Deeming an individual’s absence without permission a resignation from, or abandonment of, the position

Deeming an individual’s absence without permission a resignation from, or abandonment of, the position
New York State Off. of Mental Health v New York State Div. of Human Rights, 53 AD3d 887

Former Section 5.4(d) of the State Civil Service Commission's Rules for the Classified Service [4 NYCRR 5.4(d)] provided that an employee who was absent without permission and without explanation for ten or more days would be deemed to have resigned from his or her position effective the first day of such unauthorized absence. 4 NYCRR 5.4(d) was held to violate due process. [See, for example, Bernstein v Industrial Commissioner, 57 AD2 767] and was subsequently repealed.

However, this type of provision may survive in collective bargaining agreements, as demonstrated in this action.

An individual began working as a safety officer for the Office of Mental Health and subsequently entered an inpatient rehabilitation program for alcohol abuse. However the individual did not report back to work, but made several telephone calls to his supervisor, informing him that he would not be returning to work for various reasons, including an injury to his leg.

The personnel office then sent a letter to the employee stating that, pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the State and Purse's union, the individual was deemed to be absent from duty without authorization and he would be terminated from the position by a specified date unless he provided a satisfactory explanation for his absence since his release from the program.

Ultimately the individual was removed from the payroll and he thereafter filed a verified complaint with the State Division of Human Rights (SDHR) charging OMH with an unlawful discriminatory practice based on his status as a recovering alcoholic. SDHR determined that it had jurisdiction and after a number of hearings before an Administrative Law Judge determined, that OMH had engaged in a discriminatory practice and awarded the complainant $5,000 for emotional distress and in addition awarded Purse $385,750 for back pay.

The Appellate Division commenced its analysis of the case by noting that it “accords considerable deference to the determinations of SDHR due to its expertise in evaluating discrimination claims, and we will uphold such if supported by substantial evidence.”

Further, said the court, "[a] determination may not be set aside 'merely because the opposite decision would have been reasonable and also sustainable” and upheld SDHR's determination that OMH engaged in an unlawful discriminatory practice.

Referring to the CBA, the Appellate Division noted that it, in relevant part, that "[a]ny employee absent from work without authorization for ten consecutive workdays shall be deemed to have resigned from his [or her] position if he [or she] has not provided a satisfactory explanation for such absence on or before the eleventh workday following the commencement of such unauthorized absence." 

Here, the court noted, the record demonstrates that, after failing to report to work, OMH was contacted by telephone and put on notice of the employee’s medically excused absence, followed with telephone calls, during the last of which OMH was advised that the individual would be absent for an indefinite period of time.

Further, said the court, OMH placed the individual in “a holding status” until he furnished the proper documentation, which he submitted in the form of medical reports substantiating his absence.

This, said the court, provides substantial evidence to support SDHR's determination that OMH's proffered reason for terminating the employee was a pretext; that OMH engaged in an unlawful discriminatory practice; and that employee was entitled to an award of $5,000 for emotional distress.

The Appellate Division, however, rejected SDHR's determination that the individual was entitled to an award for back pay.

The purpose of back pay, said the court, is to make a person whole and redress the economic injury that has resulted from unlawful employment discrimination. Thus, where losses in salary are attributable to disability and not the result of discrimination, as is here the case based on the individual’s own explanation of his absence, an award of back pay should not be made.

Further, said the court, the record demonstrates that the individual was removed from OMH’s payroll and, as the result of a retroactive award, began receiving disability benefits effective on that same day. Thus, said the court, “we find that SDHR erred in making the determination that the individual was entitled to a back pay award.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://nypublicpersonnellawarchives.blogspot.com/2008/07/deeming-individuals-absence-without.html

Payments in contemplation of retirement excluded in determining an individual’s final average salary for purposes of retirement

Payments in contemplation of retirement excluded in determining an individual’s final average salary for purposes of retirement
Franks v DiNapoli, 53 AD3d 897

The Employees’ Retirement System member commenced service with the Town and served as its police chief from 1996 until his retirement in 2002. His first contracts as police chief provided for “executive longevity increments” that ranged from one-half day of pay per two-week pay period in 1996 to two days of pay per pay period in 2000.

A second contract as chief included executive longevity payments of executive longevity payments of 5½ days of pay per pay period for the first year and eight days of pay per pay period during the second year. The contract also specified that in the event the Chief continue his employment as chief beyond July 2002, his executive longevity increments would revert back to two days of pay per pay period effective August 1, 2002. The Chief served out the full term of his contract, retiring effective August 1, 2002.

When the Chief filed his application for retirement with State and Local Police and Fire Retirement System notified him that it had calculated his retirement benefits based on a final average annual salary of $166,463.40 which included only executive longevity payments equal to two days of pay per payroll period. If the amounts for the remaining six days were included, it would have increase the Chief’s annual salary to $237,114.18, significantly increasing his “final average salary” for retirement purposes.

The Retirement System said that including more than “two days per pay period of executive longevity payments” would constitute the inclusion of “compensation in anticipation of retirement,” the inclusion of which was barred by Section 302.9(d) of the Retirement and Social Security Law.

The Appellate Division rejected the Chief’s challenge of the Systems’ decision to include only “two executive longevity days per pay period” in determining his final average salary for the purposes of calculating his retirement allowance.

Retirement and Social Security Law Section 302.9(d) provides that the salary base used to compute retirement benefits "shall not include any form of termination pay or compensation paid in anticipation of retirement.” The courts said that “Regardless of the labels attached to compensation by the parties, the substance of the transaction and payments controls,” and the System’s determination in this instance is supported by substantial evidence.

In the words of the Appellate Division, “The contract dramatically increased the longevity payments compared to [the Chief’s] prior years as chief….” Although the Chief testified that the large increase in his “executive longevity payments” was negotiated in exchange for a waiver of overtime rights, the court said that the contract “does not mention such an exchange” and the Chief’s testimony in this regard “created a credibility issue which [the Retirement System] was free to resolve.”

Under the circumstances, said the court, substantial evidence supports Retirement System’s determination that the executive longevity increments in excess of two days of pay per payroll period constituted compensation in anticipation of retirement, which is properly excluded when calculating an employee's salary for the purpose of determining an individual’s retirement allowance.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://nypublicpersonnellawarchives.blogspot.com/2008/07/payments-in-contemplation-of-retirement.html

Disciplinary action follows employee’s refusal to report to a new workstation

Disciplinary action follows employee’s refusal to report to a new workstation

New York City Human Resources Administration v Griffin, OATH Index # 941/12

An employee of the City of New York was reassigned* to a new location. She, however, continued to report to her old work location and then stopped reporting to work altogether.

This resulted in the individual's being served with disciplinary charges alleging that she had refused to report to her assigned workplace, insubordination and AWOL.

Rejecting the employee’s arguments in defense of her actions, including her claim that she wanted a reassignment to another location closer to her home, OATH Administrative Law Judge Kevin F. Casey found the employee guilty of the charges filed against her.

