Seeking to recover damages for alleged employment discrimination in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law

 

Blackman v Metropolitan Tr. Auth.

2022 NY Slip Op 03490

Decided on June 1, 2022

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on June 1, 2022 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
BETSY BARROS, J.P.
CHERYL E. CHAMBERS
ROBERT J. MILLER
DEBORAH A. DOWLING, JJ.

2019-09440
(Index No. 502489/14)

[*1]Michelle Blackman, respondent,

v

Metropolitan Transit Authority, et al., defendants, New York City Transit Authority, et al., appellants.

David I. Farber (Steve S. Efron, New York, NY, of counsel), for appellants.

The Clancy Law Firm, P.C. (Niall Macgiollabhuí, New York, NY, of counsel), for respondent.

 

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for employment discrimination in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law, the defendants New York City Transit Authority, Thomas P. Latimer, and Christopher Johnson appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Katherine A. Levine, J.), dated July 8, 2019. The order, insofar as appealed from, in effect, denied those branches of those defendants' motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the first, third, fifth, seventh, ninth, eleventh, and twelfth causes of action insofar as asserted against them.

ORDERED that the order is modified insofar as appealed from, on the law, by deleting the provisions thereof, in effect, denying those branches of the motion of the defendants New York City Transit Authority, Thomas P. Latimer, and Christopher Johnson which were for summary judgment dismissing the fifth, seventh, ninth, eleventh, and twelfth causes of action insofar as asserted against them, and substituting therefor provisions granting those branches of the motion; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

The plaintiff, an African-American female, was employed by the defendant New York City Transit Authority (hereinafter the NYCTA). In March 2014, the plaintiff commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for employment discrimination on the basis of race in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law (Executive Law art 15; hereinafter NYSHRL) and the New York City Human Rights Law (Administrative Code of City of NY § 8-101 et seq.; hereinafter NYCHRL). The complaint asserted causes of action to recover damages for discrimination in hiring (first cause of action), discrimination in promotion (third cause of action), constructive discharge and hostile work environment (fifth cause of action), discrimination based on disparate impact (seventh cause of action), aiding and abetting discrimination against the defendants Thomas P. Latimer and Christopher Johnson (ninth cause of action), and breach of contract (eleventh and twelfth causes of action).

Thereafter, the NYCTA, Latimer, and Johnson (hereinafter collectively the defendants) moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them. In an order dated July 8, 2019, the Supreme Court, among other things, in effect, denied those [*2]branches of the motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the first, third, fifth, seventh, ninth, eleventh, and twelfth causes of action insofar as asserted against the defendants. The defendants appeal.

The NYSHRL and the NYCHRL prohibit discrimination in employment on the basis of race (see Golston-Green v City of New York, 184 AD3d 24, 34). "To establish a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of race under the NYSHRL, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected class, (2) the plaintiff was qualified to hold the position, (3) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination" (Ellison v Chartis Claims, Inc., 178 AD3d 665, 667; see Forrest v Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 305; Bilitch v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 194 AD3d 999, 1001). To prevail on a summary judgment motion in an action alleging discrimination in violation of the NYSHRL, "a defendant must demonstrate either the plaintiff's failure to establish every element of intentional discrimination, or, having offered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged actions, the absence of a triable issue of fact as to whether the explanations were pretextual" (Reichman v City of New York, 179 AD3d 1115, 1117 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Bilitch v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 194 AD3d at 1001).

Here, the Supreme Court properly determined that there were triable issues of fact as to whether the defendants' proffered explanations for not hiring or promoting the plaintiff to a certain position, and for, instead, promoting a white woman to that position, were a pretext for intentional racial discrimination (see Lefort v Kingsbrook Jewish Med. Ctr., 203 AD3d 708; Reichman v City of New York, 179 AD3d at 1117; see also Bilitch v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 194 AD3d at 1001).

