Violating of the terms of a disciplinary probationary settlement

Violating of the terms of a disciplinary probationary settlement
Pagan v Board of Educ. of the City School Dist. of the City of New York, 56 AD3d 330

The employee, while serving a disciplinary probationary period, was summarily dismissed for violating the terms and conditions of the probationary settlement agreement.

The Appellate Division dismissed former employee’s petition seeking reinstatement.

The court said that the terms of a signed stipulation to which the individual had agreed set out a three-year probationary period that provided as follows:

1. She was subject to automatic termination if she exceeded 10 days per school year in unexcused absences; and

2. She waived her tenure right to a hearing under Education Law § 3020-a.

Accordingly, the individual was a probationary employee with insofar as any unexcused was involved and was required to show bad faith of the part of the Board of Education in order to succeed in her challenge to her dismissal.

Here, said the court, the evidence did not demonstrate that the former employee had been terminated in bad faith. Rather, the evidence established that during the 2005-2006 school year, she had 11 unexcused absences.

The individual argued that she only had 8 unexcused absences because three of her absences were in connection with court appearances. The Appellate Division held that Pagan’s unexcused absences for court appearances “did not satisfy the terms of the stipulation for excused absences.”

NYPPL Comment: Except where a collective bargaining agreement provides otherwise, a public employee required to appear in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding pursuant to a subpoena is typically excused from his or her duties without charge to his or her leave credits. In contrast, an individual who is a party appearing in other than his or her official capacity must charge his or her absence from work to his or her leave credits or be place on leave without pay.

As an example, 4 NYCRR 21.9 of the attendance rules for employees of the State as the employer, address “Leave for subpoenaed appearance and jury attendance.” The rule provides that:

(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b) of this section, on proof of the necessity of jury service or appearance as a witness pursuant to subpoena or other order of a court or body, an employee shall be granted a leave of absence with pay with no charge against leave credits; provided, however, that this section shall not apply to any absence by an employee occasioned by such an appearance in an action to which such employee is a party; and

(b) An employee holding a position designated as overtime ineligible may be granted a leave of absence with pay with no charge against leave credits on proof of necessity of jury service or appearance as a witness pursuant to subpoena or other order of a court or body for any period(s) of less than a workweek, regardless of whether such employee is a party to the action.

4 NYCRR 28-1.9 provides for similar absences, with or without pay, by individuals designated Managerial or Confidential within the meaning of Article 14 of the Civil Service Law  [the Taylor Law].


The full text of the decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_08993.htm

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The Discipline Book, - a concise guide to disciplinary actions involving public employees in New York State. This more than 1500 page e-book is now available from the Public Employment Law Press. Click on http://thedisciplinebook.blogspot.com/for additional information concerning this electronic reference manual.

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Filing a statutory notice of claim: efforts by an individual to vindicate a personal interest and efforts to vindicate a public interest distinguished

Filing a statutory notice of claim: efforts by an individual to vindicate a personal interest and efforts to vindicate a public interest distinguished
Palmer v Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 56 AD3d 1245

A former employee sued the Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority alleging that the Authority terminated his employment in retaliation for his having advised the Authority’s employees and agents of alleged safety violations at his work site.

The Appellate Division ruled that Supreme Court properly granted the Authority’s motion for summary judgment to dismiss individual’s complaint.

The former employee had contended that the Authority had violated Civil Service Law §75-b, the “Whistle Blower Law." However, said the court, in this instance the individual sought only to vindicate his “individual interests," and he had not filed a notice of claim as mandated by Public Authorities Law §1299-p(1) before initiating his law suit. This, explained the court, was a fatal omission on the part of the individual.

With respect to the applicability of the three-month notice of claim requirement of Education Law 3813(1) to statutory or nonjudicial proceedings involving school districts, school boards and boards of cooperative educational services, as well as parallel notice of claim requirements when such proceedings involve other municipal units of government, New York’s courts have distinguished between proceedings which concern an individual’s personal interest [see, for example, Doyle v. Board of Education of Deer Park Union Free School District, 230 A.D.2d 820, a case involving a claim of lost retirement benefits] and those involving an individual seeking to vindicate a public interest (see, for example, Union Free School District No. 6 of Towns of Islip & Smithtown v New York State Division of Human Rights Appeal Board, 35 NY2d 371, at 380, motion to reargue denied 36 NY2d 807).

The general rule: statutes requiring the filing of a notice of claim as a condition precedent to initiating litigation are applicable in actions involving “only a personal interest” but not in actions involving an effort to vindicate a “public interest.”

There as some exceptions to this general rule, however.

PERB, relying on the Court of Appeals ruling in Freudenthal v. Nassau County, 99 NY2d 285, that claims filed with the NY State Division of Human Rights, an administrative agency, do not require the filing of a Notice of Claim pursuant to Education Law Section 3813, has ruled that such notice is not required with respect to improper practice charges filed with it.

Similarly, the Commissioner of Education has held that Section 3813 does not apply to appeals brought under Section 310 of the Education Law [Appeals of Bodnar and DeGiglio, 1990 Opinions of the Commissioner of Education, 12369] while in Mennella v Uniondale UFSD, 287 A.D.2d 636, the Appellate Division decided that a petition filed with the Commissioner of Education may constitute the functional equivalent of a Section 3813(1) notice of claim.

In Sephton v Board of Education of the City of New York, 99 AD2d 509, the Appellate Division ruled that "the 'tenure rights' of teachers are ... considered a matter in the public interest and therefore Section 3813 is not applicable to cases seeking to enforce such rights."

Addressing another aspect of the former employee’s petition, the Appellate Division ruled that his cause of action “is not viable because Civil Service Law §75-b(2)(a)(i) prohibits a public employer from … terminating a public employee based on the employee's disclosure of the ‘violation of a law, rule or regulation which violation creates and presents a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety’ [and the Authority] established as a matter of law that the safety concerns raised by [former employee] did not present such a danger, and [the individual] failed to raise an issue of fact.”

The full text of the decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_08947.htm

Sanctions ordered after lawsuit filed pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law ruled frivolous
Matter of Fenstermaker v Edgemont Union Free School Dist., 2006 NY Slip Op 52652(U), Decided on September 26, 2006, Supreme Court, Westchester County, Loehr, J. [Not selected for inclusion in the Official Reports, decision affirmed by the Appellate Division, 48 A.D.3d 564]

In this action, State Supreme Court Justice Gerald Loehr, in an exercise of judicial discretion, imposed sanctions on Scott L. Fenstermaker for what Justice Loehr termed a frivolous lawsuit involving his demands for public records pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law [FOIL].

Fenstermaker had asked Supreme Court to direct the Edgemont Union Free School District to provide copies of all records requested in his FOIL request of January 31, 2006 “at the lowest fee collected by the School District on FOIL requests during the period between the enactment of FOIL until the present” and to edit the material “to eliminate extraneous, irrelevant and superfluous documents” from its response to his FOIL request.

Fenstermaker’s request specified 60 categories of financial records that spanned the period from January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2003. Susan Shirken, in her capacity as the School District's Records Access Officer, advised Fenstermaker that two items in his FOIL request would not be provided because “they called for a narrative response and not for records,” but the other 58 other requests were granted subject to some of the records being redacted to delete personal information such has home addresses and Social Security numbers.

Shirken also told Fenstermaker that "When the records have been assembled and boxed up, we will, as you have suggested, have them delivered to an outside contractor for duplication at your expense. I encourage you to confer with [the School District’s counsel] for the purpose of recommending a duplicating contractor for this purpose.” In addition, Fenstermaker was advised that the District would “require that [Fenstermaker] make appropriate advance arrangements to ensure payment … as [the District] cannot permit a situation to develop in which public records might become subject to a contractor's retaining lien for unpaid services.”

Fenstermaker responded, in pertinent part, that:

“We have every intention of using professional copying services equipped to adequately, professionally, and efficiently handle this responsibility. I suggested, in the Request, that [the District’s counsel] and I agree on such a service. I again reiterate that suggestion, notwithstanding your 'requirements.' … ‘As far as ensuring that proper payment arrangements are made we will comply with your requirement that adequate payment arrangements are made. We are confident that, at the conclusion of this matter, we will ultimately be reimbursed by School District funds.’"