Judge Casey recommended that the individual’s employment be terminated.  

*N.B. Although the decision characterizes the movement of the individual from one workstation to a different workstation within the same agency as a “transfer,” it technically constituted a “reassignment.” The term "transfer" is used to describe a change of employment where the employee leaves the jurisdiction of one appointing authority and enters the jurisdiction of another, different, appointing authority. In contrast, the term "reassignment" is used to describe personnel change by the appointing authority within the same department or agency.

Except where there is a "transfer of function," transfers typically required the approval of both appointing authorities and the consent of the individual to be transferred [see Civil Service Law §70.1]. In contrast, a "reassignment" may be made without the agreement or consent of the employee concerned unless otherwise required by a collective bargaining agreement.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/12_Cases/12-941.pdf

Some decisions concerning using civil service eligible lists

Some decisions concerning using civil service eligible lists

NYPPL readers have asked about "using civil service eligible lists" involving the following situations. As these questions may be of general interest, the responses are summarized below:


Expediting holding an examination

An individual on an eligible list was not entitled to an expedited medical and psychological examination before the existing eligibility list expires. Puntillo v. Abate, 205 A.D.2d 304.

Selection of the highest person on an eligible list

Rule of three upheld with respect to passing over a "higher scoring applicants." Cassidy v. Munic. Civil Serv. Cmsn. of City of New Rochelle, 37 N.Y.2d 526. 

However, appointing authorities may make appointments by selecting individuals for appointment "in rank order," referred to as "the rule of the list," or “the rule of one,” a process typically agreed to in the course of collective bargaining.

N.B. The “rule of one” is followed when making an appointment from a preferred list [Civil Service Law §82]. In contrast, with respect to appointments from reemployment rosters [CSL 82-a] and placement rosters [CSL 82-b] the names of those eligible for appointment from such rosters “shall be certified therefrom with equal ranking for appointment” thereby permitting the appointing authority to select any individual on such a roster without regard to his or her “seniority.”

Breaking ties in an examination: It is lawful to use social security numbers to rank applicants with the same numerical scores but it would be wrong to rank candidates based on their raw scores on the pass/fail portions of a qualifying examination. Napoli v. Levitt, 176 A.D.2d 668.

Appointing authority may not summarily terminate an individual’s General Municipal Law §207-c disability benefits

Appointing authority may not summarily terminate an individual’s General Municipal Law §207-c disability benefits
Kempkes v Downey, 53 AD3d 547

The Chief of Police of the Village of Bronxville suspended the full-salary payments being made to a Bronxville police officer while he was on disability leave pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-c, advising the officer that he would be suspended without pay pending a disciplinary hearing.

The officer sued, contending that the Village was obligated to pay his disability benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-c pending an evidentiary hearing, because the benefits conferred under General Municipal Law §207-c constitute a vested property interest. Supreme Court granted the officer’s petition.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court's decision, commenting that “The payment of benefits that have been conferred pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-c constitutes a protected property interest.” 

Significantly, the Appellate Division rejected the Village’s argument that the Westchester County Police Act (Chapter 891, Laws of 1972), "takes precedence" over General Municipal Law §207-c. In this instance the court said that the pertinent issue was whether General Municipal Law §207-c creates a protected property interest in disability benefits such that a predeprivation hearing must be held, even if the Act generally allows for the suspension of a police officer's salary prior to a disciplinary hearing.

The constitutional guarantee of due process provided a recipient of benefits under General Municipal Law §207-c requires that an evidentiary hearing prior to the deprivation of such benefits. Accordingly, said the court, the Village may not discontinue the payment of General Municipal Law § 207-c benefits as a disciplinary sanction without a prior evidentiary hearing.

As the officer had not been given such a hearing, the court prohibited Bronxville from reducing, terminating, or suspending his §207-c benefits “until a final determination of the disciplinary charges has been made after an evidentiary hearing held upon notice.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://nypublicpersonnellawarchives.blogspot.com/2008/07/employer-may-not-summarily-terminate.html

Standards used in higher education for granting or denying faculty members tenure not applicable to faculty in a primary or secondary school

Standards used in higher education for granting or denying faculty members tenure not applicable to faculty members seeking tenure in a primary or secondary school

Donnelly v Greenburgh CSD #7, USCA, Second Circuit, Docket No. 11-2448-CV

Edward Donnelly, a probationary teacher employed by Greenburgh, challenged the school district’s decision denying him tenure.

One of the issues addressed by Second Circuit in adjudicating Donnelly’s appeal of the District Court’s granting the school district’s motion for summary judgment dismissing his petition concerned the magistrate judge’s conclusion that Donnelly he had not shown that he was qualified for tenure "under the standard ... applied to plaintiffs complaining of a discriminatory denial of tenure in the context of colleges and universities," as set out in Zahorik v. Cornell University, 729 F.2d 85.

The district court held that Donnelly had failed to demonstrate his qualification for tenure under Zahorik.  Considering that issue “dispositive,” the district court did not address Donnelly’s other arguable claims [see Donnelly, 2011 WL 1899713, at 1]. 

The Circuit Court noted that typically "a plaintiff-employee challenging an adverse employment action as discriminatory or retaliatory need not do much to establish his qualification for the position he holds or seeks." It then commented that it had previously ruled that "in the related context of employment discrimination, 'the qualification necessary to shift the burden to defendant for an explanation of the adverse job action is minimal; plaintiff must show only that he possesses the basic skills necessary for performance of the job.'" The district court, however, had held Donnelly, to a much higher standard.  

The district court, said the Circuit Court, concluded that, in order to show that “he was qualified for his position,” Donnelly must meet “the exacting standard [the Second Circuit has] applied in the context of allegations of discriminatory denial of tenure to university professors.”

Whatever the merits of that analysis in the university context, however, said the court, "neither we nor any other appellate court we have identified has ever applied the standards Zahorik pronounced to teachers denied tenure in elementary or secondary schools.  We decline to do so now." 

The Circuit Court ruled that while both university and high-school teachers may be awarded “tenured” positions that provide long-term employment and protections against arbitrary dismissal, “the two contexts have very little in common.” 

Although both high school teachers and scholars at universities and colleges are subject to individual performance evaluations at a predetermined stage of their careers that can lead either to the tenure or “to adverse employment events,” the Second Circuit said that “subjecting those two processes to the same analysis in the face of allegedly unlawful denial of promotion does not logically follow.” 

Concluding that Donnelly had presented “a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he worked enough hours to be eligible for FMLA leave; (2) the standard governing our review of allegedly unlawful university tenure denials is inapplicable to such denials in public high schools; and (3) [Donnelly] has adduced sufficient evidence of FMLA retaliation to survive a motion for summary judgment” the Circuit Court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the matter for further consideration.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/95201dab-a25f-41ab-940d-66738c3d9032/1/doc/11-2448_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/95201dab-a25f-41ab-940d-66738c3d9032/1/hilite/

Prior litigation does not bar revaluation of disabled employee’s ability to perform the duties of the position

Prior litigation does not bar revaluation of disabled employee’s ability to perform the duties of the position
Bett v City of Lackawanna, 53 AD3d 1097

A firefighter was disabled, preventing him from performing his duties as a firefighter and he was paid him his full salary until he was terminated after he failed to report to work for light duty.