Moreover, the defendants failed to demonstrate their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the claims of employment discrimination based on race in violation of the NYCHRL. The defendants failed to establish, prima facie, "that there was no evidentiary route that could allow a jury to find that discrimination on the basis of [race] played a role in their challenged actions" (Reichman v City of New York, 179 AD3d at 1118). The defendants' contention that the NYCTA is exempted from the requirements of the NYCHRL is without merit (see Tang v New York City Tr. Auth., 55 AD3d 720, 720-721).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied those branches of the defendants' motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the first cause of action, alleging discrimination in hiring, and the third cause of action, alleging discrimination in promotion.

However, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing so much of the fifth cause of action as alleged constructive discharge. "An employee is constructively discharged when her or his employer, rather than discharging the plaintiff directly, deliberately created working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would have felt compelled to resign" (Golston-Green v City of New York, 184 AD3d at 44; see Nelson v HSBC Bank USA, 41 AD3d 445, 447). Here, the defendants established, prima facie, that the plaintiff's complaints were insufficient to show an intolerable work environment that would lead a reasonable person in that position to feel compelled to resign (see Best v Peninsula N.Y. Hotel Mgt., 309 AD2d 524, 524-525; Petrosino v Bell Atl., 385 F3d 210, 231). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

The Supreme Court also should have granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing so much of the fifth cause of action as alleged a hostile work environment. A hostile environment claim "involves repeated conduct," not "[d]iscrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire" (National Railroad Passenger Corporation v Morgan, 536 US 101, 114). Here, the two discrete acts alleged by the plaintiff were insufficient to create a hostile work environment (see Murphy v Department of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 155 AD3d 637, 639-640; Holtz v Rockefeller & Co., 258 F3d 62, 75 [2d Cir]).

The Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the ninth cause of action, alleging aiding and abetting discrimination (see Strauss v New York State Dept. of Educ., 26 AD3d 67, 73). The court should have granted those branches of the defendants' motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the eleventh and twelfth causes of action, alleging breach of contract, since the plaintiff abandoned those causes of action by failing to address them in opposition to the defendants' motion (see Elam v Ryder Sys., Inc., 176 AD3d 675, 676). Finally, the court should have granted that branch of the motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the seventh cause of action, alleging discrimination based on disparate impact, as the plaintiff also abandoned that cause of action.

BARROS, J.P., CHAMBERS, MILLER and DOWLING, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Maria T. Fasulo

Clerk of the Court

Arbitration award vacated and the matter remanded for a rehearing and a new determination before a different arbitrator

  

Matter of Ventillo v County of Rockland Sheriff's Dept.

2022 NY Slip Op 03521

Decided on June 1, 2022

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on June 1, 2022 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
HECTOR D. LASALLE, P.J.
SHERI S. ROMAN
LINDA CHRISTOPHER
DEBORAH A. DOWLING, JJ.

2018-14993
(Index No. 34561/18)

[*1]In the Matter of Ranolfo Ventillo, respondent,

v

County of Rockland Sheriff's Department, appellant.

Saretsky Katz & Dranoff, LLP, New York, NY (Robert B. Weissman of counsel), for appellant.

Law Office of Frank M. Graziadei, P.C., New York, NY (Peter B. Fallon of counsel), for respondent.

 

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate an arbitration award dated June 4, 2018, the County of Rockland Sheriff's Department appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Paul I. Marx, J.), dated December 10, 2018. The order granted the petition to vacate the award and remitted the matter for a rehearing and a new determination before a different arbitrator.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

On April 26, 2016, the County of Rockland Sheriff's Department (hereinafter the RCSD) suspended the petitioner, Ranolfo Ventillo, from his employment as a correction officer without pay based upon conduct which was alleged in certain criminal charges that had been brought against him. Ventillo, through the Correction Officers Benevolent Association of Rockland County (hereinafter the Union), filed a grievance protesting the suspension and demanded a disciplinary arbitration pursuant to the Union's collective bargaining agreement with the County of Rockland. Ventillo was subsequently acquitted of the criminal charges on June 30, 2017, after a jury trial.

