Proceeding with an administrative hearing in the absence of the individual and his or her attorney

Proceeding with an administrative hearing in the absence of the individual and his or her attorney
2013 NY Slip Op 06900, Appellate Division, Third Department

One of the issues considered by the Appellate Division in this appeal challenging the New York State’s Administrative Review Board for Professional Medical Conduct revocation of the physician's license to practice medicine in New York State was the allegation that the physician was denied administrative due process.

With respect to the physician’s due process claims, the Appellate Division found that:

1. The physician was provided with fair notice of the charges and hearing dates, an opportunity to present a defense and a fair hearing that comported with due process.

2. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) did not abuse her discretion in denying the physician's untimely, last minute request for an adjournment of the mutually agreed-upon second day of the hearing.

According to the ruling, the parties had mutually agreed upon a number of additional hearing dates in the course of the first day of the hearing.

The day before that second hearing date, April 12, the physician's attorney belatedly an email to the ALJ and the BPMC’s counsel stating that the physician was "out of the country," she was "[un]able to contact him" and requesting an adjournment until the next hearing date. In response to the BPMC's counsel immediate objection to the request, the physician's attorney sent an email that she would "not attend the hearing."

The following day, neither physician nor his attorney appeared as scheduled for the second day of the hearing. The ALJ denied the requested adjournment, noting that, just that morning, she had received the belated email adjournment request and that physician’s attorney had offered no valid reason for her failure to appear on the physician’s behalf.

The ALJ then proceeded with the second day of hearing, notwithstanding the absence of the physician and his attorney, during which testimony was heard and BPMC rested.

The Appellate Division said that it found no error or abuse of discretion, particularly given that no good cause was offered by the physician’s attorney for their absence, noting that the request for a postponement was untimely in that “the notice of hearing had clearly advised [the physician and his attorney] that any requests for adjournments, among other requirements, had to be made ‘at least five days prior to the scheduled hearing date,’ and they were informed at the outset of the first hearing that it could continue in their absence.”

The Appellate Division also noted that the physician contended that a week prior to the second hearing date he left the county due to an unspecified death in his family, but offered no explanation why he did not, at that time, contact his attorney, the ALJ or BPMC to timely request an adjournment. In addition, the court said that the physician’s subsequent “unsubstantiated” claim advanced in the course of an administrative appeal that his attorney was ill on the second hearing date was properly rejected as not credible, “particularly given that [the physician’s attorney] made no mention of any illness in her belated emails requesting an adjournment.”

Further, said the court, the physician waived his limited right to cross-examine the witness who had testified in his absence “by failing, without good cause, to appear.”

The court said it was not persuaded that the penalty imposed for the sustained charges -- of revocation the physician’s license to practice medicine in New York State -- was so disproportionate to the physician's pattern of misconduct, as reflected in the Board's findings, "as to shock one's sense of fairness."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_06900.htm
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Final report addressing alleged unlawful discrimination, harassment and intimidation of certain Schoharie County employees posted on the Internet

Final report addressing alleged unlawful discrimination, harassment and intimidation of certain Schoharie County employees posted on the Internet

The “Confidential Final Report Concerning Discrimination, Harassment and Intimidation in the County Workplace for the Schoharie County Board of Supervisors” submitted by Mark J. Fitzmaurice, Esq., of the law firm of Fitzmaurice and Welsh, White Plains, New York, to Schoharie County Board of Supervisors has been posted on the Internet at

http://www.schohariecounty-ny.gov/CountyWebSite/countyreport.html.

The 117-page report sets out the procedures and methodology used in the evaluation process, together with Mr. Fizmaurice's findings and recommendations. Also posted are the more than 50 exhibits related to the report.

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The statutory text provides the clearest indication of “legislative intent” and should be construed by the courts to give effect to its plain meaning

The statutory text provides the clearest indication of “legislative intent” and should be construed by the courts to give effect to its plain meaning

Sheriff Officers Assn., Inc. v County of Nassau, 2013 NY Slip Op 06870, Appellate Division, Second Department

In June 2011, the Nassau County Legislature approved a bill authorizing the amendment of the County's 2011 budget in order "to abolish certain positions of employment . . . as a means of addressing the current economic shortfall." The County Legislature subsequently adopted a bill amending the budget [Local Law 198-2011] permitting the abolition of, among other things, up to 48 correction corporal positions.

Section 1 of Local Law 198-2011 stated, in relevant part, that the positions listed in "Appendix A to this Ordinance" "shall be deemed abolished effective no later than December 29, 2011." Section 3 of Local Law 198-2011 provides that, "Appendix A to this Ordinance may have individual line items in it stayed by Executive Order. Nothing contained herein shall limit the stay to an individual line and this shall be interpreted as permitting a stay applicable to individual job titles."

Consistent with the Local Law 198-2011, the County Executive ultimately stayed the abolition of 18 of the 48 correction corporal positions. The incumbents of the remaining 30 correction corporals were demoted to correction officer positions as their correction corporal upon the abolishment of the positions they encumbered.

The Sheriffs Association filed an CPLR Article 78 petition with Supreme Court alleging that the County Executive acted in violation of Local Law 198-2011 when he abolished the 30 correction corporal titles, contending that Local Law 198-2011 was not self-executing and required the County to take some affirmative action to abolish the listed positions before December 29, 2011.Thus, argued the Association, the County Executive untimely demoted 30 of the 48 correction corporals on January 12, 2012.

The Appellate Division ruled that the Association failed to meet its burden of proof in that it did not prove that the County Executive acted in violation of lawful procedure or that his act was affected by an error of law, was arbitrary and capricious, or was an abuse of discretion. The court explained that “When considering questions of statutory interpretation, a court's ‘primary consideration is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature.’ The statutory text provides the clearest indication of legislative intent, and should be construed to give effect to its plain meaning."

Here, said the court, “Supreme Court correctly found that the statutory language at issue was unambiguous, and that the provision of section 1 of [Local Law 198-2011] providing for the abolition of listed titles was self-executing.” Further, noted the Appellate Division, there is  “nothing in [Local Law 198-2011] which requires any enabling act by the County in order to abolish the positions.”

As to the County Executive’s stay of the abolition of several of the positions on or about December 28, 2011, and his amending that stay on January 12, 2012, the Appellate Division ruled that Local Law 198-2011 was self-executing, and that, as of December 29, 2011, all 48 of the correction corporal positions would have been deemed substantively abolished, but for the executive stay that was issued.