The firefighter sued and the court found that he was entitled to continue receiving his salary because Lackawanna had never made a determination pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-a (3) that he was medically able to perform light duties [see Bett v City of Lackawanna, 132 Misc 2d 630, affirmed 132 AD2d 951, 76 NY2d 900).

In this subsequent action the firefighter contended that Lackawanna is barred by principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel from now determining whether he is medically able to perform light duty work pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-a(3).

The Appellate Division rejected his argument. While Lackawanna could not discharge the firefighter because he failed to report for light duty work as it had not establish at that time that he was medically able to perform such work, Lackawanna is not precluded by that prior litigation from now evaluating the firefighter's medical condition. Indeed, said the court, it is because the firefighter is receiving the full amount of his "regular salary" pursuant to §207-a (1), he is required to undergo periodic medical evaluations.

The court also dismissed the firefighter’s claim that “the principles of equity and fairness” bar Lackawanna from ordering him to perform light duty work.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://nypublicpersonnellawarchives.blogspot.com/2008/07/prior-litigation-does-not-bar.html

Neither confusion concerning the administrative procedure nor an agency employee's incorrect information toll the running of the Statute of Limitations for filing an appeal

Neither confusion concerning the administrative procedure nor an agency employee's incorrect information toll the running of the Statute of Limitations for filing an appeal

Smith v Commissioner of Labor, 2012 NY Slip Op 05887, Appellate Division, Third Department

An applicant for unemployment insurance benefits received two notices of rejecting his claim for benefits.  

In response to his filing a request for an administrative hearing challenging the denial of his claim, an Administrative Law Judge ruled that the request for the hearing was untimely filed. The Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision and the applicant challenged the Board's ruling.

The Appellate Division sustained the Board’s ruling, noting that §620(1)(a) of the Labor Law provides that in the event an applicant for unemployment insurance benefits is dissatisfied with an initial determination, he or she must request a hearing within 30 days unless physical or mental incapacity prevents him or her from doing so.

In this instance the applicant admitted that he had received the notice of determination shortly after it was mailed and was aware of the 30-day time limit for requesting a hearing.

Noting that the applicant had testified that he failed to request a hearing within 30 days “because he thought he needed to wait until his summer employment ended to do so, and he stated that he received advice to that effect from Department of Labor employees following the initial denial of his application for benefits,” the Appellate Division held that “neither claimant's confusion regarding the two notices … nor the erroneous advice from the Department … provides a basis for us to disturb the Board's decision.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_05887.htm

Employee’s claim that she did not receive notice of disciplinary charges mailed to her rebutted by employer’s evidence of proper mailings

Employee’s claim that she did not receive notice of disciplinary charges mailed to her rebutted by employer’s evidence of proper mailings
Katz v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y., 2008 NY Slip Op 31935(U),  Supreme Court, New York County, Judge: Shirley Werner Kornreich [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports]

The New York City Board of Education [BOE] sent a “notice of charges” to a tenured teacher. The “notice” was sent by certified mail, return receipt requested and by regular mail. The certified mail copy of the Charges was returned to BOE as “unclaimed,” but the regular mail copy of the Charges was never returned. BOE subsequently sent a written statement detailing the Charges against the teacher in accordance with Education Law §3020-a by certified mail, return receipt requested, and by regular mail. Again the certified mail copy of the Charges was returned to BOE as “unclaimed,” but the regular mail copy of the Charges was never returned. A third mailing was sent via certified mail, return receipt requested, and by regular mail. This time neither copy was returned to DOE.

Ultimately a Disciplinary Panel held a hearing in absentiaand the teacher was found guilty of the charges and terminated. A letter advising the teacher of her dismissal was mailed to the same address used to send all of the previous letters to the teacher who subsequently acknowledges receiving it and filed a claim with BOE seeking reinstatement retroactive to the date of her termination, along with restoration of benefits.

When BOE refused to reinstate her the teacher filed a petition seeking a court order directing BOE to reemploy her and award her back salary and benefits contending that she never received the regular mailings of the Notice of Charges and the written statement detailing the Charges “because mail often gets lost in her large apartment complex.” Additionally, said the court, the teacher “denies deliberately ignoring the certified mail and maintains that she did not receive notice to pick it up [and] if she had received the Notice of Charges or the actual Charges, she would have requested a hearing in a timely fashion.”

Judge Kornreich said that “The standard in an Article 78 proceeding, the court’s role is to determine whether the challenged administrative action had a rational basis or whether it was an arbitrary and capricious action [and] the administrative action must be upheld unless it ‘shocks the judicial conscience and, therefore, constitutes an abuse of discretion as a law.”

The court found that BOE “properly mailed multiple copies of the Notice of Charges and the actual Charges. Only the certified mail copies were returned, and they were returned as unclaimed, indicating that the teacher failed to pick them up from the post office, not that they were improperly sent. Given BOE’s proof of mailings, the court was not persuaded by the teacher’s statement that she did not receive the Notice of Charges or the Charges.

In the words of the court, the teacher’s “bald assertion of non-receipt is insufficient to overcome the presumption that properly sent mail is received.” Accordingly, Judge Kornreich decided that it was not arbitrary or capricious for BOE to proceed with the inquest after properly mailing multiple letters informing the teacher of the situation and dismissed her petition.

Authority to issue Uniform Traffic Tickets

Authority to issue Uniform Traffic Tickets

Informal Opinions of the Attorney General: Informal Opinion 2012-07

The Attorney General advised the Village of Old Field that the Village's park rangers may issue uniform traffic tickets for violations of the Vehicle and Traffic Law within village parks. The park rangers, however, may not issue tickets for violations they observe on public streets while traveling between parks.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/opinion/2012-7%20pw.pdf

Collective Bargaining Agreement may provide for an election of remedies with respect to Title VII complaints

Collective Bargaining Agreement may provide for an election of remedies with respect to Title VII complaints
Leonyer M. Richardson, v Commission on Human Rights, 532 F.3d 114

Does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bar the inclusion of an election-of-remedies provision in a collective bargaining agreement?

EEOC contended that it does; the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities [CCHRO] – a defendant in this action, argued that Title VII does not prohibit such a provision to be negotiated and included in a collective bargaining agreement.

The Circuit Court decided that the law governing contracts that provide for the release or waive Title VII rights is independent of the law governing employer actions taken in retaliation for, and intended to deter, employee opposition to unlawful employment practices, including the filing of charges with the EEOC or its state counterpart.

