Recent decisions by New York State courts focusing on Adjective Law issues

Adjective Law is that portion of the law that deals with the rules of procedure governing evidence, pleading, and practice. For example:

1. A New York State CPLR Article 78 proceeding seeking review of an administrative determination may be filed only after the determination has become "final and binding.

An administrative determination becomes final and binding when two requirements are met: 

[1] completeness [finality] of the determination and 

[2] exhaustion of administrative remedies. 

Click Source to access the relevant decision posted on the Internet.

 

2. A settlement agreement is properly read in conjunction with the release, particularly where the release expressly refers to the settlement agreement. 

In the instant New York State litigation the court found that the agreement settled only the claims in a Federal action and made no mention of claims set out in a State action, although the State action was pending at the time. 

Further, the court noted that the claims in the two actions were not related. 

Click Source to access the relevant decision posted on the Internet.

 

3. On a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to New York State's CPLR 3211(a)(5) on the ground that the statute of limitations has expired, the moving defendant must establish, prima facie, that the time in which to commence the action has expired. 

If the defendant satisfies this burden, the burden of going forward shifts to the plaintiff to raise a question of fact as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled or is otherwise inapplicable, or whether the plaintiff actually commenced the action within the applicable limitations period.

Click Source to access the relevant decision posted on the Internet.

An Appellate Division's autopsy of an administrative departmental hearing

In this CPLR Article 78 proceeding the Petitioner asked the Appellate Division to annul the determination of a New York State Department of Motor Vehicle Administrative Law Judge [ALJ] revoking his driver's license for 180 days based upon the ALJ's finding that Petitioner violated Vehicle and Traffic Law §1111 by failing to stop at a stop light, resulting in the death of a pedestrian.

The Appellate Division unanimously confirmed the ALJ's rulings, without costs, and dismissed the petition, explaining:

1. Petitioner contended that the ALJ "improperly relied on hearsay [evidence] contained within a police accident reconstructionist's report". Citing  Matter of Sadallah v New York State Dept. of Motor Vehs., 160 AD3d 1482, the Appellate Division found that the ALJ's determination was supported by substantial evidence, observing that "Evidence which would not be admissible in a court, such as hearsay, is admissible in a departmental hearing"* and "if sufficiently relevant and probative may constitute substantial evidence". 

In this instance, said the court, "the testimony of the officer who interviewed eyewitnesses and the [police accident reconstructionist's] report were sufficient to establish that [Petitioner] violated Vehicle and Traffic Law §1111 by entering the intersection while the light was red and striking the pedestrian in the far cross-walk approximately four seconds after the traffic control device turned from yellow to red."

2. Petitioner contended that he was improperly deprived of an opportunity to cross-examine the author of the accident reconstruction report.

In the words of the Appellate Division, "that contention lacks merit; [Petitioner] could have called the author [of the report] as a witness".

3. The Appellate Division rejected Petitioner's argument that it was improper for the ALJ to "draw a negative inference from [Petitioner's] failure to testify".

4. As Petitioner did not argue on administrative appeal that a belated hearing notice deprived the ALJ of jurisdiction to hear the matter, the Appellate Division said Petitioner "failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to that contention".

5. Contrary to Petitioner's argument, the Appellate Division concluded that "a suspension of [Petitioner's] license for 180 days is not so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness".

The Appellate Division unanimously confirmed the ALJ's decision without costs and dismissed the Article 78 petition challenging it.

* 15 NYCRR 127.6 [b]

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

 

A court may not substitute its judgment for that of an administrative tribunal that is supported by substantial evidence although a contrary decision might have been reasonable

The New York State Division of Human Rights [DHR] adopted the recommended order of the Administrative Law Judge dismissing Petitioner's disability and age discrimination complaints. Petitioner appealed the DHR's decision.

The Appellate Division unanimously confirmed DHR's determination that the Employer had not engaged in unlawful discrimination on the basis of age or disability, finding that the DHR's ruling was supported by substantial evidence. 

The court noted that "[t]he record provides ample evidence to support [the Employer's] proffered reason that Petitioner's termination was due to work performance issues and Petitioner failed to show that the Employer's  legitimate reasons for terminating Plaintiff's employment were a pretext for discrimination.