Rejecting the Association’s argument to the contrary, the court concluded that the County Executive's determination on January 12, 2012 did not constitute an illegal or untimely attempt to abolish the relevant correction corporal positions.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_06870.htm
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Liquidating unused leave accruals upon retirement, resignation or death

Purcell v City of New York, 2013 NY Slip Op 06799, Appellate Division, First Department

Thomas R. Purcell, a former New York County Deputy Public Administrator employed by the Office of the Public Administrator [Office], requested payment for his unused annual and sick leave accruals following his retirement from his position. However, the appointing authority advised him that he was not due any compensation for unused leave credits and that, in fact, his “final leave balance was negative.” 

 The payment or "liquidation" of such leave credits could be a significant consideration upon retirement.

Typically an employee’s unused annual leave accruals and unpaid “overtime” or compensatory time credits are paid to the individual upon his or her resignation or retirement or to his or her estate in the event of his or her death while in service.

If, on the other hand, an employee has unused annual leave credits at the time he or she retires and elects to liquidate such credits by means of a lump sum payment rather than "run them out," the lump sum payment could be a factor to be included in computing the employee's final average salary for retirement purposes, resulting in a higher retirement allowance. 

As to sick leave, although unused sick leave is not liquidated unless authorized by law, rule or regulation or, in some instances, a collective bargaining agreement, accumulated unused sick leave may be used for “additional service credit” for the purpose of determining the individual’s retirement allowance and other benefits upon the individual's retirement.

Employees of the State as the employer, certain public authorities and certain other public entities who are members of the New York Employees' Retirement System can take advantage of their accrued and unused sick leave credits when they retire from service. Upon retirement such unused leave accruals can be used for additional member service credit in the retirement system. Up to 200 days of additional member service may be credited using such unused sick leave accruals [see Retirement and Social Security Law §41.j.1].

In addition, employee of the State as the employer and some municipal employees participating in the State's Employees' Health Insurance Plan [NYSHIP], can have the actuarial value of their unused sick leave credits applied towards the payment of any employee health insurance premium required following their retirement if they remain in NYSHIP [see Civil Service Law §167, subdivisions 4 and 5].

Purcell challenged the Office's determination in an Article 78 proceeding and Supreme Court issued and order remanding the matter to the appointing authority for issuance of “a revised determination based upon correct information.”

The Office subsequently issued a revised determination, asserting that its earlier calculation of Purcell's annual leave balance was correct. About six months after receiving the Office’s “revised” decision Purcell initiated a lawsuit alleging “breach of contract” based on the Office’s failure to compensate him for the value of his unused annual and sick leave time.

The Appellate Division agreed that Purcell was correct regarding his argument that a party seeking damages arising from an alleged breach of contract against a public official or governmental body may pursue an action at law. However, said the court, Purcell had failed to establish the existence of such a contract and thus could not maintain an action at law based on an alleged “breach of contract.”

“Although framed as one for breach of contract,” Purcell, said the court, was actually challenging to the Office of the Public Administrator's administrative determination that, based upon its calculations, he was not entitled to compensation for unused sick and annual leave. The appropriate procedure to test the Office’s decision was for Purcell to have initiated an Article 78 action.

Purcell, however, had failed to file an Article 78 petition in a timely fashion as he had initiated this lawsuit some six months after the Office issued its “final determination.” An Article 78 action cannot be maintained unless it is filed within the statutory four-month statute of limitations for initiating such actions.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_06799.htm
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The doctrine of judicial estoppel bars a party securing a ruling in his or her favor based on taking a certain position from advancing a contrary position in another action

The doctrine of judicial estoppel bars a party securing a ruling in his or her favor based on taking a certain position from advancing a contrary position in another action

2013 NY Slip Op 06783, Appellate Division, First Department

The assistant director [AD] of a day care center applied facility applied for a position with New York City Department of Health (DOH) as an Early Childhood Education Consultant (ECEC). In August 2007, DOH notified plaintiff that she was hired and was to start her new job on September 5, 2007.

As the result of a number of mishaps related to her pregnancy, AD was ultimately told that DOH could "no longer grant [her] employment" on September 6, 2007.

AD then contacted the day care center seeking reemployment and the center “agreed to take her back.”

After reporting for work at the day care center on September 12, 2007 AD went to she her doctor during her lunch break on the same day. She returned to the office with a note from her doctor indicating that she had "preterm labor" and "restrictions" on walking. According to AD, “On either September 13, 2007, or September 17, 2007” the center terminated her.

AD sued DOH alleging “gender- and pregnancy/disability-based discrimination under the New York City Human Rights Law.” Subsequently AD commenced an action against the day care center “asserting claims of gender- and pregnancy-based discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, and the New York State and City Human Rights Laws.”

The day care center defaulted and the District Court granted AD’s motion for a default judgment and held that she was entitled to damages. Significantly, the federal district court, based on the representation set out in AD’s deposition,* ruled that she had been employed at the day care center "from April 2005 until September 17, 2007."

When Supreme Court granted DOH’s motion for summary judgment dismissing AD’s complaint against DOH that had been filed in state court, AD appealed.

The Appellate Division sustained the Supreme Court’s ruling, explaining that “The doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a party who assumed a certain position in a prior proceeding and secured a ruling in his or her favor from advancing a contrary position in another action, simply because his or her interests have changed.” Also referred to as the "doctrine of estoppel against inconsistent positions," said the court, the doctrine "rests upon the principle that a litigant should not be permitted to lead a court to find a fact one way and then contend in another judicial proceeding that the same fact should be found otherwise."

The Appellate Division found that AD failed to show that she was "qualified" for the DOH position in her state court action, as required to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, as she was “judicially estopped from denying that, at the time she was allegedly discriminated against by [DOH], she was actually employed with [the day care center] which would make it impossible for her to carry out her duties for [DOH].”

Although AD argued that “there is no inconsistency between the positions she took in the federal action and those she has taken in this action,” the Appellate Division disagreed, noting that AD had “neglected to inform the District Court that, while employed at [the day care center], she pursued and accepted another job with DOH which she was slated to start on September 4, 2007, left [the day care center], was allegedly discriminated against by the City, and returned to [the day care center] prior to being discriminated against there and terminated after a single day.

The Appellate Division said that “These facts would have been highly material to her claim against [the day care center], and it was highly misleading, at best, for [AD] to omit her City employment from her submissions to the District Court.”

