Some proposed settlement agreements may require court or agency approval

Some proposed settlement agreements may require court or agency approval

Cheeks v Freeport Pancake House, Inc., USCA, 2^ndCircuit, Docket 14-299 CV

Dorian Cheeks sued Freeport Pancake House [FPH] seeking to recover overtime wages, liquidated damages and attorneys’ fees under both the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act [FLSA] and New York State’s Labor Law. He also alleged that he was demoted, and ultimately fired, for complaining about FPH’s failure to pay him and other employees the required overtime wage.

After appearing at an initial conference with the district court, the parties agreed on a private settlement of Cheeks’ action  and filed a joint  stipulation  and order  of dismissal with prejudice* pursuant to Federal Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). The federal district court, however, refused to accept the stipulation as submitted, concluding that Cheeks could not agree to a private settlement of his FLSA claims without either the approval of the district court or the supervision of the United Stated Department of Labor [DOL].

The US Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the district court's holding ruling that in the absence of such approval, parties cannot settle their FLSA claims through a private stipulated dismissal with prejudice and remanded for further proceedings.

Characterizing as “offering useful guidance,” the Second Circuit noted that other circuit courts of appeal have arrived at different results, citing Martin v Spring Break ‘83 Prods., L.L.C., 688  F.3d 247, a 5^th Circuit ruling in which the court concluded that a private settlement agreement containing a release of FLSA claims entered into between a union and an employer waived the employees’ FLSA claims, even without district court approval or DOL supervision, and, in contrast, Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v United States Dep’t of Labor, 679 F.2d 1350, an 11^th Circuit ruling in which that court held that there must be a court finding that the proposed settlement “is a fair and reasonable resolution of a bona fide dispute over FLSA provisions.”

However, said the Second Circuit, the question before it “asks whether the parties can enter into a private stipulated dismissal of FLSA claims with prejudice without the involvement of the district court or DOL that may later be enforceable?”

Explaining that requiring judicial or DOL approval of such settlements is consistent with what "both the Supreme Court and our Court have long recognized as the FLSA’s underlying purpose: to extend the frontiers of social progress by insuring to all our able-bodied working men and women a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work,” the Second Circuit concluded that review of the proposed settlement by the district court or DOL was required.

* Dismissal with prejudice means it can never be filed again by the parties to the settlement.

The Cheeks decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/52d5a9a7-8d8f-41f8-be32-a006b7a4c96f/2/doc/14-299_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/52d5a9a7-8d8f-41f8-be32-a006b7a4c96f/2/hilite/

An educator’s preferred list eligibility rights depend on his or her tenure area

An educator’s preferred list eligibility rights depend on his or her tenure area

Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision No. 16,801

A duly certified public school administrator [Administrator] employed by the Perry Central School District challenged the district school board’s [Board] decision not to appoint her to a secondary principal position following the abolishment of her position as middle school principal. 

The Board had voted to abolish the position of middle school principal for economic reasons effective June 30, 2014.  The secondary principal position was to become vacant July 1, 2014 when the incumbent of that position would move to a new position as superintendent of schools. A notice was posted regarding the open position of secondary principal and Administrator claimed that she had a right being appointed to the secondary principal position.  The Board told Administrator that she would not automatically be appointed to the position.* 

Administrator contended that she was entitled to the position of secondary principal “because the position is substantially similar to her abolished position of middle school principal” and in the same general tenure area of “principal.”  Administrator also alleged that she was being terminated without due process in violation of Education Law §§3012, 3020, and 3020-a.

In rebuttal, the Board argued that:

1. Administrator failed to meet her burden of proof in showing that the district has a general tenure area of principal;

2. Administrator did not show that she is the senior administrator in that tenure area such that she is entitled to the position of secondary principal; and

 

3. Administrator has failed to show that the district acted in bad faith by abolishing the position of middle school principal.

The Commissioner dismissed Administrator’s appeal claiming that she is entitled to the position of secondary principal because it is similar to her previously abolished middle school principal position and in the same general principal tenure area. The Commissioner explained that the Board has demonstrated, “on the record,” that it has established narrow tenure areas with regard to principals within the district, not one general principal tenure area as Administrator contended.