According to the decision, the parties agreed that they would use an outside copying service and anticipated having done by a printer in Manhattan in order to find a facility large enough to properly handle the job, which consisted of duplicating the contents of 48 boxes of original records plus several thousand pages of additional material that had to be copied so that the originals could be returned to working files or redacted.

Subsequently Fenstermaker charged the School District with “having created a situation ‘rife with bribes and kickbacks;' that he was certain that [the District] had already altered or destroyed certain of the requested records; that the District's attorney was operating under a conflict of interest in that he was responsible as counsel for [the District’s] malfeasance; and that he [Fenstermaker] was therefore demanding that the records be sent to a copy service designated by him.”

The District responded that the cost of the records it had copied was $4,666.25, at the rate of $0.25 per page, and that the balance of the requested records would be copied by a duplicating service of the School District's choice. It also advised Fenstermaker that he could inspect the records before they were sent out for copying but “they would not be sent out at all unless and until Fenstermaker paid for the copies that had already been made and provided suitable security for payment for the copies to be made."

Fenstermaker reviewed the records and did not claim that any of the records were non-responsive. He did not, however, pay for the copies already made.

He then made a second FOIL request, this time seeking a copy of each FOIL application filled with the School District since the enactment of its FOIL rules and regulations. Shirken granted the request on the condition that the $4,666.25 still outstanding for the copies made pursuant to Festermaker's first FOIL request is paid.

Ultimately Fenstermaker filed an Article 78 petition seeking a court order directing the School District to provide copies of the records requested in his FOIL request at the lowest fee collected by the School District for FOIL requests during the period between the enactment of FOIL and the present.

In his petition, said the court, Fenstermaker “reiterates that he has offered to pay for the entire cost of the copying.” However, he contends that inasmuch as the photocopying service he regularly employs would have charged only $0.15 per page, the District’s unilateral decision to use a service of its own choosing at a cost of $0.25 per page is arbitrary and capricious.

Justice Loehr said that Public Officers Law §87(l)(b)(iii) authorizes an entity subject to FOIL to charge up to $0.25 per page for copies of records. Moreover, once an agency has determined the number of copies requested, it may require that the fee therefor be paid prior to the reproduction of the records and there is no authority for the proposition that the individual who submitted the FOIL request has any right or say in how or by whom the copies shall be made.

Accordingly, the court decided that “[the District’s] decision to send the records to an independent copying service at statutorily authorized price is more than reasonable given the alternative: releasing these original School District records to a copying service where [Fenstermaker] would have had unsupervised access to them” and denied this aspect of Fenstermaker’s petition.

As to Fenstermaker’s seeking an order directing the School District to eliminate extraneous, irrelevant and superfluous documents from its response to his initial FOIL Request, the court said that “This smacks of bad faith” in that Fenstermaker cites no authority for this proposition and “it is undisputed that he was given more than an ample opportunity to review the literally hundreds of thousands of pages of records which he requested - and which required over 177 hours to collect, copy and redact at an estimated cost in lost staff time to the School District of over $14,500 - in order to cull out those records which he did not want copied.” As Fenstermaker "declined to do so, and in so doing manufactured and perpetuated an issue that could have and should have been resolved then," Justice Loehr denied his request.

As to the District’s advising Fenstermaker that his Second FOIL Request would be granted on the condition that he first pay the $4,666.25 outstanding for the copies made with respect to his First FOIL Request, the court noted that Robert J. Freeman, Executive Director of the Committee on Open Government has issued an advisory Opinion in which he stated:

"If an agency has prepared copies of records in good faith and the applicant fails or refuses to pay the fee, I do not believe that the agency would be required to make available those copies that have been prepared. In my view, it follows that an agency should not be required to honor ensuing requests until the applicant has fulfilled his or her responsibility by tendering the fee for copies previously made." This advisory opinion is posted on the Internet at http://www.dos.state.ny.us/coog/ftext/f9659.htm .

Finding that the District’s decision with respect to Fenstermaker’s Second FOIL Request was neither arbitrary nor capricious but reasonable and in accordance with the law, Justice Loehr denied this aspect Fenstermaker claim and subsequently dismissed his Article 78 petition in its entirety.

Turning to the District’s cross-motion asking that sanctions be imposed on Fenstermaker based on its claim that “this proceeding is frivolous and was filed in bad faith,” the court said that it may, as a matter of discretion, award to any party in any civil action or proceeding costs in the form of reimbursement for actual expenses reasonably incurred and reasonable attorney's fees, resulting from frivolous conduct. Frivolous conduct, said Justice Loehr, includes the filing of a proceeding that is completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.

In this instance the court found that Fenstermaker’s Article 78 action was frivolous as “Each of [the District’s] decisions challenged in this proceeding was supported by statute and administrative rulings and [Fenstermaker] cited no authority to the contrary. Accordingly, in addition to statutory costs to be taxed by the Clerk of the Court, Justice Loehr ruled that Fenstermaker was to pay for the "District’s actual expenses reasonably incurred and reasonable attorney's fees" it incurred in defending this proceeding. Expenses and attorney's fees totaled $15,960.

Fenstermaker’s appealed Justice Loehr's ruling, only to have the Appellate Division, repeating Justice Loehr’s finding, hold that “The frivolous conduct in this case was [Fenstermaker’s] initiation of a proceeding that was completely without merit in law and could not be supported by any reasonable argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law (see 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 [c] [1]).” The Appellate Division then dismiss the appeal.

Justice Loehr's decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2006/2006_52652.htm

The Appellate Division’s decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_01343.htm

A collective bargaining agreement can shorten a statute of limitations for bringing a breach of contract action set by law

A collective bargaining agreement can shorten a statute of limitations for bringing a breach of contract action set by law
Sheriff Officers Assn. Inc. v County of Nassau, 21 Misc 3d 1130(A)

Typically an action for breach of contract is governed by a six-year statute of limitations. Here, however, the COB provides that "the President [of the Association] may initiate a grievance... within one (1) calendar year after the occurrence of the event grieved, provided it does not merely affect an individual." This, said Justice McCarty, “effectively shortens the statutory period set forth in CPLR 213(2) of six years to one year with regard to class action grievances brought by the president of plaintiff union....”

Accordingly, said the court, the period for which damages may be claimed with respect to this action is from one year prior to the filing of the grievance, to the present.

The full text of the decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_52288.htm

Employee loses claim of unlawful retaliation because of her disability after conceding she lacked the seniority required for transfer

Employee loses claim of unlawful retaliation because of her disability after conceding she lacked the seniority required for transfer
Ruane-Wilkens v Board of Educ. of City of New York, 56 AD3d 648

Maryellen Ruane-Wilkens sued the New York City Board of Education in an effort to recover damages for alleged employment discrimination and retaliation pursuant to Executive Law §296. According to the decision, Ruane-Wilkens suffers from a disability.

When she requested a transfer from Prospect Heights High School to a different school, the transfer was denied because “she did not have enough seniority.” Contending that the number of students in her class was temporarily increased from 25 to 40, and she was assigned to teach another class in retaliation for her filing a transfer request, Ruane-Wilkens filed a complaint alleging unlawful employment discrimination due to her disability pursuant to Executive Law §296, the State’s Human Rights Law.

After noting that it is unlawful to retaliate against an employee because he or she opposed statutorily-forbidden discriminatory practices, the Appellate Division said that in order to make a prima facie showing of retaliation, the employee must show that: (1) he or she participated in a protected activity, (2) the employer was aware of his or her participation in that activity, (3) the employer took an adverse employment action, and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.

Dismissing Ruane-Wikens’ appeal, the Appellate Division held that she failed to present any evidence that her transfer request was denied due to her disability. Indeed, said the court, “[s]he herself conceded that it was denied because she did not have enough seniority.”

As the record contained no evidence that Ruane-Wikens ever complained about any discrimination, the Appellate Division said that she failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether she was engaged in an activity which would have given rise to a cause of action to recover damages for employment discrimination or retaliation. Accordingly, said the court, the Supreme Court properly granted the Board of Education's motion for summary judgment dismissing her complaint.