Noting that “based on [AD's] submissions, the District Court expressly found that she was employed by [the day care center] from April 2005 until September 17, 2007,” the Appellate Division said that it the District Court’s finding was incorrect, “then it was incumbent upon [AD] to move to correct the finding, or else be bound by it in subsequent legal proceedings.”

* Although AD testified at her 2010 deposition that she was terminated on September 13, 2007, she conceded that she was uncertain of the actual date of her termination. Based on AD's allegations in the federal lawsuit, she was awarded a default judgment based on a termination date of September 17, 2007.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_06783.htm
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Moreland Commission to hold third public hearing in New York City

Moreland Commission to hold third public hearing in New York City

Source: Moreland Commission Press Office

The Moreland Commission to Investigate Public Corruption will hold its third public hearing on Monday, October 28, 2013 at the Jacob K. Javits Convention Center of New York. Hearings are scheduled to begin at 5:00 p.m. [Convention Center doors will open at 4:00.p.m]

Each hearing will cover specific subject areas. The October 28 hearing will focus on Campaign Finance Reform.

The Commission has invited the following individuals to testify:* 
  
New York State Board of Elections Co-Executive Directors, Robert Brehm & Todd Valentine and Deputy Enforcement Counsel, William McCann

New York City Campaign Finance Board Executive Director, Amy Loprest
 
New York Public Interest Research Group Research Coordinator, Bill Mahoney

Campaign Finance Institute Executive Director, Michael Malbin

Connecticut Deputy Secretary of State, James Spallone & Demos President, Miles Rapoport

NYC Council Members, Brad Lander and Carlos Menchaca

 New York State League of Women Voters President, Sally Robinson

Citizens Union Director of Public Policy and Advocacy, Alex Camarda

The Commission’s Internet site address is: http://publiccorruption.moreland.ny.gov/

* Members of the public are invited to attend only. Those invited to provide testimony to the Commission will be the only individuals to speak at the hearing.



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NYC police officer’s pension vested as a result of the appointing authority’s failure to hold a timely disciplinary hearing

NYC police officer’s pension vested as a result of the appointing authority’s failure to hold a timely disciplinary hearing
2013 NY Slip Op 06772, Appellate Division, First Department

New York City’s Administrative Code §13-256 provides that a police officer's pension automatically vests thirty days after he or she "duly execute[s an] application for a deferred retirement allowance," provided, among other things, that the discontinuance of the officer's employment is not "by . . . dismissal."*

In this instance a police officer [Petitioner] submitted his retirement application. On the day before his  pension would have become vested, the New York City Police Commissioner dismissed Petitioner from the police force as the result of a disciplinary hearing held in absentia.

Petitioner challenged the Commissioner’s action and Supreme Court vacated the order of dismissal. The court ruled that that Commissioner’s notice of the disciplinary charges was not "reasonably calculated to give him actual notice and an opportunity to be heard" thus violating due process and rendering "the final determination . . . arbitrary and capricious and without sound basis in reason."

Supreme Court granted Petitioner’s petition to the extent of remanding the matter to NYPD for “a full hearing on proper notice,” which ruling was affirmed by the Appellate Division, 80 AD3d 530. The Court of Appeals denied Commissioner’s application for leave to appeal (see 16 NY3d 714).

While Supreme Court's remand order was stayed during the pendency of Commissioner’s appeals, the stay terminated five days after service of the Court of Appeals' order denying the Commissioner's leave to appeal with notice of its entry.

The Appellate Division said that the Supreme Court's initial ruling rendered the order of dismissal a nullity. Accordingly the thirty-day vesting period set forth out §13-256 “remained in effect upon remand and began running anew.” The Commissioner, however, failed to hold a hearing and issue a new order of dismissal in timely fashion.

Petitioner then asked Supreme Court to issue an order compelling NYPD to process his pension application. Supreme Court rejected the petition and Petitioner appealed.

The Appellate Division said that Petitioner’s “pension vested automatically” when the Commissioner failed to hold a hearing within thirty days of the date of the Court of Appeals’ order. Accordingly, the Appellate Division directed the Commissioner to vest Petitioner's pension.

* See §§13-256[a][1], [4] and § 13-256[b]).

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_06772.htm

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Selected reports and information published by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli during the week ending October 19, 2013

Selected reports and information published by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli during the week ending October 19, 2013

Click on text highlighted in color  to access the full report

Comptroller DiNapoli and A.G. Schneiderman Announce Arrest of Former Siemens Executive for Stealing from Monroe County Project

On October 15, 2013 Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli and Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman announced the indictment of Daniel Lynch, a former sales executive of Siemens Building Technologies and current president of Treadstone Development Corporation, for stealing $75,000 from Siemens and the Upstate Telecommunications Corporation (UTC). UTC, a local development corporation, is a not–for–profit organization that contracts with Monroe County to provide upgrades to the county’s information technology and copier systems. Lynch is charged with Grand Larceny in the Second Degree, a class C felony, and two counts of Falsifying of Business Records in the First Degree, a class E felony. The maximum prison sentence for Grand Larceny in the Second Degree is five to 15 years in state prison.

DiNapoli: Financial Challenges Remain for State Despite Progress

New York state spending declined for the second straight year in fiscal year 2012–13 while debt reached an all–time high of $63.5 billion, according to the annual reporton the Financial Condition of New York State released Tuesday by State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli.

Comptroller DiNapoli and A.G. Schneiderman Announce Arrest of Town Supervisor For Stealing Campaign Funds

Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli and Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman on Octcber 17, 2013 announced the arrest of Melinda “Mindy” Wormuth, the Town of Halfmoon Supervisor, for stealing more than $6,000 in campaign contributions from her campaign fund.

DiNapoli: Audit Finds Excessive Surplus Funds in Mt. Sinai School District

The Mt. Sinai Union Free School District in Suffolk County overestimated expenditures five years in a row creating surpluses that exceed statutory limits, according to an audit released Wednesday by State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli.

DiNapoli: Funds Missing in Town of Lebanon Justice Court

An audit by State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli has revealed that more than $2,000 is missing in the Town of Lebanon justice court in Madison County. The audit was conducted at the request of town officials and upon initiation of the audit, the town justice immediately resigned his position.

