Decisions concerning Article 75 motions seeking a stay of arbitration

Decisions concerning Article 75 motions seeking a stay of arbitration

Schenectady v Schenectady PBA, 285 AD2d 725

NYC Transit Authority v Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1056, 284 AD2d 466 

The PBA Case

The Schenectady Police Department unilaterally placed police officer Cheryl Flory on medical leave, effective April 10, 2000 to July 3, 2000, pursuant to the Family Medical Leave Act [FMLA].

Flory had been absent on unlimited paid sick leave for more than a year. Flory's union, the Schenectady PBA, grieved and demanded arbitration, contending that the department had violated the collective bargaining agreement. It alleged that the agreement provided “members with unlimited sick leave that guarantee that there will be no reduction in employee benefits or any unilateral changes in past practices.”

The department attempted to obtain a stay of arbitration on the ground that the grievance was not arbitrable because implementation of FMLA, a Federal statute, could not be considered a violation of the terms of the Agreement.*

A State Supreme Court justice denied the stay, finding that the grievance was arbitrable because it did not hinge on an interpretation of Federal law.

Instead, said the court, it simply raised the issue of whether the Agreement's provisions for employee leave time had been violated by department's unilateral imposition of one of the terms of the FMLA -- a mandatory minimum of a 12-week leave without pay -- on Flory's sick leave.

In considering the department's appeal of the denial of its petition for a stay of arbitration the Appellate Division said that, in general, grievances arising under public sector collective bargaining agreements are subject to arbitration where:

1. The Taylor Law authorizes arbitration of the dispute; and

2. The parties have agreed in their collective bargaining agreement to submit such disputes to arbitration.

The Appellate Division found that “[b]oth of these prerequisites for arbitrability are satisfied in the instant matter” since:

1. There is no dispute that the issue of employee leave time is a term or condition of employment; and

2. Although the parties did not agree to arbitrate matters pertaining to FMLA, the Agreement reflects that both parties did express their consent to arbitrate grievances regarding leave time, with “unresolved grievances * * * [to] be submitted to arbitration by either party”.

Accordingly, the court affirmed the Supreme Court's order denying the department's motion for a stay of arbitration.

FMLA entitles eligible employees to a total of 12 workweeks of leave without pay during any 12-month period for “qualifying” personal and family medical reasons. There is nothing in the FMLA barring an employer from deeming an employee to be on FMLA leave while simultaneously retaining the individual in sick leave at full pay status provided it advises the individual of this fact in writing. However, placing an individual on FMLA status does not automatically deprive the individual of other his or her rights under law, rule, or regulation or set out in a collective bargaining agreement.

The Local 1056 Case

The New York City Transit Authority [NYCTA] obtained a stay of arbitration from a State Supreme Court justice. Local 1056 appealed.

The case arose when the NYCTA received a notice from the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles [DMV] that the license of one of its bus drivers, Marvin Moses, would be suspended effective August 3, 1999, because he had allowed his automobile insurance to lapse. DMV subsequently confirmed that Moses's license had been suspended as of August 3, 1999.

Learning that Moses had continued to drive a bus during his suspension, NYCTA, citing Vehicle and Traffic Law Article 19-A, the NYCTA suspended Moses's employment for 64 days, a period equal to that during which he drove with a suspended license.

Local 1056, contending that the suspension of Moses's license was made in error, in that Moses had automobile insurance in effect during the entire period of the suspension, and that Moses was unaware of the suspension because the DMV failed to notify him, grieved the suspension.

NYCTA obtained a stay of arbitration of the denial of Moses's grievance on the theory that “the grievance was not arbitrable because it was merely performing its statutory obligation to enforce the Vehicle and Traffic Law, and that the performance of such a statutory duty was not subject to arbitration pursuant to the parties' arbitration agreement.”

The Appellate Division said that a court may stay arbitration on the ground that the particular claim sought to be arbitrated does not fall within the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement.