At the scheduled hearing date of January 24, 2018, Ventillo's counsel sought to be relieved due to a conflict of interest and requested that the hearing be adjourned. Ventillo did not appear at the January 24, 2018 hearing date due to an unspecific work emergency. The arbitrator granted counsel's request to be relieved but did not grant counsel's request for an adjournment, and allowed the RCSD to proceed with the hearing on that date and elicit testimonial evidence from two witnesses without the presence of Ventillo or counsel. The hearing was continued on four additional dates in the absence of Ventillo and counsel, despite Ventillo's repeated request for an adjournment to obtain new counsel. Thereafter, by arbitration award dated June 4, 2018 (hereinafter the arbitration award), the arbitrator, inter alia, sustained the disciplinary charges and found that just cause existed to terminate Ventillo's employment with the RCSD.

On July 27, 2018, Ventillo commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to vacate the arbitration award. In an order dated December 10, 2018, the Supreme Court granted the petition and remitted the matter for a rehearing and a new determination before a different arbitrator. The RCSD appeals, and we affirm.

"'Judicial review of arbitration awards is extremely limited'" (Matter of City of Middletown v Weissinger, 188 AD3d 670, 671, quoting Kotlyar v Khlebopros, 176 AD3d 793, 795). "However, '[p]recisely because arbitration awards are subject to such judicial deference, it is imperative that the integrity of the process, as opposed to the correctness of the individual decision, be zealously safeguarded'" (Marracino v Alexander, 73 AD3d 22, 26, quoting Matter of Goldfinger v Lisker, 68 NY2d 225, 231). An arbitration award may be vacated pursuant to CPLR 7511(b)(1)(iv) on the ground that a party's rights were prejudiced by the "failure to follow the procedure of [CPLR article 75], unless the party applying to vacate the award continued with the arbitration with notice of the defect and without objection." As part of the procedure set forth in CPLR 7506, the parties to an arbitration "are entitled to be heard, to present evidence and to cross-examine witnesses," and have "the right to be represented by an attorney" (id. § 7506[c], [d]). The right to be represented by an attorney "may not be waived" (id. § 7506[d]; see Marracino v Alexander, 73 AD3d at 26).

Here, the Supreme Court properly granted the petition to vacate the arbitration award. Proper procedure was not followed by the arbitrator, who denied Ventillo the right to be represented by an attorney by proceeding with the hearing on January 24, 2018, and thereafter continuing with the hearing over Ventillo's objection and without affording him time to obtain new counsel (see CPLR 7506[d]; 7511[b][1][iv]; Marracino v Alexander, 73 AD3d at 26; Matter of Mikel v Scharf, 85 AD2d 604, 604). This failure to observe statutory procedure was sufficiently prejudicial, under the circumstances of this matter, to require vacatur of the arbitration award (see Marracino v Alexander, 73 AD3d at 26; Sartiano v Becker, 119 AD2d 656, 656; Matter of Mikel v Scharf, 85 AD2d at 604).

The parties' remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be considered in light of our determination.

Accordingly, we affirm the order.

LASALLE, P.J., ROMAN, CHRISTOPHER and DOWLING, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Maria T. Fasulo

Clerk of the Court

Issues considered in selected decisions promulgated by New York State courts during the month of May 2022.

Application for Performance of Duty Disability Retirement Benefits. Although Employee seeking performance of duty disability retirement benefits testified that he was being cooperative during the examination but that pain restricted his range of motion, the Comptroller credited the testimony of the orthopedic surgeon who examined Employee on behalf of the New York State and Local Employees' Retirement System, and the medical report and concluded that Employee had "deliberately frustrated the Retirement System's ability to confirm, and/or rebut, [his] assertions regarding his alleged disability." Click HERE to access the court's decision.

Applying the continuing wrong doctrine. The continuing wrong doctrine "may only be predicated on continuing unlawful acts and not on the continuing effects of earlier unlawful conduct" and "The distinction is between a single wrong that has continuing effects and a series of independent, distinct wrongs." Click HERE to access the court's decision.

Determining if the issue petitioner's claims was arbitrable. As the language of the arbitration clause contained in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between Emplolyee's union and the Employer lacks the plain and sweeping language demonstrating an intent by the parties to delegate the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator (see e.g. Matter of Steyn v CRTV, LLC, 175 AD3d 1, the clause does not state that it encompasses "any and all disputes" between the parties and it does not explicitly delegate the arbitrability question to an arbitrator and the CBA does not evince a clear and unmistakable intent to arbitrate the Labor Law claims at issue here. The URL to the court's decision is https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2022/2022_03313.htm.