Although there are limits regarding what a union may agree to in the course of collective bargaining, in this instance the court decided that Richardson’s union “has not transgressed them by contracting to limit an employee’s legal recourse under certain circumstances.*

The collective bargaining agreement in question merely provided that an aggrieved employee could either arbitrates her grievance or file a charge with the CCHRO.

Accordingly, the Circuit Court ruled that the Union had not discriminated against Richardson by its adhering to the election-of-remedies provision after she chose to file a charge with the CCHRO as the collective bargaining agreement “does not constitute a waiver of any statutory rights” and dismissed her appeal.

The full text of the decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA2LTA0NzQtY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/06-0474-cv_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysquery/irld5a2/10/hilite

* New York courts have held that an employee organization may, through collective bargaining, negotiate away an employee’s statutory right to a disciplinary procedure provided an alternate procedure providing for administrative due process is available to the individual [Matter of Hickey v New York City Dept. of Education, 17 NY3d 729. See, also, Antinore v State, 40 NY2d 6].

Selected reports and information published by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli

Selected reports and information published by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli

Office of the State Comptroller - Issued during the week of August 6 - 12, 2012

DiNapoli and HUD Uncover Financial Abuses by Former Troy Housing Authority Officials

The retired comptroller of the Troy Housing Authority took home $207,000 in inappropriate payments while collecting a public pension in apparent violation of state law, among other financial problems, according to a reportreleased Tuesday by State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Office of Inspector General. Video is also available here.

DiNapoli and Project Heart Announce Joint Effort to Reunite Holocaust Survivors and Heirs with Unclaimed Funds

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli and Project HEART (Holocaust Era Asset Restitution Taskforce) today announced a partnership to reunite Holocaust survivors and their heirs with unclaimed funds that are rightfully theirs.

Comptroller DiNapoli Releases School Audit

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli Wednesday announced his office completed an audit of the New Roots Charter School.

Comptroller DiNapoli Releases Municipal Audits

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli Wednesday announced his office completed the following audits: the Village of Bergen; the Big Flats Fire District No. 1; the Caneadea Fire District; the Village of Canton; the Town of Champlain; the City of Rochester; and, the Spencerport Volunteer Fireman’s Association, Inc.

Administrative disciplinary action involving charges based on employee’s being convicted of crime

Administrative disciplinary action involving charges based on employee’s being convicted of crime

NYC Department of Sanitation v Anonymous, OATH Index No. 1159//12

A New York City sanitation police officer was served with disciplinary charges after he was convicted of possession of cocaine in federal court.

New York City’s Executive Order 16 of 1978 provides for the dismissal of any City employee who is convicted of a crime relating to their employment, “involving moral turpitude or which bears upon their fitness to perform their duties … absent compelling mitigating circumstances.” 

In defending himself in the administrative disciplinary proceeding the employee argued that his experience as a first responder on September 11 had left him with PTSD, causing depression and substance abuse. 

OATH Administrative Law Judge Ingrid M. Addison found that the individual’s conviction related to his employment as a law enforcement officer and bore upon his fitness to perform the duties of that job.  As to “mitigating circumstances” that might be a factor with respect to his misconduct, Judge Addison found his claims “insufficiently compelling” and recommended that respondent be terminated from his employment.

N.B. Public Officers Law §30.1.e provides, in pertinent part, that a public office shall become vacant “by operation of law” upon the incumbent’s “conviction of a felony, or a crime involving a violation of his oath of office…. “ A police officer is a “public officer” within the meaning of POL §30.1.e.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/12_Cases/12-1159.pdf

A “Class of One” is not available to an individual in litigation involving a public employer

A “Class of One” is not available to an individual in litigation involving a public employer
Appel v Spiridon et al, 531 F.3d 138*

A faculty member employed by Western Connecticut State University [WCSU] was told that she would be required to submit to a medical examination involuntarily as a condition of her being continued in her employment with the University.

She sued, bringing a “class action of one,” contending that this requirement violated her constitutional rights under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A federal district court judge granted her petition based on her “class of one” claim of a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Second Circuit vacated the injunction issued by the district court and remanded the matter to the district court for further proceedings, citing Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, 128 S. Ct. 2146. 

In Engquist, the Circuit Court explained, the Supreme Court held that such a theory did not apply, as here, in the public employment context. 

According to the decision, “It appears …that [the faculty member] is the only WCSU faculty member ordered to undergo an involuntary psychological examination in order to continue teaching and receiving pay and benefits at WCSU.”

The Circuit Court commented that the only basis for the lower court’s granting a preliminary injunction in favor of [the faculty member], and while it, itself, heretofore recognized such “class of one” liability in the public employment context, the Supreme Court’s holding that the Equal Protection Clause does not apply to a public employee asserting a violation of the Clause under a “class of one” theory in Engquist, it must “overrule any precedent of this Circuit to the extent that it conflicts with the holding in that decision.”

The case was remanded to the district court for further action.*

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysnative/RDpcT3BpbnNcT1BOXDA2LTU3MjMtY3Zfb3BuLnBkZg==/06-5723-cv_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov:8080/isysquery/irld5a2/14/hilite

* See Appel v. Spiridon, 463 F. Supp. 2d 255, posted on the Internet at: http://ct.findacase.com/research/wfrmDocViewer.aspx/xq/fac.20110818_0000471.DCT.htm/qx

Estoppel is not available against an administrative agency for the purpose of ratifying an administrative error

Estoppel is not available against an administrative agency for the purpose of ratifying an administrative error

Appeal of Jennifer Geiger, Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision #16,379

This decision illustrates that an individual’s actions in reliance on information provided by a school official that subsequently proves to be incorrect will not excuse the individual's not complying with statutory or regulatory requirements.

Jennifer Geiger filed a petition as a candidate for election to the school board.

Education Law §2608(1) proves that candidates for office of member of the board of education must file a nominating petition “in the office of the clerk of the board of education between the hours of nine a.m. and five p.m., on or before the twentieth day preceding the day of the annual election.” §2608(1) also provides that “[t]he clerk shall refuse to accept petitions ... which are not timely.”

With respect to the election in question, the statutory deadline for filing nominating petitions was five p.m. on April 25, 2012.  The school district admittedly had advised individuals seeking election to the board that nominating petitions were due by four p.m. on April 27, 2012. 

Ms. Geiger submitted her petition after five p.m. April 25, 2012, but prior to the district’s published deadline of four p.m. on April 27, 2012. The district clerk, however, rejected Geiger's nominating petition as untimely because it was not filed by the statutory deadline of five p.m. on April 25, 2012.

The Commissioner of Education dismissed Ms. Geiger’s appeal, pointing out that “Because Education Law §2608(1) requires that nominating petitions be filed in the office of the district clerk on or before the twentieth day preceding the day of the annual election, petitions may not be filed after the statutory deadline.” Further, said the Commissioner, the board’s incorrect statement of the filing deadline does not authorize school district officials to depart from the statutory filing requirements….”

