ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE [AI] IS NOT USED, IN WHOLE OR IN PART, IN PREPARING NYPPL SUMMARIES OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS

May 20, 2013

An appointing authority’s threatening to take adverse personnel action against an employee that it has a legal right to undertake does not constitute duress


An appointing authority’s threatening to take adverse personnel action against an employee that it has a legal right to undertake does not constitute duress 
2013 NY Slip Op 03252, Appellate Division, Fourth Department


Supreme Court determined that the resignation of a tenured teacher [Educator] formerly employed by the school district, "was involuntarily submitted as a result of fraud, coercion and duress" and directed Educator’s reinstatement with back pay and benefits.”

The school district appealed and the Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s decision, indicating that further consideration and evaluation of Educator’s allegations of duress by the Supreme Court was required.

Citing Gould v Board of Educ. of Sewanhaka Cent. High Sch. Dist., 81 NY2d 446, the Appellate Division said that as a general rule "A resignation under coercion or duress is not a voluntary act and may be nullified."

In contrast, the Appellate Division, citing Rychlick v Coughlin, 99 AD2d 863, affd. 63 NY2d 643, explained that "it has consistently been held that a threat to do that which one has the legal right to do does not constitute duress."

Stated in the alternative, as the Court of Appeals held in Abramovich v Board of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Towns of Brookhaven & Smithtown, 46 NY2d 450, motion to reargue denied 46 NY2d 1076, cert denied 444 US 845, "[a] person's resignation may not be considered to be obtained under duress unless the employer threatened to take action which it had no right to take.”

Further, said the Appellate Division, under "appropriate circumstances . . . a tenured teacher may, as part of a stipulation in settlement of a disciplinary proceeding brought against him [or her], waive his or her continued right to the protections afforded by §3020-a of the Education Law" provided that such a settlement is “voluntarily and knowingly made” in contrast to having been made "lightly, inadvertently, inadvisedly or improvidently….”

The Appellate Division ruled that under the circumstances Supreme Court should conducted a trial "to resolve the factual issue raised by the pleadings and affidavits concerning [Educator’s] allegations of duress and to make appropriate findings of fact before proceeding any further" and remanded the case to Supreme Court for that purpose.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_03252.htm

May 19, 2013

State Comptroller reports a returned 10.38 % on for the State’s pension fund Investments in FY 2013, currently valued at an all time high of $160 billion


State Comptroller reports a returned 10.38 % on for the State’s pension fund Investments in FY 2013, currently valued at an all time high of $160 billion

On May 13, 2013 New York State’s Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced that the New York State Common Retirement Fund (Fund) was valued at an estimated $160.4 billion and earned an estimated 10.38 percent rate of return on its investments for the fiscal year ending March 31, 2013.

“The New York State Common Retirement Fund has reached a milestone,” DiNapoli said. “The Fund ended the fiscal year at an estimated $160.4 billion, an all-time high, and it remains well-positioned for growth as the financial markets continue to gain strength. Fiscal year 2014-2015 will be the final year that employer contribution rates will reflect the market loss of 2008-2009.”

Returns for the Fund’s asset classes were:
  • Domestic Equities returned 14.48 percent (at 36 percent of the Fund’s total investments)
  • Fixed Income returned 4.87 percent (28.2 percent)
  • Non-US Equities returned 9.47 percent (14.1 percent)
  • Private Equity returned 11.75 percent (8.6 percent)
  • Real Estate returned 11.08 percent (6.8 percent)
  • Global Equities returned 13.88 percent (2.9 percent)
  • Absolute Return Strategies returned 7.95 percent (3.2 percent)
  • Opportunistic Alternatives returned 7.89 percent (0.2 percent)
The Fund is the third-largest public pension fund in the country and remains one of the nation’s best-managed and best-funded pension plans. In February, Funston Advisory Services completed an independent review of the Fund that found it is well-run, operates with an industry-leading level of transparency and invests effectively on behalf of its members.

The New York State and Local Retirement System provides benefits to over one million state and local government employees, retirees and beneficiaries. Over the last 20 years, 82 percent of the cost of benefits have been funded from investment returns.

Click herefor prior year returns.