Considering a motion to expunge a disciplinary letter from petitioner's personnel file. As the four-month statute of limitations on Article 78 proceedings began to run when the disciplinary letter was placed in the Employee's file on May 6, and this proceeding was not commenced until, at the earliest, the subsequent January 13, the Appellate Division said Supreme Court should not have considered the letter. Click here to access the decision: https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2022/2022_03209.htm

Holding a party in contempt for violating a prior confirmed arbitration award and order. Actions outside the scope of a confirmed arbitration award cannot be found to be a violation of a clear and unequivocal court mandate sufficient to support a finding of civil contempt. Click here to access the decision: https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2022/2022_03218.htm

Paying for expert legal services. Plaintiff serve as Defendant's expert in a separate legal matter pursuant to an engagement letter outlining Plaintiff's fees and the terms of the retainer. Defendant failed to pay certain invoices, prompting Plaintiff to commence this action for breach of contract and an account stated. The URL to access the decision is http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2021/2021_03499.htm.

Police officer terminated for excessive absences after suffering a work related injury. Following a hearing pursuant to Town Law §55 and Civil Service Law §75, a police officer was found guilty of incompetence and terminated from his position under color of Civil Service Law §75 after being charged with one count of incompetence due to excessive absenteeism as a result of his being physically unable to perform his duties on scheduled work days as the result of a work-related injury. The URL to access the decision is: https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2022/2022_02413.htm. [See, also, https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2022/2022_02420.htm]. For a "contra view" with respect relying on Civil Service Law §71 in such situations, see https://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2016/11/termination-of-police-officer-on.html

Traveling to and from work is not within the scope of employment. As a general rule, traveling to and from work is not within the scope of employment and any injuries sustained during that period are not subject to a workers' compensation award. However, there are exceptions to this general rule, including, as is relevant in this action, "outside employees who, as a distinguishing feature of their employment, have no fixed work site and are required to travel between job locations" and employees engaged in a special errand, wherein, "at the employer's direction, the employee undertakes a work-related errand and thereby 'has altered the usual geographical or temporal scheme of travel, thereby altering the risks to which the employee is usually exposed during normal travel.'" Click here to access the decision: https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2022/2022_02474.htm

Union alleged the Employer unilateral implementing the new rules and procedures for the usage of sick leave violated Civil Service Law § 209-a(1)(d). The Appellate Division affirmed portions of a determination of the New York State Public Employment Relations Board, which, after a hearing, found that the Employer violated Civil Service Law §209-a(1)(d) by issuing certain provisions of a sick leave management program, and directed the Employer to rescind those provisions. The matter was remitted to the Supreme Court for the issuance of an order compelling compliance with this decision and judgment. The URL to access the Appellate Division's ruling is https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2022/2022_03392.htm.

 

Challenging a central school district's decision to discontinue reimbursements for certain Medicare Part B premium surcharges

In various collective bargaining agreements [CBA] between the Chappaqua Central School District [District] and the Chappaqua Congress of Teachers [CCT], an association representing certain District employees, the District agreed to provide healthcare benefits for active and retired employees and their spouses and dependents. Retired employees over age 65 were required to enroll in a Medicare Part B program [Part B] and, in keeping with the provisions set out in the several CBAs, the District reimbursed retirees the cost of Part B coverage. 

Some retirees, based upon their household income, were subject to a surcharge in addition to the standard Part B premium, the so-called "income-related monthly adjustment amount" [IRMAA]. Prior to August 2018, the Districtreimbursed retirees for IRMAA surcharges in addition to the standard Medicare premium cost.

The CCT challenged the District's action. Supreme Court granted CCT's petition, annulled the District's determination, and directed the District to reinstate reimbursement for the Medicare Part B surcharges.  

In response to the District's appeal, the Appellate Division sustained the lower courts ruling. The text of its decision is set out below:

 

Matter of Bailenson v Board of Educ. of the Chappaqua Cent. Sch. Dist.

