An employer's duty to prevent an employee from committing suicide

This decision by the Appellate Division states that the Plaintiff in this action alleged  that the New York City Police Department [NYPD]  had knowledge of the state of its employee's [the Deceased] mental health and, instead of accommodating the Deceased's disability, assigned him to a position that would precipitate his death.  

Citing Jacobsen v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 22 NY3d 824, after setting out the events leading to the litigation, the decision concludes as follows:

 "In short, the NYPD's 'failure to reasonably accommodate [the Deceased's] disability as soon as [it knew] of that condition is the very societal ill which the relevant anti-discrimination statutes were designed to combat.

Continuing, the Appellate Division opined that "[t]he statutes recognize the employer's failure in that regard to be particularly invidious because it forces the worker either to quit his or her job in order to preserve the worker's health or else to continue working without adequate protective measures and then succumb to a debilitating impairment* ... [s]adly, here, [the deceased] succumbed to a debilitating impairment before he was properly accommodated.

The court, however, ruled that it was "unable to grant [the Deceased] any relief because [his] estate failed to invoke the very statute that was enacted to protect him."

* See Jacobsen at 843-844.

Click HEREto access the full text of the Appellate Division's decision

Qualified privilege may be claimed in defending statements made for a supervisory purpose in an employment context alleged to be defamatory

Plaintiff in this action alleged that his former employer defamed him in the warning letter by issuing the letter of warning and directing Plaintiff to take anti-harassment training.

In the words of the Appellate Division, Plaintiff contends that the letter, "essentially finding" that Plaintiff had violated the employer's policy, is defamatory." However, said the court, to the extent the claim is based on the letter in general, it fails to state a cause of action for defamation.

The court opined that Plaintiff paraphrased the letter in his complaint and "misstates its contents, as the letter expressly found that [Plaintiff] had not violated employer's policies."

The Appellate Division also noted that Plaintiff failed to adequately plead publication of the alleged defamatory letter. He states only that the letter, though addressed to him, was "published to the rest of the Administration." This vague and undefined phrase does not meet the particularity requirements for person and time.

Plaintiff's reliance on that part of the letter which states that the employer found Plaintiff's conduct was "unprofessional and inappropriate" and evinced a "lack of appropriate judgment," is adequately particularized, at least as to its content, being a direct and accurate quote from the letter.

In any event, the Appellate Division, citing Foster v Churchill, 87 NY2d 744, concluded  that a qualified privilege attaches to statements made for a supervisory purpose in an employment context. As the letter was written by the employer in the context of an investigation into workplace conduct, the court opined that the employer was protected under the defense of qualified privilege.

Click HEREto access the Appellate Division's decision.

 

An employer may take an adverse employment action against an employee barred by law so long the employer has demonstrated an independent basis for the action

A probationary teacher [Plaintiff] observed a teacher providing unauthorized assistance to a student. Plaintiff contended that she immediately reported the incident, and it is undisputed that she "first put her allegations in writing in a letter dated April 19, 2013."

Plaintiff subsequently received four unsatisfactory lesson observation reports, two letters of misconduct and then received an unsatisfactory rating (U-rating) for the school year. The New York City Department of Education [DOE] did not give Plaintiff a certificate of satisfactory completion of probation and terminated her employment. Her administrative appeal was denied by a divided panel.

Plaintiff initiate a hybrid CPLR Article 78/plenary action challenging DOE's decision in Supreme Court. Ultimately the Appellate Division dismissed Plaintiff's action in its entirety "on the law."

The Appellate Division explained that DOE's decision to discontinue Plaintiff's probation and terminate her employment was based on the annual U-rating, which in turn was based on four unsatisfactory observation reports and two misconduct letters. These, said the court, provide ample evidence to support the conclusion that Plaintiff's performance was unsatisfactory, and thereby establish, for purposes of reviewing Plaintiff's Article 78 action, that Plaintiff's termination was done in good faith.

Turning to Plaintiff's seeking a court order annulling the U-rating and unsatisfactory observation reports as pretexts for a retaliatory discharge, the Appellate Division opined that this effort was unavailing as the U-rating was supported by the observation reports and misconduct letters, each of which recited first-hand observations made by the Assistant Principal and Principal and the unsatisfactory reports were "rationally based in the record."

Addressing Plaintiff's second cause of action under Civil Service Law, §75-b the Appellate Division found that Plaintiff had made a prima facie case by showing that:

1. She received numerous adverse employment actions in the form of unsatisfactory reports and ultimately loss of license and termination;

2. She disclosed what appeared to be an illegal action by a fellow teacher; and

3. The temporal connection between Plaintiff's reporting "the January 23, 2013 incident  and the negative employment actions she suffered beginning in early March, suffices to establish her prima facie case on causation."

That said, the Appellate Division pointed out that an appointing authority may nonetheless initiate an adverse employment action against an employee so long the employer has an "independent basis for the action."

In the words of the Appellate Division, "Here, as discussed, [DOE] had ample independent bases for their actions against [Plaintiff], in the form of the well-documented unsatisfactory reports and a corresponding U-rating for the year. Nor is there any evidence that [DOE's] actions were pretexts for retaliation, or that [DOE] would not have taken the same actions against [Plaintiff] had she not reported the alleged teacher misconduct" and dismissed Plaintiff's second cause of action alleging the DOE had violated Civil Service Law §75-b.

Click HEREto access the text of the Appellate Division's decision.