May 18, 2013

NYPPL's Decision of the Week for the Week ending May 18, 2013 - Allegations of unlawful racial discrimination


NYPPL's Decision of the Week 
For the Week Ending May 18, 2013

Allegations of unlawful racial discrimination

This action was brought by the United States Department of Justice pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seg. and alleged that hiring of New York City firefighters was tainted by unlawful racial discrimination and that the New York City Fire Department’s employment procedures for screening and selecting entry-level firefighters had an unjustified disparate impact on black and Hispanic applicants.

The principal issues in this appeal were [1] whether summary judgment was properly entered against the City on a claim of intentional discrimination, [2] whether claims against the City’s Mayor and former Fire Commissioner were properly dismissed, [3] whether an injunction, based both on the finding of intentional discrimination and an unchallenged finding of disparate impact in entry-level examinations, is too broad, and [4] whether, in the event of a remand, the case, or some portion of it, should be reassigned to another district judge.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
August Term 2011
Heard: June 26, 2012 Decided: May 14, 2013
Docket No. 11-5113-cv(L), 12-491-cv(XAP)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, THE VULCAN SOCIETY, INC., MARCUS HAYWOOD, CANDIDO NUNEZ, ROGER GREGG, Intervenors-Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants

v.

CITY OF NEW YORK, MICHAEL BLOOMBERG MAYOR, and NICHOLAS SCOPPETTA, NEW YORK FIRE COMMISSIONER, in their individual and official capacities, Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees, NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CITYWIDE ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICE, NEW YORK CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT, Defendants.

Before: NEWMAN, WINTER, and POOLER, Circuit Judges

Appeal by the City of New York, Mayor Michael Bloomberg, and former Fire Commissioner Nicholas Scoppetta from the December 8, 2011, order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Nicholas G. Garaufis, District Judge), issuing an injunction against the City with respect to the hiring of entry-level firefighters, and a cross-appeal by the Intervenors from the February 1, 2012, partial final judgment dismissing federal and state law claims against Mayor Bloomberg and former Fire Commissioner Scoppetta.

The City’s appeal also seeks review of the January 13, 2010, order granting the Intervenors summary judgment on their disparate treatment claim, which alleged intentional discrimination, and, on the appeal from the injunction, seeks reassignment of the case to a different district judge.

Summary judgment on the disparate treatment claim against the City is vacated; dismissal of the federal claims against Mayor Bloomberg is affirmed; dismissal of the state law claims against Mayor Bloomberg and Commissioner Scoppetta is affirmed; dismissal of the federal law claims against Commissioner Scoppetta is vacated; the injunction is modified, and, as modified, is affirmed; and the bench trial on the liability phase of the discriminatory treatment claim against the City is reassigned to a different district judge.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

[Judge Pooler dissents in part with a separate opinion.]

The full text of the majority’s 59-page opinion, together with the 23-page dissenting opinion of Judge Pooler, is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/155a2259-8686-4d25-b6fc-6a56bd4db3e0/2/doc/11-5113_complete_opn.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/155a2259-8686-4d25-b6fc-6a56bd4db3e0/2/hilite/

May 17, 2013

The provisions in a collective bargaining agreement that are otherwise controlling may be waived if the waiver is “knowing and voluntarily” made


The provisions in a collective bargaining agreement that are otherwise controlling may be waived if the waiver is “knowing and voluntarily” made
2013 NY Slip Op 03251, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

In September 2006 an individual [Educator] was hired as a probationary teacher by the school district. At the end of the three-year probationary period, Educator was notified that he would not be recommended for tenure by the Superintendent. In lieu of termination, however, the school district, the Educator and the Teacher Association entered into a Juulagreement,* which extended the probationary period for one year.

In Juul the court held that agreements to extend probationary periods are valid and enforceable when found to be a "knowing and voluntary waiver of the protections afforded by the Education Law."

When the agreement ended, the parties entered into a second Juul agreement that extended Educator's probationary period for a fifth year and in exchange for this extension the Teacher Association "waive[d] any right it may have to pursue a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement [CBA]” relative to the deferral of the Superintendent's tenure recommendation, [or] the termination of [Educator’s] employment."

As the end of his fifth probationary year approached, Educator was informed by the Superintendent that he would not be recommended for tenure and that Educator’s appointment as a probationary teacher with the school district would end on a specified date.

The Association filed a grievance on behalf of Educator contesting his termination under various provisions of the CBA. The school district denied the grievance and the Association served a demand for arbitration.

