Summaries of, and commentaries on, selected court and administrative decisions and related matters affecting public employers and employees in New York State in particular and possibly in other jurisdictions in general.
On October 8, 2025, Albany Law School's Government Law Center and the Office of the Chief Disability Officer of the State of New York [OCDO] hosted Albany Law School's Nancy M. Sills 76th Memorial Lecture.
Leaders and advocates from the OCDO discussed the intersections of disability and aging and efforts being made to include the needs of individuals with disabilities in New York State's aging laws and policies.
Click HERE to access the Podcast of the presentation posted on the Internet.
Claimant for Workers' Compensation benefits appealed the Workers' Compensation Board's [Board] decision disallowing Claimant's request to amend his earlier established claim to include consequential injuries.
Claimant had established a claim for workers' compensation benefits based upon an exacerbation of a preexisting chemical sensitivity and Claimant's employer reassigned Claimant to work at a different location. Subsequently, Claimant's treating physician advised Claimant's employer that Claimant's reassignment to the new location had resulted in "a complete resolution" of Claimant's symptoms and requested that the reassignment be made permanent. Claimant continued to work at the new location until January 2020 when he took a leave of absence to care for his ailing mother and commenced working from home.
Claimant subsequently complained of certain mental health difficulties to his treating physician, asserting that, while working from home while on leave, he was harassed by his supervisor concerning his work. Claimant's physician diagnosed Claimant with a number of psychological conditions related to those complaints and Claimant then sought to amend his established chemical sensitivity claim claim "to include anxiety, depressed mood, major depressive disorder and insomnia as consequential injuries".
A Workers' Compensation Law Judge [WCLJ] found that Claimant had not demonstrated that his psychological injuries were a direct or natural consequence of his initial chemical related injury and disallowed the claim for "consequential injuries". The Workers' Compensation Board affirmed the WCLJ's findings, and Claimant appealed the Board ruling.
The Appellate Division sustained the Board's determination, noting:
1. Substantial evidence supported the Board's finding that Claimant's alleged psychological injuries did not result from a fear of being assigned to work at his original location;
2. Claimant "has not demonstrated that the asserted psychological injuries resulted directly and naturally from his prior chemical insensitivity disability so as to establish a consequential injury"; and
3. Claimant's allegations with respect to harassment, "were too remote to establish a causal nexus to the prior disability, even if the actions could constitute a separate and distinct claim for work-related stress.
The Appellate Division said its "review of the record as a whole" found no basis to disturb the Board's determination that Claimant failed to demonstrate, "by competent medical evidence, a causal relationship between his established disability and his alleged consequential injuries", and held that the Board's decision to reject Claimant's alleged consequential injuries was supported by substantial evidence.
Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.
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In 2023, the Legislature enacted the Even Year Election Law (Laws of 2023, Chapter 741) to consolidate certain elections for county and town offices with even year elections for state and federal offices. The Plaintiffs, including several counties with charter provisions setting local elections for odd-numbered years, challenge the constitutionality of the Even Year Election Law, claiming the statute violates the home rule provisions of Article IX of the State Constitution.
The Court of Appels held that "there is no express or implied constitutional limitation on the legislature's authority to enact the Even Year Election Law" [hereinafter EYEL] and affirmed the ruling of the Appellate Division.
No. 66
In the words of the court:
"The issue for this Court is whether article IX limits the power of the legislature in such a way as to make the EYEL an unconstitutional exercise of legislative authority. We conclude that it does not.
"Plaintiffs first challenge the constitutionality of the statute under section 1, arguing that, because of the rights detailed in section 1 as implemented by the Municipal Home Rule Law, counties have a constitutional right to set the timing of county elections and terms of office. In other words, because counties are authorized to adopt alternative forms of government (NY Const, art IX, §1 [h] [1], and because those counties that do so are instructed by the Municipal Home Rule Law to provide for 'the manner of election' and 'terms of office' of its officials in those charters (Municipal Home Rule Law §33 [3] [b]), that statutory instruction from the Municipal Home Rule Law is transformed into a constitutional right barring the legislature from interfering with the manner of election or terms of office for local officials. Nothing in the text of these provisions, or in our jurisprudence, supports that view. Indeed, only the right to form an alternative form of government is guaranteed by section 1 (h) (1), that right does not implicitly include a right to set terms of office or timing of elections, and the authority delegated to local governments in the Municipal Home Rule Law is statutory. Nothing in the EYEL infringes the rights provided by article IX's 'bill of rights.'