Comptroller DiNapoli Releases State Audits

New York State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli Friday announced his office completed audits of::

the City University of New York;

the Department of Environmental Conservation;

the Department of Health–Medicaid Program;

the Department of Financial Services;

the Empire State Development Corporation;

the Workers’ Compensation Board;

the Department of Health; and

the Office of Mental Health.

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Contingent permanent appointment not automatic

Contingent permanent appointment not automatic

Matter of Snyder, 132 A.D.2d 905, 907, aff'd 72. N.Y.2d 981

When the permanent incumbent of a position is placed on leave of absence for what is expected to be an extended period, the appointing authority often seeks to fill the position. Usually this results in a “temporary” appointment. However, under State Civil Service Commission rules (similar rules have been promulgated by a number of municipal civil service commissions as well), if there is an appropriate eligible list available, the department or agency may elect to fill the position on a “contingent permanent” basis by selecting a person from the eligible list.

Such an appointment may prove to be of some importance as it provides the individual appointed on a contingent permanent basis with all of the rights of a permanent employee, except the right to retain the position in the event the person on leave from the position returns to the position.

Snyder, an Associate Attorney, had been “provisionally appointed” to the title Supervising Attorney, a higher-level position. The supervising attorney position had become available when the permanent Supervising Attorney was placed on leave of absence from the title upon his temporary appointment to a higher-level position – Principal Attorney. About two years later Snyder was reinstated to his permanent, lower grade, Associate Attorney position. The permanent incumbent of the Supervising Attorney position, however, continued to serve “temporarily” in the Principal Attorney position, still on leave from the supervising attorney position.

Snyder sued, arguing that he had become tenured in the supervising attorney position on a “contingent permanent” basis when he was continued in the title for more than nine months. He claimed that he had attained such status automatically solely because he had been qualified to be appointed on a contingent permanent basis. As a result, he said, he could not be “demoted” except as a result of disciplinary action so long as the permanent incumbent of the Supervising Attorney remained on leave of absence from the  position.

Snyder based his claim of tenure on a contingent permanent basis on the fact that the supervising attorney title to which he had been appointed had always been filled by non-competitive promotion from associate attorney in accordance with “§52.6” of the Civil Service Law. As he had been appointed as a permanent Associate Attorney, he contended that his advancement to the supervising attorney position during the leave of absence of the permanent incumbent could only have been effected on a continent permanent basis.

The Department of Civil Service conceded this procedure had been followed in the past and that it did not expect to ever hold a competitive examination for the Supervising Attorney title. Reading §§52.6 and 65.4 together, Snyder contended that he was now tenured in the supervising title on a contingent permanent basis.

§65.4 provides if a person whose name is on an appropriate, nonmandatory eligible list is provisionally appointed to a vacancy, or is continued in such a position on a provisional basis beyond the maximum period of probation, is deemed to have been permanently appointed to the position.

The Commission, in interpreting its Rule concerning contingent permanent appointments, 4 NYCRR 4.11(a), said that making an appointment on a contingent permanent basis was discretionary and that the appointing authority did not have to make such an appointment merely because it was possible to do so. 4 NYCRR §4.11 provides that “a position in state service left temporarily vacant by the leave of absence may be filled on a permanent basis....” In effect, the Commission said that making a contingent permanent appointment requires an affirmative act on the part of the appointing authority to effect such an appointment.

The Appellate Division agreed with the Commission, rejecting Snyder’s theory that §65.4 applied in his case.

Noting that the regulation uses the permissive word “may,” the majority ruled that appointments to temporarily vacant positions do not have to be permanent. The Court said “[o]nce it is established that (Snyder’s) status was solely as a provisional appointee and, therefore governed entirely by Civil Service Law §65, the conclusion becomes inescapable that it could not ripen into that of permanent appointment absent full, literal compliance with all of the conditions for converting a provisional appointment to a permanent one under Civil Service Law §65.4.”

As §65.4 applies only where an examination fails to produce a list adequate to fill all positions then held on a provisional basis or where such a list is exhausted immediately following its establishment, the majority concluded that Snyder could not have attained permanent (or contingent permanent) status as there was no examination or list in his case.
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School board’s “final ruling” in a grievance reviewable by the courts absent the union’s voluntary waiver of its right to seek judicial review

School board’s “final ruling” in a grievance reviewable by the courts absent the union’s voluntary waiver of its right to seek judicial review

Aloi v. West Babylon Union Free School District, 81 AD2d 874

The Appellate Division ruled that the School Board's reliance on its regulation that provided that its decision in a grievance “shall be final” was misplaced and the regulation in question did not preclude judicial review.

A grievance was submitted by the West Babylon Non-Teaching Unit of the Civil Service Employees Association pursuant to the school board's regulations. The board of education ultimately denied the grievance.

When CSEA appealed, the board of education contended that the courts could not review its “final determination,” pointing out that its regulation provided that "The report of the Board of Education shall be final."

The Appellate Division disagreed, explaining “The regulation cannot preclude judicial review in the absence of a voluntary surrender of the union's right to resort to the courts to enforce the collective bargaining agreement,” citing Matter of Riverdale Fabrics Corp., 306 NY 288.

Further, the court said that the fact that the union submitted the dispute pursuant to the board of education's grievance mechanism did not constitute a waiver of the union's rights to appeal an adverse ruling to the courts. Otherwise, were the union not to avail itself of the administrative remedy provided by the board it might be precluded from seeking judicial review under the “failure exhaustion of administrative remedies” doctrine.

The Appellate Division viewed the school board’s regulation as self-serving  and ruled that it could not preclude CSEA’s further appeal to the Courts.
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Salary adjustments due firefighters disabled in the line of duty

Firefighter disabled in the line of duty eligible to continue to receive his of her salary

Drahos v. Village of Johnson City, 80 AD2d 100

In Drahos v. Village of Johnson City, 80 AD2d 100, the Appellate Division held that a firefighter injured in the line of duty and unable to return to work, and who is not permanently disabled, is entitled to the payment of his or her regular salary in full until he or she returns to duty* or retires, citing §207-a of the General Municipal Law.

This, according to the opinion, includes increases and adjustments received by firefighters in active status during the period of the disabled firefighter's absence due to his or her injury or disease.

Presumably the same would apply to police officers injured in the line of duty and otherwise eligible for similar benefits pursuant to §207-c of the General Municipal Law.