The school district filed a petition in Supreme Court seeking a permanent stay of the arbitration. The court, agreeing with the school district that a valid agreement to arbitrate this particular dispute no longer existed, granted the school district’s petition.

The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

The court explained that there was not dispute that the arbitration of the claim with respect to the subject matter at issue is authorized under the Taylor Law. Here, however, in accordance with the applicable two-step inquiry to be made by the courts in such situations, it must next be determined whether "such authority was in fact exercised and whether the parties did agree by the terms of their particular arbitration clause to refer their differences in this specific area to arbitration"

It was also undisputed that, absent the second Juul agreement, Educator’s termination would be subject to the grievance and arbitration procedures contained in the CBA. Rejecting the Association’s argument to the contrary, the Appellate Division concluded that the second Juul agreement “clearly manifested an intent to exclude the subject matter of [Educator’s] termination, including the just cause, teacher improvement and code of ethics grounds advanced by the Association, from the provisions of the CBA relating to grievances and arbitration.”

Similarly, employees in the classified service of the State and public authorities, public benefit corporations and other agencies for which the Civil Service Law is administered by the State Department of Civil Service   faced with termination for not satisfactorily completing his or her probationary period may be offered the opportunity to serve a second probationary position in accordance with the provision of 4 NYCRR 4.5 [b] [5] [ii]). Many local civil service commissions have adopted a similar rule.

However this provision requires that the extended probationary term to be served in a different assignment.

This last point is illustrated by the decision in Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n, Inc., Local No. 1000, AFSCME AFL-CIO, Oxford Veterans' Home Local No. 305 v. Venugopalan, 228 A.D.2d 767. In Venugopalan a cook appointed to the position of chief cook and who was required to serve a probationary appointment of from 26 to 52 weeks. When the employee’s 52 week probationary period ended it was determined that his probationary period would be extended for an additional 12 to 24 weeks rather than reinstate him to the cook position.

The court ruled that this second probationary period was “unauthorized” as there was no change in the individual’s “assignment” and thus his appointment as Chief Cook  “ripened into a permanent appointment upon his retention in the position beyond the 52-week period of probation.”

* Juul v Board of Educ. of Hempstead School Dist. No.1, Hempstead, 76 AD2d 837, affd 55 NY2d 648

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

May 16, 2013

An employee’s satisfying the employer’s residency requirement is critical to his or her continuation in employment


An employee’s satisfying the employer’s residency requirement is critical to his or her continuation in employment

Matter of Adrian v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of Niagara Falls, 92 AD3d 1272, affirmed.


The City of Niagara Falls’ Local Law No. 7 requires City employees to establish and maintain residency within the City throughout the term of their employment. "Residency" for the purposes of this action was defined as "the actual principal place of residence of an individual, where he or she normally sleeps; normally maintains personal and household effects; the place listed as an address on voter registration; and the place listed as his or her address for driver's license and motor vehicle registration, if any."*

The City determined that one of its employees [Petitioner] principally resided outside the City in the Town of Niagara. Concluding that Petitioner did not comply with its residency policy, the City terminated her employment.

Petitioner challenged the City’s decision. Supreme Court granted her petition and directed the City to reinstate her to her former position. The Appellate Division disagreed with the Supreme Court’s ruling and vacated its decision.

The Appellate Division found that the evidence relied upon by the City was sufficient to establish that Petitioner's "actual principal place of residence" was in the Town of Niagara [Niagara] and thus outside the city limits of the City of Niagara Falls.

The evidence presented to the City included an investigative report indicating that Petitioner resided at the Niagara residence, the address of the Niagara residence was listed on Petitioner's joint tax return with her husband, Petitioner's signature appeared on a recent mortgage application for the Niagara residence, Petitioner's husband and children resided at the Niagara residence and Petitioner’s children attend school in the Niagara-Wheatfield School District.

In addition, said the Appellate Division, “a surveillance company observed Petitioner on multiple occasions driving to work from the Niagara residence early in the morning and driving from work to the Niagara residence at the end of the work day, "whereupon she would retrieve the mail and park in the garage."

Petitioner had testified that she resided at a City address and that the City address was listed on various documents, including her voter registration records and her driver's license. Notwithstanding such testimony, the Appellate Division concluded that such "evidence was not so overwhelming as to support the [Supreme] court's determination granting [her] petition."