"Next, plaintiffs argue that the EYEL is unconstitutional under article IX, section 2 (b) (2) because the legislature is only empowered to act in this manner pursuant to general law or a duly enacted special law and, in their view, the EYEL is neither. This is incorrect. As defined by article IX, §3 (d) (1), a general law is one 'which in terms and in effect applies alike to all counties, all counties other than those wholly included within a city, all cities, all towns or all villages.' This Court has long held that a statute remains a general law where it is 'cast in general terms' but affects a smaller category of counties, and is "no less general because it classifies the [counties] affected on the basis of population or some other condition and extends its benefits only to" certain counties, so long as 'the classification be defined by conditions common to the class and related to the subject of the statute' (Uniformed Firefighters Assn. v City of New York, 50 NY2d 85, 90 [1980]; see also Rozler v Franger, 61 AD2d 46, 51 [4th Dept 1978], affd 46 NY2d 760 [1978] [that Village Law exempts chartered villages does not 'make it any less a general law,' because the 'exception . . . is based on a reasonable classification and the law applies uniformly to all other villages throughout the state']). The EYEL, as the Appellate Division held, is a general law because it applies to all counties, with reasonable exceptions, and has an equal impact on a 'rationally defined class similarly situated' (238 AD3d at 1540-1541 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see also Hotel Dorset Co. v Trust for Cultural Resources of City of N.Y., 46 NY2d 358, 373 [1978] [where a law 'has an equal impact on all members of a rationally defined class similarly situated, the law is thus a general' law]). While the EYEL contains exemptions, its terms are general, and the category of counties and offices it affects is defined by common conditions and related to the statute's purpose.
"Finally, plaintiffs challenge the EYEL on the basis that it runs afoul of the clause in article IX, §3 (b), which provides that the provisions of article IX 'shall not affect any existing valid provisions of acts of the legislature or of local legislation.' This language simply made clear, as the Appellate Division held, that existing local laws remained in force following the adoption of article IX, and expressly accounts for change through legislative action by stating that existing local provisions continue 'in force until repealed, amended, modified or superseded' (see 238 AD3d at 1541 [article IX, §3 'clarifies that the adoption of Article IX did not itself invalidate then-existing legislation . . . and does not preclude the Legislature from adopting a law such as the EYEL']).
"Nothing in article IX limits, expressly or by implication, the otherwise plenary authority of the legislature to mandate the timing of certain elections, as the EYEL does (see Matter of Burr v Voorhis, 229 NY 382, 388 [1920] ([T)he legislature is free to adopt concerning (voting) any reasonable, uniform and just regulations which are in harmony with constitutional provisions"]). Consequently, without any such constitutional limitation, the EYEL is a proper exercise of that authority.
"The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, without costs.
"Opinion by Judge Garcia. Chief Judge Wilson and Judges Rivera, Singas, Cannataro, Troutman and Halligan concur."
Footnotes
Footnote 1: The EYEL exempts offices whose terms are specified in the Constitution, offices for which elections must occur in odd numbered years pursuant to the Constitution, offices with a three-year term before January 1, 2025, offices in towns coterminous with villages, and offices in counties located in New York City (L 2023, ch 741, §§ 1-4; see also NY Const, art XIII, §§ 8, 10, 12, 13, 17).
Footnote 2: Individual voter plaintiffs' complaint alleges that the EYEL's consolidation of local elections with even-year elections "increases the burdens associated with casting a vote, fundraising, and generating support for candidates, among other essential campaigning activities, while contributing to voter fatigue due to higher numbers of issues and/or candidates on the ballot" and that "[w]ith more candidates on the ballot and higher turnout numbers, voters will face longer ballots, longer voting lines, voter fatigue, and 'ballot drop-off' or 'roll-off.' " These are not traditional voter suppression claims.
