Applying the terms of a settlement agreement settling a disciplinary action

During the course of Plaintiff's disciplinary hearing Plaintiff, represented by counsel, entered into a settlement agreement with the appointing authority [Employer] acting "on its own behalf and on behalf of its present and former ... employees." 

The settlement agreement provided that the Employer would discontinue the disciplinary proceeding and remove a letter of disciplinary charges from the Plaintiff's personnel file while Plaintiff agreed to retire from his employment with the Employer and to release the Employer and its employees "from all claims or causes of action he may have or claim to have . . . including any and all claims in any way arising out of, or related to, his employment with the Employer, or his separation from that employment."

Subsequently Plaintiff commenced an action to recover damages for defamation, alleging that the individuals [Defendants] named in his complaint, also employees of the Employer, had falsely accused him of actions that led to the disciplinary charges that were preferred by the Employer against him.

Defendants move to dismiss the complaint, submitting a copy of the settlement agreement that had been executed by the Plaintiff in connection with the discontinuance of the disciplinary proceeding that had been brought against him. Notwithstanding Plaintiff's argument to the contrary, Supreme Court granted the Defendant's motion "for failure to state a cause of action" and Plaintiff appealed.

The Appellate Division explained that [1] the terms of the release contained in the settlement agreement clearly and unambiguously encompass Plaintiff's action and [2] Plaintiff failed to allege any unlawful or wrongful threat by the Employer that could serve as the basis of a claim of duress, which was the only ground the plaintiff alleged to void the release. Thus, opined the Appellate Division, "the release executed by the [Plaintiff] should be enforced according to its terms."

The Appellate Division noted the following elements with respect to a release or settlement agreement that will be enforced by a court:

1. "A release is a contract, and its construction is governed by contract law;"

2.  "A party may move for judgment dismissing one or more causes of action asserted against him [or her] on the ground that . . . the cause of action may not be maintained because of . . . [a] release";

3 "Where . . . the language of a release is clear and unambiguous, the signing of a release is a jural act 'binding on the parties';"

4.  "Generally, a valid release constitutes a complete bar to an action on a claim which is the subject of the release"; and

5. "Although a defendant has the initial burden of establishing that it has been released from any claims, a signed release shifts the burden ... to the plaintiff to show that there has been fraud, duress or some other fact which will be sufficient to void the release."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2019/2019_06588.htm

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Disciplinary penalty imposed on an individual found guilty of disciplinary charges challenged as being too lenient

Courts frequently are asked to review a penalty imposed by an appointing authority following a disciplinary action. Typically such actions are brought by the employee on the theory that the penalty imposed was too harsh.

In such cases the courts usually apply the so-called Pell Doctrine: was the penalty imposed so disproportionate to the offense, in the light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness [Pell v Board of Education, 34 NY^2d 222].

This case is the mirror image of most Pell Doctrine cases: a complaint that the penalty imposed was too lenient!

The case arose when the School District [District] filed disciplinary charges against a teacher prior to the amendment of §3020-a of the Education Law in 1994 [Chapter 691, Laws of 1994].

An (old) §3020-a hearing panel found a teacher guilty of a number of specifications set out in charges alleging "inappropriate remarks and inappropriate physical contact" with female students by the teacher. The penalty imposed: suspension without pay for one and one-half years. The District  challenged the §3020-a hearing panel's decision by asking the New  York State Commissioner of Education to intervene. The District contended that the penalty should have been "more stringent." The Commissioner sustained the penalty imposed by the panel. The District then asked the courts to impose a harsher penalty -- dismissal.

What standard would the courts apply in determining if the penalty imposed is too lenient? The Appellate Division said it would apply same Pell standard that courts use to determine if a penalty is too harsh.*

Finding it neither arbitrary nor capricious, the Appellate Division sustained the Commissioner's ruling. The Court said that the underlying facts, coupled the absence of charges ever having previously been filed against the teacher during his 21-year career, supported the Commissioner's determination that the penalty imposed was proportionate to the offenses for which the teacher was found guilty.

In contrast, in Hickman v Poughkeepsie City School District, 237 A.D.2d 289, the Appellate Division sustained the dismissal of a school custodian found guilty of excessive absence, habitual lateness, falsification of his time sheets and excessive use of the telephone during his working hours as consistent with the Pell Doctrine.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

https://www.leagle.com/decision/1997958237ad2d7211189

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A Reasonable Disciplinary Penalty Under the Circumstances

Considering Title VII complaints based on the Continuing Violation Doctrine and allegations of Disparate Treatment

Plaintiff-Appellant [Plaintiff] sued his current employer, the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance [NYSTF] pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 alleging that NYSTF discriminated against him on the basis of race and retaliated against him when it failed to promote him on various occasions from 1997 to 2017.

The District Court properly concluded that Plaintiff’s Title VII claims based on acts alleged to have occurred on or before July 15, 2016 were time-barred as Title VII requires individuals aggrieved by acts of discrimination in states like New York that have state or local employment discrimination enforcement mechanisms to file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC] within 300 days “after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.”*

The majority of the alleged discriminatory acts that Plaintiff alleges in his complaint and supporting documents occurred years before this date. Notwithstanding Plaintiff's argument to the contrary, the district court correctly found that the continuing violation doctrine did not revive the claims based on these acts.

