Plaintiff sued the School District, the Board of Education and certain officers of the School District [collectively "Defendants"] for defamation. Plaintiff alleged that that he had been defamed when, in a workshop session prior to a school board meeting, the School District's Superintendent told the assembled school board members that "a very reliable source" told him that Plaintiff and his wife had "bought their son [a former student at the District] a shotgun for graduation" and that the Superintendent "did not respond when subsequently 'asked by a school board member if he meant that the [Plaintiff] had armed his son in preparation for an attack against the School Board.'"
Defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that the statements made to the school board by the Superintendent and the Vice President of the school board were covered by an absolute privilege". Supreme Court granted the Defendants' motions, and Plaintiff appealed.
The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court's ruling, explaining "[I]t is well settled that government officials are absolutely immune for discretionary acts carried out in the course of official duties and that immunity attaches 'however erroneous or wrong [such conduct] may be, or however malicious even the motive which produced it'", citing Crvelin v Board of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of City of Niagara Falls, 144 AD3d 1649. In the words of the Appellate Division, "The absolute privilege defense affords complete immunity from liability for defamation to 'an official [who] is a principal executive of State or local government[,] or [who] is [otherwise] entrusted by law with administrative or executive policy-making responsibilities of considerable dimension'".
The Appellate Division noted the decision in Sindoni v Board of Educ. of Skaneateles Cent. Sch. Dist., 217 AD3d 1363, in which reference was made to a two-prong test "with respect to statements made during the discharge of those responsibilities about matters which come within the ambit of those duties". The first prong of the test "requires an examination of ... status of the speaker," and "the second prong ... the subject matter of the statement and the forum in which it is made in the light of the speaker's public duties".
In this action the Plaintiff did not dispute that the Superintendent of the district, and the Vice President of the school board, are government officials to whom the absolute privilege would apply, thus satisfying the first prong of the test referred to in Sindoni.
As to the second prong, the Appellate Division said the "question presented is whether [the two officials] were acting within the scope of their public duties" when, as alleged in the amended complaint, the Superintendent "told the assembled school board members during a workshop session that [Plaintiff] had purchased a firearm for his son", and the Vice President of the school board stated that "she had seen social media posts commenting on the situation."
The Appellate Division concluded that Defendants submitted undisputed evidence in support of the motions for summary judgment establishing, as a matter of law, that the statements of the Superintendent and the Vice President of the Board "were made during the course of the performance of their public duties".* In the words of the Appellate Division, "Specifically, the statements concerned rumors of a potential firearm-related threat to the safety of students, faculty, and board members and thus fell squarely within the scope of the duties and responsibilities of [the School Superintendent and the Vice President of the Board]."
Accordingly, the court concluded that the statements were absolutely privileged and Supreme Court had properly granted the Defendants' motions for summary judgment.
* In Hemmens v Nelson, 138 NY 517, the Court of Appeals explained "From considerations of public policy and to secure the unembarrassed and efficient administration of justice and public affairs, the law denies to the defamed party any remedy through an action for libel or slander in such cases".
Click HERE to access the decision of the Appellate Division posted on the Internet.