Individual has no right to have another position created should the program in which he or she served is discontinued

Individual has no right to have another position created should the program in which he or she served is discontinued

Niroomand v. St. Lawrence County Board of Legislators, 82 A.D.2d 939

When the County Laboratory System was discontinued, hospitals using the service were expected to obtain laboratory service elsewhere or provide their own.

The former Director of the County Laboratory was not hired by any of the hospitals. She then attempted to compel the County to grant her permanent Civil Service status, retroactively, and then appoint her to an appropriate position pursuant to Section 70 of the Civil Service Law, or place her on a preferred list (Section 80, CSL).

The Appellate Division decided that there was no transfer of functions that would serve to entitle the former employee to a Section 70 transfer, noting that the closing of the Laboratory was to save money and avoid a duplication of services.

Holding the question of granting permanent civil service status academic, the court observed that even if Niroomand held such status, she was neither entitled to employment by any of the hospitals nor to placement on a preferred list because “it is unlikely that a County Laboratory will be re-established and there is no one whom [Niroomand] can displace”.

Significantly, the court indicated that the hospitals involved do not have to create a position for her.

N.B. Placement on a preferred list flows from a right created by Section 80 of the Civil Service Law, not whether placement pursuant to Section 81 of such law is expected or materializes.

Supervisor terminated for staging plot to “fool” employees

Supervisor terminated for staging plot to “fool” employees

Keith v NYS Thruway Authority, ;517 N.Y.S.2d 334

What might start as a “practical joke” may result in disciplinary action being taken against a supervisor or an employee if the consequences of such a “joke” adversely affect employees or the agency. A recent ruling by the Appellate Division, illustrates just such a situation.

Bertram Keith, an employee of the NYS Thruway Authority, was overseeing the installation of a new heating system in a toll plaza when some employees were apparently exposed to asbestos. The employees were granted sick leave and Keith reprimanded for “failing to take proper safety precautions.”

Believing that the employees had fabricated their illness, Keith, with the aid of his subordinates, created the appearance that asbestos removal at another location had commenced without appropriate precautions having been taken. In fact, the removal work had not yet been started. His scheme succeeded, producing worker panic and union threats of pulling all toll workers off the job.

As a result, charges of misconduct were filed against Keith alleging he had led employees to believe that their health was in danger and his actions placed the Thruway in a position where its tollbooths would be unmanned. A hearing officer found Keith guilty of the charges and recommended his termination.

When the Authority adopted the findings and recommendation of the hearing officer, Keith appealed, arguing that he should not have been terminated as “nobody was in actual peril.”

The Appellate Division affirmed Keith’s dismissal

The Appellate Division found that there was substantial evidence that Keith orchestrated a plot to simulate asbestos removal and that the deception resulted in worker panic and nearly caused the employees to abandon their workstations.

“Such conduct by a public employee in a position of supervision cannot be countenanced or lightly disregarded” said the Court. The fact that no employee had been exposed to asbestos was of no concern to the court as “the alarming situation created was precisely the result sought by (Keith)” and it was for that action that disciplinary charges were filed.

The Court than refused to modify the penalty stating that “in light of the egregious nature of (Keith’s) actions and resulting hysteria which flowed naturally and foreseeable therefrom, we cannot say that the penalty imposed by the agency was inconsistent with the notions of fairness.”

More severe disciplinary penalty imposed by Commissioner Of Education sustained

More severe disciplinary penalty imposed by Commissioner Of Education sustained

Kloepfer v. Ambach 82 A.D.2d 974

A teacher having 11 years of satisfactory service was charged with being ineffective and incompetent following her transfer to another school. After an Education Law Section 3020-1 hearing, the hearing officer recommended that she be suspended for six months and placed in another school.

On appeal, the Commissioner of Education held the teacher should be terminated. When the teacher sued, the Court held the Commissioner could impose the penalty of dismissal.