In making such a determination, the courts do not to engage in a penetrating analysis of the scope of the substantive provisions of a collective bargaining agreement but merely determine “whether there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the [collective bargaining agreement].”

Here, said the Appellate Division, the arbitration provision is broad and there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the collective bargaining agreement.

The collective bargaining agreement bars the arbitrator from rendering a determination or opinion “limiting or interfering in any way with the statutory powers, duties, and responsibilities of the Authority in operating, controlling, and directing the maintenance and operation of the transit facilities, or with the Authority's managerial responsibility to run the transit lines safely, efficiently, and economically”.

However, “[c]ontrary to the contention of the NYCTA, whether the resolution of the grievance by the arbitrator would violate that prohibition is not a matter for the courts.” Rather, such an inquiry requires the type of exacting interpretation of the precise scope of the substantive provisions of the CBA that is for the arbitrator” to resolve.

Vacating the stay that the NYCTA had obtained from Supreme Court, the Appellate Division commented that fact that submitting the grievance to arbitration “may require the arbitrator to interpret or apply statutes such as Vehicle and Traffic Law Article 19-A does not compel a different result.”

* FMLA entitles eligible employees to a total of 12 workweeks of leave without pay during any 12-month period for “qualifying” personal and family medical reasons. There is nothing in the FMLA barring an employer from deeming an employee to be on FMLA leave while simultaneously retaining the individual in sick leave at full pay status provided it advises the individual of this fact in writing. However, placing an individual on FMLA status does not automatically deprive the individual of other his or her rights under law, rule, or regulation or set out in a collective bargaining agreement.

Unpaid student workers: are they volunteers or employees?

Unpaid student workers: are they volunteers or employees?

Onondaga-Cortland-Madison BOCES v McGowan, 285 AD2d 36

The Onondaga-Cortland-Madison County BOCES attempted to augment the workforce training programs available to public high school students by involving its construction technology students in the actual construction of an office building being built for the West Genesee Central School District.

Under the immediate supervision of their instructors, BOCES student workers erected exterior and interior walls, installed sheet rock and placed insulation. The commercial contractors, using skilled union workers, performed the majority of the construction work, including all plumbing, electrical, foundation, truss and roofing work.

Following a union officer's complaint, the State Labor Department held that the students could not be classified as volunteers in connection with the project and, therefore, they would be considered employees subject to the prevailing wage provisions of Labor Law Section 220.

The Department's conclusion: BOCES had failed to pay the participating students “prevailing wages and supplements.” The amount to be paid to the students was determined to be $44,012. BOCES appealed.

The Appellate Division said that the basic questions are whether the BOCES students should be considered employees of a contractor on the project. Its answer: the students should not be considered employees of the project's contractors for the following reasons:

1. Education Law Section 4606(6) provides that students participating in school-to-employment programs are not employees within the purview of the Labor Law.

2. There is a public policy to exempt unpaid student workers from classification as employees under circumstances where the primary purpose of the work is instructional training for future employment.

3. The BOCES students were not hired, were not paid or otherwise compensated for their work, did not work a regular workday, and performed no work without the direct and constant supervision of their instructors.

4. The students were assigned tasks in order to fulfill the requirements of their technology class and receive credit from their home school districts.

The Appellate Division then annulled the Labor Commissioner's determination.
 

New York State's Human Rights Law bars discrimination against heterosexual individuals

New York State's Human Rights Law bars discrimination against heterosexual individuals

Brennan v Metropolitan Opera Association, Inc, 284 AD2d 66

Martha Ellen Brennan claimed that “on the basis of her [heterosexual] sexual orientation, her former employer, the Metropolitan Opera Association (Met), her former supervisor at the Met, David Kneuss, and the Met's general manager, Joseph Volpe, refused to renew her contract and subjected her to a hostile work environment, in violation of New York City law.”