The full text of the decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_09062.htm

Governor Cuomo and NYSCOPBA Announce Tentative Contract Agreement

Governor Cuomo and NYSCOPBA Announce Tentative Contract Agreement

Source: Office of the Governor

On June 18, 2012 Governor Andrew M. Cuomo and Donn Rowe, President of the New York State Correctional Officers and Police Benevolent Association, Inc. (NYSCOPBA), issued a press release announcing that a contract agreement between the State and the Union representing New York State's correction officers. The agreement is subject to ratification by the members of NYSCOPBA.

The proposed agreement resolves outstanding wage and contractual issues dating to 2009 and follows the pattern of recently negotiated contracts. The contract is tentative pending ratification by NYSCOPBA membership.

NYSCOPBA’s Security Services unit is composed of correction officers and sergeants assigned to prisons in the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision. Members of NYSCOPBA have not had a contract since 2008 and opted out of arbitration for the years 2009 through 2011. The press release reports that "This is the first negotiated agreement between the state and NYSCOPBA since 1999. NYSCOPBA and New York State were unable to agree on a contract for 9 years prior to this proposed agreement." 

Highlights of the agreement, which will require ratification by the NYSCOPBA membership, include:

• Zero percent wage increases for the three years 2011-2013, and 2% increases in 2014 and 2015.

• A $1,000 retention bonus paid out $775 in 2013 and $225 in 2014.

• Deficit Reduction Leave of nine days (unpaid leave).

• One retroactive payment that is scheduled to be paid before the end of the calendar year, “only if possible.”

• Health insurance premium share increase by 6% for both individual and families, making the share 16% for individuals and 31% for dependent premiums.

• Officers will receive layoff protection identical to that provided to other unions in labor agreements negotiated since last year. Workforce reductions due to management decisions to close or restructure facilities authorized by legislation, SAGE recommendations or material or unanticipated changes in the state's fiscal circumstances are not covered by this limitation.

Probationary employee terminated for alleged misuse of sick leave

Probationary employee terminated for alleged misuse of sick leave
Curcio v New York City Dept. of Education, 55 AD3d 438

The New York City Department of Education dismissed a probationary physical education teacher, Louis Curcio, from his position and simultaneously reemployed him as a tenured teacher under his common branch license.

In response to Curcio’s petition seeking reinstatement as a probationer in his former physical education teacher position Supreme Court, New York County Justice Shirley Werner Kornreich, denied the Department of Education’s motion to dismiss so much of the petition as sought review of the termination of Curcio's probationary employment under his physical education license. Justice Kornreich also reinstated petitioner's physical education license nunc pro tunc*  to May 15, 2006.

The Department appealed. The Appellate Division “unanimously reversed” Justice Kornreich’s reinstating Curcio’s physical education license and dismissed Curcio’s petition challenging his termination.

Curcio had sued the Department for terminating his probationary employment under his physical education license. The Department had dismissed him because of Curcio’s alleged premeditated misuse of sick leave. The Appellate Division said that Curcio petition challenging his dismissal from his probationary employment should have been dismissed as he failed to establish that his termination "was for a constitutionally impermissible purpose, violative of a statute, or done in bad faith."

On a related issue, the Appellate Division noted the record shows that Curcio was not given the requisite 60-day statutory notice that his probationary employment was being terminated by the Department.

Typically such a lack of notice would have entitled Curcio to one day's pay for each day the notice was late. Here, however, the court determined that Curcio was not entitled to such payment because after being terminated from his probationary employment, he immediately resumed his duties at the same school and at the same rate of pay under his common branch license under which he was fully tenured.

* Nunc pro tunc [Latin for "now for then"] refers setting an earlier date for the effective date of an order or judgment, giving it a “retroactive” legal effect.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_08020.htm

Petitioning for a separate negotiating unit

Petitioning for a separate negotiating unit
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, and Baldwin Union Free School District, PERB Decision C-5690

CSEA filed a petition seeking to represent Security Aides in a separate unit. The District opposed the petition.

PERB’s Administrative Law Judge found that the Security Aides were most appropriately added to the existing School Monitors and Health Aides unit represented by CSEA. A community of interest was found to exist based upon a similarity in mission, skill level and working conditions. The ALJ rejected CSEA's argument that a conflict of interest was created by CSEA's initiation of litigation that challenged the District's assignment of certain duties to Security Aides instead of School Monitors.

Also rejected was CSEA's argument that a conflict existed because the Security Aides perform a security function. The ALJ noted that the Security Aides are not charged with the primary duty of investigating or reporting the job related misconduct of District employees, but to protect students and District employees from outside intruders. The ALJ placed the position in the existing unit pursuant to New York Convention Center Operating Corp, 27 PERB 3034 (1994), since there was no contractual bar to the placement and adding the position effectuated a de minimus change to the unit.

Appeal dismissed after employee fails to prove efforts to exhaust her administrative remedy would have been an exercise in futility

Appeal dismissed after employee fails to prove efforts to exhaust her administrative remedy would have been an exercise in futility
Amorosano-LePore v Grant, 56 AD3d 663

This decision by the Appellate Division illustrates the importance of exhausting administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief.

Gina Amorosano-LePore filed a CPLR Article 78 petition seeking a review of the City of New Rochelle’s decision to terminate her after she was found guilty of the disciplinary filed against her.

Instead of filling its answer to Amorosano-LePore’s petition, the City asked Supreme Court to dismiss the petition because Amorosano-LePore had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under the collective bargaining agreement between the City and the Civil Service Employee's Association.

Supreme Court granted the City’s motion and Amorosano-LePore appealed.

The Appellate Division sustained the lower court’s ruling, holding that the evidence demonstrated that Amorosano-LePore failed to avail herself of the available administrative remedies provided in the CBA.

While there are some exceptions to the rule requiring the exhaustion of administrative remedies, such as demonstrating that efforts to avail oneself of the available administrative procedures such as those that are set out in a statute or a collective bargaining agreement would be futile and thus excuse such failure to exhaust those remedies, the court said that in Amorosano-LePore's case she failed to prove that her pursuing her administrative remedies provided by the controlling collective bargaining agreement would have been an exercise in futility.

The court also rejected Amorosano-LePore argument that the City’s officials acted beyond the scope of their authority, noting that this directly related to questions of interpretation, application, and enforcement provisions of the CBA and thus was reviewable under the CBA. Similarly, Amorosano-LePore claim that she was deprived of due process the hearing officer’s conduct also could have been addressed through administrative review as provided for in the collective bargaining agreement.

The full text of the decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_09073.htm

Employees and retirees covered by a health insurance plan must be advised of changes

Employees and retirees covered by a health insurance plan must be advised of changes

Orth v Wisconsin State Employees Union Council 24 et al, USCA 7^th Circuit, Docket # 07-2778.

A collective bargaining agreement between the employer (Council 24 of the Wisconsin State Employees Union) and the union that represented Mr. Orth prior to his retirement provided for certain changes to the health insurance plan available to employees and retirees. Although the case involved alleged violations of the Taft-Hartley Act and ERISA, it may be instructive to those entities and individuals not subject to these federal acts.

According to the decision, there was a “secret side deal between the union and the employer in this case” regarding certain changes in the health insurance plan. This, said the court, constituted a breach of the plan managers’ fiduciary duty to the plan participants and beneficiaries.

Further, said the Circuit Court, "The plan fiduciaries are to the plan participants and beneficiaries as the union is to the workers it represents;" the union too is a fiduciary, and its duty of fair representation is simply another name for “fiduciary duty” and “just as in the collective bargaining setting, it is a breach of fiduciary duty to change the plan without notice to those affected by the change.”

Without knowledge of their rights under the plan, participants cannot make intelligent decisions with regard to the purchase of private health insurance to replace or supplement their plan benefits. The secret side deal between the union and the employer in this case, said the court, was a breach of the plan managers’ fiduciary duty to the plan participants and beneficiaries.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/HW1FFQKO.pdf

Residence requirements for public officers

Residence requirements for public officers
Informal Opinions of the Attorney General 2008-10

Public Officers Law §3 generally requires that a public officer reside in the political subdivision or municipality in which he or she holds such public office, i.e., the incumbent of a local office “must be a resident of the political subdivision or municipal corporation of the state for which he shall be chosen, or within which the electors electing him [or her] reside, or within which his [or her] official functions are required to be exercised ….”