The Board admitted that “it has not been consistent in its appointment of elementary principals, with past appointment resolutions referencing the elementary principal tenure area.” However, said the Commissioner, it appears that Board “has otherwise consistently applied narrow administrative tenure areas and this [admission] appears to be an error with respect to one employee rather than a conscious decision to revert to a general principal tenure area for all principals.”

The Commissioner’s decision also noted that the Board’s resolution appointing Administrator “on probation” and the Board’s resolution appointing her “on tenure” very explicitly appointed her to the Middle School Principal tenure area.  Thus, concluded the Commissioner, the Board met its burden of proof to show that the Perry Central School District has narrow tenure areas for its principal positions.

Finding that the secondary principal position is not in the same tenure area as Administrator’s abolished position of middle school principal, the Commissioner ruled that Administrator is not entitled to appointment to the secondary principal position, presumably from a preferred eligible list established upon the abolishment of the middle school principal position. 

As to Administrator’s claim that she was terminated without due process, the Commissioner said that the school board explained that the abolition of Administrator’s position resulted from a reorganization of its schools to a pre-kindergarten through sixth grade and seventh grade through twelfth grade configurations that would result in cost savings to the district at a time of fiscal difficulties.  Thus, said the Commissioner, Administrator has not demonstrated that she was denied administrative due process when she was advised that her position was abolished and that she would be terminated as a result of that action, and this branch of her appeal must also be dismissed.

*At the time Administrator filed her appeal to the Commissioner, the position of secondary principal had not yet been filled.  

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume55/d16801

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The Layoff, Preferred List and Reinstatement Manual - a 645 page e-book reviewing the relevant laws, rules and regulations and summarizing selected court and administrative decisions involving layoff issues. For more information click on http://nylayoff.blogspot.com/

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Selected reports and information issued by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli issued during the week ending August 8, 2015

Selected reports and information issued by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli issued during the week ending August 8, 2015

[Click on text highlighted in colorto access the full report]

Tax collector pleads guilty to faking her own tax payments
DePeyster Town Clerk Michelle Sheppard resigned her two public jobs and agreed to pay $4,303 in restitution for dodging her personal town and county tax payments over several years. http://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/aug15/080715.htm?utm_source=weeklynews20150809&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=080715release

Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced his office completed audits of the

Niskayuna Fire District 2

http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/firedists/2015/niskayuna2.pdf?utm_source=weeklynews20150809&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=080515arelease

Northville Public Library

http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/libraries/2015/northville.pdf?utm_source=weeklynews20150809&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=080515arelease

Town of North Norwich

http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/towns/2015/northnorwich.pdf?utm_source=weeklynews20150809&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=080515arelease

Town of Phelps

http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/towns/2015/phelps.pdf?utm_source=weeklynews20150809&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=080515arelease

Bethpage Union Free School District

http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/schools/2015/bethpage.pdf?utm_source=weeklynews20150809&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=080515release

Commack Union Free School District

http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/schools/2015/commack.pdf?utm_source=weeklynews20150809&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=080515release

and the

Plainview-Old Bethpage Central School District

http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/audits/schools/2015/plainviewoldbethpage.pdf?utm_source=weeklynews20150809&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=080515release

Public Authority agrees to pay legal expenses incurred as a result of its not responding to a Freedom of Information request

Public Authority agrees to pay legal expenses incurred as a result of its not responding to a Freedom of Information request

Source: Empire Center for Public Policy

The Metropolitan Transportation Authority [MTA] and the Empire Center for Public Policy [Center] have reached an out-of-court settlement in which the MTA acknowledged its failure to respond “in a timely manner” to a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request submitted to it by the Center.

MTA agreed to pay the legal costs and fees incurred by the Center in the course of settling the lawsuit brought by the Center to obtain MTA 2014 payroll records.* The Center said that it had initiated the legal action after more than four months of  “delays and missed deadlines” by MTA. 

The Center alleged that although some MTA units provided payroll records after lengthy delays, the MTA’s New York City Transit Authority failed to answer the  Center’s “appeal of denial,” the last avenue of recourse to exhaust its administrative remedy, before initiating the legal action.