The essential elements of Brennan's multiple allegations: the Met refused to renew her employment contract and subjected her to a hostile work environment because of her age, her sex and her heterosexual orientation, thereby discriminating against her in violation of:

1. 42 USC 2000e-2[a][1], prohibiting discrimination “because of ... sex”;

2. 29 USC 623[a][1], prohibiting discrimination “because of ... age”;

3. New York's Executive Law Section 296[1][a], prohibiting discrimination “because of ... sex”; and

4. New York City's Administrative Code Section 8-107, prohibiting discrimination because of “actual or perceived ... sexual orientation”.

Following the dismissal of her federal age and sex discrimination claims by the U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, (Brennan v Metropolitan Opera Association, 192 F.3d 310), Brennan commenced an action in New York State Supreme Court action on her sexual orientation discrimination claims.

The Supreme Court justice, noting that this issue was one “of first impression,” ruled that Brennan “is protected, as a heterosexual female, under the New York City law against employment discrimination based on sexual orientation.” The court explained: The fact that discrimination against heterosexuals is not as pervasive as that found against homosexuals does not change the clear wording of the municipal law nor does it lessen the impact of such prejudices on the individuals involved.

After making this finding, the Supreme Court justice granted the Mets' motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Brennan failed to show that her sexual orientation created a hostile work environment or was the reason for non-renewal of her contract. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court's determination.

The Appellate Division said that for Brennan to prevail on her claim of a hostile work environment she must show that she was subjected to harassment based on her sexual orientation and that the harassment was so severe or pervasive as to “alter the conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive working environment,” citing Meritor Savings Bank v Vinson, 477 US 57, 67.

The Appellate Division pointed out that “first and foremost is the evidence” and Brennan “simply did not adduce sufficient evidence to sustain her claim that [the Met] created an environment hostile to heterosexuals.”

Brennan's case involved the lack of evidence sufficient to state a prima facie case of discrimination.

In contrast, “unrebutted evidence” of the complainant's prima facie case precludes administrative dismissal of unlawful discrimination charges. In Sauer v NYS Division of Human Rights Appellate Division, 285 AD2d 372, the Appellate Division annulled the New York State's Divisions of Human Rights dismissal of Vincent A. Sauer's age discrimination complaint and remanded it to the Division for an administrative hearing.

The Appellate Division said that Sauer's allegations that he was not hired because of his age and that younger Pan American Airways mechanics with less seniority, whom he specifically identified, were hired by Delta Airlines in his stead, are unrebutted by any evidence in the record.

According to the ruling, “Delta's unsigned and unsworn position statement, submitted in an attempt to settle [Sauer's] complaint,” in which Delta said that Sauer was not hired because he lacked sufficient seniority to be considered, was inadequate for that purpose.

New York City police sergeants not “management” for the purposes of the FLSA and thus entitled to payment for overtime

New York City police sergeants not “management” for the purposes of the FLSA and thus entitled to payment for overtime

Edward D. Mullins, et al v City Of New York, US Court Of Appeals, Second Circuit, Docket No. 09-3435-cv

The Fair Labor Standards Act, subject to certain exceptions, mandates overtime pay for employees who work more than 40 hours per week. Specifically, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) of the Act provides that no employer shall employ any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce,* for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed."

Noting that the FLSA exempts workers who are “employed in a bona fide executive . . . capacity” from the Act’s overtime requirement, the Second Circuit supported the United States Secretary of Labor’s holding that New York City Police Department sergeants are not “management,” and thus the sergeants “do not qualify for the “bona fide executive” exemption from the overtime pay requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.”

The sergeants had sued the City, alleging denial of overtime pay under the FLSA to which they were entitled for overtime they worked from April 19, 2001 to the present.

* Presumably the Circuit Court found that the New York City Police Department is an employer “engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.” 


 

Application for unemployment insurance after resignation rejected

Application for unemployment insurance after resignation rejected

Barry v Commissioner of Labor, 284 AD2d 701

Miriam R. Barry, a part-time teacher, applied for unemployment insurance benefits after resigning from her position. The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ruled that Barry was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because she voluntarily left her employment without good cause.

