within the judicial department embracing such town, village, improvement district or fire district. Such application shall be made upon notice to such officer of not less than eight days, and a copy of the charges upon which the application will be made must be served with such notice."

Another example: §5.2 of the New York Civil Service Law provides that the New York State Civil Service Commission consists of three Commissioners appointed by the Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the State Senate, "not more than two of whom shall be adherents of the same political party."

The Governor designates one of the members of the Commission to be President of the Commission and "such member shall serve in the capacity of President during the pleasure of the governor." Although the President of the Commission serves in that capacity at the pleasure of the Governor, in the event he or she is removed from the position of President, he or she would revert to his or her position as a member of the Commission for the remainder of his or her six-year term of office.

In all probability the US Supreme Court will be asked to consider the Circuit Court's decision in PHH Corporation v Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:


[1] Bruso v County of Clinton, 139 AD3d 1166; City Council of Mount Vernon v Batra, 82 AD3d 1224.
[2]Branti v Finkel, 445 US 507
[3]In some situations it may be possible to discontinue the services of an incumbent in the event he or she becomes mentally or physically unable to satisfactorily perform the duties of the position.
[4]The Director of the CFPB is appointed for a five year term of office
[5]See 12 U.S.C. §5481(12).
[6]Humphrey’s Executor v United States , 295 U.S. 602.

February 02, 2018

Law enforcement and corrections resources


Law enforcement and corrections resources
Source: AELE

1. New AELE Monthly Law Journal article

Constitutionality of Postcard-Only Policy for Incoming Prisoner Mail.
View at http://www.aele.org/law/2018all02/2018-02MLJ301.pdf


2. Seminars:

AELE's next seminar is on Use of Force in Las Vegas on April 30-May 3, 2018. For more information and to register click here: http://www.aele.org/menu-lethal.html

Use of Force by law enforcement and correctional personnel is in the news every day.  This comprehensive 4-day program covers all major aspects of use of force.  It includes the use of lethal and non-lethal force, investigation and adjudication of use of force incidents, and complaints of excessive force.  It also includes psychological and bio-mechanical aspects of the use of force. Attendance at this program satisfies one of the requirements for the AELE Certified Litigation Specialist (CLS) Designation.  Information on the CLS designation may also be found on the AELE web site at http://www.aele.org/cls-info.html

Discipline and Internal Investigations. Las Vegas on Oct. 29-Nov. 1, 2018.
For more information and to register click here:   http://www.aele.org/menu-disc.html


3. February 2018 issues of AELE's three periodicals have been uploaded.

The current issues, back issues since 2000, and case digests since 1975 are FREE. Everyone is welcome to read, print or download AELE publications without charge. The main menu is at: http://www.aele.org/law


4. Law Enforcement Liability Reporter

This issue has cases on dogs, false arrest/imprisonment: warrant, firearms related: intentional use, firearms related: Second Amendment issues, First Amendment, gang activity, and privacy.


5. Fire, Police & Corrections Personnel Reporter

This issue has cases on arbitration procedures, handicap/abilities discrimination: regarded as disabled, political discrimination, retaliatory personnel actions, retirement rights and benefits, union activity, veterans and other preferences laws, and workers' compensation.


6.  Jail and Prisoner Law Bulletin

This issue has cases on access to courts/legal info, Federal Tort Claims Act, mail, Prison Litigation Reform Act: exhaustion of remedies, prisoner assault: by inmate, prisoner transport, religion, sex offenders, and visitation.
View at http://www.aele.org/law/2018all02/JB2018FEB.html


7. Selected criminal law and procedure cases are at three other free websites.


February 01, 2018

Determining the employee status of an individual for the purposes of maintaining a Title VII civil rights action

Determining the employee status of an individual for the purposes of maintaining a Title VII civil rights action
Knight v State University of New York at Stony Brook, USCA, 2nd Circuit, Docket No. 17-54-cv

Anthony Knight, an African-American electrician, sued State University of New York at Stony Brook, alleging that Defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when it terminated his employment after he reported racist graffiti in a bathroom located at his worksite.

At the trial Stony Brook contended that Knight was not an employee for purposes of Title VII as was an electrician and a member of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 25. Local 25 had an arrangement with Stony Brook under which it referred union electricians to Stony Brook when additional workers were needed to supplement its workforce during large construction projects.

