Timely appeal to the Commissioner of Education provides the pre-litigation Section 3813 Notice of Claim that must be filed with a school district

Timely appeal to the Commissioner of Education provides the pre-litigation Section 3813 Notice of Claim that must be filed with a school district
Mennella v Uniondale UFSD, Supreme Court, 287 AD2d 636, Motion for leave to appeal denied, 98 NY2d 602

As a general rule, Section 3813 of the Education Law requires that in order to sue a school district the plaintiff must file a timely notice of claim if he or she plans or expects to sue the district. Such notices are usually required with respect to claims related to or involving personnel decisions.

The Mennella case, for example, concerned the termination of a probationary employee and turned on whether the court should excuse a late filing of such a claim pursuant to Section 3813(2-a) of the Education Law.

As a condition precedent to commencement of an action against a school district, Education Law §3813(1) requires that a written verified claim be delivered to the school district within three months of accrual of the claim. The Section 3813 notice must set out the nature of the claim, and the “essential facts underlying the claim.” Citing Matter of Board of Educ. v Ambach, 81 AD2d 691, the Appellate Division noted that “a petition to the Commissioner of Education can constitute the functional equivalent of a notice of claim.”

In this instance, Mennella filed a petition with the Commissioner of Education challenging the school district’s decision terminating him from employment within a week of the district’s action. The petition included allegations that the acting principal made certain statements indicative of racial discrimination. In the proceedings before the Commissioner of Education, the school district asserted that the allegations of racial discrimination were "baseless."

Accordingly, the Appellate Division concluded that Mennella’s petition to the Commissioner of Education constituted the functional equivalent of a notice of claim for the purposes of Education Law Section 3813 insofar as his going forward with litigation regarding his allegations of racial discrimination is concerned.
NYPPL

Medical experts and conflicting medical opinions

Medical experts and conflicting medical opinions
Harper v McCall, App. Div., Third Dept., 277 AD2d 589

Pauline Harper challenged the rejection of her applications for ordinary and accidental disability retirement benefits by the New York State Employees’ Retirement System, contending that the Comptroller should have considered the expert medical opinion of her physician in making his determination.

Harper, a school bus driver, claimed that she was permanently disabled due to a neck condition. Her personal physician said that Harper was permanently incapacitated from performing the duties of a school bus driver as a result of a degenerative arthritic condition in her neck that was asymptomatic prior to a 1994 work-related accident that aggravated the condition.

The retirement system’s expert testified that, while Harper exhibited pain and discomfort when he examined her in 1997, he could find no objective evidence of neurological disease or injury that would cause her subjective symptoms, and he concluded that petitioner could perform the duties of a school bus driver.

The Appellate Division rejected Harper’s appeal, commenting that “[i]t is well settled that [the Comptroller] has the authority to resolve conflicts in medical opinion and to credit the testimony of one expert over that of another and may rely on an expert opinion based on a review of medical records and a physical examination is generally credible evidence.”
NYPPL

Complimentary Webinar - Assessing the Risks of Moving to "The Cloud"

Complimentary Webinar - Assessing the Risks of Moving to "The Cloud"
Source: Virtual LegalTech

A one-hour webinar entitled, "Addressing and Assessing the Risks of Moving to the Cloud," will offered by Virtual LegalTech on December 14, 2010 from 1:30 – 2:30 PM ET.

The webinar will discuss the merits and pitfalls of the cloud, examining the issues surrounding chain of custody, legal hold and review capabilities in the event of an e-discovery request and how well will privacy be maintained.

Participants in the webinar are eligible for CLE in certain jurisdictions.*

Registration is complimentary. Follow this link to register.

The full schedule for these CLE accredited sessions* at Virtual LegalTech on December 14, 2010 follows:

9:00 – 10:00 am ET – Information Governance: Managing your Information to Reduce the Costs of Discovery

9:30 – 10:30 am ET – Ethical and Privilege Issues for Pharmaceutical Whistleblowers Counsel

10:00 – 11:00 am ET – Facing the Legal Dangers of Social Media1

2:15 – 1:15 pm ET – Frontiers of E-Discovery: What you Need to Know about Predictive Coding

1:30 – 2:30 pm ET – Addressing and Assessing the Risks of Moving to the Cloud

3:00 - 4:00 pm ET – Ethical Considerations in the New Era of Whistleblower Claims Under Dodd-Frank and Other Statutes

3:45 – 4:45 pm ET – Back to the Future: The Most Important 2020 E-Discovery Cases, and a Look Ahead to 2011

If you have additional CLE questions, please contact Virtual LegalTech at 212.457.7912 or via e-mail at ljackson@alm.com .