One of the exceptions to this general rule permits police officers to reside in a county in New York State that is contiguous to the county in which the political subdivision or municipality is located. Police officers are public officers for the purposes of Public Officers Law Section 3. Although not all public employees are public officers, all public officers are public employees.

With respect to police officers, other than police officers employed by the City of New York, POL Section 3.2 provides as follows:

2. Neither the provisions of this section or of any general, special or local law, charter, code, ordinance, resolution, rule or regulation, requiring a person to be a resident of the political subdivision or municipal corporation of the state for which he shall be chosen or within which his official functions are required to be exercised, shall apply to the appointment of a person as a member of the police force of any political subdivision or municipal corporation of the state if such person resides (a) in the county in which such political subdivision or municipal corporation is located; or (b) in a county within the state contiguous to the county in which such political subdivision or municipal corporation is located; or (c) in a county within the state contiguous to such political subdivision or municipal corporation; or (d) in a county within the state contiguous to a county described in item (c) hereof where the former is less than fifteen miles from such political subdivision or municipal corporation, measured from their respective nearest boundary lines; or (e) in a county within the state contiguous to a county described in item (d) hereof where the former is less than thirty miles from such political subdivision or municipal corporation, measured from their respective nearest boundary lines. [N.B. Subdivision 19 of Section 3 sets out provisions applicable to police officers of the City of New York, i.e., a city of over one million population.]

Is it lawful for a municipality to permit a police officer to reside in a county that is not contiguous with the county in which the municipality is located? No, advised the Attorney General.

According to the Informal Opinion, “Contiguous” as used in Public Officers Law §3.2 means “sharing a border” or “touching.” In this instance the Attorney General said that police officers employed by the City of Syracuse may not live in Oneida County because that Oneida County is not contiguous to Onondaga County.

Failing to observe the mandates of Public Officers Law Section 3.2 could have other adverse consequences. For example, Kevin O'Connor, a Town of Clarkstown police officer, was terminated from his position by the Police Commission pursuant to Section 30.1.(d) of the Public Officers Law because O'Connor "ceased to be an inhabitant within the geographical restrictions" set by law. Public Officers Law Section 30.1(d) provides that the public office "shall be vacant" if the officer does not live in the appropriate geographical area.

Although Section 3.2 of the Public Officers Law permits a police officer to reside in the same or a contiguous county in which the political subdivision employing the officer is located, O'Connor had moved to Warren County. Clarkstown is in Rockland County. Warren and Rockland Counties are not contiguous.

In O’Connor v Police Commission of the Town of Clarkstown, [221 A.D.2d 444], the Appellate Division said that there was ample evidence to support the Commission's determination that O'Connor had ceased to be an inhabitant of the geographical area required for members of the Clarkstown Police Department. Accordingly, the Commission's decision terminating O'Connor from his position was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

Another issue involved O'Connor's receiving disability benefits pursuant to Section 207-c of the General Municipal Law following a work-related injury at the time he moved to Warren County. Significantly, the Appellate Division ruled that "the fact that O'Connor was disabled and entitled to the benefits of General Municipal Law Section 207-c(1) does not render Public Officers Law Section 30 inapplicable."

In a case involving disability benefits under General Municipal Law Section 207-a, which provides firefighters injured on the job with benefits similar to those available to police officers pursuant to Section 207-c, the court decided that Section 207-a benefits were only available to firefighters while they remain members of the fire department. Payments are not made if a disabled firefighter ceases to be an employee of the fire department [Robinson v Cole, 193 Misc.717].

The Appellate Division also rejected O'Connor's claim that he satisfied Section 3.2's residence requirement because he "occasionally stayed" at an in-laws apartment that was within the geographical area."

The Informal Opinion is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/bureaus/appeals_opinions/opinions/2008/Informal/I%202008-10%20pw.pdf

Procedural matters to satisfy when filing an appeal with the Commissioner of Education

Procedural matters to satisfy when filing an appeal with the Commissioner of Education
Appeal of Carl Stieffenhofer from actions of Donna Pieszala, President of the Board of Education of the Newfane Central School District, Decisions of the Commissioner of Education No. 15,846

Although the Commissioner dismissed Stieffenhofer’s appeal as untimely, he addressed a number of relevant procedural matters that are instructive. The Commissioner pointed out that:

1. A petition must contain “a clear and concise statement of the petitioner’s claim showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, and shall further contain a demand for the relief to which the petitioner deems himself entitled … which statement must be sufficiently clear to advise a respondent of the nature of petitioner’s claim and of the specific act or acts complained of.”

2. Where the complaint relates to allegedly "illegal" actions taken while the Board was in “executive session,” such matters fall “squarely within the ambit of the Open Meetings Law [and] Public Officers Law §107 vests exclusive jurisdiction over complaints alleging violations of the Open Meetings Law in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, and alleged violations thereof may not be adjudicated in an appeal to the Commissioner.”

3. The failure to join as a necessary party is fatal to the petition as a party whose rights would be adversely affected by a determination of an appeal in favor of a petitioner is a necessary party and must be joined as such, named as a respondent in the caption and served with a copy of the notice of petition and petition to inform the individual that he or she should respond to the petition and enter a defense.

Although the Commissioner dismissed the appeal, he did address a motion by Pieszala that he issue her a certificate of good faith pursuant to Education Law §3811(1) thereby authorizing the board to indemnify her for legal fees and expenses incurred in defending this proceeding which arose out of the exercise of her powers or performance of duties as a board member.

The Commissioner ruled that it was appropriate to issue such certification as there was nothing in the record to indicate that Piezala acted in bad faith.

The full text of the decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume48/d15846.htm

Statutory presumption that an individual suffered a disease of the heart as a result of the performance of duty rebutted by medical evidence to the contrary

Statutory presumption that an individual suffered a disease of the heart as a result of the performance of duty rebutted by medical evidence to the contrary
Lawless v DiNapoli, 56 AD3d 1114

A member of the New York State Employees’ Retirement System [NYSERS] applied for performance of duty disability retirement benefits alleging that he was permanently incapacitated as the result of a heart attack he suffered approximately six months earlier. The member filed his application relying upon the statutory presumption contained in Retirement and Social Security Law §507-b(c).

§507-b(c) provides that “…any condition of impairment of health caused by diseases of the heart, resulting in disability or death to a member covered by this section, presently employed and who shall have sustained such disability while so employed, who successfully passed a physical examination on entry into service as a correction officer or security hospital treatment assistant, which examination failed to disclose evidence of any disease or other impairment of the heart, shall be presumptive evidence that it was incurred in the performance and discharge of duty, unless the contrary be proved by competent evidence.”

NYSERS conceded that the individual was permanently incapacitated from the performance of his duties, but decided that his disability was not sustained as a result of the discharge of his duties as a correction officer and rejected his application for line-of-duty disability benefits. The Hearing Officer upheld the denial, concluding that the proof submitted by the Retirement System was sufficient to rebut the statutory "incurred in the line of duty presumption" set out in Retirement and Social Security Law §507-b(c).

The Appellate Division, noting that the Retirement System did not dispute that the member had successfully passed his pre-employment physical or that he is now permanently disabled from performing his duties as a correction officer due to his heart attack and underlying coronary artery disease, said that because the applicant elected to rely upon the statutory presumption contained in §507-b(c), the issue to resolve was whether the Retirement System had rebutted this presumption with competent medical evidence.

The court said that its conclusion, after its review of the record as a whole, was that the Retirement System successfully rebutted the statutory presumption and thus properly rejected the member’s application for benefits.