The payroll data are posted and updated annually at http://seethroughny.net/, the Empire Center’s “transparency website.”

* Empire Center for Public Policy v Metropolitan Transportation Authority, New York City Transit Authority, Supreme Court, Kings County, Docket 6681/2015

Court dismissed discrimination complaint for failure to allege discriminatory intent and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies

Court dismissed discrimination complaint for failure to allege discriminatory intent and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies

Burgis v New York City Department of Sanitation, USCA, Second Circuit, Docket #14-14-1640 cv

In this class action lawsuit the plaintiffs alleged that they suffered unlawful discrimination on the basis of race and/or national origin in the New York City Department of Sanitation’s promotional practices, relying on statistics that they claim demonstrate disparities in the composition of various supervisory positions within the department.

The federal district court dismissed the Equal Protection and §1981 claims filed by the plaintiffs “for failure to allege discriminatory intent”, and dismissed their Title VII claim  alleging disparate impact “for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.”

The Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, sustained the district court’s ruling, explaining that although statistics alone may be sufficient in some circumstances to show discriminatory intent in an Equal Protection or §1981 class claim, “the statistics here alleged in the complaint were insufficient for this purpose” and, further, the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing the Title VII disparate impact claim.

As to the statistics presented by the plaintiffs, the Circuit Court said the plaintiff’s bare allegations do not present circumstances that “give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” Without any specificity as to the qualifications considered for each position and without any reference to specific statements or individual circumstances that suggest discriminatory treatment, plaintiffs’ allegations do not support a finding that the Department of Sanitation acted with a discriminatory purpose.

Addressing the plaintiffs’ Title VII claim, the court said that discriminatory intent need not be alleged in a case based on so-called “disparate impact." In this instance, however, the plaintiffs’ Title VII claim must be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

To bring a claim under Title VII, explained the court, a plaintiff must first have filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) or a state equivalent - here, the New York State Division of Human Rights - as Courts may only hear claims “reasonably related” to allegations set forth in the administrative complaint.

Accordingly, said the court, the judgment of the United States District Court is affirmed.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/abbf2748-836b-4838-813b-85ffacc115c6/9/doc/14-1640_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/abbf2748-836b-4838-813b-85ffacc115c6/9/hilite/

Disqualification of applicants for a license or employment because of his or her criminal conviction

Disqualification of applicants for a license or employment because of his or her criminal conviction

Source: Civil Service Attorney LawBlog, by Kevin Sheerin

In a lawsuit brought by the New York Community Service Society [DCAS] for petitioner, KM, Judge Moulton of the New York County Supreme Court held “that both the New York City Department of Citywide Administrative Services and the New York City Civil Service Commission failed to consider Correction Law Article 23-A, in disqualifying the petitioner.”

Article 23-A of the Correction Law, enacted in 1976, addresses the “Licensure and Employment of Persons Previously Convicted of One or More Criminal Offenses,” and attempts to eliminate the effect of bias against ex-offenders by imposing an obligation on employers and public agencies to deal equitably with them by setting out a broad general rule that employers and public agencies cannot deny employment or license to an applicant solely based on the applicant status as an ex-offender.

Petitioner had applied for employment as a DCAS special officer  but was disqualified by Citywide Administrative Service. Petitioner then appealed Administrative Service’s decision to the New York City Civil Service Commission. The Commission sustained Petitioner’s disqualification. Supreme Court reversed the Commission’s decision.

In Arrocha v NYC Bd. of Education, 93 NY2d 361, a case involving the denial of a teaching license to an individual who had been convicted of a crime, the Court of Appeals said that the Correction Law protects individuals from unlawful discrimination based on his or her conviction of a crime and an applicant for a license or employment may not be automatically disqualified because of his or her previous conviction of a crime.  