2021 NY Slip Op 03318

Decided on May 26, 2021

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on May 26, 2021 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
HECTOR D. LASALLE, P.J.
CHERYL E. CHAMBERS
LEONARD B. AUSTIN
ANGELA G. IANNACCI, JJ.

2019-08292
(Index No. 70427/18)

[*1]In the Matter of Myrna Bailenson, et al., respondents,

v

Board of Education of the Chappaqua Central School District, et al., appellants.

Shaw, Perelson, May & Lambert, LLP, Poughkeepsie, NY (Mark C. Rushfield of counsel), for appellants.

Robert T. Reilly, New York, NY (Oriana Vigliotti of counsel), for respondents.

 

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the Board of Education of the Chappaqua Central School District dated August 16, 2018, which discontinued reimbursements for certain Medicare Part B premium surcharges, the appeal is from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Susan Cacace, J.), dated May 20, 2019. The judgment granted the petition, annulled the determination, and directed the respondents to reinstate reimbursement for the Medicare Part B surcharges.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

Pursuant to collective bargaining agreements (hereinafter CBAs) between the Chappaqua Central School District (hereinafter the district) and the Chappaqua Congress of Teachers (hereinafter the CCT), an association representing district employees, the district agreed to provide healthcare benefits for active and retired employees and their spouses and dependents. Retired employees over age 65 were required to enroll in a Medicare Part B program (hereinafter Part B) and, in keeping with the CBAs, the district reimbursed retirees the cost of Part B coverage. Some retirees, based upon their household income, were subject to a surcharge in addition to the standard Part B premium, known as the income-related monthly adjustment amount (hereinafter IRMAA). Prior to August 2018, the district reimbursed retirees for IRMAA surcharges in addition to the standard premium cost.

On August 16, 2018, the district informed retirees that it would no longer reimburse them for IRMAA surcharges. In response, the petitioners commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding against the Board of Education of the Chappaqua Central School District, the district, and Christine Ackerman, as superintendent of the district, seeking to annul the August 16, 2018 determination on the ground that it violated chapter 729 of the Laws of 1994 (as amended by L 2007, ch 22), known as the Retiree Health Insurance Moratorium Act (hereinafter the moratorium statute), and seeking reinstatement of the reimbursements.

The Supreme Court agreed that the district's discontinuation of reimbursements violated the moratorium statute, granted the petition, and directed the district to reinstate the reimbursement, including retroactive reimbursements. This appeal ensued.

The moratorium statute sets "'a minimum baseline or "floor" for retiree health benefits'" which is "'measured by the health insurance benefits received by active employees. . . . In other words, the moratorium statute does not permit an employer to whom the statute applies to provide retirees with lesser health insurance benefits than active employees'" (Matter of Altic v Board of Educ., 142 AD3d 1311, 1312, quoting Matter of Anderson v Niagara Falls City Sch. Dist., 125 AD3d 1407, 1408). Thus, a school district may not diminish retirees' health insurance benefits unless it makes "a corresponding diminution in the health insurance benefits or contributions of active employees" (Matter of Baker v Board of Educ., 29 AD3d 574, 575). The purpose of the moratorium statute is to protect the rights of retirees who "'are not represented in the collective bargaining process, [and] are powerless to stop unilateral depreciation or even elimination of health insurance benefits once the contract under which they retired has expired'" (Matter of Bryant v Board of Educ., Chenango Forks Cent. School Dist., 21 AD3d 1134, 1135, quoting Assembly Mem in Support, 1996 McKinney's Session Laws of NY at 2050; see Matter of Jones v Board of Educ. of Watertown City School Dist., 30 AD3d 967, 970).

Here, it is undisputed both that the CBAs between the district and the CCT did not address Part B or IRMAA reimbursements and that the district in fact provided such reimbursements, even if, as it claims, the reimbursements were made inconsistently. Thus, the reimbursements were "retiree health insurance benefits that were voluntarily conferredas a matter of school district policy" (Kolbe v Tibbetts, 22 NY3d 344, 358). Accordingly, the Supreme Court correctly concluded that the discontinuation of IRMAA reimbursements was a matter subject to the moratorium statute (see Matter of Anderson v Niagara Falls City Sch. Dist., 125 AD3d at 1408-1409; Matter of Baker v Board of Educ., 29 AD3d at 575; Matter of Bryant v Board of Educ., Chenango Forks Cent. School Dist., 21 AD3d at 1136; see generally Matter of Albany Police Officers Union, Local 2841, Law Enforcement Officers Union Dist. Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v New York Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 149 AD3d 1236, 1238; Matter of Chenango Forks Cent. School Dist. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 95 AD3d 1479, 1480-1481, affd 95 AD3d 1479).