The full text of the decisions is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_09335.htm

The duties and responsibilities of the position control with respect its classification and allocation to a salary grade

The duties and responsibilities of the position control with respect its classification and allocation to a salary grade
Matter of Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v State of New York Unified Court System, 55 AD3d 1070

Following the reallocation of positions previously titled "Hearing Examiner" to “Support Magistrates, JG-31” and the adoption of a new title standard, individual Support Magistrates and the labor union representing them [petitioners], commenced a proceeding seeking to rescind the allocation of the title to JG-31, and place the Support Magistrate title in a higher salary grade -- JG-33. The title change and level of compensation had been determined by the Chief Administrative Judge.

Supreme Court concluded that the classification of the position and its allocation to JG-31 had a rational basis, was not arbitrary and capricious and dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division affirmed Supreme Court’s determination.

In the course of the proceeding the Administrative Director of the Unified Court System submitted an affidavit in support of the classification of the position and the allocation of the title Support Magistrates to JG-31 in which he stated that the allocation of the Support Magistrate title to salary grade JG-31 was based upon the Chief Administrative Judge's finding that duties, responsibilities and functions of Support Magistrates are comparable to those of Court Attorney-Referees. Court Attorney-Referees act as special referees in a number of courts, including Family Court, and are also allocated to grade JG-31.

In addition, the Administrative Director said that “Court Attorney-Referees, when authorized by a Family Court judge and upon consent of the parties, perform the same quasi-judicial functions that Support Magistrates do and in the same court both conduct trials, take evidence and issue orders, including orders of protection.”

Conceding that the reasons underlying the determination, are "facially legal," the petitioners argued that the two titles are not comparable because a Support Magistrate is directly empowered by statute to decide certain issues while a Court Attorney-Referee has no original jurisdiction conferred by statute and the Court Attorney-Referee must be appointed by a court to hear and report or, with the consent of the parties, hear and determine, the issues.

The Appellate Division was not persuaded by the petitioners’ argument, ruling that “the difference in the origin of authority to entertain issues does not contradict [the Chief Administrative Judge’s] conclusion that the duties, responsibilities and functions of the two titles are similar.” In other words, it is the duties and responsibilities of the position that are controlling in classifying the position and allocating it to a salary grade, not the source of the authority that the incumbent of the title exercises.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_08043.htm

 

Reports from the Office of the State Comptroller

Reports from the Office of the State Comptroller

For the week of June 11 - 17, 2012

Forensic Audit Reveals Metro–North Employees Were No Shows

Metro–North Railroad employees that were supposed to monitor train conditions and crew performance were not on the job when they were scheduled to work and performed poorly when they were, according to an audit released Friday by New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli. Auditors and investigators also found that a relative of a manager was hired at an inflated salary over other more qualified employees, a possible violation of the New York State Public Officers Law.

DiNapoli: State Agencies’ Late Approvals of Contracts with Not–For–Profits Rose to 80 Percent Last Year

State agencies were late more than 80 percent of the time in approving contracts subject to the Prompt Contracting Law with not–for–profit providers last year, according to a report released Thursday by State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli. This prompted interest payments that cost taxpayers nearly $200,000, the report found.

DiNapoli: Auditors Blocked $61.5 Million in Erroneous Workers’ Compensation Payment Requests

Auditors uncovered $61.5 million in erroneous workers’ compensation payment requests, according to a report released Thursday by New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli. The 2011 year–end report details errors caused by improper data entry or computation, among other reasons. After discussions with the Comptroller’s Office, the Workers’ Compensation Board made improvements which reduced the improper payment rate by 17 percent in November and December of 2011.

Comptroller DiNapoli Releases School Audit

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced his office completed an audit of the Hoosick Falls Central School District.

Comptroller DiNapoli Releases Municipal Audit

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced his office completed an audit of the City of Syracuse.

An employer may find that firefighter’s disability was not the result of a work-related injury or disease not withstanding the Retirement System’s decision to the contrary

An employer may find that firefighter’s disability was not the result of a work-related injury or disease not withstanding the Retirement System’s decision to the contrary

Davenport v City of Mount Vernon, 2012 NY Slip Op 04744, Appellate Division, Second Department

The City of Mount Vernon Fire Commissioner adopted the recommendation of a hearing officer denying a firefighter’s application for supplemental benefits otherwise available pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-a(2).* The Appellate Division confirmed the Commissioner’s decision, commenting that it was supported by substantial evidence.

The court said that the record contains evidence consisting of the reports of three orthopedic surgeons, each of whom concluded that the firefighter's condition was not caused by an accident, explaining that the Commissioner had the authority to evaluate conflicting medical evidence, and was free to credit evidence based on reports of one set of physicians over that of another set of physicians.

In Cook v City Of Utica, 88 NY 2d 833, the court ruled that while a disabled firefighter's Section 207-a benefits may depend in part on benefits paid pursuant to RSSL Section 363-c, there is no specific statutory language or anything in the legislative history concerning these measures suggesting that the Comptroller's eligibility determination with respect to RSSL benefits precluded the municipal employer from making a separate, and, as here, contrary determination with respect an individual's eligibility for GML Section 207-a benefits. Accordingly, the employer could deny granting the firefighter supplemental benefits to his or her disability retirement allowance upon a finding that the disability was not the result of a work-related injury or disease that was supported by substantial evidence.

Similarly, in Balcerak v Nassau County, 94 NY2d 25, the Court of Appeals said that "[a] determination by the Workers' Compensation Board that an injury is work-related does not by operation of collateral estoppel, automatically entitle an injured [police] officer to General Municipal Law Section 207-c benefits."

Accordingly, an employer was not precluded from determining that an individual was not entitled to Section 207-c benefits despite a prior Workers' Compensation determination in an employee had suffered an "on-the-job" injury.

* The amount of the supplement that would be paid the disabled firefighter pursuant to §207-a(2) would the difference between his or her retirement allowance and the compensation he or she would have received in active service, payable until the firefighter's mandatory age of retirement.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_04744.htm

Removal of an officer of a political subdivision of the State for misconduct, maladministration, malfeasance or malversation in office

Removal of an officer of a political subdivision of the State for misconduct, maladministration, malfeasance or malversation in office
Matter of Hedman v Town Bd. of Town of Howard, 56 AD3d 1287

§36 of the Public Officers Law provides for the removal of an officer of a town, a village, an improvement district or a fire district, [other than a justice of the peace], found guilty of misconduct, maladministration [performing official duties corruptly or inefficiently], malfeasance [performing official duties inadequately or poorly], or malversation [misuse of public or other funds] while holding public office.

In this action it was alleged that a member of the Town Board attempted to conceal his relationship with an alternate energy company, and ignored an alleged conflict of interest that arose when he voted to approve a wind energy facility proposed by company that included installing a wind turbine on the Board member’s property.

The Appellate Division, citing Jones v Filkins, 238 AD2d 954, said that the removal of an official from office pursuant to Public Officers Law §36 "generally will not be granted absent allegations of self-dealing, corrupt activities, conflict of interest, moral turpitude, intentional wrongdoing or violation of a public trust[,]” while allegations of  “minor neglect of duties, administrative oversights, or violations of law do not, in general, warrant removal."

The court decided no an actual conflict of interest that would warrant the removal of the Board member had been shown, explaining that the submitted evidence in support of the alleged conflict of interest that consisted solely of company's proposal for a wind energy facility in which Board member was identified as a proposed participating landowner on whose property a wind turbine would be located.

In contrast, the Appellate Division said that the Board member had established that he had not entered into any agreement with company with respect to a wind turbine at the time he voted on the proposal in favor of the company's plan for a wind energy facility. Further, the court said that the allegation that Board member had intentionally concealed his relationship with company “was based on pure speculation and thus was not entitled to any evidentiary weight.”

The full text of the decision is posted on the Internet at:

 http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_09229.htm

Consideration of ex parte information in a disciplinary action constitutes a denial of due process

Consideration of ex parte information  in a disciplinary action constitutes a denial of due process

Faga v Board of Educ. of Harrison Cent. School Dist., 2008 NY Slip Op 09078, Decided on November 18, 2008, Appellate Division, Second Department

An employee, terminated from his position with the Harrison Central School District, challenged the District’s action, contending that his due process rights were violated the Board of Education had “received ex parte information about the charges from the District's attorneys and the Superintendent of Schools.”