The Appellate Division found that substantial evidence supported the Board's decision since Barry resigned from her part-time employment as a teacher to avoid possible scheduling conflicts with any potential new employment.

Although Barry was in the process of looking for a new job, she had no firm offer of new employment at the time she resigned. Since she resigned notwithstanding the fact that “continuing work was available,” the court said that it found “no reason to disturb the Board's decision.”

Challenging not being selected for a provisional appointment

Challenging not being selected for a provisional appointment

Cameron v Church, 309 AD2d 747

Is an individual entitled to a court order directing his or her provisional appointment or promotion to a position if there is proof that the reason for the applicant's nonselection was bias on the part of the individual making the employment decision? This was the issue in the Cameron case.

Terence R. Cameron challenged Westchester County's Commissioner of Transportation Marvin Church's appointment of Florence Petronio as a provisional “Program Specialist.” He obtained a court order from State Supreme Court Justice Nastasi directing Church to appoint him to the position.

Although the Appellate Division vacated Justice Nastasi's ordering Cameron's appointment to the position, it upheld the lower court's finding that Church's decision to reject Cameron's promotion request was arbitrary and capricious. The court said that the County failed to introduce any proof to controvert Cameron's evidence that he was denied the requested promotion “because of the personal animosity of Church towards his cousin.”

Although the Appellate Division held that Cameron was not entitled to an order directing that he be given the provisional promotion he wanted, it said that he was entitled to “consideration of his application on the merits, without improper factors” and remanded the matter to the lower court for further action. 

Disciplinary penalty vacated as too harsh

Disciplinary penalty vacated as too harsh

Lagala v NYC Police Dept., 286 AD2d 205; Leave to appeal denied, 97 NY2d 605

Courts have consistently ruled that an administrative disciplinary penalty imposed on an individual must be upheld “unless it shocks the judicial conscience and, therefore, constitutes an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.” A leading case setting out this principle: Pell v Board of Education, 34 NY2d 222. In Pell, the Court of Appeals said that a disciplinary penalty “shocks the judicial conscience when it is so graven in its impact that it is disproportionate to the offense.”

In the Lagala case the Appellate Division, First Department, applied the Pell standard and determined that the disciplinary penalty imposed on Lagala -- dismissal -- “shocks the judicial conscience.” The court directed that the matter be returned to the Commissioner for his reconsideration of the appropriate penalty to be imposed.

New York City police officer Anthony Lagala challenged his dismissal after he was found guilty of disciplinary charges alleging that he had (1) improperly issuing summonses for parking violations and (2) used a Department scooter without authorization.

The reasons given by the Appellate Division for vacating the disciplinary penalty imposed on Lagala and remanding the matter to the Commissioner of Police:

1. Lagala's sergeant testified that she never noticed deficiencies in the summonses he wrote, nor did she speak to him regarding the summonses he issued, although she spoke to 30 or 40 other officers about their deficiencies.

2. Lagala's performance evaluation for the period in question rated him between competent and highly competent.

3. The record showed that Lagala could not have taken the scooter without having obtained a supervisor's consent.

4. There is no evidence in the record that Lagala's misconduct involved dishonesty, venality or threat to public safety.

The court, referring to Pell, ruled that considering the relevant circumstances, the sanction of dismissal was so disproportionate to these “minor offenses” as to shock “one's sense of fairness.” 

DiNapoli’s Office Completes School Audits

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced his office completed the following audits: the Central Islip Union Free School District; the Eden Central School District; and, the Fonda-Fultonville Central School District..

In addition, Comptroller DiNapoli posted his completed audits of the City of Binghamton; the Town of Elma; the Elmont Fire District; the Town of Farmersville; Orange County; the Town of Orange; the Village of Penn Yan; and, the Village of Sherman.