Citing Beck-Nichols v Bianco, 20 N.Y.3d 540,** a case involving a school district employee’s failure to comply with the district’s residence requirement, the Appellate Division said that under the "extremely deferential standard" of review applicable in Petitioner’s case, it concluded that the City's determination that Petitioner principally resides outside the City is not “without foundation in fact,” and thus the City had "rationally concluded that [Petitioner] did not comply with the residency policy."

The court then reversed Supreme Court's decision "on the law" and the dismissed the City's former employee’s petition.

* The Appellate Division noted that this “definition [of residence] is akin to, if not synonymous with, the legal concept of ‘domicile,’ i.e., ‘living in [a] locality with intent to make it a fixed and permanent home.’”

** NYPPL’s summary of Beck-Nichols is posted on the Internet at: http://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2013/02/court-of-appeals-holds-that-residency.html

The City of Niagara Falls decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_03230.htm

An employee’s satisfying the employer’s residency requirement is critical to his or her continuation in employment


An employee’s satisfying the employer’s residency requirement is critical to his or her continuation in employment

Matter of Adrian v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of Niagara Falls, 92 AD3d 1272, affirmed.


The City of Niagara Falls’ Local Law No. 7 requires City employees to establish and maintain residency within the City throughout the term of their employment. "Residency" for the purposes of this action was defined as "the actual principal place of residence of an individual, where he or she normally sleeps; normally maintains personal and household effects; the place listed as an address on voter registration; and the place listed as his or her address for driver's license and motor vehicle registration, if any."*

The City determined that one of its employees [Petitioner] principally resided outside the City in the Town of Niagara. Concluding that Petitioner did not comply with its residency policy, the City terminated her employment.

Petitioner challenged the City’s decision. Supreme Court granted her petition and directed the City to reinstate her to her former position. The Appellate Division disagreed with the Supreme Court’s ruling and vacated its decision.

The Appellate Division found that the evidence relied upon by the City was sufficient to establish that Petitioner's "actual principal place of residence" was in the Town of Niagara [Niagara] and thus outside the city limits of the City of Niagara Falls.

The evidence presented to the City included an investigative report indicating that Petitioner resided at the Niagara residence, the address of the Niagara residence was listed on Petitioner's joint tax return with her husband, Petitioner's signature appeared on a recent mortgage application for the Niagara residence, Petitioner's husband and children resided at the Niagara residence and Petitioner’s children attend school in the Niagara-Wheatfield School District.

In addition, said the Appellate Division, “a surveillance company observed Petitioner on multiple occasions driving to work from the Niagara residence early in the morning and driving from work to the Niagara residence at the end of the work day, "whereupon she would retrieve the mail and park in the garage."

Petitioner had testified that she resided at a City address and that the City address was listed on various documents, including her voter registration records and her driver's license. Notwithstanding such testimony, the Appellate Division concluded that such "evidence was not so overwhelming as to support the [Supreme] court's determination granting [her] petition."

Citing Beck-Nichols v Bianco, 20 N.Y.3d 540,** a case involving a school district employee’s failure to comply with the district’s residence requirement, the Appellate Division said that under the "extremely deferential standard" of review applicable in Petitioner’s case, it concluded that the City's determination that Petitioner principally resides outside the City is not “without foundation in fact,” and thus the City had "rationally concluded that [Petitioner] did not comply with the residency policy."

The court then reversed Supreme Court's decision "on the law" and the dismissed the City's former employee’s petition.

* The Appellate Division noted that this “definition [of residence] is akin to, if not synonymous with, the legal concept of ‘domicile,’ i.e., ‘living in [a] locality with intent to make it a fixed and permanent home.’”

** NYPPL’s summary of Beck-Nichols is posted on the Internet at: http://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2013/02/court-of-appeals-holds-that-residency.html

The City of Niagara Falls decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_03230.htm

May 15, 2013

Where there is broad arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement, the arbitrator rather than the court is to determine if the subject of the dispute is arbitrable


Where there is broad arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement, the arbitrator rather than the court is to determine if the subject of the dispute is arbitrable
Ontario County v County Sheriff's Unit 7850-01, CSEA, Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO), 2013 NY Slip Op 03204, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

The Collective Bargaining Agreement [CBA] between Ontario County and the Ontario County Sheriff's Unit 7850-01 provided that disputes over the meaning or application of the CBA were initially required to be submitted through the contract's grievance process. In the event the employee was "not satisfied" with the result obtained through that process, the Unit could submit the matter to arbitration .

