Probationary employee terminated after testing positive for cocaine

Probationary employee terminated after testing positive for cocaine

2015 NY Slip Op 03359, Appellate Division, Second Department

The New York City Transit Authority [Authority] terminated the employment of a subway conductor [Conductor] who was then serving as a probationary employee.

Conductor had sustained injuries in an off-duty motor vehicle accident and was absent from work for a period of more than 21 days. As a condition of returning to work, Conductor was required to undergo a medical evaluation, including the administration of a drug test. Conductor tested positive for cocaine and the Authority terminated his employment.

Conductor filed an Article 78 petition seeking a court order directing his reinstatement to his former position. Supreme Court denied Conductor’s petition and Conductor appealed the court’s dismissal of the proceeding.

The Appellate Division sustained the Supreme Court’s ruling. Citing York v McGuire, 63 NY2d 760,  the court explained that a probationary employee may be discharged without a hearing* and without a statement of reasons in the absence of any demonstration that the termination was in bad faith, for a constitutionally impermissible purpose, or in violation of statutory or decisional law. Finding that Conductor failed to carry his burden of presenting competent proof of bad faith, illegal reasons, or a violation of statutory or decisional law, the court dismissed his appeal.

As to the Authority’s decision to terminate Conductor, the Appellate Division said that “the penalty of termination was not so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness.”

* N.B. Where a probationary period has been set in terms of a minimum and a maximum period of probation, case law holds that if the appointing authority elected to terminate a probationary employee during his or her minimum period of probation, such an individual is entitled to a notice and hearing in the same manner as a tenured individual.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_03359.htm

Unscrupulous conduct or gross dereliction of duty warrants the removal of an officer of a town, village and other political subdivisions of the State pursuant to Public Officers Law §36

Unscrupulous conduct or gross dereliction of duty warrants the removal of an officer of a town, village and other political subdivisions of the State pursuant to Public Officers Law §36

2015 NY Slip Op 02815, Appellate Division, Third Department

Public Officers Law §36 provides that certain officers of a political division of the State may be removed from his or her office for misconduct, maladministration, malfeasance or malversation in office.  Loosely defined, these terms are used to describe, respectively, [1] acting unlawfully; [2] administer or manage badly or inefficiently; [3] commission of an act that is unequivocally illegal; and [4] corrupt behavior while serving in a position of trust.

In this action to remove a public officer from his positions with a Village the Appellate Division explained that “To warrant removal, an official's misconduct must amount to more than minor violations and must consist of "self-dealing, corrupt activities, conflict of interest, moral turpitude, intentional wrongdoing or violation of a public trust” constituting "unscrupulous conduct or gross dereliction of duty or conduct that . . . connotes a pattern of misconduct and abuse of authority."

Residents of the Village commenced this proceeding in the Appellate Division*seeking to remove the incumbent [Officer] from the public offices of Mayor and Village Manager pursuant to Public Officers Law §36. When Officer moved to dismiss the petition the court denied the motion. The Appellate Division then referred the matter to a Referee to conduct a hearing and report his findings and recommendations to the court.

In the course of the hearing the residents offered testimony from a Village Trustee, an Assistant District Attorney, two Village police officers and a Village employee, as well as submitting affidavits and other evidence to support their allegations.  In contrast, Officer, who was present and was represented by counsel during the hearing, offered no testimony or evidence on his own behalf.

Ultimately the Referee issued a report recommending the removal of Officer from his positions. When the residents moved to confirm the Referee's report, Officer cross-moved to disconfirm the report and dismiss the petition.

The Appellate Division confirmed the Referee's report, concluding that Officer’s conduct warranted his removal from the offices of Mayor and Village Administrator pursuant to Public Officers Law §36. The court commented that Officer’s actions "rise to the level of 'unscrupulous conduct or gross dereliction of duty or conduct that connotes a pattern of misconduct and abuse of authority.’"

* §36 provides, in pertinent part, that an application for such removal “may be made by any citizen resident of such town, village, improvement district or fire district … and shall be made to the appellate division of the supreme court held within the judicial department embracing such town, village, improvement district or fire district.”

The decision, which sets out the acts or omissions alleged to warrant Officer’s removal from office are set out in the decision of the Appellate Division which is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_02815.htm

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A disciplinary penalty consisting of a “51 days' forfeiture” deemed already served while on prehearing suspension without pay, found appropriate under the circumstances

A disciplinary penalty consisting of a “51 days' forfeiture” deemed already served while on prehearing suspension without pay, found appropriate under the circumstances 
2015 NY Slip Op 02913, Appellate Division, First Department 

Supreme Court annulled the New York City’s Police Commissioner finding an employee [Employee] of the New York City Police Department [NYPD] guilty of multiple disciplinary charges filed against Employee and the penalty imposed by the Commissioner: 51 days' forfeiture, deemed already served while on pretrial suspension.”