These audits have been posted on the Internet and may be accessed by clicking on the name of the school district or municipality.

And the winner is….

And the winner is….

Goggle statistics

Goggle Statistics reports that as of August 1, 2011 “Any administrative action in the nature of discipline taken against a tenured teacher must be taken pursuant to Education Law §3020-a exclusively” the most read item posted on NYPPL.

Originally posted on July 13, 2010, it is found at: http://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2010/07/any-administrative-action-in-nature-of.html

Public policy voids arbitrator’s award

Public policy voids arbitrator’s award

City of New York v. Uniformed Firefighters Assn, 87 AD2d 255, [Revs'd on other grounds, 58 NY2d 957]

When New York City announced it would establish positions of (civilian) Fire Inspection Inspectors, the Firefighters Union objected.

An arbitrator ruled that assigning civilians to perform inspection and fire prevention duties previously performed by uniformed firefighters violated the Taylor Law contract between the City and the Firefighters Union and ordered the City not to make any further such assignments.

The City appealed the arbitrator’s award in favor of the Union to the Court (see Article 75, Civil Practice Law and Rules which sets forth limited grounds for challenging the award of an arbitrator). The Appellate Division ruled that “if an (arbitrator’s) award, such as the award in this case, contravenes the statutory mandate, it violates public policy and the court is required to set it aside....”

The decision noted that the City’s Administrative Code provided that the City determine the “methods, means and personnel by which government operations are to be conducted.” The opinion implies that where the arbitrator fashions an award which violates the mandate of a statute, the arbitrator has exceeded his authority and the award will not be enforced by the court. 

Temporary assignment not the same as appointment to a “position”

Temporary assignment not the same as appointment to a “position”

Miller, et al, v. Braun, Sheriff of Erie County, 89 A.D.2d 787

A number of Criminal Deputy Sheriffs with the Erie County Sheriff’s Department, a position in the competitive class, were “appointed” to the “position” of Special Deputy.

The Erie County Charter permitted the Sheriff to make “temporary assignments” as “Detective Deputy and Special Deputy.” The County eliminated the “Special Deputy” and established a competitive class position of Sergeant.

When former “Special Deputies” failed the test for Sergeant, they were returned to their regular Criminal Deputy positions. They then sued.

With respect to Miller’s claim that a “local law” was required to “reclassify” the position of “Special Deputy” to Sergeant, the Appellate Division ruled that the County had not created the position of “Special Deputy” but merely authorized the Sheriff to make a “temporary assignment” to that status.

The court then concluded “reclassification of the position of Special Deputy to make it competitive...does not effect an abolishment of or change in a position created by the Charter.”

It seems that there was some confusion between the creation of a “position” and the status of a person given a special title while in a position. Under traditional Civil Service classification concepts, the “position” of “Special Deputy”, if properly established, could have been “reclassified” to Sergeant.

In any event, the former “Special Deputies” would not appear to have a claim to permanent status in the Sergeant positions unless they were “permanently appointed” in accordance with law. (See CSEA v. Harrison, 48 NY2 66.)

Discipline to proceed despite pending criminal action involving the same event

Discipline to proceed despite pending criminal action involving the same event

Matter of Mountain, ___ AD2 ___, {1982]

From time to time an agency is faced with the question of what it should do when an employee has been given a notice of discipline and there are criminal charges involving the same event pending in the Court. In Matter of Mountain, the District Attorney, Schenectady County, attempted to get a court order to stop a disciplinary proceeding based on the same facts instituted against Mountain by the City of Schenectady.

The Appellate Division rejected the District Attorney’s argument that a premature disclosure of the testimony of witnesses would imperil the criminal proceeding against Mountain. The Court also noted that a criminal defendant did not have any right to stop a disciplinary proceeding pending the outcome of the criminal trial and the “prosecution has no greater right to protect its case.”

The courts appear to agree that the disciplinary action should not be influenced by the fact that the employee is also facing criminal action as a result of the same event.