Finding that the New York City Board of Education properly considered all eight factors set out in the Article 23-A of the New York State Correction Law when it refused to grant a teaching license to a person with a criminal record, the Court of Appeals explained that Article 23-A sets out a broad general rule that employers and public agencies cannot deny employment or license to an applicant solely based on the applicant’s status as an ex-offender. Rather it must measure its decision against the eight criteria set out in §753 of the Correction Law set out below,

1. The public policy of this state, as expressed in this act, is to encourage the licensure and employment of persons previously convicted of one or more criminal offenses;

2. The specific duties and responsibilities necessarily related to the license or employment sought;

3. The bearing, if any, the criminal offense or offenses for which the person was previously convicted will have on his fitness or ability to perform one or more such duties or responsibilities;

4. The time that has elapsed since the occurrence of the criminal offense or offenses.

5. The age of the person at the time of occurrence of the criminal offense or offenses;

6. The seriousness of the offense or offenses;

7. Any information produced by the person, or produced on his behalf, in regard to his rehabilitation and good conduct; and

8. The legitimate interest of the public agency or private employer in protecting property, and the safety and welfare of specific individuals or the general public.”

Read about New York Community Service Society by clicking Article 78 Civil Service Job disqualification case.

Settlement agreements

Settlement agreements

George W. & Dacie Clements Agric. Research Institute, Inc. v Green, 2015 NY Slip Op 06399, Appellate Division, Third Department

In its review of a Supreme Court ruling in a real property action in which one of the parties sought summary judgment to enforce a “settlement agreement,” the Appellate Division set out a number of guidelines that could lead to effecting a binding settlement agreement. 

These guidelines may prove helpful in the context of a “settlement agreement” resolving an employee disciplinary action.

1. An out-of-court settlement agreement "is not binding upon a party unless it is in a writing subscribed by [that party] or [that party's] attorney;"

2. Writings between parties to an action or proceeding that discuss the possibility of settlement will be considered to constitute a binding agreement if "the settlement agreement was adequately described in [such] writings, namely, the agreement was clear, the product of mutual accord and contained all material terms;" and

3. Settlement-related writings may be deemed to have contained sufficiently detailed terms to give rise to a binding agreement when, for example, these writings explicitly incorporate the terms of other documents prepared in anticipation of settlement.

In contrast, said the court, settlement-related writings will not be found to have created a binding agreement if they expressly anticipate a subsequent writing that is to officially memorialize the existence of a settlement agreement and set forth all of its material terms or where the terms of the settlement agreed upon by the employee organization on behalf of an employee and the appointing authority’s representative is subject to the approval of the appointing authority.

In Alfred v Safir, 283 AD2d 280, the disciplinary penalty to be imposed agreed upon by the employee and employer’s representative was made part of the record by the disciplinary hearing officer.

New York City Police Commissioner Howard Safir suspended Gary Alfred for 30 days without pay and placed him on disciplinary probation for one year following the "settlement of disciplinary charges" filed against Alfred. Alfred objected, contending that he, the department’s representative at the disciplinary hearing and the disciplinary hearing officer had all agreed to the imposition of a different disciplinary penalty.

The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed Safir’s decision, commenting that “[t]he various determinations and penalties agreed to by [Alfred] and [the department’s] advocate and/or hearing officer were not binding” on Safir, the appointing authority, citing Silverman v McGuire, 51 NY2d 228.

This decision suggests that where the appointing authority makes the final disciplinary determination, it would be prudent for:

1. The employer’s representative to insist that any settlement of a disciplinary action include a statement to the effect that the settlement is subject to the approval of the appointing authority; and

2. The employee or the employee’s representative to insist on a provision spelling out what is to happen if the appointing officer does not agree to impose the penalty set out in the settlement proposal.

Another issue that may arise as the result of efforts by the employer and the employee organization to settle a disciplinary action: the employee organization later refuses to sign the disciplinary settlement agreement. Would the union's refusal to sign the agreement constitute a failure to bargain in good faith? PERB considered this question in Town of Henrietta and CWA, 23 PERB 3004. 

The employer filed a complaint with PERB alleging the union violated its duty to negotiate in good faith when it refused to sign the disciplinary settlement agreement that the employer contended was required by §204.3 of the Civil Service Law [the Taylor Law].

PERB found an oral agreement had been reached. However, the only issue for it to decide, said PERB, was “whether a Taylor Law duty exists to execute the disciplinary settlement agreement reached.”