* Where appropriate, the injured firefighter may be required to return to work to perform "light duty."
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US Supreme Court declines to review a 9th Circuit holding that the ADEA is the exclusive remedy available to individuals alleging unlawful age discrimination by a California governmental entity

US Supreme Court declines to review a 9th Circuit holding that the ADEA is the exclusive remedy available to individuals alleging unlawful age discrimination by a California governmental entity

Source: Meyers Nave PLC. Reproduced with permission. Copyright © 2013, Meyers Nave. All rights reserved.

Meyer Nave, a law firm, distributed an e-mail stating that there is “Good news for California public employers out of the U.S. Supreme Court today:[October 15, 2013] the high court officially kicked the age bias case of Madigan v. Levin* to the curb, dismissing the matter in a per curiam decision as improvidently granted."

The e-mail reports that “The bottom line for California public employers is that the rule in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit under Ahlmeyer v. Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 555 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2009) remains in effect: the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) is the exclusive remedy in federal courts for age discrimination claims against state and municipal employers, precluding equal protection claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983.”

Click here to Read the full article online

* Madigan v. Levin, No. 12-872

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Provisional employee terminated after failing two examinations for the position

Provisional employee terminated after failing two examinations for the position

Matter of the Steuben County Civil Service Commission, 113 Misc 2d 570

Subdivision 4 of §65 of the Civil Service Law provides as that "successive provisional appointments shall not be made to the same position after the expiration of the authorized period of the original provisional appointment to such position; provided, however, that where an examination for a position or group of positions fails to produce a list adequate to fill all positions then held on a provisional basis, or where such list is exhausted immediately following its establishment, a new provisional appointment may be made to any such position remaining unfilled by permanent appointment, and such new provisional appointment may, in the discretion of the appointing authority, be given to a current or former provisional appointee in such position".

When the employee failed two successive examinations for the position he held on a provisional basis, the Steuben County Civil Service Commission invoked its “Two Examination Failure” Rule and refused to approve the employee’s continuation in the position as a provisional provisional.

The Rule provided that no provisional employee who twice failed the test for the position would be given another provisional appointment unless the test failed to produce any qualified eligible or where the list was immediately exhausted. In this case the list consisted of four names, but one candidate refused appointment and a second withdrew his name from consideration.

The Commission successfully argued that further provisional appointment was not permitted because the examination did not fail to produce any qualified candidates and

the list was not exhausted.

Noting that a local commission has the discretion to adopt such a Rule, the Court suggested the employer, who “clearly was under no compulsion” to use the eligible list, would effect the purposes of the Constitution’s merit and fitness provision by appointing one of the two remaining eligibles on a provisional basis to the position.

Of course, the appointing authority could elect to make a permanent appointment from  “two-name list.”

However, if a person on eligible list is appointed to the vacancy provisionally, applying the decision in Roulett v Hempstead Civil Service Commission, 40 AD2d 611,the individual selected would automatically attain permanent status if continued in service beyond the maximum probationary period otherwise required for the position.

In Roulett the Appellate Division ruled that if a person on a nonmandatory eligible list is provisionally appointed to a vacant position, or is continued as a provisional employee after being certified for appointment from a nonmandatory list, he or she will be deemed to have been permanently appointed to the position if continued in service beyond the maximum period of probation

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An administrative hearing in §50.4 termination proceeding is not required

An administrative hearing in §50.4 termination proceeding is not required

55 NY2d 101

The Wayne County Civil Service Commission disqualified an employee and removed him from his position as police officer with the Village of Palmyra pursuant to §50.4 of the Civil Service Law. The Commission had determined that the police officer had “intentionally made false statements of material facts in his application or (had) attempted to practice (a) deception or fraud in his application”. The employee sued, claiming he could not be removed from the position without a hearing.

The Court of Appeals rejected the police officer’s argument, stating that §50.4 “requires no more than that the person be given a written statement of the reasons therefore and afforded an opportunity to make explanation and to submit facts in opposition to such disqualification”. No hearing is required.

The Commission had found that individual had falsified his application with respect to his experience as a police officer and concealed facts related to his separation from previous employment.
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Denial of access to teacher’s mailbox during "non-challenge period" lawful

Denial of access to teacher’s mailbox during "non-challenge period" lawful

89 AD2d 967, Appeal dismissed, 58 NY2d 823

An individual attempted to obtain access to teacher mailboxes in the face of the District’s policy of granting exclusive access to such mailboxes to the certified or recognized employee representative.

The Appellate Division rejected the individual’s denial of free speech argument on the basis that:

there were many alternatives means available to him to communicate with the teachers and

there was not denial of equal protection, as individual and the Middle Country Teachers Association were not similarly situated and therefore there was no differential treatment.

The Appellate Division also pointed out that the District’s policy was not in operation during the period when the certified or recognized union’s representation status could be challenged (See §208.2, Civil Service Law) and dismissed the appeal.

In many school districts the contract itself provides for “exclusive” rights of access to employees in the negotiating unit, except during the “challenge period”. 
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State legislature resists providing information requested by the Moreland Commission to the Commission

State legislature resists providing information requested by the Moreland Commission to the Commission

Source: Office of the Moreland Commission

Reacting to the Senate and the Assembly “refusal to cooperate” with the Commission in its efforts “to examine abuse of office by public officials and misconduct while in office,” the Commission issued the following statement:

STATEMENT FROM MORELAND COMMISSION CO-CHAIRS

"Pursuant to the Executive Order, the mandate of the Moreland Commission, among other things, is to examine abuse of office by public officials and misconduct while in office. Our investigation includes examining New York State legislators and their connections to outside business practices.

"On August 27, we requested information to be submitted by certain legislators. Leaders of the legislature for both the Assembly and Senate refused to cooperate.

"The Commission voted today [October 15, 2013] to aggressively move forward in compelling production of information into specific matters that the Commission is investigating.

"The Commission will continue its mandate of investigating corruption, issuing subpoenas, holding public hearings and will issue our first report on December 1."

Co-Chairs
Kathleen Rice
Milton Williams, Jr.
William Fitzpatrick

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Teacher terminated after being found guilty of filing a fraudulent affidavit to obtain a free New York City education for her non-resident child

Teacher terminated after being found guilty of filing a fraudulent affidavit to obtain a free New York City education for her non-resident child

Matter of the Department of Education of the City of New York, 2013 NY Slip Op 06615, Appellate Division, First Department

A New York City School teacher was served with disciplinary charges pursuant to §3020-a of the Education Law alleging that she had “fraudulently obtained a free New York City public school education for her son during the 2009-2010 school year.”