The Ontario County Sheriff's Unit 7850-01 [Unit] filed grievances on behalf of two correction officers whose request for a shift exchange was denied. Contending that the denial "[v]iolated or [i]nvolved" the clause in the CBA that addressed "time exchanged between employees," the Unit informed County of its intent to seek arbitration. 

The County thereupon filed a petition in Supreme Court pursuant to CPLR Article 75 to stay arbitration and the Unit "cross-moved" to compel arbitration.

Supreme Court denied the County’s petition and granted the Unit’s cross motion.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s ruling, noting that “A grievance may be submitted to arbitration only where the parties agree to arbitrate that kind of dispute, and where it is lawful for them to do so." In this instance,” said the court, “the parties do not challenge the lawfulness of arbitrating the instant dispute and, instead, [the County contends] that there is no valid agreement to arbitrate the grievances at issue inasmuch as the CBA did not contemplate shift exchanges."

The Appellate Division rejected the County’s argument, explaining that in determining whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute at issue a court’s review “is limited to the language of the grievance and the demand for arbitration, as well as to the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom"

In this instance, said the court, there is “a broad arbitration clause and a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the parties.” Accordingly, the court decided that the was arbitrable and it was left to the arbitrator to make “a more exacting interpretation of the precise scope of the substantive provisions of the [CBA], and whether the subject matter of the dispute fits within them.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

May 14, 2013

Governor Cuomo's financial restructuring proposal to assist distressed local governments


Governor Cuomo's financial restructuring proposal to assist distressed local governments

On May 14, 2013, Governor Andrew M. Cuomo issued a proposal to create a Financial Restructuring Board to help distressed local governments manage their finances. The proposal includes an alternative binding arbitration process that municipalities and unions could voluntarily opt for to resolve contract issues in an expedited procedure.

In the words of the Governor: "Growing retirement costs, declining populations, decreasing property values, and the recent fiscal crisis have all contributed to the difficult financial issues facing localities today …The Financial Restructuring Board will bring together state and local officials to help localities make tough decisions and solve this crisis now instead of kicking the can down the road."

More money is not the solution to help local governments solve their fiscal issues said the Governor. “The State's existing Aid and Incentives for Municipalities (AIM) program does not reflect local government need or performance, and already constitutes a large percentage of the budgets of New York's largest cities (outside of NYC)”
The proposal to help fiscally distressed municipalities includes the following elements:

Financial Restructuring Board: The Board would include the State Budget Director, Secretary of State, Attorney General, Comptroller, and one private sector restructuring professional. The Budget Director would establish standards to determine which local governments qualify as fiscally distressed. Fiscally distressed local governments would be able to request the assistance of the Board, and work together to identify a specific restructuring plan.

Implementing Restructuring Plan: The 2013-14 Budget includes up to $80 million to assist local governments with reorganization plans. Recommendations of the Board would be binding upon any municipality that accepts funding. The Board may require development of multi-year financial plans, functional consolidation, mergers, shared services, fewer elected officials, and other measures.

The Board would also serve as a binding arbitration panel: The Board would provide an alternative to the binding arbitration process for police, fire, or deputy sheriff unions if municipalities and unions agree. The Board would render an arbitration ruling within 9 months.


Employee terminated following a disciplinary hearing after receiving counseling memoranda regarding serious and specific deficiencies in her job performance


Employee terminated following a disciplinary hearing after receiving counseling memoranda regarding serious and specific deficiencies in her job performance
Kuznia v Adams, 2013 NY Slip Op 03369, Appellate Division, Third Department

An individual [Petitioner] commenced her employment with the County Probation Department in 1979 and in 2004 was named as the Department's deputy director. When the Department’s director retired, Petitioner “effectively was in charge of the Department” until a new director was named in August 2010.

Although prior to serving as the Department's deputy director Petitioner had consistently received positive performance evaluations,* in March 2010 the County Administrator sent Petitioner a "letter of counseling" raising a number of concerns regarding her leadership, supervisory and time-management skills. Petitioner was encouraged to "immediately make every effort to improve [her] management skills" and was warned that her failure to do so could result in a loss of her employment.

In October 2010, Petitioner received a second counseling notification — this time in the form of a memorandum from the newly appointed director. The director noted, among other things, Petitioner's  failure to timely submit various state-mandated reports and surveys to the Department's oversight agency.