The Commissioner’s ruling is consistent with Renaud v City of New York, 269 A.D.2d 283. In Renaud the Appellate Division said that "estoppel is not available against an administrative agency for the purpose of ratifying administrative error."

The Geiger decision is posted on the Internet at: http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume52/d16379.html

Less than 30-days notice of termination of a probationary educator does not always result in the payment back salary

Less than 30-days notice of termination of a probationary educator does not always result in the payment back salary
Vetter v Board of Educ., Ravena- Coeymans-Selkirk Cent. School Dist., 53 AD3d 847

A probationary teacher of physical education and health education employed by Ravena-Coeymans-Selkirk Central School District. During the school year, several students made written complaints that the teacher had walked through the middle school girls' locker room while females were changing their clothes. Placed on administrative leave while an investigation was conducted, the teacher was told by the Superintendent that she planned to recommend his termination at the June 19, 2006 Board meeting .The decision notes that although the Board terminated the teacher’s employment on June 21, 2006 effective July 21, 2006, it did not notify him of that fact in writing until a letter dated July 19, 2006 was sent to him.

The teacher sued, seeking a name-clearing hearing pursuant to US Constitution 14th Amendment and 42 USC §1983, payment of 30 days salary in accordance with Education Law §3019-a and an award of counsel fees pursuant to 42 USC §1988. Without conceding that the probationer was entitled to a name-clearing hearing, the district agreed to provide him with one. Supreme Court awarded the teacher counsel fees related to his attempt to secure the name-clearing hearing, but denied his request for 30 days salary. Both parties appealed those portions of the Supreme Court’s ruling respectively viewed as adverse to them.

Regarding the teacher’s demand for salary payment, the Appellate Division said that a school district terminating a probationary teacher that fails to provide the 30-days notice required by Education Law §3019-a, must provide "one day's pay for each day the notice was late." Although it is uncontroverted that the teacher was only given two days notice of his termination - 28 days less than the required 30 days notice – the court agreed with the district that because “the time during which salary would be paid on account of the late notice fell during the summer vacation a time” when the teacher did not work and, therefore, would not otherwise have been paid, he was not entitled to receive any pay based upon the district's failure to provide the requisite notice.

The court noted that there is no evidence that the probationary teacher would have been entitled to any pay during the period in question if he had not been terminated. Thus, under these circumstances, the payment of salary to him would, in effect, provide a windfall to him and would not serve the purposes for which such payment was intended.

As to Supreme Court’s awarding the teacher attorney fees, the Appellate Division said such fees were erroneously awarded to him. The United States Supreme Court has clearly held that a voluntary resolution of a matter "lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur" to warrant "an award of attorney's fees." In this instance the district decided to give the probationer the “name-clearing hearing” he demanded. As the hearing was the result of the voluntary actions of school district, which was not enforced by a consent decree or judgment of Supreme Court, the Appellate Division ruled that the award of counsel fees was improper.

NYPPL Comments: A name clearing hearing, however, serves only one purpose - to clear the accused individual's good name and reputation. It does not result in the individual obtaining any right to reemployment. This means that having been provided with a hearing and having cleared his name is, at best, all the relief an individual can expect. Prevailing at a name-clearing hearing does not require the individual to be reemployed by his or her former employer.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://nypublicpersonnellawarchives.blogspot.com/2008/07/less-than-30-days-notice-of-termination.html

Failure to produce a valid license required to perform the duties of the position bars individual’s employment

Failure to produce a valid license required to perform the duties of the position bars individual’s employment

NYC Department of Sanitation v Wright, OATH Index #1601/12

OATH Administrative Law Judge John B. Spooner found that the worker’s failure to possess a valid driver’s license barred him from continued employment as a sanitation worker. The Appointing Authority adopted Judge Spooner recommendation that the individual be terminated from his position.

The decision indicates that the worker “violated department rules by failing to have a valid driver’s license and not having the license reinstated after being notified of the need to do so.”

Where a valid license, permit or certification is required to lawfully perform the duties of the position, courts have ruled that an individual may be suspended without pay if he or she becomes unable to lawfully perform the duties of the position because of a lack of, or the loss of, the required license, certification or similar permit. “Summarily” in this context means without preferring disciplinary charges and providing a due process hearing once the individual has been given a reasonable opportunity to produce the required credential and has failed to do so.

Common examples of situations leading to a valid summary dismissal include the revocation of a truck driver’s permit to operate a motor vehicle on public roads, the loss of an attorney’s license to practice law and the expiration of a temporary permit to teach. All that appears to be necessary in such cases is for the appointing authority to make some reasonable inquiry to determine if the employee may lawfully perform the duties of the position.

Essentially courts have viewed employees who lack such a required credential as being “unqualified,” in contrast to being “incompetent,” to perform the duties of the position. As the Court of Appeals indicated in New York State Off. of Children & Family Servs. v Lanterman, 14 NY3d 275, termination from the position because the individual does not possess a valid required license or certification is not a disciplinary termination.

Other examples include Meliti v Nyquist, 53 AD2d 951, affirmed 41 NY2d 183 (immediate suspension of teachers was lawful because their teaching licenses had expired) and O’Keefe v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp, 714 FSupp 622, (traveling company demonstrator was not discriminated against when a private sector employer terminated the individual after his driver’s license was suspended).

In contrast, in Martin ex rel Lekkas, 86 AD2d 712, the issue focused on the employer's requiring Lekkas, an Assistant Clinical Physician, to have a valid license to practice medicine while serving as an administrator, a position that did not involve Lekkas’ practicing medicine. The appointing authority had terminated Lekkas from his position because he did not hold a valid New York State license to practice medicine. The Appellate Division ruled that only in the event the duties of the position require the incumbent to be licensed may the lack of such a license serve as grounds for termination.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/12_Cases/12-1601.pdf

Employer’s duty to provide a safe place to work does not extend to hazards inherent in the duties of the position

Employer’s duty to provide a safe place to work does not extend to hazards inherent in the duties of the position

Consalvo v City of New York, 53 AD3d 521

A New York City Sanitation Department employee was instructed to remove a dead cat from a public roadway. While removing the animal for the roadway the employee was struck by a hit-and-run driver, and thereafter died. Diane Consalvo sued the City, alleging wrongful death claming the City was negligent. The Supreme Court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the action. On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department reversed the lower court’s ruling.

The Appellate Division said that “The duty of an employer to provide its employees with a safe place to work does not extend to hazards which are part of or inherent in the very work which the [employee] is to perform [nor] to secure the safety of [an employee] against a condition, or even defects, risks or dangers that may be readily observed by the reasonable use of the senses, having in view the age, intelligence and experience of the [employee]”

In this instance, said the court, the City demonstrated it was entitled to judgment as a law by showing that the employee was an experienced sanitation worker, that it was part of his work to pick up dead animals from the roadway, and that the risks inherent therein, including the risk of being struck by a car, were readily observable.