Finding the teacher guilty of certain charges and specifications filed against her and not withstanding the teacher’s efforts to mitigate the penalty to be imposed by noting her previously “unblemished record as a teacher” and her offering to pay the appropriate tuition for her child’s education, the arbitrator imposed the penalty of termination for her misconduct.

The teacher then filed a petition pursuant to Article 75 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules in an effort to have Supreme Court vacate the penalty imposed. Supreme Court sustained the arbitrator's determination and dismissed the teacher's petition.*

The Appellate Division sustained the Supreme Court's ruling, noting the arbitrator’s decision was supported by adequate evidence in the record. Further, said the court the teacher “did not urge the hearing officer to apply a heightened standard in finding fraud.”

The Appellate Division said that under the circumstances “the penalty of termination is not shocking” in view of the teacher’s using “a fraudulent affidavit to obtain a free New York City education for her non-resident child.”

* The Supreme Court's ruling on the teacher's Article 75 petition is posted on the Internet at: http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/pdfs/2011/2011_33408.pdf

The Appellate Division’s decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_06615.htm

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Some important procedural matters in processing disciplinary action

Some important procedural matters in processing disciplinary action

Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision 10894

On occasion a determination by the Court or an administrative body is instructive to non-participants because of the procedural matters it discusses. An example of this is found in Decision 10894 by the Commissioner of Education.

In this appeal involving processing a disciplinary procedure initiated pursuant to §3020-a of the Education Law, the Commissioner dismissed both the appeal by the employer and the cross-appeal filed by the teacher, noting:

     1. The subpoenas duces tecum (produce the papers) served on the District was non-judicial subpoena and it was necessary for the teacher to seek a Court judicial subpoena compelling compliance [see CPLR §2308(b)].

     2. Charges served on the teacher not sufficiently specific to enable the teacher to adequately respond may be dismissed (without prejudice) by the hearing panel chair.

     3. §3020-a procedures are not required to comply with technical rules of evidence and hearsay testimony in such hearings is not improper.

     4. Admissions against interest alleged to have been made by an employee will not satisfy the District’s burden of proof, and due process requires the production of, and the opportunity to cross-examine, a witness who could competently testify to the fact that such a statement was made by the employee in question.

These basic concepts apply in Civil Service Law §75 disciplinary actions and are typically followed in contract disciplinary arbitrations as well.
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Negotiating on behalf of active employees concerning to benefits available to them following retirement and negotiating on behalf of retired employees distinguished

Negotiating on behalf of active employees concerning to benefits available to them following retirement and negotiating on behalf of retired employees distinguished

Oneida PBA v. City of Oneida, PERB Case U-5805

The Union (PBA) demanded hospitalization benefits which the City contended would apply to retired employees. The PBA reformed its demand, claiming that the benefit improvement would apply only to present employees and that it merely requested that the present health insurance benefits be continued for retired employees.

The City subsequently filed a charge with PERB claiming PBA had applied for arbitration on non-mandatory items of negotiations. When the hearing officer ruled in favor of the City, finding the “revised demand constituted a unitary demand which is nonnegotiable,” PBA appealed. 

PERB affirmed the hearing officer’s ruling, distinguishing between PBA negotiating on behalf of present employees with respect to benefits to be available to them upon their retirement and negotiating on behalf of then retired employees.

PBA, said PERB, had the right to negotiate only for current unit members and retired persons are not “current unit members”

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New York court apply a “two-step test" when determining if a grievance alleging a violation of the collective bargaining agreement may be submitted to arbitration

New York courts apply a “two-step test" when determining if a grievance alleging a violation of the collective bargaining agreement may be submitted to arbitration

Matter of Kenmore-Town of Tonawanda Union Free Sch. Dist. (Ken-Ton School. Employees. Assn.), 2013 NY Slip Op 06490, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

The Kenmore-Town of Tonawanda UFSD [District] filed a petition pursuant to Article 75 of the CPLR seeing a permanent stay of arbitration with respect to a grievance filed challenging the District’s terminating an employee. Supreme Court dismissed the District’s petition and the Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

The Appellate Division explained that in determining if a grievance is subject to arbitration under the relevant collective bargaining agreement (CBA), the court applies the “two-step analysis set forth in Matter of Acting Supt. of Schs. of Liverpool Cent. Sch. Dist. (United Liverpool Faculty Assn), 42 NY2d 509”

Step 1 – The court must determine whether there is any statutory, constitutional or public policy prohibition against arbitrating the grievance.

Step 2 – In the event the court determines that there is no such bar to proceeding to arbitration, it then considers whether the CBA demonstrates that the parties agreed to refer this type of dispute to arbitration.

The CBA in this instance, said the Appellate Division, set out a broad arbitration clause and thus the court’s inquiry is limited to determining “whether there is a reasonable relationship between the subject matter of the dispute and the general subject matter of the CBA"

The grievance filed with the District questioned whether the District had followed "the procedures mandated by the CBA in terminating the employee in question.” The Appellate Division concluded that Supreme Court “properly determined that the parties had the authority to agree to arbitrate this grievance, and that they in fact agreed to do so.”

As to the District’s argument that the provisions of the CBA “violate public policy and the Civil Service Law,” an issue raised for the first time on appeal, the Appellate Division elected to consider the claim. It ruled that that Civil Service Law §75 "may be supplemented, modified or replaced by agreements negotiated between the state and an employee organization pursuant to article fourteen of this chapter," citing Civil Service Law §76[4].

§76[4], in pertinent part, provides: “… section seventy-five or seventy-six of this … may be supplemented, modified or replaced by agreements negotiated between the state and an employee organization pursuant to article fourteen of this chapter …”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_06490.htm

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Employee terminated for use of vulgar language and conduct detrimental to the employer's interests

Employee terminated for use of vulgar language and conduct detrimental to the employer's interests

2013 NY Slip Op 06061, Appellate Division, Third Department

An employee [A] called the office to check on the attendance of a particular staff member [B] with whom she had been having difficulties. A, believing that she was speaking to another staff member, when in fact, B had answered the phone, made a statement about B that contained obscenities and a racial epithet. The employer, finding that the A’s statement had caused a disruption in the operation of the workplace, terminated her.

A’s application for unemployment insurance was rejected by the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board after the Board ruled that A was disqualified from receiving unemployment insurance benefits because her employment was terminated due to misconduct.