Like the Supreme Court, we find unpersuasive the district's claim that IRMAA reimbursements were disbursed for a decade as the result of an administrative error without the district becoming aware of the error. However, even if proved, the district has pointed to no authority suggesting that this alleged error removes the matter from the scope of the moratorium statute. Similarly, the court correctly rejected as "circular reasoning" which was "entirely inconsistent with the legislative intent" of the moratorium statute the district's claim that the new policy would cause a corresponding diminution in active employees' benefits since, upon retirement, they, too, would not receive IRMAA reimbursements. The purpose of the moratorium statute was to tie retiree benefits to active employee benefits so that retirees could benefit from the collective bargaining power of the active employees. To accept the district's argument would eviscerate that purpose (see Matter of Bryant v Board of Educ., Chenango Forks Cent. School Dist., 21 AD3d at 1135; Assembly Mem in Support, 1996 McKinney's Session Laws of NY at 2049-2050). Accordingly, the court correctly determined that discontinuation of IRMAA reimbursements violated the moratorium statute and properly granted the petition.

LASALLE, P.J, CHAMBERS, AUSTIN and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.

2019-08292 DECISION & ORDER ON MOTION

N.B.

In the Matter of Myrna Bailenson, et al., respondents,

v Board of Education of the Chappaqua Central

School District, et al., appellants.

(Index No. 70427/18)

Motion by the petitioners to strike footnote 2 on page 5 of the appellants' reply brief on the ground that it refers to matter dehors the record. By decision and order on motion of this Court dated July 31, 2020, the motion was held in abeyance and referred to the panel of Justices [*2]hearing the appeal for determination upon the argument or submission thereof.

Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in opposition thereto, and upon the argument of the appeal, it is

ORDERED that the motion is granted, and footnote 2 on page 5 of the appellants' reply brief is deemed stricken and has not been considered in the determination of the appeal.

LASALLE, P.J, CHAMBERS, AUSTIN and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Aprilanne Agostino

Clerk of the Court

Setting the compensation to be paid the Governor and Lieutenant Governor of the State of New York

In April, 2019, the New York State Legislature passed a concurrent resolution increasing the Governor's and Lieutenant Governor's annual salaries retroactive to January 1, 2019. Plaintiff challenged the Legislature's action, alleging that "the concurrent resolution ran afoul of NY Constitution, Article XIII, §7." As relevant here, Supreme Court granted the Comptroller's [Defendant] motion to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff appealed.

The Appellate Division reversed Supreme Court's granting the Defendant's motion for summary judgment and denied the motion. The full text of the Appellate Division's decision is set out below:

 

Robert Arrigo, Appellant,

v

Thomas P. DiNapoli, as State Comptroller, Respondent.

Calendar Date:March 25, 2022
Before:Garry, P.J., Lynch, Aarons, Colangelo and Ceresia, JJ.

Government Justice Center, Inc., Albany (Cameron J. Macdonald of counsel), for appellant.

Letitia James, Attorney General, Albany (Victor Paladino of counsel), for respondent.

Garry, P.J.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (McDonough, J.), entered January 8, 2021 in Albany County, which, among other things, granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Pursuant to matching provisions in the NY Constitution, the annual salaries of the Governor and Lieutenant Governor are "fixed by joint resolution of the [S]enate and [A]ssembly" (NY Const, art IV, §§ 3, 6). In April 2019, the Legislature passed a concurrent resolution increasing the Governor's and Lieutenant Governor's annual salaries retroactive to January 1, 2019 (hereinafter the concurrent resolution). The concurrent resolution also provided that those officials would receive two additional increases to their annual salaries on January 1, 2020 and January 1, 2021 but conditioned each increase "upon the timely legislative passage of the budget for the preceding year" (seeL 2018, ch 59, § 1, part HHH, § 2 [4]; see also Legislative Law § 5 [3]).

