Although Supreme Court granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss complaints
of unlawful discrimination, the Appellate Division unanimously modified the
decision, "on the law," and reinstated Plaintiff's cause of
action alleging retaliatory termination.
The Appellate Division explained to state a claim for retaliation under the
New York State Human Rights Law [Executive Law §296], the plaintiff must show:
1. He was engaged in a protected activity;
2. His employer was aware that he participated in such activity:
3. He suffered an adverse employment action based upon his activity; and
4. There is a causal connection between the protected activity and the
adverse action.
Further, observed the Appellate Division, "plaintiffs in retaliation
cases are held to a lenient pleading standard and are generally afforded
deference at the pleading stage, citing Thomas v Mintz, 182 AD3d 490 and Petit v Department of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 177
AD3d 402. On appeal, the sole contested element is whether the plaintiff
sufficiently pleaded a causal connection between the protected activity.
In the instant appeal the court found that Plaintiff corroborated sexual
harassment allegations against his former and his allegedly retaliatory
termination from his position later that year and a "causal connection
needed for proof of a retaliation claim can be established indirectly by
showing that the protected activity was closely followed in time by the adverse
action".
Citing Summa v Hofstra Univ., 708 F3d 115 [quoting Cifra v Gen.
Elec. Co., 252 F3d 205], the Appellate Division noted that federal courts have
"'not drawn a bright line to define the outer limits beyond which a
temporal relationship is too attenuated to establish a causal relationship
between the exercise of a federal constitutional right and an allegedly
retaliatory action."* This, opined the Appellate Division, has allowed
the Second Circuit] to "exercise its judgment about the permissible
inferences that can be drawn from temporal proximity in the context of
particular cases".
In this case the Appellate Division opined that "the four-month period
between [Plaintiff's] interview and termination easily falls within the
acceptable temporal range to establish a causal connection."
Also noted by the Appellate Division was "when analyzing the timing and
context of retaliatory actions, courts also consider whether the employer 'waited
to exact [its] retaliation at an opportune time' in order to have an
explanation for the action." Further, "[q]uestions regarding the time
gap and causal connection of an alleged retaliatory termination may entail special
consideration of the size and complexity of a defendant employer, where
termination of employment may involve multiple levels of decisionmakers, as
well as the nature of plaintiff's claims."
In this instance the Appellate Division opined that "The additional circumstances
surrounding Plaintiff's termination support an inference that it was done in
retaliation for [Plaintiff's] corroboration of allegations of sexual harassment
against the former [Employee]."
In contrast, the Appellate Division held that "despite the lenient
pleading standard governing employment discrimination cases, the complaint
fails to state a cause of action for sex discrimination under the New York
State Human Rights Law because it contains no factual allegations giving rise
to an inference of discrimination," citing Brown v City of New York, 188 AD3d 518,.
* In a footnote in its decision, the Appellate
Division said "Federal retaliation claims under Title VII are subject
to the same standards as those of the New York State Human Rights Law and
therefore highly instructive as to the claim at bar", citing Banks v
General Motors, LLC, 81 F4th 242 and Collins v Indart-Etienne, 59 Misc 3d 1026.
Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's
decision Posted on the Internet.