PERB ruled that “the duty to execute a written agreement created by §204.3 is most appropriately construed as applying to collectively negotiated agreements and not to settlement agreements reached pursuant to the grievance procedure contained in such a collective bargaining agreement.”

As to the contents of a settlement agreement, the agreement might set out provisions that could affect the employer's ability to file disciplinary charges against the employee in the future. 

For example, in Matter of the Board of Education of the Unadilla Valley Central School District, 97 AD3d 1078, the Appellate Division held that a disciplinary settlement agreement that provided that the appointing authority waived its right to bring certain charges against an individual barred it from subsequently bring charges based on the same event[s] or omission[s] while in Shuler v State of New York, 48 AD3d 384, the court sustained a provision in a disciplinary settlement agreement that preserved certain allegations of employee misconduct for subsequent action.

The Research Institute decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_06399.htm

Alternative to personal service of a petition upon a respondent in an appeal to the Commissioner of Education may be authorized

Alternative to personal service of a petition upon a respondent in an appeal to the Commissioner of Education may be authorized

Decisions of the Commissioner, Decision #16798

One of the objections raised by the School District in this appeal submitted by Stan J. Ercolano to the Commissioner of Education challenging the election of certain members of the School Board to the Board was that the petition was served on one of the named respondents [Pierce] by mail rather than by personal service. 

Addressing this particular objection included among a number of procedural challenges advance by School Board in its efforts to have Ercolano’s appeal dismissed, the Commissioner noted that §275.8(d) of the Commissioner’s regulations provides, in pertinent part. That “If an appeal involves the validity of a school district meeting or election ... a copy of the petition must be served upon the trustee or board of trustees or board of education as the case may be, and upon each person whose right to hold office is disputed and such person must be joined as a respondent.” (emphasis in the Decision).

However, said the Commissioner, although §275.8(a) of the Commissioner’s regulations generally requires that the petition be personally served upon each named respondent,  §275.8(a) provides, in pertinent part that, “if a named respondent cannot be found upon diligent search, ... [service may be made] as otherwise directed by the commissioner.” 

The decision indicates that Ercolano had sent a fax to Education Department’s Office of Counsel requesting permission to effect alternate service by mail upon Pierce after he had “unsuccessfully attempting to effect personal service” upon Pierce at various different times and on different days.  The Office of Counsel sent Ercolano a letter granting him permission to serve Pierce by regular and certified mail, return receipt requested.  Ercolano then effected service, as approved, that same day.

 

The Commissioner said that it appears that Pierce “chose not to pick up the copy of the pleadings sent to her by certified mail” and found that service upon Pierce “was proper and made in compliance with the alternative service petitioner was authorized to use pursuant to §275.8(a) of the Commissioner’s regulations.”

The School District also argue that Ercolano “should have continued to attempt personal service” on Pierce even after the pleadings had been mailed to her by Ercolano as he was directed to do in Office of Councel’s approval letter.  However, affidavits of service submitted by Ercolano stated that an additional attempt to personally serve Pierce was made on the evening of June 16, 2011, but was unsuccessful.

The Commissioner ruled that in this instance “service was proper and [declined] to dismiss the appeal for failure to properly serve Pierce … and join her as a necessary party. 

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.counsel.nysed.gov/Decisions/volume55/d16798

Dismissed probationary teacher seeks damages for the employer’s alleged fraudulent inducement and breach of contract and for the union’s alleged breach of its duty of fair representation

Dismissed probationary teacher seeks damages for the employer’s alleged fraudulent inducement and breach of contract and for the union’s alleged breach of its duty of fair representation

2015 NY Slip Op 06331, Appellate Division, Second Department

The plaintiff [Probationer] commenced an action against the School District and certain named individuals [district defendants] and against the school district’s Teachers Association and New York State United Teachers [union defendants] .after her employment as a probationary teacher was terminated. Probationer’s amended complaint asserted causes of action to recover damages for the district defendant' alleged fraudulent inducement and breach of contract and a cause of action to recover damages for the union defendants' alleged breach of the duty of fair representation.