Citing Matter of White, 160 AD3d at 448, the Appellate Division also noted that a court may not substitute its judgment for DHR's, even if a contrary decision might have been reasonable.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

 

Reviving previously time-barred tort claims involving sex offenses against children

In 2019, the New York State Legislature passed the Child Victims Act [CVA], which provided that previously time-barred tort claims based on sex offenses against children could be brought within a specified time.

In response to a question certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and accepting the Second Circuit's interpretation for purposes of its answer to the question certified without endorsing it, in Jones v Cattaraugus-Little Valley Central School District* the New York State Court of Appeals concluded that the six-month waiting period preceding August 14, 2019, the date on which previously barred claims could be brought, is neither a statute of limitations nor a condition precedent.

In other words, the New York State Court of Appeals held the actions on such claims could be commenced "not earlier than" August 14, 2019 and "not later than" August 14, 2021.

The New York State Court of Appeals, citing Anderson v Eli Lilly & Co., 79 NY2d 797, said "the CVA, like other claim revival statutes, temporarily revived certain previously time[-]barred claims — it did not act to create any new causes of action".

Click HERE to access the opinion of the Court of Appeals posted on the Internet.

 

Does New York State's Freedom of Information Law's personal privacy exemption categorically permit an appointing authority to withhold of all police officer disciplinary records not deemed substantiated?

Until 2020, disciplinary records of law enforcement officers were categorically exempted from the public disclosure requirements of the Freedom of Information Law [FOIL] by statute. As observed by the New York State Court of Appeals in its opinion in New York Civil Liberties Union v City of Rochester et al., "in response to the national outcry over the killing of George Floyd, and rising public concern that law enforcement agencies were not appropriately handling allegations of officer misconduct, the New York State Legislature repealed Civil Rights Law §50-a and amended FOIL to specifically address the disclosure of law enforcement disciplinary records.*

Shortly after the 2020 amendments went into effect, the New York Civil Liberties Union initiated the instant litigation in which the question to be addressed was whether FOIL's personal privacy exemption, which was left intact by the 2020 amendments, provided a basis for appointing authorities to categorically withhold all disciplinary records relating to complaints against law enforcement officers that were not deemed substantiated**.

The Court of Appeals response: "The answer is no."

Earlier the Appellate Division held that the personal privacy exemption did not authorize the City of Rochester [City] to categorically withhold all such records and, instead, directed the City to review the requested records and determine whether there is a particularized and specific justification to redact or withhold each record on personal privacy grounds".

In response to City's appeal of the Appellate Division's decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's ruling, opining that "To promote open government and public accountability, FOIL imposes a broad duty on government agencies to make their records available to the public". 

In the words of the Court of Appeals: "The statute is based on the principle that 'the public is vested with an inherent right to know and that official secrecy is anathematic to our form of government'". The Court of Appeals further observed that pursuant to FOIL, "[a]ll records are presumptively available for public inspection and copying, unless the agency satisfies its burden of demonstrating that the material requested falls squarely within the ambit of one of [the] statutory exemptions," which statutory exemption must be "narrowly interpreted".

Observing that FOIL's personal privacy exemption permits an agency to withhold from the public access any record that "if disclosed would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" and "FOIL, as amended in conjunction with the repeal of Civil Rights Law §50-a, does not deny law enforcement officers the benefit of this exemption", the Court of Appeals said that the Appellate Division correctly concluded — consistent with uniform appellate precedent — that there is no categorical or blanket personal privacy exemption for records relating to complaints against law enforcement officers that are not deemed substantiated".

In contrast to withholding all such records, the Court of Appeals said "Public Officers Law §87(2) requires an agency to evaluate each record individually and determine whether 'a particularized and specific justification' exists for denying access on the ground that disclosing all or part of the record would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy" and observed that the Appellate Division's ruling indicating that in the event "redactions would prevent such an invasion and can be made without unreasonable difficulty, the agency must disclose the record with those necessary redactions."

* See Chapter 96 of the Laws of 2020.

** FOIL does not define or use the term "substantiated." For purposes of this appeal, the Court of Appeals deemed substantiated to mean supported by "sufficient credible evidence to believe that the subject officer committed the alleged act without legal justification".

Click HERE to access the Court of Appeals' decision posted on the Internet.