* Complimentary CLE is approved by the responsible authorizing agencies in New York, California and Illinois. Approval of CLE credit is pending in Florida.

Disciplinary charges must sufficiently specific so as to permit the accused to prepare his or her defense

Disciplinary charges must sufficiently specific so as to permit the accused to prepare his or her defense
Wolfe v Kelly, 2010 NY Slip Op 08847, decided on December 2, 2010, Appellate Division, First Department

Eric Wolfe, a New York City Police Department detective, was served with disciplinary charges alleging that He was guilty of perjury and the confiscation of drugs and money for personal gain involving Wolfe’s “stopping unidentified individuals in unspecified locations and confiscating unspecified amounts of narcotics and cash for his own personal gain on four occasions that occurred on unspecified dates at some time during a 24-month period between January 1998 and December 1999.”

Terminated from his position, Wolfe contended that he was denied due process of law, and that the lack of specificity in the charges prevented him from preparing any type of defense other than offering a general denial of any wrongdoing.

The Appellate Division, noting that Wolfe’s disciplinary hearing was held some six to eight years after the alleged acts of misconduct occurred, agreed.

Specification 1 alleged that "on two separate occasions between January 1998 and December 1999," Wolfe "stopped two individuals who were traveling in cabs and confiscated, without affecting [sic] an arrest and for personal monetary gain, a quantity of heroin from one, and a quantity of prescription drugs from the other."

Specification 2 alleged that "on two separate occasions between January 1998 and December 1999," Wolfe "stopped two individuals and confiscated, for personal monetary gain, a quantity of United States currency."

Specification 3 alleged that on or about and between April 23, 1998, and December 17, 1998, Wolfe testified falsely while under oath during an official court proceeding, in violation of Penal Law §210.15.

The Appellate Division explained that “It is well settled that the principles of due process applicable to criminal trials apply to government administrative proceedings, citing Matter of Murray v Murphy, 24 NY2d 150” and that the requirements of due process of law applied here because Wolfe has a constitutionally protected property interest in continued public employment.

Further, said the court, due process requires that the accused employee be provided with the notice of the charges that are "reasonably specific, in light of all the relevant circumstances, to apprise the party whose rights are being determined of the charges against him . . . and to allow for the preparation of an adequate defense," citing Matter of Block v Ambach, 73 NY2d 323.
While the specificity of the notice of charges required varies from case to case, but it must be specific enough to give actual notice to the party being charged.

The Appellate Division agreed with Wolfe that indicating a general time frame that spanned two entire years was not reasonably specific so as to satisfy due process requirements.*

The Appellate Division characterized the Department’s rebuttal of Wolfe’s claims to the effect that Wolfe could have offered an alibi defense by testifying about "any times during those two years when . . . he was not partners with [New York City police officers Julio] Vasquez or [Thomas] Rachko"** as “an incomprehensible — and inane — argument, and one that impermissibly shifts the burden of proof” to Wolfe.

In addition, the court commented that:

Equally incomprehensible is that, in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss for violation of due process, the ADC stated that "the unique nature of events alleged, the places where the misconduct occurred and the witnesses present, provided the defense with ample opportunity to prepare." The alleged incidents could only be assumed as "unique" if [Wolfe] was, indeed, guilty as charged. Otherwise, as the record reflects, there was nothing at all unusual or "unique" about any of the circumstances surrounding the alleged misconduct.

Annulling the Commissioner’s determination as to Specifications 1 and 2, the Appellate Division then rejected Wolfe’s arguments with respect to Specification 3 “given the low threshold in a substantial evidence analysis” and affirmed the Commissioner's determination that Wolfe was guilty of Specification 3.

As the penalty imposed on Wolfe, termination from his position, the court remanded the matter to the Department for its reconsideration based the court's annulling Specifications 1 and 2.

* The Appellate Division said that Wolfe’s alleged misconduct in specifications one and two applied to three or four discrete incidents and was therefore “not an offense of an ongoing/continuing nature.”

