Applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel in the course of litigation

Plaintiff, an individual earlier employed by the defendant [School District] commenced an action seeking, among other things, damages based on allegations that School District had violated the New York State's Human Rights Law [Executive Law §290 et seq.] by engaging in age discrimination and had violated Article 1, §8 of the New York State Constitution by retaliating against Plaintiff for, among other things, complaining about failures to follow certain safety precautions.

Prior to the commencement of the instant action School District had terminated Plaintiff, which action was challenged by Plaintiff's union filing a grievance on his behalf. In the arbitration that followed the arbitrator concluded that School District had just cause to terminate Plaintiff.

However, while the arbitration was pending, Plaintiff commenced the instant action in Supreme Court. Prior to discovery, School District moved for, among other things, summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff's amended complaint. In support of its motion, School District contended that Plaintiff's claims were collaterally estopped as a result of the arbitration award. Supreme Court agreed with School District and granted its motion insofar as it sought summary judgment.

Plaintiff appealed the Supreme Court's judgment dismissing Plaintiff's amended complaint, which judgment was reverse by the Appellate Division.

The Appellate Division explained that Supreme Court "erred in granting the motion to the extent that it sought summary judgment based upon the application of collateral estoppel", observing that "It is well settled that there are 'but two necessary requirements for the invocation of the doctrine of collateral estoppel';

1. "There must be an identity of issue which has necessarily been decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action; and

2. "There must have been a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling."

In the words of the Appellate Division, "The party seeking to invoke [the doctrine of] collateral estoppel has the burden of showing the identity of the issue, while the party trying to avoid application of the doctrine must establish the lack of a full and fair opportunity to litigate".

The Appellate Division opined that School District failed to establish the "identity of issue" necessary for application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel inasmuch as "the arbitration proceeding concerned whether the allegedly unlawful actions by [the School District] violated the collective bargaining agreement between [the] union and the [School District]" and did not address Plaintiff's claims of discrimination or retaliation.

The Appellate Division then reversed the Supreme Court's judgment, denied the School District's motion, and reinstated Plaintiff's amended complaint.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Seeking a religious exemption from complying with employer's mandate that the employee obtain the COVID-19 vaccine

The petitioner [Applicant] for unemployment insurance benefits was notified by his Employer that, to continue his employment, he was required to obtain the first dose of the COVID-19 vaccine by a certain date pursuant to directives of the Mayor of the City of New York and the New York City Commissioner of Health and Mental Hygiene.

Claimant submitted a written reasonable accommodation request from the vaccination requirement for religious reasons, and he continued to work during the pendency of his request. Ultimately Employer denied Claimant's request for an exemption, finding that Claimant failed to provided sufficient religious documentation, that Claimant failed to explain how religious tenets conflict with the vaccination requirement and that he had no history of vaccination/medication refusals. Claimant subsequen0lty filed for retirement and stopped working on the last day he could submit verification of vaccination. Claimant then applied for unemployment insurance benefits. 

The Department of Labor subsequently issued an initial determination finding, among other things, that Claimant was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because he had voluntarily separated from his employment without good cause. Claimant appealed and an Administrative Law Judge [ALJ] sustained that portion of the Department's initial determination disqualifying claimant from receiving benefits on the ground that Claimant voluntarily separated from his employment without good cause.

Upon administrative review of the ALJ's findings and decision, the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board remanded the matter and directed Claimant to provide testimony and other evidence to establish the relevant doctrines of his religious beliefs, whether and how he practices those beliefs, whether those beliefs impact his decision to receive other vaccinations and/or to seek other medical treatment, and whether Claimant's decision not to be vaccinated was based upon safety concerns.

Claimant, however, failed to make such a showing at the remand hearings and the Board affirmed the disqualification of Claimant from receiving benefits, concluding that Claimant failed to demonstrate that his noncompliance with the COVID-19 vaccination mandate was rooted in a sincerely held religious belief and that his voluntary separation from his employment was therefore without good cause.