Consalvo relied upon union rules, which the court said “were promulgated not as a safety measure, but to promote efficiency,” and upon the alleged "custom" of the Sanitation Department to dispatch two workers to collect garbage. However, said the Appellate Division, such evidence did not raise a “triable issue of fact” sufficient to defeat the City's entitlement to judgment as a law.

In another “safe workplace” case, Scharff v Sachem Cent. School Dist. at Holbrook, 53 AD3d 538, the court said that although Labor Law §240(1) affords special protection to workers who sustain personal injuries as a result of elevation-related risks such as falling from a height or being struck by a falling object that was improperly hoisted, the provision does not "encompass any and all perils that may be connected in some tangential way with the effects of gravity."

The injured worker testified that he slipped and fell onto the surface of a roof of a school while working. The school district, said the Appellate Division, met its burden of establishing its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a law by showing that the employee’s injury was not incurred as a result of an elevation-related risk. The Appellate Division also commented that “Supreme Court properly found that the [worker’s] affidavit, in which he alleged that he also slid down the roof, contradicted prior deposition testimony and was an attempt to create a feigned issue of fact.

The Consalvo decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://nypublicpersonnellawarchives.blogspot.com/2008/07/employers-duty-to-provide-safe-place-to.html

The Scharff decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://nypublicpersonnellawarchives.blogspot.com/2008/07/worker-injured-while-working-above.html

 

The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel held to bar applicant’s claim for unemployment insurance benefits

The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel held to bar applicant’s claim for unemployment insurance benefits

Matter of Redd (Commissioner of Labor), 2012 NY Slip Op 05886, Appellate Division, Third Department

Initially suspended without pay from her employment for alleged misconduct, an arbitrator ultimately found the employee guilty of misconduct and terminated from her position.

The individual then filed for unemployment insurance benefits. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board denied her claim for unemployment insurance benefits on the basis that she lost her employment through misconduct.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s decision, holding that as “there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding, collateral estoppel* effect must be given to the arbitrator's factual findings regarding claimant's misconduct.”

Further, said the court, upon review it concluded that "the Board properly took into account the arbitrator's factual findings regarding the events which led to claimant's dismissal and then went on to reach its own conclusion as to whether claimant's behavior constituted [disqualifying] misconduct under the Labor Law."

As the record before court provided substantial evidence to support the Board's conclusion that claimant engaged in disqualifying misconduct, the Appellate Division said that it found no basis to reverse the Board’s ruling.

* The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel holds that the determination of the facts litigated between the parties to an earlier proceeding are binding and conclusive on those parties in any subsequent litigation involving the same issue[s] and parties.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_05886.htm

Mode of payroll payment should not affect the employer’s being reimbursed for the salary paid an educator while he or she was receiving workers’ compensation benefits

Mode of payroll payment should not affect the employer’s being reimbursed for the salary paid an educator while he or she was receiving workers’ compensation benefits
Pawlewski v Buffalo Bd. of Educ., 53 AD3d 834

A teacher employed by the Buffalo Board of Education, was injured when she fell at work. She was still out of work at the time of the relevant workers' compensation hearings. The controlling provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between the Board and the educator’s union provide that the teacher was continue to receive her regular wages and benefits for up to two years and "the salary allowance paid [to her] under worker[s'] compensation [would] be assigned to the [employer]."

Buffalo paid the teacher her full salary during this period but when it sought reimbursement, the Workers' Compensation Board modified its hearing officer’s determination, finding that Buffalo was not entitled to reimbursement for payments it made to the teacher for the “summer recess” period during which she was “on disability leave.”

Buffalo and its workers' compensation carrier appealed.

The Appellate Division noted that Workers' Compensation Law §25 (4) (a) “provides, in pertinent part, that if an employer ‘has made payments to an employee in like manner as wages during any period of disability, [the employer] shall be entitled to be reimbursed out of an unpaid installment or installments of compensation due.’”

In this instance the teacher had received her full annual wages, which had been paid in the same manner as she had received them before her injury in accordance with the contractual terms providing that a teacher's total annual salary is paid over a period of 10 months. Under the circumstances, said the court, the Board erred in reversing that part of the ALJ’s determination that would have reimbursed Buffalo for the summer recess period.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://nypublicpersonnellawarchives.blogspot.com/2008/07/mode-of-payroll-payment-should-not.html

Waiving further administrative or judicial consideration of the resulting decision as a conditions of electing a particular administrative review procedure binding

Waiving further administrative or judicial consideration of the resulting decision as a conditions of electing a particular administrative review procedure binding

Colon v New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 2012 NY Slip Op 05819, Appellate Division, Second Department

When the application for a performance-of-duty retirement disability pension was denied by the Board of Trustees of the New York City Employees' Retirement System, the applicant was advised that there were three different options to seek review of the determination available: (1) to commence a CPLR article 78 proceeding within four months of receipt of the denial letter; (2) to request review of her case by a Special Medical Committee consisting of three independent physicians; or (3) to refile for a disability pension.

The applicant elected to have her case reviewed by the Special Medical Committee and, as a condition of obtaining such a review, waived any right to further administrative or judicial review of the Board of Trustees' determination.

The Special Medical Review Committee concluded that while the applicant was, indeed, disabled, the disability was not the result of a job-related accident.

Board of Trustees adopted the Special Medical Review Committee's recommendation, again denying the application, and the applicant filed an Article 78 petition seeking to overturn the Board’s determination.

Denying the appeal, the Appellate Division said that by “electing to have her case reviewed by the Special Medical Review Committee and executing a waiver of her right to further administrative or judicial review, [the applicant] agreed to accept the Special Medical Review Committee's determination as binding and conclusive.”

Noting that the applicant did not allege that the waiver was the result of coercion or duress and its terms were “clear and unambiguous,” the court explained that "[W]hen a waiver is freely and knowingly made and not the product of coercion or duress, a party can waive his rights to seek review of an administrative proceeding and such determination is binding."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_05819.htm

Limitations on the use of sick leave by police officers

Limitations on the use of sick leave by police officers
Economico v. Village of Pelham, 50 NY2d 120

Is it lawful to terminate a police officer on sick leave at full pay if he or she is unable to perform the duties of the position due to a non-work related injury or disease?

In contrast to the discontinuation of a police officer from the payroll while he or she is eligible for benefits pursuant to §207-c of the General Municipal Law,* a police officer placed on a leave of absence pursuant to §72 of the Civil Service Law because of an injury or disease that is not work-related may be terminated from his or her position pursuant to §73 of the Civil Service Law at the discretion of the appointing authority.

Notwithstanding a Taylor Law contract provision providing for “unlimited sick leave with pay” for police officers unable to work due to non-service related disabilities, the New York State Court of Appeals has held that a police officer so disabled could be terminated pursuant to §73 of the Civil Service Law. The Court distinguished Economico from the Yonkers teacher case (Board of Educ. v Yonkers Fedn. of Teachers, 40 NY2d 268) where the Court held there was no prohibition against the establishment of a limited job security clause in a collective bargaining agreement.