The Appellate Division ruled that Supreme Court properly granted the district defendants' cross motion to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against them. The court explained that a teacher's employment may be terminated during his or her probationary period for any reason, or no reason at all, unless the teacher establishes that his or her employment was terminated for a constitutionally impermissible purpose or in violation of a statutory proscription.

Here, said the court, the amended complaint failed to allege that Probationer’s employment was terminated for a constitutionally impermissible purpose or in violation of a statutory proscription. As Probationer was an at-will employee, whose employment could be terminated at any time during the probationary period, the Appellate Division said that “there can be no action alleging breach of contract, citing Havilland v Yonkers Public Schools, 21 AD3d 527.

In addition, the court commented that the amended complaint failed to establish that the Probationer reasonably relied upon the district defendants' alleged misrepresentations, which is an element necessary to the recovery of damages under a theory of fraudulent inducement.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division concluded that the amended complaint failed to state a cause of action against the district defendants.

Turning Supreme Court’s dismissal of the amended complaint insofar as asserted against the union defendants, the Appellate Division said that “Because the union defendants were unincorporated associations, and because the amended complaint failed to allege that the conduct complained of on the part of the union defendants was authorized or ratified by every one of their respective members, the amended complaint failed to state a cause of action against the union defendants.”

In Martin v Curran, 303 NY 276, the Court of Appeals held that a voluntary unincorporated association "has no existence independent of its members" and that "for better or worse, wisely or otherwise, the Legislature has limited . . . suits against association officers, whether for breaches of agreements or for tortious wrongs, to cases where the individual liability of every single member can be alleged and proven" it vacated the lower courts ruling. 

Although certain exceptions have been carved out from this general rule, the court said that one commentator has observed that, “although a claim of breach of the duty of fair representation may be brought either in court or before an appropriate agency (such as the Public Employment Relations Board), the reality in light of Martin is that most such claims must be brought before an agency to survive early dismissal," citing Rubenstein, Union Immunity From Suit in New York, 2 NYU Journal of Law & Business 641.

An abstract of the Rubenstein article is posted on the Internet at:

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=919143

The Appellate Division’s decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_06331.htm

Justia ranks the popularity of 6,208 Blawgs in 74 subcategories

Justia ranks the popularity of 6,208 Blawgs in 74 subcategories

Source: http://blawgsearch.justia.com/topblawgs

Listed below are “the top 25 Blawgs” of the 6208 Law Blogs  reported by Justia for the week ending July 31, 2015. Blawgs are ranked based on the number of visits to the Blawg from the BlawgSearch search engine and directory listing pages. Click on the highlighted text in color to access the Blawg. 

TalkLeft: The Politics of Crime [Feed]

Provides liberal coverage of crime-related political and injustice news.

Last Updated: July 31, 2015 - Rank this Week: 2

http://www.talkleft.com/

Mortgage Fraud Blog [Feed]

Covers mortgage fraud information, fraud schemes and indictments. By Rachel Dollar.

Last Updated: July 31, 2015 - Rank this Week: 3

http://mortgagefraudblog.com/

Current Awareness Weblog [Feed]

Covers England and Walescase law, legislation, and legal news. From the Inner Temple Library.

Last Updated: July 31, 2015 - Rank this Week: 4

http://www.innertemplelibrary.com/

DealBook [Feed]

Covers mergers and acquisitions, investment banking, IPOs, private equity, hedge funds, venture capital and law. From The New York Times.

Last Updated: July 31, 2015 - Rank this Week: 5

http://dealbook.nytimes.com/

Sex Offender Issues [Feed]

Covers sex offender laws and cases.

Last Updated: July 5, 2015 - Rank this Week: 6

http://sexoffenderissues.blogspot.com/

Above the Law [Feed]

A legal tabloid that provides news and gossip about the profession's colorful personalities and powerful institutions, as well as original commentary on breaking legal developments.

Last Updated: July 31, 2015 - Rank this Week: 7

http://abovethelaw.com/

Real Estate Law Blog [Feed]

Includes news, cases and commentary on real estate and property law in New Yorkand nationwide. By Newman FerraraLLP.