** In November 2003, Vasquez and Rachko were arrested for the theft of $169,000 from a narcotics merchant who was under federal surveillance. Both subsequently entered into cooperation agreements with federal authorities, the terms of which required them "to testify at any proceeding in the Eastern District of New York or elsewhere as requested by the [U.S. Attorney's] Office." They were required to testify at Wolfe’s hearing. The decision notes that “In exchange for their testimony, Vasquez and Rachko were given the possibility of lighter sentences, and the Manhattan District Attorney's office agreed not to prosecute them for any crimes they may have committed in New York County. Both former officers were facing terms of life imprisonment at the time of petitioner's administrative hearing but had not been sentenced.”
The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_08847.htm

Placement on a preferred list

Placement on a preferred list
Bratge v Stockbridge Valley CSD, Decision of the Commissioner of Education #14454

The Bratge case demonstrates the importance of complying with all statutory and contractual procedures relevant to personnel actions.

The Stockbridge Valley Central School District appointed Katrina Bratge as an Assistant Building Principal/Guidance Counselor [K-12]. Bratge’s appointment was subject to a three-year probationary period.

In March 1999 School Superintendent Charles Stratton met with Bratge. According to Bratge, the superintendent told her that the district intended to eliminate her position in favor of creating a new full-time guidance counselor position and converting a part-time business administrator position to a full-time position.

Stratton, on the other hand, said that he had told Bratge that he intended to terminate her probationary employment but that she would be allowed to resign rather than be terminated.

In August 1999 Bratge wrote to the school board indicating that she did not intend to resign her position and requested it place her name on the preferred eligibility list for appointment as a guidance or administrative position should one become available in accordance with Sections 2510(3) and 3013(3) of the Education Law.

In response, the district wrote to Bratge advising her that because she had voluntarily resigned from her position and had returned to a position with the Rome City School District ... she had no recall rights. Bratge wrote the district to clarify the events that had led to her asking to be placed on a preferred list and repeated her request. When the district failed to act, Bratge asked the Commissioner to order it to place her on a preferred list.

Although the Commissioner ruled that Bratge’s appeal had to be dismissed because it was untimely, he elected to comment on the merits of her appeal.

The Commissioner pointed out that the problem resulted because the district did not provide Bratge with a clear and unambiguous notice of its intentions. Although the district claims that Bratge agreed to resign and asked for her letter of resignation, it never actually received a written resignation from her.

Despite not having received Bratge’s written resignation, the Commissioner noted, the district did not take the procedural steps required to terminate her probationary employment.* This, according to the Commissioner, left Bratge unsure of her exact status and the district believing that the position was vacant as of the beginning of the 1999-2000 school year.

The Commissioner also took the opportunity to point out that personnel decisions must comply with all applicable legal and contractual requirements. In the event the district provides an employee with an option of resigning in lieu of termination, it must comply with all statutory and contractual notification requirements if it then wishes to terminate an employee who does not voluntarily submit his or her written resignation.

One issue not addressed by the Commissioner: assuming that Bratge had a right to have her name place on a preferred list, would her returning to a position with the Rome City School District have any impact on her status on such a list?

Here are some points to keep in mind regarding preferred lists:

1. Typically the most senior individual on the list may be passed over or, under certain circumstances, have his or her name removed from the list, only if he or she actually declines the appointment.

2. The name of an individual may not be removed from a preferred list if he or she merely declines appointment to a different position for which certification of the preferred list was not mandated or deemed appropriate.

3. The individual is not required to seek information concerning the existence of any vacancy for which he or she could be certified.

4. While an appointing authority is not required to fill a vacant position, if it elects to do so, it must use the appropriate preferred list if one exists. (Under certain circumstances, a public employer may be required to use other types of preferred lists such as a special military list.)

5. If an individual accepts other employment, his or her name is to remain on the preferred list until it may otherwise be lawfully removed. For example, Jones is laid off from Position A and subsequently accepts a position to a lower rank position for which the preferred list was certified. If Position A is reestablished and Jones is eligible for certification from the preferred list and is the most senior person on the list, Jones must be certified for appointed to the newly created position.