Zero drug tolerance policy must be consistent with terms of the collective bargaining agreement

Zero drug tolerance policy must be consistent with terms of the collective bargaining agreement

Matter of Matter of Shenendehowa Cent. School Dist. Bd. of Educ. (Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc., Local 1000, 2011 NY Slip Op 08703, Appellate Division, Third Department

The Civil Service Employees Association had filed a grievance challenging the dismissal of one of the employees in the collective bargaining unit it represented was terminated after failing a random test for drug and alcohol test. The issues that the parties jointly presented to the arbitrator were, "Did [the school district] violate Article IV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement [CBA] when it terminated [the employee]? If so, what shall the remedy be?"

The arbitrator determined that employee had tested positive for marijuana, but that the school district had violated the CBA by terminating her. As a remedy, the arbitrator directed that the employee be reinstate, without back pay, but required that she comply with follow-up drug and alcohol testing and an evaluation by a substance abuse professional.

Supreme Court granted the Shenendehowa Central School District’s Article 75 petition seeking vacate an arbitration award thereby “reinstating the employee’s termination.”

The Appellate Division disagreed, ruling that the award was not against public policy was rational, and in making the award the arbitrator did not exceed his powers, holding that “Supreme Court should have confirmed the arbitration award.”

The Appellate Division explained that “If a matter is submitted to arbitration, reviewing courts should not interpret substantive conditions of the agreement or delve into the merits of the dispute.” Citing Matter of Grasso, 72 AD2d 1463 [Leave to appeal denied, 15 NY3d 703], the court said that "Courts must give deference to an arbitrator's decision and cannot examine the merits of an arbitration award, even if the arbitrator misapplied or misinterpreted the law or facts, but a court may vacate an award" where it "violates a strong public policy, is irrational or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power." Further, the Appellate Division stated that "[W]here an agreement is 'reasonably susceptible of the construction given it by the arbitrator, a court may not vacate the award," citing Matter of Albany County Sheriffs Local 775 of N.Y. State Law Enforcement Officers Union, Dist. Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO [County of Albany], 27 AD3d 979.

Underlying the school district’s decision to terminate the employee was its assertion that it had “a zero tolerance policy concerning positive drug tests, thereby mandating discharge.” However, said the court, no such written policy was produced in evidence. Rather, the school district’s written drug testing policy states that a violation "shall be grounds for disciplinary action including, but not limited to, fines, suspension and/or discharge."

Here, said the Appellate Division, the arbitrator reasoned that the school district did not have a written zero tolerance policy. When read in conjunction with the CBA, the district’s policy “permitted either suspension without pay or discharge after a positive drug test result.”

The arbitrator, the court found, determined that school district had violated the CBA by refusing to consider the disciplinary options provided for in petitioner's own policy and the CBA, instead imposing the penalty of discharge as if it were mandatory.

According to the decision, if the school district intended to implement a zero tolerance policy, it could and should have negotiated with CSEA to include such mandatory language in the CBA. Not having done so, petitioner must abide by the language actually negotiated for and agreed upon with CSEA.

Having determined that the school district had violated the CBA, the arbitrator — who was permitted by the parties' statement of the issues to determine a remedy — then found the appropriate penalty for respondent to be reinstatement without back pay, which equated to a suspension of approximately six months without pay, a rational result and with the powers granted to the arbitrator.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_08703.htm

Appointment of hearing officer and due process

Appointment of hearing officer and due process

Alhmeyer v. Retirement System, 82 A.D.2d 954

An employee occasionally may challenge the results of a disciplinary action on the grounds that due process had been denied because the appointing officer designated the hearing officer to consider the disciplinary action.

In Alhmeyer v. Retirement System, 82 A.D.2d 954, the Appellate Division held that in the absence of a factual showing of some impropriety in the hearing process, the mere fact that the Comptroller appointed the hearing officer and the doctors who examined Alhmeyer on behalf of the Retirement System does not constitute a denial of due process.

It is believed that courts would apply the same standard with respect to the appointment of hearing officers in disciplinary actions pursuant to Section 75 of the Civil Service Law as well as in hearings required pursuant to Sections 71, 72 and 73 of the Civil Service Law and similar administrative proceedings.