Although Supreme Court granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss complaints of unlawful discrimination, the Appellate Division unanimously modified the decision, "on the law," and reinstated Plaintiff's cause of action alleging retaliatory termination.
The Appellate Division explained to state a claim for retaliation under the New York State Human Rights Law [Executive Law §296], the plaintiff must show:
1. He was engaged in a protected activity;
2. His employer was aware that he participated in such activity:
3. He suffered an adverse employment action based upon his activity; and
4. There is a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.
Further, observed the Appellate Division, "plaintiffs in retaliation cases are held to a lenient pleading standard and are generally afforded deference at the pleading stage, citing Thomas v Mintz, 182 AD3d 490 and Petit v Department of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 177 AD3d 402. On appeal, the sole contested element is whether the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a causal connection between the protected activity.
In the instant appeal the court found that Plaintiff corroborated sexual harassment allegations against his former and his allegedly retaliatory termination from his position later that year and a "causal connection needed for proof of a retaliation claim can be established indirectly by showing that the protected activity was closely followed in time by the adverse action".
Citing Summa v Hofstra Univ., 708 F3d 115 [quoting Cifra v Gen. Elec. Co., 252 F3d 205], the Appellate Division noted that federal courts have "'not drawn a bright line to define the outer limits beyond which a temporal relationship is too attenuated to establish a causal relationship between the exercise of a federal constitutional right and an allegedly retaliatory action."* This, opined the Appellate Division, has allowed the Second Circuit] to "exercise its judgment about the permissible inferences that can be drawn from temporal proximity in the context of particular cases".
In this case the Appellate Division opined that "the four-month period between [Plaintiff's] interview and termination easily falls within the acceptable temporal range to establish a causal connection."
Also noted by the Appellate Division was "when analyzing the timing and context of retaliatory actions, courts also consider whether the employer 'waited to exact [its] retaliation at an opportune time' in order to have an explanation for the action." Further, "[q]uestions regarding the time gap and causal connection of an alleged retaliatory termination may entail special consideration of the size and complexity of a defendant employer, where termination of employment may involve multiple levels of decisionmakers, as well as the nature of plaintiff's claims."
In this instance the Appellate Division opined that "The additional circumstances surrounding Plaintiff's termination support an inference that it was done in retaliation for [Plaintiff's] corroboration of allegations of sexual harassment against the former [Employee]."
In contrast, the Appellate Division held that "despite the lenient pleading standard governing employment discrimination cases, the complaint fails to state a cause of action for sex discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law because it contains no factual allegations giving rise to an inference of discrimination," citing Brown v City of New York, 188 AD3d 518,.
* In a footnote in its decision, the Appellate Division said "Federal retaliation claims under Title VII are subject to the same standards as those of the New York State Human Rights Law and therefore highly instructive as to the claim at bar", citing Banks v General Motors, LLC, 81 F4th 242 and Collins v Indart-Etienne, 59 Misc 3d 1026.
Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision Posted on the Internet.