* The fact that the district did not take the procedural steps required to terminate Bratge’s probationary employment suggests that had Bratge filed a timely appeal the Commissioner might have found that she had attained tenure by estoppel.
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For information about PELP's electronic handbook Layoff, Preferred Lists and Reinstatement of public employees in New York, go to: http://nylayoff.blogspot.com/
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NYPPL

Rejection of an applicant for appointment as a police officer based on “psychological unsuitability”

Rejection of an applicant for appointment as a police officer based on “psychological unsuitability”
Massaro v Mercado, 276 AD2d 445

After being rejected for appointment as a police officer, Louis Massaro filed a complaint with the Division of Human Rights. Massaro contended that the New York Police Department had unlawfully discriminated against him because of his disability. According to the decision, Massaro was rejected for appointment as a police officer of the grounds of psychological unsuitability for the position.

After initially finding probable cause, the State Division of Human Rights [DHR] dismissed Massaro’s compliant without conducting an administrative hearing. Massaro sued in an effort to compel DHR to conduct a hearing, only to have his petition dismissed by State Supreme Court Judge Lottie Watkins.

The Appellate Division affirmed Judge Watkins’ action, holding that DHR “was not required to conduct a hearing simply because it had previously made a probable cause determination in [Massaro’s] favor.”

There was no question that Massaro was rejected after a finding of psychological unsuitability. However, said the court, this is neither a disability within the meaning of the Human Rights Law nor was it perceived as a disability by the Police Department.

As the Division of Human Rights cannot disturb a hiring decision absent a showing that the decision was influenced by unlawful discrimination, the Appellate Division agreed that it should not be required to hold a hearing when it is clear that such a showing cannot be made.
NYPPL

Determining if assigned duties constitute out-of-title work

Determining if assigned duties constitute out-of-title work
CSEA v Angello, App. Div., Third Dept.,

CSEA, representing 128 employees of the Central New York Developmental Disabilities Service Organization serving as Developmental Aide - In Residence [DA-IR9] filed a grievance claiming that such employees were routinely assigned supervisory duties of a SG-12 Developmental Assistant I - In Residence [DAI-IR12] and that such tasks constituted out-of-title work under the relevant Taylor Law contract.

The SG-12 duties allegedly assigned to the SG-9 workers: submit budget reports, purchase requests, maintenance logs, time and attendance sheets, vehicle reports, formulate menus, supervise client recreational activities, provide for subordinate staff training and make decisions concerning the operation of the sleepover residences on a regular basis.

The grievance was denied at all steps of the contract grievance procedure and CSEA appealed. A state supreme court dismissed CSEA’s petition after finding that the duties complained of were not beyond the contemplation of the job description for DA-IR9 nor excessively complex or difficult, that CSEA failed to show that class members spent a significant amount of time at the objectionable tasks. Supreme Court concluded that there was a rational basis for denial of the grievance.

Pointing out that although [o]ut-of-title work, other than on an emergency basis, is prohibited by Section 61.2 of the Civil Service Law, the performance of duties by a grievant which are substantially similar to those set forth in that person’s job description does not constitute out-of-title work, nor does some overlap of the duties of a DA-IR9 employee and the higher grade DAI-IR12 employee.

The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of CSEA’s petition. Its rationale: CSEA’s main argument that DA-IR9s were routinely assigned supervisory duties of DA1-IR12s is tempered by CSEA’s concession that “... DA-IR9s do not supervise other employees and the tasks of preparing and submitting budget reports, purchase requests and other documents performed by DA-IR9s in their residential settings ... were rationally determined not to be out-of-title work or [constituted a] permissive overlap of the duties of DAI-IR12s who supervise those residences.”
NYPPL

Administrative Law Judge examination scheduled

Administrative Law Judge examination scheduled
Source: New York State Department of Civil Service

The New York State Department of Civil Service will hold an examination for Administrative Law Judge, NYS Workers Compensation Board, on February 5, 2011. This is an “SG-28 position, with a starting salary of $86,168.

Appointees working in the five boroughs of New York City or in Nassau, Suffolk, Rockland, or Westchester Counties will receive an additional $3,026 annual “downstate salary adjustment.” Appointees working in Dutchess, Orange, or Putnam Counties will receive an additional $1,513 annual “mid-Hudson salary adjustment.”

A $45 application fee is required.

N.B. The deadline for filing applications is January 3, 2011.

This examination open to all individuals meeting the minimum qualifications set out in the Examination Announcement.

There is an "ONLINE APPLICATION PROCESS" available at http://www.cs.state.ny.us/exams
For additional information, including a description of the duties of the position, and the minimum qualifications for this examination, go to: http://www.cs.state.ny.us/examannouncements/announcements/pdf/25-438.pdf
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Fruits of an undercover investigation used as a basis for disciplinary charges

Fruits of an undercover investigation used as a basis for disciplinary charges
DiGiovanni v Safir277 AD2d 36

May the appointing authority bring disciplinary action against an employee based on information obtained from undercover police officers. As the DiGiovanni decision indicates, such information can serve as a basis for filing disciplinary charges against an individual.