The individual also alleged that his right to due process was violated because the Superintendent submitted a statement to members of the Board before the charges were brought that he believed that charges could be sustained.

The Appellate Division found that the District established that the Board did not prejudge the matter nor did it rely on any improperly-obtained information in making its determination to dismiss the employee from his position.

In contrast, where the court finds that the rights of the accused were prejudiced because of some activity of the appointing authority, it will typically vacate the determination.

For example, in Ernst v Saratoga County, 234 AD2d 764, the Appellate Division annulled the dismissal of an individual found guilty of disciplinary charges because the chairman of the county Board of Supervisors - 
(a) met with the county’s attorneys “to discuss the pending investigation;” (b) met with the employees involved to, as the chairman phrased it, “relieve their fears;” (c) signed the notice of the charges against the individual, (d) voted to bring charges against the employee; (e) served as a witness at the disciplinary hearing; and (f) voted to accept a hearing officer’s findings of guilt and impose the recommended penalty. 


These actions, said the court, denied the employee a fair and impartial tribunal.

The Faga decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_09078.htm

Placement of a candidates name on an eligible list does not give the individual a right to an appointment

Placement of a candidates name on an eligible list does not give the individual a right to an appointment
Tardif v Town of Southold, 56 AD3d 755

John J. Tardif filed a notice of claim alleging that the Town of Southold, and the Town's police department, did not appoint him as a police officer even though he had "the best qualifications" and "the number one test score" on the examination to become a police officer because of his age.*

The Town moved for summary judgment, contending it did not discriminate against Tardif because of his age but elected not to appoint him “because he submitted deceptive responses in his application to become a police officer.”

In opposing the Town’s motion, Tardif did not make any argument in support of his age discrimination claim. He, instead, contended that the Town “had violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection in other ways.” The Appellate Division, however, ruled that Tardif failed to raise any triable issue of fact with regard to any of his constitutional claim.

The court pointed out that Tardif does not have a protectable property interest in a position with the Town's police department that would entitle him to maintain a due process claim. In this regard, said the court, “An individual does not have a "legally protectable interest" in an appointment to the position of police officer merely because he or she achieved a sufficient score on the examination to be placed on an eligibility list,” citing Andriola v Ortiz, 82 NY2d 320 and Cassidy v Municipal Civil Service Commission of City of New Rochelle, 37 NY2d 526.

Specifically, the Appellate Division commented that "'An appointing authority has wide discretion in determining the fitness of candidates . . . This discretion is particularly broad in the hiring of law enforcement officers, to whom high standards may be applied . . . As long as the administrative determination is not irrational or arbitrary, this Court will not interfere with it."

As Tardif did not have a property interest in an appointment as a police officer and failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to the deprivation of a protected liberty interest, the Appellate Division held that the Supreme Court had properly determined that he had failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether he was deprived of his constitutional right to due process.

Finally, said the court, Tardif did not establish any right to a “name-clearing hearing” with respect to his rejection for appointment as a police officer by the Town.

*Section 54 of the Civil Service Law sets out standards for establishing age requirement for appointment to positions in the public service in general while Section 58.1(a) sets out age requirements for police officers in particular.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_09381.htm

A provision in a town code that is intended to supercede a statutory provision must comply with the statutory method set by law to accomplish that end

A provision in a town code that is intended to supercede a statutory provision must comply with the statutory method set by law to accomplish that end
Matter of Guzdek v Mohan, 56 AD3d 1206

The Amherst Town Board adopted a resolution providing for the appointment of three officers to fill vacancies in the Town’s Police Department.

When Satish Mohan, the Town Supervisor, declined to comply with the Board’s action, Edward W. Guzdek, Jr., the President of the Amherst Police Club, sued in an effort to obtain a court order directing Mohan to fill the vacancies.

Mohan argued that, pursuant to Section 4-10 of the Town of Amherst’s Code, he had the authority to appoint officers to the Town Police Department.

The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the Code was inconsistent with Town Law §150. The court said that Town Law §150 provides that the appointment of police officers "is a legislative function within the exclusive jurisdiction of the town board," citing a 1980 opinion of the Attorney General [1980 Informal Opinion 249].

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s ruling, holding that although the Amherst Town Board may delegate its authority to appoint police officers to the Town Supervisor by designating the Supervisor to serve as police commissioner as authorized by Town Law §150.2, it had not done so. Nor, said the court, does Section 4-10 of the Code effectively supersede the provisions of Town Law §150 with respect to the Town Board's authority to make appointments to the Town Police Department.

Section 150.1 of the Town Law provides, in pertinent part that “The town board of any town may establish a police department and appoint a chief of police and such officers and patrolmen as may be needed and fix their compensation.”

The Appellate Division concluded that Section 4-10 did not "substantial[ly] adhere to the statutory methods to evidence a legislative intent to … supersede those provisions of [Town Law §150] sought to be … superseded” and dismissed Mohan’s appeal.

On this point, Section 150.2, in pertinent part, provides that “The town board may also by resolution designate the supervisor to serve as police commissioner, and when so designated, such supervisor shall have all the powers of and perform the duties of such board of police commissioners.” In this instance the court, in effect, ruled that that no such resolution had been adopted and that Section 4-10 of the Town Code was not sufficient to demonstrate such a legislative intent.

The full text of the decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_08875.htm

A public school district is not an "education corporation or association" within the meaning of the State’s Human Rights Law §296(4)

A public school district is not an “education corporation or association” within the meaning of the State’s Human Rights Law §296(4)

North Syracuse Cent. School Dist. v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 2012 NY Slip Op 04668, Court of Appeals

Is a public school district an "education corporation or association" within the meaning of  Executive Law §296(4)? If it is an “education corporation or association,” then the New York State Division of Human Rights (SDHR) has jurisdiction to investigate complaints filed against public school districts under that provision. Otherwise it does not. The Court of Appeals decided “not.”

The case arose when a number of public school students filed complaints with the SDHR claiming that their respective school districts engaged in an "unlawful discriminatory practice" barred by §296(4) of the Executive Law, the "Human Rights Law," by permitting their harassment on the basis of race and/or disability.

The school districts involved filed Article 78 petitions seeking a writ of prohibition* barring the SDHR from investigating the complaints on the ground that a public school district is not an "education corporation or association" as contemplated by Executive Law §296(4).**

The Appellate Division concluded that as a school district is a "municipal corporation" and therefore a "public corporation" under the General Construction Law, it could not be an "education corporation" within the meaning of Executive Law §296(4)]. However, the Court of Appeals, noting that this “approach is a legitimate one,” decided that there was some problem in SDHR's relying on the General Construction Law because the provision at issue in the Executive Law was enacted 15 years prior to General Construction Law §§65 and 66.

The Court, however, said that it did not need to address whether the General Construction Law is applicable here as there was an independent basis, supported by legislative history of Tax Law §4(6), for its conclusion that a public school district is not an "education corporation or association."

The Court of Appeals said that the legislative history surrounding the enactment of Tax Law §4(6), in concert with the circumstances under which the Legislature transferred the term "education corporation or association" from Tax Law §4(6) to Executive Law §296(4), “bespeaks the Legislature's intention that the term was to have the same meaning in the Executive Law as it did in former Tax Law §4(6).” Moreover, said the court, the use of the phrase "non-sectarian" was plainly included in Executive Law  296(4) to carve out an exception for parochial schools, while reserving for the SDHR the jurisdiction to investigate §296(4) complaints against private, non-sectarian education corporations or associations.

The Court then noted that “Public school districts are different from private, non-sectarian institutions and fall outside the purview of the SDHR's jurisdiction relative to §296(4) claims … [as] a public school district receives tax-exempt status by virtue of the fact that it is public, so there would never be any need for it to 'hold itself out to the public to be non-sectarian' as, say, a private school."

The fact that the SDHR did not have jurisdiction to consider the students’ complaints did not mean that they did not have a forum in which to seek relief. The Court said that “In addition to potential remedies under federal law, public school students may file a complaint with the Commissioner of Education (see Education Law §310).”