The Circuit Court explained that under the continuing violation doctrine, “if a Title VII plaintiff files an EEOC charge that is timely as to any incident of discrimination in furtherance of an ongoing policy of discrimination, all claims of acts of discrimination under that policy will be timely even if they would be untimely standing alone.” However, said the court, the continuing violation doctrine does not apply to discrete unlawful acts, even if the discrete acts were undertaken “pursuant to a general policy that results in other discrete acts occurring within the limitations period.”

Holding that “[A]n employer’s failure to promote is by its very nature a discrete act,” the Circuit Court ruled that the District Court correctly concluded that Plaintiff’s complaint, which focused on multiple failures to promote, alleged only a series of discrete acts of retaliation and discrimination, occurring over the course of more than twenty years and often separated by years. Thus the continuing violation doctrine did not revive Plaintiff's time-barred claims.

Considering Plaintiff's "disparate treatment claims based on the NYSTF’s failure to promote him between June 2, 2016 and May 10, 2017," the Circuit Court indicated that at the pleadings stage, Title VII “requires a plaintiff asserting a discrimination claim to allege two elements: (1) the employer discriminated against him (2) because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”

Although a plaintiff may adequately plead this second element “by alleging facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination,” the Circuit Court found that the District Court correctly ruled that Plaintiff failed to make this showing because he made only conclusory allegations that he was denied promotions due to racial animus.

Finally, the Circuit Court held that the District Court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s retaliation claim for failure to state a claim, explaining that to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, an employee must show:

(1) participation in a protected activity;

(2) that the defendant knew of the protected activity;

(3) an adverse employment action; and

(4) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.”

The District Court, said the Circuit Court, correctly held that allegations that Plaintiff was passed over for promotions in 2016 and 2017 were too attenuated from the protected activity to plausibly allege a causal connection between the two.

* 42 USC §2000e-5(e)(1) claims falling outside this statute of limitations are time-barred unless they are subject to waiver, estoppel, or equitable tolling, or fall within the continuing violation exception to the 300-day rule.

The decision if posted on the Internet at:

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/a3712f29-09cf-44d6-a607-af2f13c230a6/1/doc/18-2302_so.pdf#xml=http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/a3712f29-09cf-44d6-a607-af2f13c230a6/1/hilite/

Authority to modify or vacate an arbitration award may be limited by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement

A collective bargaining agreement between the parties provided that if an employee was found guilty of charges involving an assault, the appointing authority had the power to set and impose a penalty.

An employee was charged with assaulting another worker. Found guilty of the charge, the penalty imposed by the appointing authority was dismissal. The union, on behalf of the employee, appealed the appointing authority's determination to the Tripartite Arbitration Board [Board] in accordance with the controlling contract disciplinary grievance procedure.

When the Board denied the grievance but modified the penalty imposed to a suspension rather than termination, the appointing authority filed an Article 75 petition pursuant to §7511 petition seeking to vacate the Board's action. The appointing authority contended that the Board had exceeded its authority when it modified the penalty the appointing authority had imposed.

Supreme Court agreed and vacated that portion of the award that modified the penalty imposed by the appointing authority. The Appellate Division subsequently rejected the union's appeal challenging the lower court's ruling. The Appellate Division said that a court could vacate an arbitrator's award for a limited numbers of reasons, including:

a. the violation of a strong public policy;

b. finding that the award was irrational; or

c. determining that the award clearly exceeded a specific limitation on the arbitrator's powers.

Here the Appellate Division found the limitation described in (c) above controlled as the collective bargaining agreement specifically provided that where the Board sustained the disciplinary charges, the penalty imposed by the Authority must be sustained as well.

Accordingly, the Court ruled that the Board, having sustained the assault charge, had no authority to modify the penalty fixed by the appointing authority -- termination of the employee.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

https://www.leagle.com/decision/1997660239ad2d4211268

Applying the Principle of “Obey Now, Grieve Later"

Under the “obey now, grieve later” principle, employees are required to follow their supervisor's orders when given, and, if they have an objection, contest the order subsequently through formal grievance procedures.

A New York City public employee was served with disciplinary charges alleging that he had disobeyed a lawful order to report for drug testing and failed to timely provide medical documentation justifying his inability to travel to the clinic for testing.

Here, however, the worker claimed one of the recognized exceptions to the principle, a situation where obeying the order would present an imminent and serious threat to the worker’s health or safety.*

OATH Administrative Law Judge Garcia found that the worker made out an "imminent and serious threat" to the worker’s health or safety defense. The worker presented documentation from a hospital emergency room showing that he had fainted on a subway platform on his way to the clinic and was told by a doctor not to travel for several days.

Judge Garcia recommended that the charges against the employee be dismissed.

Other decisions in which ignoring the principle "work now, grieve later" was a consideration include  Ferreri v. New York State Thruway Authority, 62 N.Y.2d 855 [refusal to obey an order claimed justified as consistent with the advice of union officials], Scazafavo v Erie County Water Authority, 30 AD3d 1034, [refusal to comply with an order to submit to drug testing because the employee did not believe that he was subject to random drug testing] and Tanvikr v NYC Health and Hospital Corporation, 112 AD 3d 436, [employee refused to obey orders to undertake training for a new position after being reassigned].

* Other exceptions include situations in which it is indisputably clear that the order is beyond the power of management.

The OATH decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://archive.citylaw.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/17/oath/19_cases/19-1454.pdf