The County of Rockland [and others "Defendant"] and the Rockland Association of Management Union, AFT Local 4404 [RAM] executed a collective bargaining agreement that covered the period from January 1, 2014, to July 31, 2016 [2014 CBA].
On September 30, 2020, the Defendant and RAM executed a collective bargaining agreement that covered the period from August 1, 2016, to December 31, 2021[2020 CBA] which, as did the 2014 CBA, provided that "[whenever]" the parties agreed that "wage increases shall be paid retroactively," retired employees would be eligible for wage adjustments for any applicable continuous period of active service.
The 2020 CBA provided that employees who "(1) had worked in 2017 and 2018 and (2) remained active on the County's payroll on the date the County executive approved the successor CBA would receive 'lump sum' payments of $800 and $1500, respectively".
The Plaintiff in the instant action had worked for the County from March 26, 1986, until her retirement on August 7, 2018, brought this act seeking to :
1. Recover damages for breach of contract; and
2. Under color of 42 USC §1983, alleged the "deprivation of a vested property interest without due process", claiming entitlement to the two lump sum payments set forth in the 2020 CBA.
The Defendant moved, among other things pursuant to CPLR 3211, to dismiss Plaintiff's first and second causes of action insofar as asserted against the County, the County Executive, and the County Legislature. Supreme Court granted the motion; Plaintiff appealed the Supreme Court's judgment.
In its decision, the Appellate Division noted that:
1. "A motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(1) to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action is barred by documentary evidence may be granted only where the documentary evidence utterly refutes the plaintiff's factual allegations, thereby conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law;
2. "To constitute documentary evidence, the evidence must be unambiguous, authentic, and undeniable, such as . . . deeds, contracts, and any other papers, the contents of which are essentially undeniable. Conversely, letters, emails, and . . . affidavits . . . do not meet the requirements for documentary evidence";
3. On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action under CPLR 3211(a)(7), a court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory"; and
4. Where a court considers evidentiary material in determining a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), but does not convert the motion into one for summary judgment, the criterion becomes whether the plaintiff has a cause of action, not whether the plaintiff has stated one, and unless the movant shows that a material fact as claimed by the plaintiff is not a fact at all and no significant dispute exists regarding the alleged fact, the complaint shall not be dismissed".
Opining that County conclusively established that the Plaintiff was not entitled to the two lump sum payments set forth in the successor CBA, the Appellate Division said that "By the terms of Article VIII(3)(a)(1) and (2) of the successor CBA, the [Plaintiff] was ineligible for the lump sum payments because she had retired before the successor CBA had been approved by the County executive".
Further, Appellate Division commented that the Plaintiff's entitlement to retroactive wage increases only vested upon the agreement of the County and RAM to enact such increases and "the 2020 CBA expressly provided that the lump sum payments 'shall not increase the salary rate of the employees receiving [them] or the salary schedule'".
The Appellate Division then observed that Supreme Court, citing Domitz v City of Long Beach, 187 AD3d 853, quoting Matter of Aeneas McDonald Police Benevolent Assn. v City of Geneva, 92 NY2d 32, "properly declined" to consider [Plaintiff's] allegation that it was the past practice of the County to pay retired employees similarly situated to the plaintiff pursuant to prior collective bargaining agreements since "'past practice, like any other form of parole evidence, . . . cannot be used to create a contractual right independent of some express source in the underlying agreement", concluding that Supreme Court properly granted dismissal of the first cause of action, alleging breach of contract, insofar as asserted against the County, the Executive, and the Legislature.
The Supreme Court, said the Appellate Division, "also properly granted dismissal of the second cause of action, alleging a violation of 42 USC §1983, insofar as asserted against the County, the Executive, and the Legislature pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7)". In the words of the Appellate Division, "The benefit allegedly denied to the [Plaintiff] 'does not constitute the kind of deprivation that may give rise to a due process claim'".
Click HERE to access the decision of the Appellate Division posted on the Internet.