A appealed the Board’s determination but the Appellate Division sustained the Board’s ruling, explaining that  “An employee's use of vulgar language and conduct that is detrimental to the employer's interests have been found to constitute disqualifying misconduct,” citing Matter of Cheeseboro, 84 AD3d 1635.

Given the undisputed facts of this case, said the court, substantial evidence supports the Board's determination that A's statement and its effect on the workplace environment constituted disqualifying misconduct.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_06061.htm

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First group of Master Teachers in mathematics and science recognized by Governor Cuomo

First group of Master Teachers in mathematics and science recognized by Governor Cuomo

Source: Office of the Governor

Governor Andrew M. Cuomo recently announced the selection of 105 educators from four regions as the first group of New York State Master Teachers.* All ten regions will accept applications between November 1st and January 3rd with final selections being made in the spring.**

The New York State Master Teacher Program was established by Governor Cuomo to identify, reward, and support master math and science teachers throughout New York State. The role of master teachers as professional mentors and content experts is key to developing the current cadre of outstanding educators as well as developing skilled future teachers.

Each regional program is paired with a SUNY campus to give participants additional content exposure. The number of teachers from each region in this first selection and the respective partner SUNY campus are:

· Central New York: 36 (SUNY Cortland)
· Mid-Hudson: 19 (SUNY New Paltz)
· North Country: 21 (SUNY Plattsburgh)
· Western New York: 29 (SUNY Buffalo State)

Additionally, the SUNY pairing for the remaining regions are:

· Long Island: Stony Brook University
· Southern Tier: Binghamton University
· Capital Region: University at Albany
· Finger Lakes: SUNY Geneseo
· Mohawk Valley: SUNY Oneonta
· New York City: in partnership with Math for America

Master Teacher Fellows will:

· Receive a $15,000 stipend per year over 4 years for participation in the program (total compensation of $60,000 per Fellow).

· Engage in peer mentoring and intensive content-oriented professional development opportunities throughout the academic year.

· Work closely with pre-service and early career teachers to foster a supportive environment for the next generation of STEM teachers.

· Attend required regular cohort meetings, participate in and lead several professional development sessions each year, and participate in the training of pre-service and early career educators as part of the Master Teacher program.

*  A full list of Master Teachers and their school districts is available here.

** Applications can be submitted online at http://www.suny.edu/MasterTeacher/.

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A NYC police officer “not in service” on the effective date of his or her retirement or vesting of retirement benefits forfeits the pension portion of his or her retirement allowance

A NYC police officer “not in service” on the effective date of his or her retirement or vesting of retirement benefits forfeits the pension portion of his or her retirement allowance

2013 NY Slip Op 51252(U), Supreme Court, New York County [Not selected for publication in the Official Reports]

The Administrative Code of the City of New York requires a member of the NYC Police Retirement System to "be in service" on the effective date of his or her retirement or vesting of retirement benefits in order to be eligible for a retirement allowance. If the employee is not "in service" on that date, he or she forfeits the pension portion his or her retirement allowance.*

In this Article 78 proceeding a New York City police officer [Officer] asked the court to annul the termination of his employment as a New York City Police Department [NYPD] Police Officer following a disciplinary hearing. Officer's disciplinary termination was effective prior to a final determination regarding his application for disability retirement by the NYC Police Pension System's Board of Trustees .

In 2009 NYPD filed disciplinary charges and specifications against Officer for allegedly receiving a bribe, a violation of Penal Law §200.10, in that in 2007 Officer had accepted $400 from an acquaintance in exchange for helping him recover a car which was in NYPD custody. In 2010, NYPD filed additional disciplinary charges against Officer for allegedly failing an integrity test conducted by the Internal Affairs Bureau [IAB] involving Officer’s alleged not having properly invoiced property and allegedly not having notified IAB of the possible misconduct of other police officers.

In October 2010, Officer, who had suffered a stroke and heart attack earlier that year, applied for disability retirement under the so-called Heart Bill.** NYPD's Medical Board approved Officer’s application. However, in February 2011, Officer agreed to defer the application and final determination by the NYC Police Retirement System's Board of Trustees until the resolution of the disciplinary charges then pending, or upon "the Police Commissioner's approval of either a Negotiated Settlement or the disposition pursuant to trial."

The disciplinary hearing was conducted in July 2011 and Officer was found guilty of soliciting and accepting a bribe, and based on petitioner's plea of guilty to failing the integrity test by failing to voucher property, failing to safeguard that property and other misconduct such as transmitting a radio signal with the intent to conceal from the NYPD the existence of the property, failing to report misconduct related to the taking of the property, attempting to cover up the improper handling of the property, and trying to cover up the incident by initially failing to provide accurate information about it at an official NYPD interview.

The hearing officer recommended that Officer be terminated from his position. The Commissioner of Police accepted the hearing officer’s findings and recommendation and terminated Officer from his position.

As Officer’s termination was prior to the effective date of his retirement, he became ineligible to receive pension portion of his retirement benefits. In ruling on Officer’s CPLR Article 78 petition, Supreme Court Judge Barbara Jaffee sustained the forfeiture of the pension portion of Officer's retirement allowance, commenting that this was “a risk he took by engaging in the misconduct at issue.”

In reviewing an administrative agency's determination as to whether it is arbitrary and capricious under CPLR Article 78, said the court, the test is whether the determination "is without sound basis in reason and . . . without regard to the facts.” Further, the determination of an administrative agency, "acting pursuant to its authority and within the orbit of its expertise, is entitled to deference, and even if different conclusions could be reached as a result of conflicting evidence, a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency when the agency's determination is supported by the record."

Here, given the charges and findings, which rest on the credibility determinations of the hearing officer, it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that respondents' decision to terminate petitioner's employment was arbitrary and capricious.

As to the penalty imposed, Judge Jaffeet, citing Matter of Pell, 34 NY2d at 222, said that the standard for reviewing a penalty imposed after a hearing is whether the punishment imposed "is so disproportionate to the offense, in the light of all the circumstances, as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness." 

Judge Jaffee noted that “NYPD may not terminate employee in order to prevent employee from collecting [a] disability pension, [the] pension may be denied as unintended consequence of [the] termination if [the] termination [was] made in good faith." However, the fact that Officer was terminated "after his application for disability retirement had been provisionally approved” by Medical Board did not show bad faith as Officer's disciplinary investigation was not completed until after Medical Board's determination and prior to any action being taken by the Retirement System's Board of Trustees.

