In an Article 78 action involving the payment of a death benefit by the New York City Employees' Retirement System [NYCERS] involving competing claimants, one of Plaintiffs seeking the death benefit appealed a Supreme Court's decision granting NYCERS' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss Plaintiff's cause of action. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's ruling.
Plaintiff's claimed decedent [Decedent] had been employed by the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation and was a member of NYCERS. In 1980, Decedent submitted a designation of beneficiary form to NYCERS designating his daughter and his mother as his beneficiaries for an ordinary death benefit [ODB] which was to be paid to the designated beneficiaries if the NYCERS member died while in service.
In 2008, Decedent submitted a designation of beneficiary form designating Plaintiff, Decedent's spouse, as his beneficiary for the ODB. Decedent also checked a box on the 2008 designation form stating that he was nominating his estate as his beneficiary, which was accompanied by an acknowledgment that a NYCERS member could not designate both an individual and the member's estate as beneficiaries.
By letters sent in August 2008 through October 2008, NYCERS notified Decedent that the 2008 designation was invalid because he had designated both the Plaintiff and his estate as beneficiaries and that the Decedent needed to complete a new designation of beneficiary form. Decedent failed to complete and file a new designation of beneficiary form with NYCERS.
In early 2017, Decedent submitted an application for service retirement to NYCERS at which time Decedent had the option of designating a beneficiary or beneficiaries to receive a postretirement death benefit [PRDB] upon his death, or in the absence of such an election, NYCERS would issue the PRDB to the beneficiary or beneficiaries who were designated to receive the ODB. Decedent did not designate a beneficiary to receive the PRDB.
Decedent died in May, 2017 and NYCERS then informed the Decedent's daughter and his mother that they were entitled to the PRDB by virtue of their status as ODB beneficiaries.
In March 2018 Plaintiff inquired as to her entitlement to the PRDB. NYCERS responded, notifying Plaintiff that although the Decedent had named her as a beneficiary, he had also designated his estate as a beneficiary, and, therefore, the designation was "invalid" and she was not entitled to the PRDB.
In June 2019, Plaintiff commenced the instant action against NYCERS seeking a judgment declaring that NYCERS is obligated to pay the PRDB to the Plaintiff. NYCERS moved to dismiss the complaint as time-barred, contending that Plaintiff could have commenced a CPLR Article 78 proceeding to challenge NYCERS's determination that the 2008 designation was invalid and the Plaintiff was not entitled to the PRDB and that the four-month statute of limitations applicable to such proceedings applied. However, as the action was not commenced within the four-month period, Supreme Court granted NYCERS's motion, determining that the action was time-barred and Plaintiff appealed Supreme Court's ruling.
The Appellate Division, explaining that:
1. On a motion to dismiss a cause of action pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5) on the ground that it is barred by the statute of limitations, a defendant bears the initial burden of establishing, prima facie, that the time in which to sue has expired; and
2. "The burden then shift[s] to the plaintiff to present admissible evidence establishing that the action was timely or to raise a question of fact as to whether the action was timely'".
In addition, the Appellate Division noted that "Where a declaratory judgment [or other] action involves claims that could have been made in another proceeding for which a specific limitation period is provided, the action is subject to the shorter limitations period" and thus where as is here the situation, "a proceeding could have been brought pursuant to CPLR article 78, the four-month statute of limitations applicable to such proceedings applies. The Appellate Division observed that as "Plaintiff correctly concedes," the four-month statute of limitations applicable to a proceeding commenced pursuant to CPLR Article 78 applies, and Plaintiff could have commenced such a proceeding to challenge NYCERS's determination that the 2008 designation was invalid".
In the words of the Appellate Division:
a. "A challenge to an administrative determination must be commenced within four months of the time the determination is 'final and binding upon the petitioner;
b. "A determination is final and binding within the meaning of CPLR 217 when the decisionmaker arrives at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury; and
c. The statute of limitations "does not begin to run until the petitioner receives notice of the [final] determination".
Following further discussion concerning the running of the several statutes of limitations involved in this situation, the Appellate Division concluded that "Supreme Court properly granted the Defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss [Plaintiff's] complaint as time-barred".
Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.