When Knight moved for judgment as a matter of law that he was Stony Brook's employee the United States District Court judge denied Knight’s motion and submitted the issue to the jury. The jury found that Knight was not an employee and thus Stony Brook was not the employer for the purposes of Title II.

On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment, holding that Knight was not an employee of Stony Brook.

In response to Knight's argument that the court rather than the jury should have decided his employment status, the Circuit Court explained that whether a jury may determine a plaintiff’s status as an employee presents a question of law, citing Kirsch v. Fleet Street, Ltd., 148 F.3d 149. 

In Kirsch the Circuit Court had rejected the argument that submitting the question to a jury is prejudicial error, the same contention Knight advanced in this action, noting that whether an individual is an employee is “regularly presented to juries that are instructed to return general verdicts, informed by the court’s instructions on the law and given the direction that if they find that the plaintiffs in question were employees . . . they should simply state that they find in favor of the plaintiffs.”*  

The question as to whether an individual is an employee of a defendant in a Title VII action was considered in Community for Creative Non-Violencev. Reid, 490 U.S. 730. Borrowing from the common law of agency, the Supreme Court established a "non-exhaustive list of thirteen factors which guide the determination of employee status," the so-called Reid factors,  set out below:

1. The hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished;

2. The skill required;

3. the source of the instrumentalities and tools;

4. the location of the work;

5. The duration of the relationship between the parties;

6. Whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party;

7. The extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long to work;

8. The method of payment;

9. The hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants;

10. Whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party;

11. Whether the hiring party is in business;

12. The provision of employee benefits; and

13. The tax treatment of the hired party.

Although Knight had shown that Stony Brook provided some of his tools, it was also shown that the electricians were required to supply their own basic tools. When Knight argued that he was an employee because Stony Brook provided him with benefits, Stony Brook produced evidence that the benefits were in fact paid to the union, which was charged with dispersing the benefits to individual members.

Although Knight presented uncontradicted evidence that he was paid by checks issued by the New York State Comptroller and was treated as an employee for tax purposes, Stony Brook, in turn, presented undisputed evidence that the construction work for which Knight was hired was not its usual business and that the duration of his employment was brief.

The District Court instructed the jury to consider and balance the Reid factors in determining Knight’s employment status. The jury returned a verdict finding that Knight was not an employee of Stony Brook. Finding no error requiring the reversal of the jury’s finding that Knight was not an employee of Stony Brook, the Circuit Court affirmed the judgment of the District Court.

* The Circuit Court also noted that in Baker v. Tex. & Pac. Ry.Co., 359 U.S. 227, "the Supreme Court has held that a jury may decide the employer/employee issue in Federal Employers’ Liability Act cases."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

CAUTION

Subsequent court and administrative rulings, or changes to laws, rules and regulations may have modified or clarified or vacated or reversed the information and, or, decisions summarized in NYPPL. For example, New York State Department of Civil Service's Advisory Memorandum 24-08 reflects changes required as the result of certain amendments to §72 of the New York State Civil Service Law to take effect January 1, 2025 [See Chapter 306 of the Laws of 2024]. Advisory Memorandum 24-08 in PDF format is posted on the Internet at https://www.cs.ny.gov/ssd/pdf/AM24-08Combined.pdf. Accordingly, the information and case summaries should be Shepardized® or otherwise checked to make certain that the most recent information is being considered by the reader.
THE MATERIAL ON THIS WEBSITE IS FOR INFORMATION ONLY. AGAIN, CHANGES IN LAWS, RULES, REGULATIONS AND NEW COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS MAY AFFECT THE ACCURACY OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THIS LAWBLOG. THE MATERIAL PRESENTED IS NOT LEGAL ADVICE AND THE USE OF ANY MATERIAL POSTED ON THIS WEBSITE, OR CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING SUCH MATERIAL, DOES NOT CREATE AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP.
NYPPL Blogger Harvey Randall served as Principal Attorney, New York State Department of Civil Service; Director of Personnel, SUNY Central Administration; Director of Research, Governor’s Office of Employee Relations; and Staff Judge Advocate General, New York Guard. Consistent with the Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations, the material posted to this blog is presented with the understanding that neither the publisher nor NYPPL and, or, its staff and contributors are providing legal advice to the reader and in the event legal or other expert assistance is needed, the reader is urged to seek such advice from a knowledgeable professional.
New York Public Personnel Law. Email: publications@nycap.rr.com