Claimant appealed the Board's affirming the administrative decision disqualifying him  from receiving unemployment insurance benefits based on a finding that Claimant had "separated from employment without good cause. The Appellate Divisions sustained the Board's ruling.

The Appellate Division ruled that, under these circumstances, and deferring to the Board's credibility assessments and the inferences to be drawn from Claimant's testimony and submissions, substantial evidence supported the Board's determination that Claimant's noncompliance with the Employer's mandate was not based upon a sincerely held religious belief and that, as a consequence, Claimant's separation from his employment was without good cause.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Paying plaintiff's salary and having the power to control plaintiff's conduct held sufficient to establish the defendant was the plaintiff's employee in this discrimination action

The former secretary [Plaintiff] to a former New York State Supreme Court Justice [Justice] commenced this human rights action naming as defendants the New York State Supreme Court, Monroe County, the Unified Court System of the State of New York, the Office of Court Administration, and the Office of the Managing Inspector General for Bias Matters [Defendants]. Plaintiff alleged Defendants discriminated against her on the basis of sex in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law [NYSHRL (Executive Law §290 et seq.)] Plaintiff alleged that she was the victim of sexual abuse and harassment of Plaintiff by Justice.

Supreme Court granted Defendants' pre-answer motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) (7) and (c), holding that Plaintiff was not Defendants' employee and therefore Defendants were not liable under the NYSHRL. Plaintiff appealed Supreme Court's ruling.

The Appellate Division reversed the lower court's ruling, denied Defendant's motion, and reinstated the Plaintiff's complaint. 

The Court noted that it agreed with Plaintiff that her complaint stated a cause of action against Defendants for a violation under the NYSHRL. Citing Van Ostrand v Latham, 222 AD3d 1382, the Appellate Division explained that  when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) ... "[this Court] must afford the pleadings a liberal construction, accept the allegations of the complaint as true and provide plaintiff . . . the benefit of every possible favorable inference". Further, the Appellate Division opined that "Whether a plaintiff can ultimately establish its allegations is not part of the calculus in determining a motion to dismiss".

Accepting the facts as alleged in the Plaintiff's complaint as true, the Appellate Division held that Plaintiff's argument that Defendants were Plaintiff's employers was sufficient to establish an employer-employee relationship by reciting certain factors including that alleging that Defendants paid Plaintiff's salary and had the power to control Plaintiff's conduct.

Click HERE to access the Appellate Division's decision posted on the Internet.

Topics addressed by Rochester New York attorney Nicole Black in columns recently published by the Daily Record

In-State But Out of Reach: North Carolina Unable to Discipline New York Attorney: Click here to Read the whole entry »

Ethical Jury Selection in the AI Era: Click here to Read the whole entry »

Three attorneys sanctioned by United States Federal District Court Judge after submitting AI generated citations for decisions that did not exist to the court

U.S. District Judge Anna Manasco, Northern District of Alabama, has publicly reprimanded three lawyers employed to defend the State of Alabama in a case involving the State's prison system by issuing a "Sanctions Order" after determining that the "artificial intelligence" [AI] program that had been used to prepare material submitted to the Court in the instant proceeding included certain case citations that did not, in fact, exist.* 

Such events appear to be occurring with increasing frequency as the result of the use AI programs by attorneys and others involved in preparing materials for use in litigation. In the instant situation the Court found that the case citations AI reported had not been verified before being included in the material presented to the Court for consideration.

The Court's order directed the three attorneys, among other things, "to provide a copy of the court's order to their clients, opposing counsel, and presiding judge in every pending state or federal case in which they are counsel of record; provide a copy of the court's order to every attorney in their law firm; and to comply with this requirement within ten days from the date of this order". The three attorneys must also certify to the Court that all the requirements set out in Judge Manasco's order have been satisfied within 24 hours of such compliance.

Judge Manasco's order also directed the Clerk of Court "to serve a copy of [her] order on the General Counsel of the Alabama State Bar and any other applicable licensing authorities for further proceedings as appropriate."

* Such "creativity" on the part of AI is sometimes referred to as an "AI generated hallucination".

Click HERE to access Judge Manasco's order posted on the Internet.