Seeking reinstatement and back pay following his dismissal from his position, Petitioner [Plaintiff] brought a CPLR Article 78 action asking Supreme Court to review the determination of the Board of Education [Board] [a] terminating his employment and [b] its denial of payment for [1] certain days that he alleged he had worked, [2] his accrued sick leave credits, and [3] his unused health care benefits.
The Board, contending that Plaintiff had not complied with the notice of claim requirements set out in Education Law §3813(1), moved to dismiss Plaintiff's petition. The Supreme Court granted the Board's motion, in effect denying Plaintiff's petition for failure to comply §3813(1) and dismissed the proceeding. Plaintiff appealed the court's ruling.
The Appellate Division, affirming the lower court's ruling, explaining that §3813[1] provides that a written verified claim upon which such action or special proceeding is founded must be presented to the governing body of the school district "within three months after the accrual of such claim, and that the officer or body having the power to adjust or pay said claim has neglected or refused to make an adjustment or payment thereof for thirty days after such presentment."
Citing Parochial Bus Sys. v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 NY2d 539, the Appellate Division, said a "failure to present a claim within the statutory time limitation or to notify the correct party, is a fatal defect."
While the Court of Appeals has held that where the school district has been sufficiently informed of the claim all that is required is substantial compliance with the statute regarding the degree of descriptive detail in a notice of claim, it has "nevertheless, always insisted that statutory requirements mandating notification to the proper public body or official must be fulfilled." Further, opined the Appellate Division, §3813[1]'s prerequisite is not satisfied by presenting such notice to any other individual or body and, moreover, "the statute permits no exception regardless of whether the Board had actual knowledge of the claim or failed to demonstrate actual prejudice."
Agreeing with the Supreme Court's finding that Plaintiff failed to present his purported notice of claim to the governing body, namely, the Board, the Appellate Division pointed out that Plaintiff's sending a letter setting out his claims to the School District's Superintendent did "not constitute service upon the Board."
The fact that the Board ultimately obtained actual knowledge of the letter from the Superintendent's office did not satisfy the mandates set out in §3813[1] and Plaintiff failed to submit an affidavit of service or any other evidence to demonstrate that he had, in fact, served or presented his letter to the Board.
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