Click HERE to access the decision of the Court of Appeals posted on the Internet.
The Decision of the Commissioner of Education in this appeal challenging the disciplinary action taken against a student initiated by the school district and the penalty imposed on a student upon being found guilty of misconduct while attending school noted that:
1. A school district's decision to suspend a student from school pursuant to Education Law §3214 must be based on competent and substantial evidence that the accused student participated in the "objectionable conduct".
2. In an appeal to the Commissioner of Education the petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief requested and has the burden of establishing the facts supporting the relief sought by the petitioner; and
3. The school district must present "Competent and substantial evidence of the accused [student’s] guilt" supporting its determination and the penalty imposed.
Based on the record, the Commissioner found that Petitioners in the instant appeal failed to establish that school district lacked competent and substantial evidence of the student's guilt of the misconduct charged.
The text of the Commissioner's decision in the instant matter is set out below:
Decisions of the Commissioner of Education
Appeal of J.C. and C.C., on behalf of their child, from action of the Board of Education of the Cold Spring Harbor Central School District regarding student discipline.
Decision No. 18,639
(September 29, 2025)
Frazer & Feldman, LLP, attorneys for respondent, Amanda Hickey, Esq., of counsel
ROSA., Commissioner. -- Petitioners challenge the determination of the Board of Education of the Cold Spring Harbor Central School District (“board” or “respondent”) to suspend their child (“student A”). The appeal must be dismissed.
On May 31, 2024, student A and a classmate (“student B”) were involved in a physical altercation. A security guard intervened and escorted both students to the principal’s office. Soon thereafter, student A, stated, unprompted that he had “just beat the s*** out of” student B and “couldn’t be happier” about it. The principal proceeded to interview student B, who stated that student A began “swinging” at him as he left the cafeteria. The principal also reviewed security footage showing that student A confronted, and initiated an altercation with, student B. Student A declined to speak to the principal about the incident unless petitioners were present. Although petitioners arrived soon thereafter, Student A did not provide any further information regarding his role in the altercation.
In a letter dated May 31, 2024, the principal concluded that student A’s presence in school represented a continuing danger and/or an ongoing threat of disruption to the academic process and suspended him for five days. This letter was hand-delivered to petitioners’ home that same day. Appeals to the superintendent and board were denied, and this appeal ensued.
Petitioners argue that respondent failed to amend student A’s educational plan pursuant to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”) to protect him from ongoing harassment from student B. Petitioners further assert that student A, who they claim was the victim of longstanding bullying by student B, acted in self-defense. Petitioners also allege, among other due process violations, that respondent wrongfully withheld security footage of the altercation. For relief, petitioners seek expungement of the short-term suspension from student A’s record.
Respondent argues that the Commissioner lacks jurisdiction to review petitioners’ Section 504 claims. On the merits, respondent denies that it violated student A’s due process rights or that he acted in self-defense. Respondent further contends that its decision to suspend student A was based on competent and substantial evidence.
I must first address three preliminary matters. I lack jurisdiction over those portions of petitioners’ appeal claiming that respondent failed to amend student A’s Section 504 plan to protect against student B’s alleged bullying. Section 504 prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities who are “excluded from ... participation in, ... denied the benefits of, or ... subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,” which includes public schools (29 USC §794 [a]). The Commissioner of Education has no authority to review Section 504 claims in an appeal under Education Law §310 (Appeal of J.B., 62 Ed Dept Rep., Decision No. 18,245; Appeal of K.V., 61 id., Decision No. 18,067).[1]
Next, I must address the scope of petitioners’ reply. The purpose of a reply is to respond to new material or affirmative defenses set forth in an answer (8 NYCRR 275.3, 275.14). A reply is not meant to buttress allegations in the petition or belatedly add assertions that should have been raised in the petition (Appeal of Nappi, 57 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,300; Appeal of Caswell, 48 id. 472, Decision No. 15,920; Appeal of Hinson, 48 id. 437, Decision No. 15,908). Therefore, while I have reviewed the reply, I have not considered those portions containing new allegations or exhibits that are not responsive to new material or affirmative defenses set forth in the answer.