Subsequently it was found that there were significant past deficiencies and omissions in the operation of the Department during Petitioner's tenure as deputy director and  was served with disciplinary charges in March 2011 pursuant to Civil Service Law §75 alleging various acts of misconduct. The Hearing Officer sustained the bulk of the charges and specifications filed against Petitioner and recommended Petitioner's "dismissal from service [as] the only viable solution."

The County Administrator adopted the Hearing Officer's findings and recommendation and terminated Petitioner’s employment. Petitioner appealed, challenging the County Administrator’s decision and asked the court to direct her reinstatement as deputy director of the Department with back pay.

The Appellate Division affirmed the County Administrator’s determination, explaining that "[T]he standard of review to be applied in reviewing an administrative determination made pursuant to Civil Service Law §75 is whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.”

The Appellate Division noted that [1] Credibility determinations solely within the province of the Hearing Officer and that it may neither substitute its own judgment for that of the Hearing Officer nor weigh the evidence presented and [2] a finding of incompetence only requires evidence of some dereliction or neglect of duty.

As to the issue of penalty, the Appellate Division said that it was “well settled” that it would set aside the penalty imposed "only if it is so disproportionate as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness."

Despite the Appellate Division's considering Petitioner's many years of service and her prior positive performance evaluations, the court said that it did not find the penalty of termination to be shocking to its sense of fairness, explaining that in this instance “the record reflects that although Petitioner twice was warned regarding serious and specific deficiencies in her job performance, she continued to exercise poor professional judgment with respect to, among other things, the management, training and supervision of [Department personnel].

Further said the court, “The record … illustrates that Petitioner's neglect of her duties — particularly with respect to her failure to implement certain policies and/or comply with mandated reporting requirements — not only created what [Department’s director] aptly described as ‘a huge public safety issue,’ but also exposed the County to liability.”

* According to the decision, written performance evaluations of the Petitioner ceased after 2004 because the then County Administrator “preferred to personally conduct yearly evaluations in his office.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_03369.htm

Internet search engine focused on job opportunities


Internet search engine focused on job opportunities
On the Internet at: www.careerjet.com

Careerjet is a free employment opportunity search engine available to job seekers and offers users the ability to access jobs opportunities published on some 69,000 web sites. Careerjet indexes job descriptions from a large number of sources "around the web." The Careerjet's job search engine network encompasses over 90 countries, featuring separate interfaces that are translated into 28 languages.

Job seekers can search across these resources for positions in which they may be interested and once found, click on the link provided to get transferred to the original advertisement for specific information about the position[s] available.

Searching can be done using locations and other keywords such as "Attorney, Detroit" or "Human Resources Director, Los Angeles."

As examples, the two Careerjet posting shown below were dated May 13, 2013:

ACLU 
City of Richmond

Professions and employment areas currently listed by Careerjet include: 




Users may also post their resume and, in addition, create "job alerts" on Careerjet.

May 13, 2013

The State Commission on Public Integrity’s investigatory powers, including its power to issue a subpoena, do not terminate upon the issuance of a Notice of Reasonable Cause.


The State Commission on Public Integrity’s investigatory powers, including its power to issue a subpoena, do not terminate upon the issuance of a Notice of Reasonable Cause.
O'Connor v Ginsberg, 2013 NY Slip Op 03363, Appellate Division, Third Department

In 2009, the Commission on Public Integrity notified the then President and Chief Executive Officer of the State University of New York Research Foundation [CEO] that it had received information indicating that he may have violated Public Officers Law §74 (3) (d), (f) and (h). The information received by the Commission alleged that he had secured employment for an individual "for which she was not qualified and for which she did little or no work," and had given her privileges that he did not confer on the other Research Foundation employees.*

During the course of its investigation the Commission made several attempts to secure the CEO’s sworn testimony concerning these allegations on a voluntary basis. These efforts were unsuccessful and the Commission issued a subpoena requiring the CEO to appear before it. This resulted in the parties entering into an agreement whereby “in exchange for the Commission's withdrawal of the subpoena, [the CEO] would appear voluntarily for a sworn interview on a date certain. The agreement also provided that the CEO would be given an opportunity to provide an unsworn statement or explanation concerning the matters under investigation.