Further, said the court, in 2010, the Legislature enacted the "Dignity for All Students Act," establishing article 2 of the Education Law, designed "to afford all [public school] students an environment free of any harassment that substantially interferes with their education, regardless of the basis of the harassment, and free of discrimination based on actual or perceived race, color, weight, national origin, ethnic group, religion, disability, sexual orientation, gender, or sex," commenting that while SDHR lauded this legislation by noting that it "addresses a myriad of harassment and discrimination issues that arise within a school context and its goals comport with the goals of the [Human Rights Law]," noticeably absent from SDHR’s correspondence was any indication that the Division had previously handled similar claims of that nature arising in public schools.***

The Court’s conclusion: Because a public school district is not an "education corporation or association" under Executive Law §296(4), the SDHR lacked jurisdiction to investigate the complaints filed by the students in these appeals.

* A writ of prohibition, one of the ancient writs under English Common Law, is an order issued by a higher tribunal barring a lower tribunal prohibiting the litigation from going forward because the lower tribunal lacks jurisdiction to consider the matter before it.

**Executive Law § 296 (4) provides, in relevant part, that "[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for an education corporation or association which holds itself out to the public to be non-sectarian and exempt from taxation pursuant to … [RPTL Article 4] … to permit the harassment of any student or applicant, by reason of his race … [or] disability …."

***The Court of Appeals referred to a letter from New York State Div. of Human Rights, dated July 22, 2010, and included in the Bill Jacket for Chapter 482 of the Laws of 2010, in support of this statement.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_04668.htm

A public officer must show that alleged false statements concerning him or her were made with actual malice to recover damages for defamation

A public officer must show that alleged false statements concerning him or her were made with actual malice to recover damages for defamation
Watson v Jamestown, 56 AD3d 1289

Michael J. Watson, a police officer, sued a number of police department officials, alleging, among other alleged wrongdoing, defamation.

Supreme Court granted summary judgment dismissing Watson’s complaints. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s action.

Addressing Watson’s claim of defamation, the Appellate Division noted that "A public official [as a police officer, Watson was a public officer] may not recover damages for defamation unless the official proves that the offending false statement was made with actual malice -- that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not," citing Freeman v Johnston, 84 NY2d 52.

In this instance, said the court, the officials being sued established “their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with respect to that cause of action by demonstrating that the remarks that allegedly defamed [Watson] were true with the exception of one remark that was a misstatement but was not made with malice.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_09231.htm

A union’s duty of fair representation

A union’s duty of fair representation

County of Tompkins and Tompkins County Sheriff and Tompkins County Deputy Sheriff’s Association, Inc., 44 PERB ¶3024, U-28437, U-28483

The Board affirmed the dismissal of a charge by the Tompkins County Deputy Sheriff’s Association, Inc. (Association), which alleged that the joint employer violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act) by submitting to interest arbitration a proposal to exclude all unit employees not on the payroll at the time of contract ratification and/or the date of an interest arbitration award from receiving retroactive payments of wages and benefits. 

Although a demand for retroactivity of wages and benefits is generally a mandatory subject of negotiations under the Act and arbitrable under §204.9(g) of the Act, the Association asserted that the joint employer’s proposal was prohibited based upon the rationale in the Appellate Division, Third Department’s decision in Baker v Board of Education, Hoosick Falls Central School District, 3 AD3d 678, 37 PERB ¶7502 (3d Dept 2004).

In that decision, the appellate court concluded that the particular facts alleged in a plenary action were sufficient to state a claim of a breach of the duty of fair representation based upon the employee organization’s alleged failure to provide any representation to the plaintiffs, who had been excluded from receiving retroactive salary increases under a negotiated agreement.

The Board noted that in reaching its decision, the Appellate Division was obligated to grant all reasonable inferences to the factual allegations of bad faith and arbitrariness made in the complaint. Accordingly, the Board found that the Hoosick Falls decision does not stand for the substantive proposition that parties are prohibited from proposing the exclusion of one group of employee from a negotiated retroactive salary increase or other benefits.

In its decision, the Board also resolved exceptions and cross-exceptions to the ALJ’s conclusions with respect to the arbitrability of various Association proposals under §209.4(g) of the Act. The Board concluded that the Association’s mandatory on-call and General Municipal Law §207-c proposals were nonarbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act because they were unitary demands that included inseparable nonarbitrable components under §209.4(g) of the Act.

The Board emphasized that the application of the unitary demand principle to disputes under §209.4(g) of the Act is necessitated by the Legislature’s public policy choice of dividing the subject matter of proposals for deputy sheriffs into two classes with distinct impasse procedures.

The Association’s health insurance buy-out, rate of pay and overtime proposals were found to be arbitrable because they are directly related to compensation. However, the Board found that the Association’s proposals concerning union leave, road patrol schedules, and clothing were nonarbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act.

Providing employees with legal representation and reimbursement for legal fees and expenses incurred in defense of a civil action arising out work related activities

Providing employees with legal representation and reimbursement for legal fees and expenses incurred in defense of a civil action arising out work related activities

Thomas v New York City Dept. of Educ., 2012 NY Slip Op 04280, Appellate Division, First Department [See, also, Sagal-Cotler v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of the City of N.Y., 2012 NY Slip Op 04281, Appellate Division, First Department]

The genesis of the Thomas action: An individual employed as a paraprofessional by the New York City Department of Education (DOE), sought to obtain legal representation pursuant to Education Law §2560(1) when she was named as the defendant in a civil action.*

To obtain legal representation pursuant to the statute in such a situation, however, the individual must meet three requirements: 

1. He or she must have acted within the scope of her employment;

2. He or she must have acted in the discharge of her duties; and

3. His or her action must not have been in violation any rule or regulation of the DOE at the time of the incident.

The Corporation Counsel rejected the individual request for representation and indemnification if held liable.

Noting that the Corporation Counsel is empowered by General Municipal Law §50-k(2) to make factual determinations in the first instance as to whether the individual violated any agency rule or regulation, which "determination may be set aside only if it lacks a factual basis and in that sense, is arbitrary and capricious," the Appellate Division sustained the Corporation Counsel’s decision.

Although the individual denied the charges that had been filed against her, the court said that the allegations against her were "substantiated" at the conclusion of an investigation. Significantly, said the Appellate Division, the individual did not challenge the disciplinary findings against her.

Accordingly, the Corporation Counsel’s determination denying the individual with legal representation and indemnification in a civil action arising out of this incident had a rational basis and was not arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to law.

In so ruling the Appellate Division sustained Supreme Court’s holding that Education Law §2560, which incorporates by reference General Municipal Law §50-k, and Education Law §3028, are not in conflict and should be read together and "applied harmoniously and consistently," citing Alweis v Evans, 69 NY2d 199.

The Appellate Division explained that "It is the duty of the courts to so construe two statutes that they will be in harmony, if that can be done without violating the established canons of statutory interpretation," (see McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York, Book 1, Statutes §398).

In this instance the Appellate Division said that individual was acting within the scope of her employment since the incident occurred in a classroom but the alleged action, hitting a child on the head during a lesson, violated DOE Chancellor's Regulation A-420 as well as a Statewide rule prohibiting corporal punishment (see 8 NYCRR 19.5[a][2]).

Accordingly, said the court, the alleged act was not undertaken in the discharge or furtherance of the individual’s duties as a school employee, regardless of the purpose of the alleged act.

 

The decision notes that it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that a court, "in interpreting a statute, should attempt to effectuate the intent of the Legislature" and the plain meaning of the statutory language is "the clearest indicator of legislative intent.”

Both Education Law §§3028 and 2560 provide for the legal representation and indemnification of Board of Education employees. However, they each set forth different circumstances under which such representation and indemnification are to be provided.

When read together, said the court, it is clear that, pursuant to Education Law §3028, a board of education must provide legal representation and pay attorney's fees and expenses incurred in the defense of an employee in any action arising out of a disciplinary action taken against a student by an employee while acting in the scope of his or her employment and in the discharge of his or her duties, unless, pursuant to Education Law §2560(1), the employee is a member of a board of education in a city having a population of one million or more, and, pursuant to General Municipal Law §50-k, he or she violated any rule or regulation of the agency.

