In February 2020, Respondent entered a New York City police station, drew a gun and opened fire, wounding a police lieutenant. Respondent pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted murder in the first degree and was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 23 years to life.
In December 2023, the New York City Comptroller notified the New York State Office of Victim Services [Victim Services] which was acting on behalf of a police officer [PO] who was on duty in the police station during Respondent's attack that Respondent was to receive a settlement of $189,300 in connection with a class action. Victim Services relayed that information to PO and PO told Victim Services of PO's intent to commence a civil action against Respondent to recover damages for psychological and emotional injuries PO sustained as a result of Respondent's crime.
Victim Services, acting on PO's behalf, then commenced a proceeding pursuant to Executive Law §632-a, commonly known as the Son of Sam Law, seeking a preliminary injunction to preserve the settlement funds. Supreme Court initially granted Victim Services' request for a temporary restraining order freezing those funds until joinder of issue. Following a hearing at which Respondent appeared pro se, Supreme Court determined that PO was not a "crime victim" within the meaning of Executive Law §632-a (1) (d) because PO did not satisfy the definition of "victim" in Executive Law §621 (5), which, as relevant here, encompasses "a person who suffers personal physical injury as a direct result of a crime" (Executive Law §621 [5] [a]) and dismissed Victim Services' petition and vacated the temporary restraining order. Victim Services appealed.
The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court's ruling, observing that "Executive Law §632-a sets forth a statutory scheme intended to improve the ability of crime victims to obtain full and just compensation from the person(s) convicted of the crime by allowing crime victims or their representatives to sue the convicted criminals who harmed them when the criminals receive substantial sums of money from virtually any source and protecting those funds while litigation is pending" and a "[c]rime" is, as relevant here, is "any felony defined in the laws of the state" (see Executive Law §632-a [1] [a] [i]), and a "[c]rime victim" is "the victim of a crime" (see Executive Law § 632-a [1] [d] [i]), a phrase that "includes the subject of the felonious conduct".
Explaining that Executive Law §621 "govern[s] the general powers of [Victim Services]" and provides that its definitions apply throughout Executive Law Article 22 — of which Executive Law §632-a is a part", the Appellate Division said that "The issue is therefore whether Executive Law §632-a's definition of 'crime victim' incorporates Executive Law §621's definition of 'victim' or replaces it" The Appellate Division then observed that "It is well settled that, when interpreting a statute, [courts] attempt to effectuate the intent of the Legislature and the starting point for discerning such intent is the language of the statute, citing Matter of New York State Crime Victims Bd. v Gordon, 66 AD3d 1213, and other New York State Court decisions.
The Appellate Division's decision observes that the structure and language of Executive Law § 632-a (1) (d) demonstrate that its reference to "the victim of a crime" does not incorporate the definition of "victim" in Executive Law § 621 (5). Where the Legislature intended to incorporate a definition from Executive Law § 621, it did so by explicit cross-reference. Thus, in addition to "the victim of a crime" (Executive Law § 632-a [1] [d] [i]), a "crime victim" under the Son of Sam Law includes "the representative of a crime victim as defined in [Executive Law §621(6)]" and "a good samaritan as defined in [Executive Law § 621(7)]". The absence of a comparable cross-reference to Executive Law §621 (5)'s definition of "victim" must be regarded as deliberate (see People v Finnegan, 85 NY2d 53, 59 [1995], cert denied 516 US 919 [1995]). It follows that "the victim of a crime" under Executive Law § 632-a (1) (d) (i) is not confined to persons who suffer physical injury (see Executive Law § 621 [5] [a]; cf. Matter of New York State Off. of Victim Servs. v Mobayed, 245 AD3d 1085). Applying the statute as written, the Appellate Division concluded that PO is a "crime victim" pursuant to Executive Law § 632-a.
Turning to Victim Services' application for a preliminary injunction freezing Respondent's settlement funds, the Appellate Division opined that Victim Services satisfied each of prongs of the appropriate test: A probability of success on the merits; PO's additional details of Respondent's conduct and PO's resulting losses and injuries; and the risk of irreparable injury without provisional relief is manifest, as dissipation of the settlement funds would bar any recovery by PO and potentially other injured victims of Respondent's crime.
The Appellate Division then observed that 10% of Respondent's settlement — $18,930 — is statutorily exempt from restraint and considering the policy objectives of the Son of Sam Law, the balance of equities favor Victim Services and remitted the matter to Supreme Court to issue an appropriate preliminary injunction.
Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.