Plaintiff brought this action in federal district court
contending her employee organization [Union] declined to
demand arbitration of her workload grievances relating to the size of the
office space she was required to clean but acted upon a similar grievances advanced
by a coworker who was not Hispanic. Plaintiff charged the Union
with "unlawful discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. ('Title VII'); the New York State Human Rights
Law, N.Y. Executive. Law §290 et seq. ('NYSHRL'); and the New
York City Human Rights Law, N.Y.
City Admin. Code §8-101 et seq. ('NYCHRL');
as well as violation of the Union’s duty of fair
representation under the National Labor Relations Act ('NLRA'), 29 U.S.C. §151
et seq."
Upon conclusion of discovery, the Union
moved for, and the district court granted, summary judgment in favor of the Union,
determining that Plaintiff failed to show that the reason's the Union
advanced for declining to file a grievance on behalf of Plaintiff "was
pretextual, arbitrary, or taken in bad faith, or that the [Union's] decision
was otherwise motivated by discrimination."
The United States
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit [Circuit Court], viewing the federal
district court's granting summary judgment de
novo and viewing the evidence "in the light most favorable to [Plaintiff]
as to 'whether genuine issues of material fact preclude judgment as a matter of
law' ....” Also noting the Union withdrew the
arbitration of the coworker’s grievance in the aftermath of the COVID-19
pandemic, the Circuit Court said "To the extent that [Plaintiff]
challenges the district court’s determination that her
duty-of-fair-representation claims were untimely," the Circuit Court said
it would resolve those claims on the merits as follows:
Addressing Plaintiff's claim of Unlawful Discrimination Under
Title VII and NYSHRL, the Circuit Court opined Title VII bars a Union
from discriminating against its members because of, inter alia, race or national origin citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)].
"Under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792," Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of Title VII discrimination'by showing that:
"(1) she is a member of a protected class;
"(2) she is qualified for her position;
"(3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and
"(4) the circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination."
Once Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of going forward shifts to the Union to offer “some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the
differing treatment. In the event the Union "offers
such a reason for its actions, the burden shifts back to Plaintiff to
demonstrate that the proffered reason was pretextual.
The Circuit Court ruled that the Union
had satisfied this requirement.
Citing see Salamon v. Our Lady of Victory Hosp.,
514 F.3d 217, 226 n.9, the Circuit Court noted that the Second Circuit had recognized that Title VII
and NYSHRL discrimination claims are “analytically identical, applying the same
standard of proof to both claims”, and that "the reasoning in
this section applies to both claims". In this instance, explained the
Circuit Court, no reasonable jury could find, based on the record evidence,
find that the Union’s articulated reasoning was
pretextual or that Plaintiff's race or national origin argument was a motivating
factor in the Union’s decision-making.
Pointing out that Plaintiff had "acknowledged that the
coworker’s floor was the largest in the building, lending support to the
Union’s stated reason (supported by an affidavit from a Union attorney) for
taking only the coworker’s claim to arbitration", while [Paintiff] pointed
to "a troubling incident in which a Union official referred to her in a
text message as a 'stupid Dominican' after a Union election", Plaintiff
did not indicate how that statement was connected to the Union’s
arbitration decisions.*
Further, the Circuit Court held that "the coworker was
not an adequate comparator" because of the relative sizes of their
respective assigned cleaning areas.
Accordingly, the Circuit Court held that "the district court
did not err in granting summary judgment to the Union
under both Title VII and NYSHRL.
Turning to Plaintiff's "Unlawful Discrimination Under
NYCHRL" claim, the Circuit Court said that the Second Circuit has
"recognized that courts must analyze NYCHRL discrimination claims 'separately
and independently from any federal and state law claims'.” In the words of the
Circuit Court, summary judgment may be appropriate under the NYCHRL “if no
reasonable jury could conclude either that the defendant’s reasons were
pretextual, or that the defendant’s stated reasons were not its sole basis for
taking action, and that its conduct was based at least in part on discrimination.”
Focusing on Plaintiff's Fair Representation Under the
NLRA argument, citing Fowlkes v. Ironworkers Local 40, 790 F.3d 378, 387
(2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171, 177 (1967), the Circuit Court opined that "the duty of fair
representation is a 'statutory obligation,'" demanding that a union “serve
the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination ... to
exercise its discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid
arbitrary conduct".
The duty of fair representation, said the Circuit Court, is breached
where a union’s actions “with respect to a member are arbitrary, discriminatory,
or taken in bad faith.”
Finding that the Union "offered a clear explanation for
why its decision was neither arbitrary nor taken in bad faith", the
Circuit Court observed that Plaintiff rejected the Union’s
stated reasoning, but "offered no evidence supporting her assertion that
the Union pursues fewer arbitration grievances raised by
Hispanic workers than it does for non-Hispanic workers."
Opining that a reasonable jury could conclude that the Union’s
decision was not arbitrary, irrational, or taken in bad faith, the Circuit Court affirmed the
district court ruling, holding that the lower court "did not err in granting [the Union's motion for] summary judgment".
* Plaintiff, in her deposition,
"did not assert that she thought that the [Union's] arbitration decision was
connected to the Union election".
Click HERE to access the Circuit Court's
decision posted on the Internet.