Plaintiff, a resident and taxpayer of this state, commenced this action pursuant to State Finance Law §§ 123-b and 123-e, alleging that the concurrent resolution ran afoul of NY Constitution, article XIII, § 7, which provides that "[e]ach of the state officers named in this constitution shall, during his or her continuance in office, receive a compensation, to be fixed by law, which shall not be increased or diminished during the term for which he or she shall have been elected or appointed; nor shall he or she receive to his or her use any fees or perquisites of office or other compensation." Plaintiff sought an order (1) declaring that the concurrent resolution was "null and void" for having violated the NY Constitution, (2) permanently enjoining defendant from paying the Governor and Lieutenant Governor the rates set by the concurrent resolution, and (3) awarding him counsel fees and costs. Defendant's answer asserted, among other things, that plaintiff failed to join the Governor and Lieutenant Governor as necessary parties and requested that Supreme Court dismiss the complaint or declare that the concurrent resolution "ha[d] not been shown to be unconstitutional."

Defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and for such a declaration or, in the alternative, joinder of necessary parties. Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment. Supreme Court granted defendant summary judgment dismissing the complaint, issued the declaration requested by defendant, and denied plaintiff's cross motion. Plaintiff appeals.

We first address the joinder issue. CPLR 1001 (a) provides that "[p]ersons . . . who might be inequitably affected by a judgment in the action shall be made plaintiffs or defendants." When such a person "has not been made a party and is subject to the jurisdiction of the court, the court shall order him [or her] summoned" (CPLR 1001 [b]). This requirement protects the right to due process by providing such a person the opportunity to be heard before his or her interests are adversely affected (see Matter of Martin v Ronan, 47 NY2d 486, 490 [1979]; Mahinda v Board of Collective Bargaining, 91 AD3d 564, 565 [2012]; Matter of 27th St. Block Assn. v Dormitory Auth. of State of N.Y., 302 AD2d 155, 160 [2002]). Parties may be added by leave of court at any stage of the action (see CPLR 1003), including, "in the first instance, on appeal" (Matter of New York State Assn. of Plumbing-Heating-Cooling Contrs. v Egan, 86 AD2d 100, 105 [1982], affd on opinion below 60 NY2d 882 [1983]).

The Governor and Lieutenant Governor have an interest in their own salaries (see e.g. Matter of Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v Pataki, 259 AD2d 826, 827-828 [1999], lv dismissed and denied 93 NY2d 993 [1999]; Matter of McGuinn v City of New York, 219 AD2d 489, 490 [1995], lv dismissed and denied 87 NY2d 966 [1996]; Matter of Cassidy v New York City Dept. of Correction, 95 AD2d 733, 734-735 [1983]; Matter of Serth v New York State Dept. of Transp., 79 AD2d 801, 802 [1980]).^[FN1]Although those salaries are subject to change, CPLR 1001 does not speak of, and is not limited to, vested rights or interests (see Matter of Basha Kill Area Assn. v Town Bd. of Town of Mamakating, 302 AD2d 662, 664 [2003]; Matter of 27th St. Block Assn. v Dormitory Auth. of State of N.Y., 302 AD2d at 160). The interests of the Governor and Lieutenant Governor could be inequitably affected if we declare that the concurrent resolution is void and enjoin defendant from paying their salaries at the rates set in that resolution (see Matter of Jim Ludtka Sporting Goods, Inc. v City of Buffalo School Dist., 48 AD3d 1103, 1104 [2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 704 [2008]; Matter of Romeo v New York State Dept. of Educ., 41 AD3d 1102, 1104 [2007]; Matter of Boston Culinary Group, Inc. v New York State Olympic Regional Dev. Auth., 18 AD3d 1103, 1104 [2005], lv denied5 NY3d 712 [2005]; Matter of Basha Kill Area Assn. v Town Bd. of Town of Mamakating, 302 AD2d at 664). "[T]he possibility that a judgment rendered without the omitted party could have an adverse practical effect on that party is enough to indicate joinder" (Matter of Nemeth v K-Tooling, 163 AD3d 1143, 1144 [2018] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Matter of 27th St. Block Assn. v Dormitory Auth. of State of N.Y., 302 AD2d at 160).