Third, petitioners request that I accept numerous submissions into the record pursuant to 8 NYCRR 276.5. That provision authorizes the acceptance of additional evidence submitted by a party if the Commissioner deems it necessary to render a decision. Here, petitioners seek to bolster their contention that the student was bullied and acted in self-defense. This evidence, however, should have been submitted with the petition or reply (Appeal of R.H. and S.H., 60 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,869; Appeal of Nappi, 57 id., Decision No. 17,300). To the extent that these submissions also contain evidence that post-dates the pleadings, such evidence is not relevant to the claims presented herein. Accordingly, I decline to accept the additional evidence submitted by petitioners.
Turning to the merits, the decision to suspend a student from school pursuant to Education Law §3214 must be based on competent and substantial evidence that the student participated in the objectionable conduct (Matter of Board of Educ. of Monticello Cent. School Dist. v Commissioner of Educ., 91 NY2d 133, 140-141 [1997]; Matter of Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y. v Mills, 293 AD2d 37, 39 [3d Dept 2002]; Appeal of M.J., 57 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,292; Appeal of B.M., 48 id. 441, Decision No. 15,909). The Court of Appeals has described the substantial evidence standard as “proof within the whole record of such quality and quantity as to generate conviction in and persuade a fair and detached fact finder that, from that proof as a premise, a conclusion or ultimate fact may be extracted reasonably probatively and logically” (300 Gramatan Ave. Assoc. v State Div. of Human Rights, 45 NY2d 176, 181 [1978]; see Appeal of J.J., 46 Ed Dept Rep 270, Decision No. 15,505; Appeal of Wallen, 33 id. 313, Decision No. 13,060).
In an appeal to the Commissioner, a petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief requested and establishing the facts upon which he or she seeks relief (8 NYCRR 275.10; Appeal of P.C. and K.C., 57 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,337; Appeal of Aversa, 48 id. 523, Decision No. 15,936; Appeal of Hansen, 48 id. 354, Decision No. 15,884).
Turning first to petitioners’ due process claims, petitioners contend that respondent denied their district-level appeal “without explanation,” in an untimely manner, and without adequate investigation. The record establishes that respondent complied with its own policy in issuing written determinations to petitioners after each level of review. Moreover, respondent’s policy does not require that the board meet with petitioners, interview witnesses, or provide a written determination to petitioners within a certain timeframe. Accordingly, petitioners’ procedural challenges to respondent’s internal review process are without merit.
Petitioners have also failed to establish that respondent lacked competent and substantial evidence of the student’s guilt. During its investigation, respondent obtained a witness statement from student B, reviewed security footage of the altercation, and spoke to the security guard who broke up the altercation. Most notably, respondent relied upon student A’s unprompted utterance that he “beat the s*** out of” student B. Where a student admits the charged conduct, the admission is sufficient proof of guilt (Appeal of N.S., 57 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,268; Appeal of S.U., 57 id., Decision No. 17,159; Appeal of M.K., 48 id. 462, Decision No. 15,916). Based on this evidence, I find that respondent’s determination was based upon competent and substantial evidence (Appeal of F.P., 64 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 18,525).
Petitioners further contend that student A’s actions were justified on the ground of self-defense. Students may not be disciplined for engaging in conduct necessary to protect themselves from attack, including proportionate force if necessary (See e.g. Appeal of A.C., 59 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,799; Appeal of G.J.-F., 58 id., Decision No. 17,608; Appeal of J.M., 57 id., Decision No. 17,335). Petitioners have not submitted any direct evidence from student A, or any other persuasive evidence, demonstrating that the student acted in self-defense (Appeal of G.J.-F., 58 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,608; Appeal of a Student with a Disability, 49 id. 452, Decision No. 16,079). While petitioners’ appeal to the board contained a lengthy narrative attributed to student A, this statement is uncorroborated hearsay entitled to minimal probative value. Additionally, while petitioners claim to possess “dispositive student video footage of the brawl,” they have not submitted any such evidence on appeal.[2] Thus, petitioners have failed to meet their burden of proving that student B initiated the altercation or that student A acted in self-defense (Appeal of G.J.-F., 58 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 17,608).[3]
Petitioners also argue that student A’s conduct was justified as he had been previously bullied and harassed by student B. The Commissioner has previously held that bullying or harassment does not affect a student’s guilt in a disciplinary matter (Appeal of J.M., 60 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 18,002). However, “respondent has an ongoing obligation to address all incidents of bullying and harassment” (Appeal of M.C. and T.H., 64 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 18,550). Thus, if it has not already, respondent must investigate petitioners’ claims presented herein pursuant to the Dignity for all Students Act. If respondent concludes that student A was bullied or harassed, “nothing would preclude respondent … from expunging [the instant] suspension … as a remedy ‘reasonably calculated to end the harassment, bullying, and/or discrimination, eliminate any hostile environment, create a more positive school culture and climate [or] prevent recurrence of the behavior’” (Appeal of J.M., 60 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 18,002, quoting Education Law §13 [1] [e]).