The State’s interest in maintaining the efficiency and continuity of its civil service was held to be a substantial one and §73 truncates the employee’s right to be continued in his or her position without limitation, even in the face of a contract provision to the contrary, at the discretion by the appointing authority. It should be noted, however, that a police officer eligible for General Municipal Law §207-c benefits would be subject to the provisions of §71 of the Civil Service Law while a police officer absent due to an injury or disease that was not job-related is typically granted leave, with or without pay, pursuant to §72 of the Civil Service Law.

In Dolan v Whalen, 49 NY2d 991, the Court of Appeals held that a hearing in connection with termination pursuant to §73 is required if there is “some factual dispute impacting upon the employer’s right to discharge” the employee.**

Although §73 speaks of “termination,” such a termination is not a “dismissal” in a pejorative sense as the individual has certain rights to reinstatement to his or her former position, or a similar position, upon his or her recovery from the underlying disability or, if there is no suitable vacancy available at that time, the placement of his or her name on a preferred list. The same it true with respect to an individual who is terminated from his or her position while on leave pursuant to §71 of the Civil Service Law.

The police officer injured in the line of duty is entitled to unlimited leave with pay and other benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law, Sections 207-c(1), which leave is at full salary until the disability ceases or the individual retires or is retired, as provided by law. 

Further, the police officer cannot be required to use any leave credits available to him (Op. St. Comp. 79-356). The Comptroller’s Opinion noted that “a municipality and its policemen may not agree through collective bargaining that a policeman injured in the performance of his duties apply accumulated sick leave or vacation credits to receive the full amount of his salary during the period of his [or her] disability.”

* An appointing authority may not summarily terminate an individual’s §207-c disability benefits [Kempkes v Downey, 53 AD3d 547].

** See Sheeran v New York State Dept. of Transp., 18 NY3d 61, a case addressing the rights of an individual who has voluntarily absented him or herself from work due to a non-work related injury of disease and seeks to return to his or her position.

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General Municipal Law§§ 207-a and 207-c - a 1098 page e-book focusing on administering General Municipal Law Sections 207-a/207-c and providing benefits thereunder and other disability retirement issues is available from the Public Employment Law Press. Click on http://section207.blogspot.com/for additional information about this electronic reference manual.

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Reports and information published by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli

Reports and information published by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli

Issued during the week of July 30 - August 5, 2012 [Click on the caption to access the full report]

DiNapoli: Special Education Contractor Bilked Taxpayers Out of $2.6 Million

IncludED Educational Services, a Cedarhurst–based provider of special education services, inappropriately charged New York City’s Department of Education and others more than $2.6 million over a two–year period, including more than $850,000 in salaries paid to the sons and other relatives of its executive director, according to an auditreleased Wednesday by State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli. The findings have been referred to the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office.

DiNapoli: Auditors Block $1.4 Million in Improper Unemployment Insurance Payments

State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli prevented $1.4 million in inappropriate unemployment insurance payments or payment requests by the Department of Labor, including to recipients that were employed, deceased or unauthorized to work in the United States, according to a reportreleased Tuesday. The Comptroller’s Office also found nearly $1 million in improper payments, which had already been paid.

DiNapoli: Local Governments Facing New Fiscal Reality

The Office of the State Comptroller has released a reportentitled New Fiscal Realities Challenge Local Governments, which is now available on our website. This summarizes 60 audit reports released in fiscal year 2011–12 that identified local governments with inaccurate budgeting practices. The report also summarizes 23 budget reviews that OSC completed during the same time period. The report outlines the Comptroller’s commitment to ensuring that local officials develop budgets that provide transparency and accountability to taxpayers. The report can be accessed on the OSC website at http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/fiscalrealities2012.pdf.

DiNapoli: MTA Gave Apple Inside Advantage For Grand Central Terminal Lease

The Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) slanted a supposedly competitive process to fill prime retail space in Grand Central Terminal in Apple’s favor, according to an auditissued Monday by New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli. Auditors and investigators found that the MTA worked exclusively with Apple behind the scenes on a lease for more than a year before issuing a request for proposals that resulted in only one response — from Apple.

Comptroller DiNapoli Releases Municipal Audits

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli Tuesday announced his office completed the following audits: the Town of German; the Town of Hurley; the Town of Ridgeway; Washington County; and, the Westfield Volunteer Fire Department.

An appeal to the Commissioner of Education must comply with all precedural requirements set out in the relevant Regulations of the Commissioner

An appeal to the Commissioner of Education must comply with all precedural requirements set out in the relevant Regulations of the Commissioner

Appeal of R.F. and D.F., on behalf of their son R.F., from action of the Board of Education of the East Meadow Union Free School District, Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision #16,369

In this pro se appeal, R.F. and D.F. [the parents] appealed the suspension of their child, R.F., and asked the Commissioner to remove the Superintendent and the Board President from their respective positions.

The Commissioner denied the parents’ appeal on the merits but addressed a number of procedural matters that should be noted.

The School District contended that the appeal should be dismissed because the petition filed by the parents:

1. Failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;

2. Failed to join necessary parties; and

3. Was not verified. 

The School District also objected to parents’ response to its memorandum of law. On this point the Commissioner said: “Although labeled ‘Reply,’ it is unclear whether [the parents] intend this document to be a reply or reply memorandum of law …to the extent this ‘Reply’ was intended as a reply, it is untimely, because the parents failed to serve it within 10 days after service of the school district’s answer in accordance with §275.14(a) of the Commissioner’s regulations.”

 

If, however, the “Reply” was intended as a reply memorandum of law, the Commissioner pointed out that a reply memorandum of law may not be used to belatedly add new assertions that are not part of the pleadings and may be accepted only with the prior approval of the Commissioner, citing 8 NYCRR §276.4.  Although the Commissioner said that the parents had “apparently contacted my Office of Counsel prior to their submission, it fails to comply with §276.4 of the Commissioner’s regulations pertaining to memoranda of law, or with §276.5 pertaining to additional affidavits, exhibits and other supporting papers.”

 

Accordingly, said the Commissioner, “I have not considered it.”

The School District also contended that the appeal must be dismissed because the petition is not verified.  8 NYCRR §275.5 of the Commissioner's regulations requires that all pleadings in an appeal to the Commissioner be verified.  In the event a petition is not properly verified, the appeal must be dismissed.

The Commissioner, noting that the parents’ petition that was filed with his Office of Counsel included the required verification, ruled that dismissal on that basis is not warranted.

Turning to that portion of the parents’ appeal that challenged their child’s suspension from school and seeking to expunge any report of the incident from his school record, the Commissioner said that he will only decide matters in actual controversy and will not render a decision on a state of facts which no longer exist or which subsequent events have laid to rest. As the child had already “served the suspensions and returned to school,” that aspect of the appeal, said the Commissioner, was moot.

However, said the Commissioner, to the extent that parents seek expungement of the incident from their child’s school record, that aspect of the appeal survived.

