Recent administrative hearing decisions issued by New York State's Commission of Education Dr. Betty A. Rosa

Termination of a teacher during her serving an extension of her probation period pursuant to written agreements.

The teacher claimed the discontinuance of her probation was unconstitutional or unreasonable. In addition, the teacher contended that she had attained "tenure by estoppel".  She sought, among other relief, an order directing New York City Board of Education “to either grant tenure to [her] or to declare that she has received tenure by estoppel.”

The Commissioner opined that the appointing authority may "discontinue the services of a probationary teacher 'at any time and for any reason, unless the teacher establishes that the termination was for a constitutionally impermissible purpose, violative of a statute, or done in bad faith'”. The Commissioner's noted "bad faith” has been defined as  “[d]ishonesty of belief, purpose, or motive”, citing Appeals of Prisinzano, 62 Ed Dept Rep, Decision No. 18,195, citing Black’s Law Dictionary [11th ed. 2019].

Noting that the petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a clear legal right to the relief requested and establishing the facts upon which he or she seeks relief, the Commissioner concluded "Petitioner has not proven that [appointing authority] discontinued her probation in bad faith" and dismissed the teacher's appeal.

Click HERE to access Commissioner Rosa's decision posted on the Internet.

 

Challenges to actions of a Board of Education related to school district expenditures and petitions seeking the removal of the superintendent, assistant superintendent, and the  president of the school board.

The Commissioner dismissed one of the Petitioner's two appeals,* explaining the Petitioner failed to join a necessary party. A necessary party, said the Commissioner, is a person or entity "whose rights would be adversely affected by a determination in favor of a petitioner and must be joined as such."

The Commissioner also denied the Petitioner’s second appeal in which he sought the removal of certain named school district officials.

Noting that "The Commissioner of Education may remove a school officer or member of a board of education from office when it is proven to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the officer or board member has engaged in a willful violation or neglect of duty under the Education Law or has willfully disobeyed a decision, order, rule, or regulation of the Board of Regents or the Commissioner," the Commissioner opined that "Petitioner alleges, without proof" that named school district personnel engaged in a “concerted effort to cover up [their] many transgressions” related to the fundraiser." 

As an example, the Commissioner's decision notes Petitioner admitted that he “do[es] not know for certain” that the board president acted improperly, but complains that she “was absolutely no aid in seeking the truth ....” This speculation, said the Commissioner, "does not constitute proof that any respondent violated the Education Law" and denied the Petitioner's application for removal.

In addition, the Commissioner issued individuals named in the removal application certifications pursuant to Education Law §3811(1). Such s certification authorizes a board of education to indemnify "a respondent for costs incurred in defending against a proceeding arising out of the exercise of the respondent’s powers or the performance of the respondent’s duties as a board member or other official listed in §3811 (1)".

* Because the appeals present similar issues of fact and law, they were consolidated for decision [See 8 NYCRR 275.18] 

Click HERE to access Commissioner Rosa's decision posted on the Internet.

Absent consideration of a disciplinary hearing officer's report or other factual findings, an appointing authority has no basis to make a disciplinary determination

The Plaintiff in this CPLR Article 78 proceeding was served with disciplinary charges pursuant to §75(2) of the Civil Service Law alleging he "caused himself to receive unauthorized overtime compensation and an unauthorized increase in salary for a pay period."   

Although a §75 disciplinary hearing was conducted before a duly designated hearing officer, the hearing officer failed to issue a report of findings or make a recommendation with respect the disposition of the disciplinary charges filed against Plaintiff by the appointing authority. Notwithstanding this defect in the disciplinary procedure,* the appointing authority terminated Plaintiff's employment effective December 31, 2019.

In response to Plaintiff's challenge to the appointing authority's action, Supreme Court concluded that the Board's determination was not arbitrary and transferred the matter to the Appellate Division.**

The Appellate, noting that it is undisputed that "the hearing officer did not issue a report with findings or recommendations" before the appointing authority made its determination to terminate Plaintiff 's employment, concluded that any action taken by the appointing authority was "unavoidably ... arbitrary", citing Matter of Wiggins v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 60 NY2d 385.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division held that "under the circumstances, the [Petitioner] is entitled to be reinstated to his position and to back pay and benefits, even if the proceedings against him eventually lead to the termination of his employment."

The court granted the Plaintiff's Article 78 petition, annulled the determination of the appointing authority, reinstate the Plaintiff to his former position, with full back pay and benefits, and "remitted the matter to the [appointing authority] for a new hearing and a new determination with respect to the charges."

* §75.2 of the Civil Service Law, in pertinent part, provides "In case a deputy or other person is so designated, he shall, for the purpose of such hearing, be vested with all the powers of such officer or body and shall make a record of such hearing which shall, with his recommendations, be referred to such officer or body for review and decision." 

 ** See CPLR §7804(g).

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

 

Employee terminated after failing to provide a urine sample for a drug test

The New York City Transit Authority [Respondent] terminated Plaintiff's employment as a bus operator because he failed to provide a urine sample for a drug test. The Plaintiff commenced a proceeding pursuant to CPLR Article 75 in an effort to vacate an arbitration award sustaining the Respondent's terminating Plaintiff's employment. The Supreme Court denied the petition, dismissed the proceeding and Plaintiff appealed.

The Appellate Division's decision noted:

1. The courts have limited power when reviewing an arbitration award, indicated an arbitrator "exceed[s] his [or her] power [within the meaning of the statute] where the ... award violates a strong public policy, is irrational or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power", citing Matter of New York City Tr. Auth. v Transport Workers' Union of Am., Local 100 AFL-CIO, 6 NY3d 332*;

2. "Even where an arbitrator has made an error of law or fact, courts generally may not disturb the arbitrator's decision", citing Matter of Falzone [New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.], 15 NY3d 530; and

3. "A party seeking to overturn an arbitration award bears a heavy burden and must establish a ground for vacatur by clear and convincing evidence."

Observing that Plaintiff failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the arbitration award should be vacated, the Appellate Division opined that although the Plaintiff contended on appeal that the arbitration award was irrational, the arbitration award was supported by evidence in the record, and, thus, was not irrational.

The Appellate Division's conclusion: Supreme Court properly denied and dismissed Plaintiff's CPLR Article 75 petition.

* See, also, Matter of Kowaleski [New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs.], 16 NY3d 85.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division decision posted on the Internet.