In this instance an undercover police officer and her supervisor testified that George DiGiovanni approached a police decoy and proposed oral sex for a fee.

DiGiovanni, as it turned out, was a New York City police officer. As a result of this episode, he was served with administrative disciplinary charges. The hearing officer found him guilty of soliciting sex and imposed the penalty of dismissal. DiGiovanni appealed only to have the Appellate Division unanimously affirm both the administrative determination that he was guilty of the charges filed against him and penalty imposed.

The Appellate Division decided that the evidence presented at the disciplinary hearing supported the finding that DiGiovanni was guilty of soliciting sex for money from a person believed by him to be a prostitute.

Turning to DiGiovanni’s objection to his being dismissed from his position, the court said that "[g]iven the gravity of the offense and [DiGiovanni’s] prior disciplinary history, the penalty imposed does not shock our conscience."

The court’s reference to DiGiovanni’s prior disciplinary history suggests that the department asked the hearing officer to consider DiGiovanni’s personnel history in determining the penalty to be imposed.

An employee’s personnel records may be considered by a hearing officer when the setting a disciplinary penalty provided the appointing authority has complied with the procedures set out by the Court of Appeals in Bigelow v Village of Gouverneur, 63 NY2d 470. The procedures to be followed in order to satisfy the Bigelow test:

1. The employee must be advised that his or her prior disciplinary record will be considered in setting the penalty to be imposed; and

2. The employee must be given an opportunity to submit a written response to any adverse material contained in the record or offer mitigating circumstances.
NYPPL

Modifying employee work schedules

Modifying employee work schedules
Maineri v Syosset CSD, 276 AD2d 793

Contract grievances involving changing an individual’s work schedule generally are resolved by interpreting the language set out in the collective bargaining agreement. Of equal importance in such situations is whether the contract is silent or sets out exclusions with respect to such changes as the Maineri case demonstrates.

David Maineri sued the Syosset Central School District after the district denied his grievance challenging a change in his working hours. A State Supreme Court justice dismissed his petition and Maineri appealed.

The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the lower court’s ruling. The court said that dispute, which centered on Maineri’s working hours, was covered by the terms and conditions of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement and, therefore there is no further statutory duty to bargain collectively with respect to the matter.

On the merits, the court ruled that “the district did not violate the parties’ collective bargaining agreement by altering [Maineri’s] working hours since the agreement did not establish the his right and entitlement to specific hours of work.” In the words of the court, “in the absence of such entitlement there can be no violation of the contract by the alteration of those hours.”

In addition, the court said that “the school district, as a municipal entity, may not be estopped from changing the [Maineri’s] working hours to correct errors in those hours, since the challenged alteration concerns the performance of a governmental function.”

In another change of work schedule case, In the Arbitration between Sullivan County and Teamsters Local 445, 276 AD2d 861, Appellate Division, Third Department, [Motion for leave to appeal denied, 96 NY2d 703 ], the court overturned an arbitrator’s ruling that Sullivan County had violated the collective bargaining agreement when it unilaterally changed the work schedule of certain employees.

The individuals involved worked 35 hours per week as aides for the County’s Division of Health and Family Services. Their work schedule: Monday through Friday, between the hours of 9:00 A.M. and 5:00 P.M.

In response to a decline in the demand for home health aide services, the County changed all full-time aide positions to part-time positions. The aides filed a contract grievance and the arbitrator ruled that the change from full-time to part-time constituted a violation of the collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator ordered the County to restore the aides to full-time status [i.e., 35-hours per week] with back pay.

A State Supreme Court judge vacated the award on the grounds that the arbitrator had misread the Taylor Law agreement. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

First the Appellate Division noted that judicial review of an arbitration decision is limited and such a decision will not be disturbed unless it is violative of a strong public policy, is totally irrational or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator’s power, citing Matter of the Town of Callicoon, 70 NY2d 907. Here, however, the court concluded that the arbitrator erroneously applied Section 408 of the agreement to the aides’ positions and, therefore, his decision was irrational.