The Police Commissioner appealed and the Appellate Division unanimously reversed the lower court’s ruling “on the law” and reinstated the penalty set by the Commissioner.

The Appellate Division noted that Employee had been found guilty of multiple disciplinary charges stemming from a variety of circumstances by a hearing officer including:

Accessing police computer information for personal purposes,

Supplying a resident address different from that of her actual address to obtain more favorable insurance rates, and

Patronizing an unlicensed establishment that served alcohol.

The court also noted that Employee’s at the NYPD reflected two prior disciplinary matters, one of which stemmed from “a DWI arrest” and resulted in a penalty of, among other things, one year on “dismissal probation.”

Under the circumstances, said the Appellate Division, the penalty imposed by the Commissioner was not so disproportionate to Employee's offenses “as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness” and found no basis to disturb the penalty imposed on Employee.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_02913.htm

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Rules and regulations of the Department of Civil Service reviewed.in accordance with §207 of the State Administrative Procedure Act

Rules and regulations of the Department of Civil Service reviewed in accordance with §207 of the State Administrative Procedure Act

Source: The New York State Register


§207 of the State Administrative Procedures Act, in pertinent part, provides that any rule adopted on or after its effective ion for the rule, provided that at a minimum every rule shall be initially reviewed no later than in the fifth calendar year after the year in which the rule is adopted, and, thereafter, every rule shall be re-reviewed at five-year intervals.

The April 15, 2015 issue of the New York State Register reports the publication of the Five Year review of certain existing rules and regulations set out in 4 NYCRR and the conclusion of the forty-five (45) day public comment period. No public comments were received regarding any of the rules and regulations listed below during this forty-five day comment period.

The rules and regulations reviewed were found to “have functioned consistent with the purposes underlying their adoption and are continued without modification:”

Adopted in 2000

1. Amendment to Chapter I of Title 4 of NYCRR (Rules for the Classified Service). The resolution added a new subdivision (vii) to paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of Rule 4.5 to provide for a probationary term for the position of “Thruway Maintenance Worker” of not less than 26 weeks nor more than 52 weeks.

2. Amendments to Chapter IV of 4 NYCRR (Regulations of the State Civil Service Commission [Commission’s Regulations]) A new §55.5 codified the long-standing Civil Service Commission practice of granting prior approval for certain examination rating keys, according to the conditions and standards set forth within such section, upon the request of the Civil Service Department’s Director of Examinations or his or her designee. The existing §§55.5 and 55.6 were renumbered §§55.6 and 55.7, respectively.

Adopted in 2005

Amendment to Chapter I of Title 4 of NYCRR (Rules for the Classified Service). The resolution added a new paragraph (viii) to subdivision (1) of subsection (b) of Rule 4.5 to provide for a probationary term for the positions of “University Police Officer 1” and “University Police Officer 1 (Spanish Language)” of not less than 52 weeks nor more than 78 weeks.

Adopted in 2010

Amendment to Chapter V of Title 4 of NYCRR (Regulations of the Department of Civil Service [President’s Regulations]). The resolution added a new paragraph to Rule 72.1 designating the Authorities Budget Office as a separate unit for suspension, demotion or displacement within the Department of State.

Individual’s right to due process in a disciplinary hearing was not violated when the complaining witness was absent from the hearing due to intimidation and feared to testify

Individual’s right to due process in a disciplinary hearing was not violated when the complaining witness was absent from the hearing due to intimidation and feared to testify

2015 NY Slip Op 03075, Appellate Division, First Department

The Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health adopted an Administrative Law Judge's recommendation to sustain the three charges alleging patient abuse and/or neglect by a certified nurse's aide [Aide]. The Aide appealed the Commissioner's determination but the Appellate Division sustained the Commissioner’s finding that the Aide was guilty of these three charges alleged in the notice of discipline.

The Appellate Division said that there was no basis for disturbing the ALJ’s determination with respect to the credibility of witnesses, citing Berenhaus v Ward, 70 NY2d 436.

The court found that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s findings including:

1. Consistent testimony from several witnesses;

2. Photographs of the patient’s bruises; and

3. The facility's clinical records.

Further, the Appellate Division said that the Aide’s right to administrative due process was not violated as the result of the patient's absence at the hearing as the record supports the ALJ’s finding that the patient was intimidated and was afraid to testify.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_03075.htm