Contrary to plaintiff's argument, the interests of the Governor and Lieutenant Governor are not necessarily being represented or protected by defendant and his counsel — the Attorney General, who would also typically represent those other state officials (see Matter of Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v Pataki, 259 AD2d at 828). We cannot determine whether the Governor and Lieutenant Governor will necessarily support and integrate defendant's argument that the resolution is constitutional; indeed, they may argue against its constitutionality, to establish precedent that would prevent a potential future intra-term diminution of their salaries. Accordingly, and as the Governor and Lieutenant Governor are subject to its jurisdiction, Supreme Court should have granted defendant's request that those officers be joined as necessary parties and ordered them summoned (see CPLR 1001 [b]; 1003; Matter of Alexy v Otte, 58 AD3d 967, 967-968 [2009]; see also State Finance Law § 123-b [2] [permitting a plaintiff in an action concerning a wrongful expenditure of state funds to "join as a party defendant the recipient of such a wrongful expenditure"]).

Plaintiff has expressly limited his argument for relief to seeking a declaration that the concurrent resolution is unconstitutional and that defendant prospectively stop paying the Governor and Lieutenant Governor at the higher salary rate. However, "the fundamental duty" of defendant's office is "to 'superintend the fiscal concerns of the state'" (Matter of Martin H. Handler, M.D., P.C. v DiNapoli, 23 NY3d 239, 246 [2014] [brackets and citation omitted], quoting State Finance Law § 8 [1]); as the state's chief fiscal officer, he has "legally mandated duties to prevent unauthorized payments and overpayments" of state monies (Matter of Martin H. Handler, M.D., P.C. v DiNapoli, 23 NY3d at 247; see NY Const, art V, § 1; State Finance Law § 8 [1], [2], [2-b], [3], [7]). Considering that defendant "has long been viewed as having authority to confirm that payments already made were proper," if it were to be held that defendant had been making payments that were unconstitutional, defendant would then be authorized to recoup any state funds illegally paid (Matter of Martin H. Handler, M.D., P.C. v DiNapoli, 88 AD3d 1187, 1190 [2011], affd 23 NY3d 239 [2014]); see Matter of Signature Health Ctr., LLC v Hevesi, 13 Misc 3d 1189, 1192 [Sup Ct, Albany County 2006]). Indeed, some of the statutorily enumerated forms of relief under State Finance Law § 123-e are "a declaration that a proposed disbursement . . . would be illegal" and "restitution to the state of those public funds disbursed" (State Finance Law § 123-e [1]). Therefore, despite plaintiff's attempt to limit the relief he seeks in this action, if plaintiff is successful, defendant may seek to recoup any state monies illegally paid under the concurrent resolution retroactively, back to January 1, 2019. Thus, former Governor Andrew M. Cuomo — who was authorized to receive a salary under the concurrent resolution from January 2019 until August 2021 — may also be adversely affected and should similarly be joined as a necessary party.

Following plaintiff's service of the initiatory papers upon the Governor, Lieutenant Governor and former Governor, they will have an opportunity to respond and raise any applicable defenses. Supreme Court will then be able to consider this action "with the benefit of participation by all necessary parties" (Matter of Romeo v New York State Dept. of Educ., 41 AD3d at 1105).

Lynch, Aarons, Colangelo and Ceresia, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the judgment is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as granted defendant's motion for summary judgment; said motion denied and the Governor, Lieutenant Governor and former Governor Andrew M. Cuomo are joined as defendants, plaintiff is ordered to serve the summons and complaint adding said parties within 20 days of the date of this Court's decision, and matter remitted to the Supreme Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision; and, as so modified, affirmed.

Footnotes

Footnote 1: After the date of oral argument, the Lieutenant Governor resigned from office. Our decision is not affected by this development, as he still retains an interest in his salary from his time in that office. Any further references to the Lieutenant Governor should be read to include the recent occupant of that office.