After the CEO failed to appear on the date scheduled the Commission issued a Notice of Reasonable Cause (hereinafter NORC)** alleging that the CEO had knowingly and intentionally violated Public Officers Law §74 (3) (d), (f) and (h). The CEO’s attorney notified the Commission that the subpoena that accompanied the NORC requiring the CEO to provide testimony “informed the Commission that the subpoena was ineffective and, thus, [the CEO] would not be appearing to give testimony.”

The CEO then sought a court order “directing [the Commission] to commence an administrative hearing on the NORC on a fixed date and to appoint an independent hearing officer to preside over the hearing.” The Commission opposed the CEO’s petition and asked the court for an order compelling the CEO to comply with its subpoena.

Supreme Court dismissed the CEO’s petition, finding that he had failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the relief sought. The court also denied Commission’s motion, concluding that the Commission's power to issue a subpoena was limited to the investigatory period preceding the issuance of the NORC. ***

The Appellate Division expressed a different view, stating that the Commission's interpretation of its regulation****was consistent with the overall purpose and spirit of Executive Law §94, which is to "strengthen the public's trust and confidence in government through fair and just adjudicatory procedures that afford all parties due process protection and fair and just resolution of all matters." 

Accordingly, said the court, its investigatory powers were not truncated upon its issuing a NORC.

The Appellate Division pointed out that “[f]ollowing the issuance of a NORC, the Commission could become aware of other potential witnesses or additional information relevant to the possible violations. Thus, construing the regulation to permit the Commission to continue its investigation, despite having issued a NORC, would best serve the underlying purposes of the statute.”

Further, interpreting the regulation as “precluding investigation into new evidence, based solely on the fact that a NORC had been issued, would clearly impede the truth seeking function of the Commission.”

The Appellate Division concluded that the Commission's investigatory powers, including its power to issue a subpoena, do not terminate upon the issuance of a NORC.

Observing that the CEO “has continually resisted efforts by the Commission to secure his testimony,” the Appellate Division opined “the Commission should not be hamstrung by [the CEO’s] tactics …. To do so would abridge the Commission's statutory power to conduct an investigation and subpoena witnesses and ultimately impede its truth seeking function.”

* Subsequently the Commission issued a second letter in January 2010, which superceded and replaced the first letter, clarifying that the alleged misconduct related to acts occurring after April 25, 2007, the effective date of legislation that deemed the Research Foundation to be a "state agency" subject to the provisions of the State Code of Ethics set forth in Public Officers Law §74.

** See Executive Law §94 former [12] [b].

*** Supreme Court agreed with the Commission and dismissed the CEO’s petition. The CEO did appeal that ruling by Supreme Court but subsequently elected not to pursue it.

**** The Appellate Division pointed out that the interpretation given to a regulation by the agency which promulgated it and is responsible for its administration is entitled to deference and should be upheld if not irrational or unreasonable, citing Transitional Services v NYS Office of Mental Hygiene, 13 NY3d 801.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_03363.htm

May 12, 2013

Selected reports and information published by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli


Selected reports and information published by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli
Issued during the week ending May 12, 2013 [Click on text highlighted in bold to access the full report] 


DiNapoli: IDA Performance Improves, But Concerns Remain

New York’s Industrial Development Agencies (IDAs) supported nearly 4,500 projects and provided $560 million in net tax exemptions in 2011, increasing estimated job gains by almost 36,000 from the previous year, according to a reportissued Tuesday by State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli. DiNapoli’s sixth annual report examining the performance of the state’s IDAs found improved reporting of data but recommended that IDAs do more to objectively weigh incentives against economic benefits to communities and evaluate projects receiving tax and other breaks.


State Pension Fund Invests $568,000 In Fieldlens

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli announced a $568,000 investment in FieldLens, creator of a mobile and web application designed for the construction industry. The investment was made through High Peaks Venture Partners, SoftBank Capital and Contour Venture Partners. The New York State Common Retirement Fund is an investor in these funds through its In–State Private Equity Program.


DiNapoli: Empire Continuing to Overpay for Special Medical Items

New York State health insurance provider Empire BlueCross BlueShield overpaid hospitals by nearly $490,000 for special medical items such as implants, drugs and blood, including more than $77,000 to just one hospital, over a six month period, according to an auditof the New York State Health Insurance Program released Thursday by State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli.


Comptroller DiNapoli Releases Municipal Audits

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli Wednesday announced his office completed the following audits:









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