Last Updated: July 31, 2015 - Rank this Week: 8

http://www.nyrealestatelawblog.com/

The Volokh Conspiracy [Feed]

By Eugene Volokh, Dale Carpenter, David Kopel, David Bernstein, David Post, Erik Jaffe, Ilya Somin, Jim Lindgren, Jonathan Adler, Kevan Choset, Orin Kerr, Randy Barnett, Russell Korobkin, Sasha Volokh, Stuart Benjamin, Todd Zywicki & Tyler Cowen.

Last Updated: July 31, 2015 - Rank this Week: 9

http://www.volokh.com/

SCOTUSblog[Feed]

Covers the Supreme Court of the United States. By Bloomberg Law.

Last Updated: July 30, 2015 - Rank this Week: 10

http://www.scotusblog.com/

JURIST - Paper Chase [Feed]

Covers legal news. From the University of Pittsburgh School of Law.

Last Updated: July 31, 2015 - Rank this Week: 11

http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/

Threat Level [Feed]

Covers privacy, crime and security online. From Wired News.

Last Updated: July 31, 2015 - Rank this Week: 12

http://www.wired.com/threatlevel

Discourse.net[Feed]

By University of Miamilaw professor Michael Froomkin. Covers civil liberties, the Internet, Guantanamo, Iraqattrocities, politics and more.

Last Updated: July 29, 2015 - Rank this Week: 13

http://www.discourse.net/

Real Lawyers Have Blogs [Feed]

Blogging resources, ideas and news for law firm bloggers. By Kevin O'Keefe.

Last Updated: July 31, 2015 - Rank this Week: 14

http://kevin.lexblog.com/

DNT - O Direito e as novas tecnologias [Feed]

Covers Brazilian IT law. In Portuguese. By Alexandre Atheniense.

Last Updated: January 25, 2015 - Rank this Week: 15

http://www.dnt.adv.br

State Law Library of Montana [Feed]

Features notices of new Opinions and Orders from the Montana Supreme Court, library announcements, research tips, and Montanalegal news.

Last Updated: July 30, 2015 - Rank this Week: 16

http://mtlawlibrary.wordpress.com

beSpacific[Feed]

Features law, marketing, Internet legal resources and technology news. By Sabrina I. Pacifici.

Last Updated: July 31, 2015 - Rank this Week: 17

http://www.bespacific.com/

The Am Law Daily [Feed]

Covers legal business news, analysis and intelligence. From The American Lawyer.

Last Updated: May 4, 2012 - Rank this Week: 18

http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/

New York Public Personnel Law [Feed]

Provides summary and commentary on selected court and administrative decisions and related matters affecting public employers and employees in New York State. By Harvey Randall, Esq.

Last Updated: July 31, 2015 - Rank this Week: 19

http://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/

Legal Scholarship Blog [Feed]

Features law-related calls for papers, conferences and workshops. From the Ohio State Moritz College of Law, University of Georgia School of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law and University of Washington School of Law.

Last Updated: July 19, 2015 - Rank this Week: 20

http://legalscholarshipblog.com

Federal Criminal Defense Blog [Feed]

Covers federal criminal law topics such as identity theft, capital punishment, drug enforcement, environmental crimes, immigration, and military law. By Tom Withers.

Last Updated: July 2, 2014 - Rank this Week: 21

http://www.federalcriminaldefenseblog.com/

Sex Offender Research by A Voice of Reason [Feed]

Covers research, studies, and court cases related to sex offender issues.

Last Updated: July 30, 2015 - Rank this Week: 22

http://sexoffenderresearch.blogspot.com/

Overlawyered[Feed]

Chronicles the high cost of our legal system.

Last Updated: July 31, 2015 - Rank this Week: 23

http://overlawyered.com/

Marler Blog [Feed]

Covers food poisoning law. By Bill Marler.

Last Updated: July 31, 2015 - Rank this Week: 24

http://www.marlerblog.com/

The FRAUDfiles Blog [Feed]

Covers fraud and forensic accounting, including tax fraud and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. By Tracy Coenen.

Last Updated: July 22, 2015 - Rank this Week: 25

http://www.sequenceinc.com/fraudfiles