Finally, even assuming that respondent wrongfully refused to allow petitioners to view the district’s surveillance footage of the altercation, this constitutes harmless error under the circumstances. As indicated above, respondent possessed competent and substantial evidence of the student’s guilt, including student A’s unprompted admission that he “beat the s***” out of student B. Moreover, the surveillance video, which I have obtained and reviewed in camera, does not support petitioners’ claim of self-defense. Thus, even if petitioners had a right to view the footage, it would not affect the outcome of this appeal.[4]
To the extent they are not addressed herein, I have considered petitioners’ remaining contentions and find them to be without merit.
THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED.
[1] I note that Section 504 claims alleging a denial of a free appropriate public education are subject to the Individual with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) exhaustion procedures (20 USC §1415 [l]; see L.K. v Sewanhaka Cent. High Sch. Dist., 641 Fed Appx 56 [2d Cir 2016]).
[2] In their reply, petitioner submitted social media and text message conversations from students as well as still images of the confrontation from an unidentified videographer. While I have not accepted this evidence into the record for the reasons articulated above, it would not, if accepted, prove that student A acted in self-defense.
[3] I further note that student A did not allege that he acted in self-defense when he met with the principal.
[4] The United States Department of Education has opined that a video recording maintained by a school district for disciplinary purposes constitutes an education record under the Family Education Rights & Privacy Act (U.S. Dept. of Education, “FAQs on Photos and Videos under FERPA,” https://studentprivacy.ed.gov/faq/faqs-photos-and-videos-under-ferpa(link is external) [last accessed Aug. 27, 2025]; see also U.S. Dept. of Education, Student Privacy Policy Office, Letter to Wachter, Dec. 7, 2017, available at https://studentprivacy.ed.gov/resources/letter-wachter-regarding-surveillance-video-multiple-students(link is external) [last accessed Sept. 18, 2025] and N.Y. State Educ. Dept. Privacy Office, Matter of a Privacy Complaint filed against the Shenendehowa Cent. Sch. Dist, Jul. 28, 2022, https://www.nysed.gov/sites/default/files/final-determination-7.28.22-_redacted.pdf [last accessed Sept. 18, 2025]). Therefore, if parents request access to such a video, they must be provided with the opportunity to inspect and review, or be informed of the contents of, the video (20 USC § 1232g [a] [1] [A]; 34 CFR 99.12 [a]).
(link is external [last accessed Aug. 27, 2025]; see also U.S. Dept. of Education, Student Privacy Policy Office, Letter to Wachter, Dec. 7, 2017, available at https://studentprivacy.ed.gov/resources/letter-wachter-regarding-surveillance-video-multiple-students(link is external)[last accessed Sept. 18, 2025] and N.Y. State Educ. Dept. Privacy Office, Matter of a Privacy Complaint filed against the Shenendehowa Cent. Sch. Dist, Jul. 28, 2022, https://www.nysed.gov/sites/default/files/final-determination-7.28.22-_redacted.pdf [last accessed Sept. 18, 2025]). Therefore, if parents request access to such a video, they must be provided with the opportunity to inspect and review, or be informed of the contents of, the video (20 USC §1232g [a] [1] [A]; 34 CFR 99.12 [a]).
Click HERE to access the Decision of the Commissioner Education No. 18,639 posted on the Internet.