As to the parents’ seeking the removal of the Superintendent and the Board President, the Commissioner said that their application must be denied for failure to join necessary parties, i.e., a party whose rights would be adversely affected by a determination of an appeal in favor of a petitioner is a necessary party and must be joined as such.

“Joinder” requires that an individual be clearly named as a respondent in the caption and served with a copy of the notice of petition and petition to inform the individual that he or she should respond to the petition and enter a defense.

Turning to the requirement that the appropriate parties must be served with the necessary papers, the Commissioner noted that the parents had “served only the district by personally serving the Superintendent’s secretary and … a member of the board.” As neither the Superintendent nor the Board President was personally served with a copy of the notice of petition and petition, the Commissioner ruled that the parents’ “removal application must be denied.”

Further, said the Commissioner, there was another basis for denying parents’ application for removal: the notice of petition was defective.  8 NYCRR §277.1[b] requires that the notice accompanying a removal application must specifically advise a school officer that an application is being made for his or her removal from office. The parents, however, had failed to give such notice and, instead, used the notice prescribed under 8 NYCRR §275.11(a) for appeals brought pursuant to Education Law §310. 

A notice of petition that fails to include the language required by the Commissioner’s regulation is fatally defective and does not secure jurisdiction over the intended respondents.

Finally, the Commissioner noted that “A petition to the Commissioner is required to set forth the allegations in numbered paragraphs, be typewritten and double spaced, citing 8 NYCRR §275.3[c].  Although a liberal interpretation of these rules is appropriate where petitioners are pro se and there is no prejudice to respondent, the Commissioner noted that the parents’ lack of adherence to the regulations “has obfuscated their contentions.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume52/d16369.html

Employee’s termination based on the findings and recommendation of the disciplinary hearing officer

Employee’s termination based on the findings and recommendation of the disciplinary hearing officer

Snead v Village of Spring Valley, 2012 NY Slip Op 05749, Appellate Division, Second Department

Supreme Court dismissed a petition filed pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules challenging the determination of the Village of Spring Valley Justice Court dismissing the individual from her position, noting that the Justice Court had adopted the findings and recommendation of the disciplinary hearing officer.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Justice Court’s action, noting that the alleged misconduct, falsification of public records, and insubordination, was supported by “substantial evidence adduced at the administrative hearing.”

In addition, the court held that “in light of the charges and the [employee’s] duties, the penalty imposed was not so disproportionate to the offenses as to be "shocking to one's sense of fairness," thus constituting an abuse of discretion as a matter of law, citing Pell v Board of Education, 34 NY2d 222.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_05749.htm

Where available, the Doctrine of Absolute Privilege defeats a plaintiff's defamation claim

Where available, the Doctrine of Absolute Privilege defeats a plaintiff's defamation claim
Murphy v City of New York, 2008 NY Slip Op 31926(U), Supreme Court, New York County, Docket Number: 0106059/2006, Judge: Karen Smith [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports.]

Judge Smith said that “the privilege of absolute immunity is bestowed upon an official who is ‘a principal executive of State or local government or is entrusted by law with administrative or executive policy-making responsibilities of considerable dimension,'" and that this privilege “extends to those of subordinate rank who exercise delegated powers,” citing Firth v State of New York, 12 AD3d 907, lv to appeal denied, 4NY3d 709 and Ward Telecom. & Computer Services v State of New York, 42 NY2d 289.

In Firth, the New York Office the State Inspector General ”) was found to be cloaked with absolute immunity, where it had conducted an investigation of the Department of Environmental Conservation’s Law Enforcement Division and its subsequent report, allegedly containing defamatory statements about the Division’s former director, was later published on the Internet.

Among the most common situations where the issue of privilege is raised are those involving the employee alleging that internal communications between administrators or between an employee and an administrator concerning the worker contains defamatory statements. Murphy v Herfort, 428 NYS2d 117, is an example of litigation resulting from communications between administrators; Missek-Falkoff v Keller, 153 AD2d 841, is an example of a case where one employee sued another because of the contents of a memorandum from the second employee to a superior concerning a "problem" with the coworker.

This issue may also arise in connection with an employee's former employer supplying information to a prospective employer of the individual in response to a request for "references" (see Buxton v Plant City, 57 LW 2649). Unless malice is shown, the courts usually dispose of such a case by applying the doctrine of "qualified immunity."

In Tulloch v Coughlin, 50 F.3d 114, the US Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, considered the differences between “absolute immunity” and “qualified immunity.”

The difference is significant. Absolute immunity completely insulates an individual from civil law suits. In contrast, a qualified immunity protects the individual from liability only where the individual did not violate a person’s "clearly established" right.

Performing tasks that are a reasonable outgrowth of an employee’s in-title work does not constitute “out-of-title” work

Performing tasks that are a reasonable outgrowth of an employee’s in-title work does not constitute “out-of-title” work

Scarsdale Assn. of Educ. Secretaries v Board of Educ. of Scarsdale Union Free School Dist., 53 AD3d 572

The Scarsdale Association of Education Secretaries filed a petition pursuant to CPLR Article 78 seeking a review of a determination of the Scarsdale Union Free School District that assigning certain employee security responsibilities did not constitute "out-of-title" work within the meaning of the Civil Service Law. Supreme Court dismissed the Association’s petition and the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

The Association sued the School District as a result of its implementation of a "single point of entry system" in each of its elementary schools. In order for a visitor to enter the building, he or she had to go to the school's main entrance, which was monitored by a video camera, and ring a doorbell. Some of the secretaries and typists working at the schools were assigned the responsibility of granting the visitors access to the schools. This required the employee to look at a monitor, see that a visitor wanted to come inside, and press a "buzzer" to remotely unlock the door to the main entrance.

Subsequently the District required some secretaries and typists to provide contractors working inside school buildings with identification badges. The secretaries and typists claimed that these new responsibilities were not required by their job descriptions and thus constituted "out-of-title" work within the meaning of Section 61.2 of the Civil Service Law.

The Appellate Division agreed that Civil Service Law §61(2) prohibits out-of-title work except during an emergency situation but noted that “work is not considered out-of-title if it is related to, similar in nature to, or a reasonable outgrowth of, the employee's ‘in-title’ work,“ citing Healy v County of Nassau, 18 AD3d 873.

In this instance the court decided that ”the directives requiring the secretaries and typists involved to use the surveillance monitors and buzzers to admit visitors, and to supply contractors with identification badges, constituted a reasonable outgrowth of their “in-title” work. In particular, the court noted that the job description for the typists included "receiv[ing] visitors, ascertain[ing] their business and direct[ing them] to appropriate staff members."

As to the secretaries, the Appellate Division said that their job description included "a considerable amount of contact with the public."

The court decided that fact that these tasks overlap job responsibilities “set forth in the job specifications of the schools' security workers” does not mandate the conclusion that the secretaries and typists assigned to perform these tasks are performing out-of-title work.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2008/2008_06291.htm