The agreement did, in fact, set out the workday, workweek and overtime for certain workers. The decision notes that Section 401 of the agreement defined the normal work week and indicates that [e]xcept as hereinafter provided, the work week of all employees shall be five (5) days, Monday through Friday, seven (7) hours per day, thirty-five (35) hours per week [and] [t]he hours of employment shall be 9:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M.

The agreement also sets a 40-hour work week for certain of workers, and further provides that [n]otwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Article, employees who work a five (5) day, forty (40) hour week, excluding time off for lunch, Monday through Friday, shall continue [Section 408 of the agreement].

The court said that the aides worked a 35-hour workweek prior to the reduction of their hours. It agreed with the Supreme Court’s conclusion that Section 408 relates only to employees who work 40 hours per week and cannot reasonably be interpreted as applicable to the aides’ positions.

Since there was not other provision in the agreement preventing the County from unilaterally reducing the hours of the aides due to business necessity, the Appellate Division concluded that the arbitrator’s award was properly vacated.

The Appellate Division also commented that:

"Indeed, Section 2502(d) [of the contract] expressly vests [the county] with the authority [t]o relieve employees from duties because of lack of work or other legitimate reason. Taking the above into consideration and applying Section 2103 of the agreement that specifically prohibits modification of its provisions by arbitration, we conclude that Supreme Court properly vacated the award."
NYPPL

Employee disciplined for disruptive behavior alleges charges were based on the employer's perception of a disability

Employee disciplined for disruptive behavior alleges charges were based on the employer's perception of a disability
Robinson v NYS Division of Human Rights, 277 AD2d 76

The appointing authority orders an employee who is exhibiting disruptive behavior to report for a drug test or for a physiological evaluation. Does such a directive constitute unlawful discrimination on the grounds that the employer has a perception that the employee has a disability? Such directives were the basis for New York City corrections officer Michael Robinson filing discrimination complaints against the New York City Department of Corrections.

According to the decision by the Appellate Division, First Department, Michael Robinson had a number of disciplinary problems over a period of time. In 1984 he accepted a command discipline penalty of two pass days for being absent without leave. This disciplinary action was followed by a pattern of lateness, unexcused absences and volatile behavior, including use of excessive force against inmates and verbal abuse of superiors and fellow officers.

Robinson was ordered to submit to urinalysis and to undergo psychiatric evaluation in connection with charges of attendance and conduct deficiencies during 1984 and 1985, as well as the investigation of an automobile accident on December 19, 1984.

As a result, Robinson filed a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights [DHR] contending that DOC had discriminated against him on the basis of perceived disabilities. Robinson subsequently filed additional allegations of unlawful discrimination, claiming that DOC had retaliated against him in response to Dorr’s finding of probable cause by first suspending and then terminating him.

The New York State Division of Human Rights found that DOC had unlawfully discriminated against Robinson by creating a hostile work environment based upon a belief that Robinson was mentally unstable or under the influence of drugs. It awarded Robinson $75,000 in compensatory damages and directed DOC to reinstate him to his former position.

Although the Appellate Division vacated Dorr’s decision for technical reasons based on timeliness, it commented that were it to have to decide on the case on its merits, it would find Robinson’s allegations of harassment to be baseless.

The Appellate Division explained that “[t]here is ample evidence of [Robinson’s] erratic and hostile conduct to warrant subjecting him to physical and psychological evaluation.”

The fact the test results were negative were apparently not considered relevant as the court commented that it noted that Robinson’s behavior continued to be erratic.

The court concluded that “considering DOC’s responsibility for the safety of its officers as well as the inmates they oversee and its exposure to liability for any injury that might result ... its precautions cannot be viewed as unreasonable or discriminatory.”
NYPPL

New York State Register

New York State Register
Source: New York State Department of State

The New York State Register provides notice of proposed new administrative rules and amendments to existing administrative rules. It also posts emergency rules and other information.

Also available is the revised Rule Making in New York manual. The manual outlines the procedures for preparation of SAPA notices for the New York State Register and for Filing adopted rules for publication in the official NYCRR. You may download PDF version of the manual by clicking here (218kb 74 pages).

To access the New York State Register on the Internet, go to: http://www.dos.state.ny.us/info/register.htm

The Department of State’s site also provides a fully searchable "rule making" database starting with postings from 2007. Postings are provided in a PDF format.

You may subscribe to a free weekly State Register email alert using a link provided on the site. that will notify subscribers when new postings are available.