* §§17 and 18 of the Public Officers Law respectively address providing State officers and employees and officers and employees of political subdivisions of the State with legal representation and reimbursement for legal fees and expenses incurred in defense of a civil action arising out an act or omission involving the performance of official duties. §19 of the Public Officers Law provides for the state to pay reasonable attorneys' fees and litigation expenses incurred by or on behalf of a State officer or employee in his or her defense of a criminal proceeding in a state or federal court arising out of any act which occurred while such officer or employee was acting within the scope of his or her public employment or duties upon his or her acquittal or upon the dismissal of the criminal charges against him or her or reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in connection.

The Thomas decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_04280.htm

The Sagal-Cotler decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_04281.htm

Individual dismissed after being found guilty of stealing from a fellow employee

Individual dismissed after being found guilty of stealing from a fellow employee

Clinkscales v Kelly, 2012 NY Slip Op 04287, Appellate Division, First Department

New York City Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly dismissed a police officer found guilty of disciplinary charges that alleged that the officer had stolen a money order from a fellow officer and deposited it in her bank account.

Holding that there was substantial evidence to support finding the officer guilty of the charges filed against her, the Appellate Division then addressed the issue of the officer’s request for an adjournment of the hearing pending the disposition of the complaining officers' related disciplinary charges.

The court ruled that the officer was not deprived of due process as her counsel agreed to the scheduled hearing date, knowing that the minutes, but not the decision, in the related matter were available. Indeed, the decision reports that the officer had a copy of the complaining officers' testimony in the related hearing.

Further, said the court, the decision in the related matter was not probative of any issue in the officer’s disciplinary proceeding.

As to the penalty imposed, dismissal, the Appellate Division said that it did not shock its sense of fairness, citing Kelly v Safir, 96 NY2d 32.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_04287.htm

Negotiating under the Taylor Law in joint employment relationship

Negotiating under the Taylor Law in joint employment relationship

Negotiating under the Taylor Law in joint employment relationship

Matter of the County of Erie, 44 PERB ¶3027, U-28856

The Board affirmed, as modified, a decision of a PERB Administrative Law Judge finding that the County of Erie violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act when it refused to execute memoranda of agreement negotiated and signed by CSEA and the Erie County Medical Center Corporation.

The Board reiterated that Public Authorities Law §§3629 and 3630 demonstrate a clear legislative intent to create a statutory joint employment relationship between the County and ECMCC, but with unique characteristics distinct from those of other joint employers designated under the Act.

The Board held that the County violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act by failing to sign the agreements because the County had previously acquiesced in ECMCC conducting separate direct negotiations with CSEA resulting in memoranda of agreement that the County signed and the County failed to inform ECMCC and CSEA that it would not execute future agreements resulting from the direct ECMCCCSEA negotiations. 

Failure to cooperate defeats allegations the union violated Civil Service Law §209-a [The Taylor Law] when it withdrew from representing the individual in a disciplinary proceeding

Failure to cooperate defeats allegations the union violated Civil Service Law §209-a [The Taylor Law] when it withdrew from representing the individual in a disciplinary proceeding

Ronald Grassel and United Federation Of Teachers, Local 2, PERB Case U-29040

PERB Administrative Law Judge Blassman dismissed the charge which alleged that the United Federation of Teachers [UFT] violated §209-a.2(a) and (c) of the Act when it withdrew as Grassel’s representative in his Education Law §3020-a disciplinary proceeding.

The ALJ found that the UFT did not act arbitrarily, discriminatory or in bad faith when it withdrew as Grassel’s representative, the standard required for such violations.

The record showed that NYSUT, which was representing Grassel on behalf of the UFT, withdrew as Grassel’s representative because Grassel sent a letter to the arbitrator in which he made various motions and requests to the arbitrator and refused to rescind that letter upon NYSUT’s request. The ALJ found that, by making motions and requests normally reserved for the assigned attorney, Grassel had failed to cooperate with NYSUT in his representation and had impinged upon the negotiating representative’s rights under the Act to make litigation and trial decisions.

Arbitration award granting relief to both active employees and retired employees confirmed

Arbitration award granting relief to both active employees and retired employees confirmed

Matter of City of Buffalo (Buffalo Professional Firefighters Assn., IAFF Local 282), 2012 NY Slip Op 04527, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

The City of Buffalo modified the health insurance plan provided to members of in several negotiating units. The several unions representing City employees in those units filed a grievance with respect to the modified plan, alleging that the modified plan violated their respective collective bargaining agreements (CBA).

An arbitrator issued an award finding that the City's actions violated the relevant CBAs and awarded relief to both active members and retired former members in the collective bargaining units that brought the grievances. 

Buffalo filed an Article 75 petition seeking to vacate the award to the extent that it granted relief to the retirees.

The Appellate Division ruled that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority in fashioning an award that granted relief to the retired unit employees, explaining that the issue whether the unions had standing to represent retired employees formerly in their respective collective bargaining units was for the arbitrator to determine. 

Significantly, the court noted that the record was devoid of any evidence that the elimination of health insurance options did not affect the retirees such that the relevant unions would lack standing to represent them. Accordingly, the court held that Buffalo “failed to demonstrate that the arbitrator exceeded his authority.”

As to Buffalo’s argument that the arbitration award should be vacated because it was "indefinite" as the arbitrator had granted its request to delay implementation of the award until a related police union case completed the appeal process and thus was finalized, the Appellate Division said that it rejected the City’s theory, holding that "An award is subject to vacatur as indefinite or nonfinal only if it leaves the parties unable to determine their rights or obligations, if it does not resolve the controversy submitted, or if it creates a new controversy."

The Appellate Division then confirmed the arbitration award.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_04527.htm

A demand is directly related to compensation when its primary characteristic is a modification in the amount or level of compensation and is thus arbitrable

A demand is directly related to compensation when its primary characteristic is a modification in the amount or level of compensation and is thus arbitrable

County of Orange and Sheriff of Orange County and Orange County Deputy Sheriff’s Police Benevolent Association, Inc., 44 PERB ¶3023, U-28693, U-28738 

The Board reaffirmed that a demand is directly related to compensation, and therefore arbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Public Employees’ Fair Employment Act (Act), when its sole, predominant or primary characteristic is a modification in the amount or level of compensation.

In making such a determination, the Board compares the proposal with the lists of subjects specifically identified by the Legislature in §209.4(g) of the Act. The Board, however, reversed the decision in Putnam County Sheriff’s Dept PBA, Inc., 38 PERB ¶3031 (2005), to the extent it held that a proposal seeking a change in the aggregate amount or level of compensation received by unit members from the nonuse of sick leave is nonarbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act.

The Board concluded that the primary characteristic of such a demand is the monetization of sick leave, a compensatory benefit ordinarily unavailable to public employees.

In addition, the Board reversed Sullivan County Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association, 39 PERB ¶3034 (2006) to the extent it concluded that a proposal seeking to permit the conversion of overtime compensation into compensatory leave and to permit the subsequent remonetization of that leave back into cash or to be applied to health insurance is nonarbitrable because it relates only to “potential” compensation.

The Board held that union proposals in the present cases seeking to permit the conversion of accumulated unused leave time into cash at the time of separation from service were arbitrable under §209.4(g) of the Act because each seeks a form of deferred compensation. However, the Board found that a proposal to increase the amount of compensatory leave time that can be accumulated is nonarbitrable.

Finally, it found a proposal to require an unpaid leave of absence to run currently with leave under the Family Medical Leave Act was nonarbitrable.

PERB reached the same conclusion concerning a unitary demand involving overtime, flex time and scheduling. 

Practice tip noted by PERB staff:  The practical impact of the distinction drawn in §209.4(g) of the Act between arbitrable and nonarbitrable subjects might lead parties to choose to segregate arbitrable subjects from the nonarbitrable in their initial proposals or to sever them during the course of negotiations. While such an approach is not obligatory under §209.4(g) of the Act, it can help avoid unnecessary delays in the issuance of interest arbitration awards and fact-finding reports following an impasse. In contrast, placing arbitrable and nonarbitable subjects into a single demand creates the high risk that the demand will be treated as a nonarbitrable unitary demand.