Accordingly, Judge Jaffee denied Officer’s petition and dismissed the action.

* §13-240 of the New York City Administrative Code, which concerns the New York City Police Pension Fund, address the termination of membership or discontinuance of service. It provides, in pertinent part,  “Should a member discontinue city-service except by death or retirement, he or she shall be paid such part of the amount of the accumulated deductions standing to the credit of his or her individual account in the annuity savings fund as he or she shall demand.” Waldeck v NYC Employees' Retirement System, 81 N.Y.2d 804 [181 A.D.2d 412] decided with Barbaro v NYC Employees' Retirement System, [181 A.D.2d 437] addresses a similar situation involving members of the NYC Sanitation Workers' Retirement System.

** See General Municipal Law §207-k

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_51252.htm
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Service as an independent contractor does not count in qualifying for unemployment insurance benefits

Service as an independent contractor does not count in qualifying for unemployment insurance benefits

Matter of Tkachyshyn (Commissioner of Labor), 2013 NY Slip Op 06057, Appellate Division, Third Department

Volodymyr I. Tkachyshyn, a substitute teacher and math tutor, filed three claims for unemployment insurance benefits.

Although initially deemed eligible for benefits in each instance, following Appellate Division’s decision in Leazard v TestQuest, Inc., 74 AD3d 1414, the Department of Labor issued revised decisions finding that earnings in connection with tutoring services through TestQuest, Inc. was not covered employment for the purposes of qualifying for unemployment insurance benefits “given that tutors such as [Tkachyshyn] were independent contractors.”

The Appellate Division commented that in “TestQuest, Inc. tutors such as claimant were deemed by this Court to be independent contractors … which decision is conclusive and binding upon all such persons employed by TestQuest, Inc.,” citing Labor Law §620[1][b].*Thus, said the court, those earnings cannot qualify for inclusion as remuneration in the base periods to determine eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits.**

As the record establishes that Tkachyshyn did not have sufficient covered earnings to file a valid original claim pursuant to Labor Law §527 in either his base period or alternate base period for any of the three claims, the Appellate Division found that substantial evidence supports the Board's decision and dismissed his appeal.

* §620[1][b] of the Labor Law, in pertinent part, provides that the hearing officer’s “decision shall not be deemed limited in its effect to the immediate claimant making the claim for benefits but shall be deemed a general determination of such questions with respect to all those employed by such person or employer for all the purposes of this article, and such decision shall be conclusive and binding upon the claimant and such person or employer…”.

** The Appellate Division noted that “notwithstanding the absence of any fault on the part of Tkachyshyn, he was charged with a recoverable overpayment of federal emergency unemployment compensation funds. Whether Tkachyshyn was eligible for a waiver of recoverability of those benefits was referred back to the Department of Labor and was not at issue on this appeal.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2013/2013_06057.htm
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October is Cyber Security Awareness Month in New York State - ACT – Achieve Cyber security Together

October is Cyber Security Awareness Month in New York State - ACT – Achieve Cyber security Together Source: Office of the Governor - Thomas D. Smith, NYS Chief Information Security Officer

Governor Andrew M. Cuomo announced the start of Cyber Security Awareness Month in New York State and issued a proclamation in support to raise citizen awareness about cyber based threats and how to stay safe online at: http://www.dhses.ny.gov/go/proclamation2013.  The NYS Office of Information Technology Services, Enterprise Information Security Office (ITS EISO) is providing a number of educational resources to the public, including an electronic Cyber Security Awareness Toolkit.  The Toolkit includes cyber security themed posters, calendars, guides, brochures, and other content that can be downloaded to help promote and reinforce cyber safety in practical, informative, entertaining, and usable ways.  The Toolkit material may be found at www.dhses.ny.gov/ocs/awareness-training-events/#awareness. N.B. In conjunction with Cyber Security Awareness Month, the NYS ITS EISO is coordinating a statewide cyber security poster contest for students in grades Kindergarten-12.  This is a timely opportunity for school art and technology teachers to promote keeping children safe online in a fun way.  Entries may be used in state, regional, and national computer security awareness campaigns.  New York State winners will be featured on the ITS website and entered into the National Contest with the opportunity to be featured in the 2015 Cyber Security Calendar.  For more information on the poster contest, please visit http://www.dhses.ny.gov/ocs/awareness-training-events/events/2013/index.cfm and click on the Poster Contest tab. While there are many steps that can be taken to keep personal information and data secure, below are some helpful cyber security tips to follow provided by the Governor’s Office: Secure your computer:  Keep your operating system and application software updated and patched. Be sure to check that your anti-virus and anti-spyware software is running and receiving automatic updates.  Confirm that your firewall is enabled. Use Strong Passwords:  Passwords should have at least eight characters and include letters (uppercase and lowercase), numbers, and special characters.  It is important to maintain separate passwords for different accounts to reduce the likelihood that the compromise of one password will make other accounts vulnerable as well.  Developing good password practices will help keep your personal information and identity secure. Secure your online transactions:  When submitting sensitive information, look for the "lock" icon on the browser's status bar to be sure your information is sent securely during transmission.  Also be sure that "https" appears in the website's address bar before making an online transaction.  The "s" stands for "secure" and indicates that communication with the webpage is encrypted. Don't reveal personal information online:  The less information you post, the less data you make available for a cyber criminal to use in a potential attack or scam. Protect your laptop, smartphone, or other portable devices when traveling:  Just as your wallet contains lots of important and personal information that you wouldn't want to lose, so do your portable devices.  Don't let them out of your sight.  Never store your laptop in checked luggage.  If there is a room safe available at your hotel, use it to securely store your devices.  In addition, make sure you have strong passwords on these devices in the event they are lost or stolen. Be aware that public computers and public wireless access are not necessarily secure:  Cyber criminals can potentially access any information you provide, such as credit card numbers, passwords or other confidential information.  Do not conduct any sensitive transactions on public Wi-Fi sites. Do not email sensitive data:  Beware of emails requesting account or purchase information.  Legitimate businesses do not solicit sensitive or confidential information through email. Dispose of information properly:  When it's time to dispose of your computer or mobile device, make sure you have a process in place to completely erase your information or physically destroy the hard drive. Properly erasing your hard drive thwarts efforts to steal your information. More information on Cyber Security Awareness Month is posted on the Internet at: http://www.dhses.ny.gov/ocs/awareness-training-events/events/2013/index.cfm. .