Scheduling a disciplinary hearing after charges have been served on the employee a “discretionary act”

Scheduling a disciplinary hearing after charges have been served on the employee a “discretionary act”

Clark v Schriro, 2012 NY Slip Op 00118, Appellate Division, First Department

Jesse Clark filed a CPLR Article 78 petition “in the nature of mandamus” seeking to compel the New York City Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings [OATH] to hold a disciplinary hearing on charges that had been filed against him by the NYC Department of Correction. Supreme Court dismissed Clark’s petition and the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision.

In the words of the Appellate Division, “Supreme Court properly found that since respondents were not required to provide [Clark] with a hearing within a specifically prescribed period, but only within a "reasonable time" (New York City Charter §1046[c]), their failure to do so for more than a year after charging [Clark] with misconduct did not constitute failure to fulfill a nondiscretionary duty or perform a purely ministerial act.”

Should an employee be suspended from his or her position without pay upon his or her being served with disciplinary charges, however, typically the individual must be restored to the payroll after a specified period of time if such action is mandated by law [see, for example, Civil Service Law §75.3] or as required by a collective bargaining agreement.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_00118.htm

An appointing authority’s rejection of the disciplinary hearing officer’s recommendation must be supported by substantial evidence in the record

An appointing authority’s rejection of the disciplinary hearing officer’s recommendation must be supported by substantial evidence in the record 

Rauschmeier v Village of Johnson City, 2012 NY Slip Op 00158, Appellate Division, Third Department

The Village of Johnson City filed disciplinary charges against an employee pursuant to Civil Service Law §75. Following a disciplinary hearing, the Hearing Officer recommended that employee be found not guilty of the charges filed against him and that he be reinstated to his position with full back pay, benefits and seniority.

The Mayor of the Village, with support of the Village Board of Trustees, rejected the Hearing Officer's recommendation, found the employee guilty of misconduct and dismissed the employee from service.

Contending that the Mayor lacked the legal authority to review and reject the Hearing Officer's recommendation, the employee sued, seeking, among other things, an annulment of the penalty imposed by the Mayor. 

Although Supreme Court rejected the employee’s claim that the Mayor lacked the legal authority to review and reject the Hearing Officer's recommendation, a determination sustained by the Appellate Division,* another issue, whether the Mayor’s decision to reject the Hearing Officer's recommendation was supported by substantial evidence, was referred to, and considered by, the Appellate Division.

Addressing the Mayor’s decision to reject the Hearing Officer's recommendation, the Appellate Division said that its review of such a determination was limited to whether it is supported by substantial evidence.

When, however, the appointing authority, rejects a disciplinary recommendation made by a hearing officer after a hearing, the appointing authority must set forth in its decision "findings of fact based on competent proof contained in the record and then employ those findings to arrive at conclusions that are supported by substantial evidence."

The Appellate Division said that the Mayor, in rejecting the Hearing Officer's recommendation, referred to testimony of certain witnesses given at the hearing, but did not specify what in their testimony supported his conclusion.

More is required said the court, “especially since the other evidence introduced at the hearing – all of which is uncontradicted and not in dispute — supports the Hearing Officer's determination.”

Accordingly, the Appellate Division ruled that the Mayor’s “conclusion to the contrary was not supported by substantial evidence,” and thus his determination must be annulled and the employee reinstated to his position with full back pay and benefits.

* The Appellate Division also rejected the employee’s contention that the Mayor acted beyond his legal authority, pointing out that Civil Service Law §75(2) provides that an employee disciplinary proceeding shall be conducted "by the officer or body having the power to remove the person against whom such charges are preferred, or by a deputy or other person designated by such officer or body in writing for that purpose" and where such a designation is made, the person so designated is to make a record of the hearing  and a recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed in the event the individual is found guilty of one or more charges. The record of the hearing and the recommendation is then to "be referred to [the appointing authority] for review and decision."

The “dual employers” of a volunteer firefighter injured when fighting a fire are both liable for the payment of workers’ compensation benefits

The “dual employers” of a volunteer firefighter injured when fighting a fire are both liable for the payment of workers’ compensation benefits

Levy v Plainview Fire Dept., 89 AD3d 1331

Danny Levy, a member of the Plainview Fire Department, submitted a volunteer firefighters' claim for benefits based upon injuries allegedly sustained while assisting the City of New York Fire Department at the World Trade Center disaster in September 2001.

The Workers' Compensation Board awarded claimant benefits, finding dual liability between the Plainview Fire Department and the self-insured employer, the City of New York, on the ground that Levy's activities at ground zero were directed and controlled by both entities. Rejecting the City’s appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s ruling.

The court noted that the General Municipal Law §209-i 1) provides that "Whenever a volunteer [firefighter] is within this state, but outside the area regularly served by the fire company or fire department of which [the volunteer] is a member and has knowledge of a fire or other emergency at or near the place where [the volunteer] is for the time being, such volunteer . . . may report to the officer in command of the paid or volunteer fire company or paid or volunteer fire department, or in command of one of the paid or volunteer fire companies or one of the paid or volunteer fire departments, engaged in the handling of any such fire or other emergency and, on an individual basis, offer his [or her] services to assist such fire company or fire department. After [the volunteer's] services are so accepted, the volunteer . . . shall then be entitled to all powers, rights, privileges and immunities granted by law to volunteer [firefighers] during the time such services are rendered, in the same manner and to the same extent as if [the volunteer] were a volunteer member of the fire company or fire department which he [or she] is assisting, including benefits under the volunteer [firefighters'] benefit law."

The Appellate Division said that the record establishes that Levy initially volunteered on his own at ground zero on September 11, 2001. Thereafter, on September 12, 2001, claimant reported to the Plainview fire house where the fire chief requested volunteers to assist in the rescue and recovery efforts at ground zero. Levy testified that over the course of the next two weeks, he reported to the City's headquarters with other Plainview firefighters who volunteered and that their activities were then directed and controlled by the City.

Accordingly, the court held that substantial evidence supported the Board's factual conclusions regarding Levy’s dual employment.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_08514.htm