Determining the availability of Jarema credit for the purposes of attaining tenure

Determining the availability of Jarema credit for the purposes of attaining tenure

2015 NY Slip Op 04847, Appellate Division, Second Department

Pursuant to Education Law §3012(1)(a), teachers were appointed for a probationary period of three years.*However, in the case of a teacher who has rendered satisfactory service as a regular substitute for a period of two years and has been appointed to teach the same subject on an annual salary, the probationary period is limited to one year. Although service as a substitute teacher does not constitute probationary service for purposes of obtaining tenure as a regular teacher, a substitute teacher's three-year probationary period can be reduced to one year through so-called "Jarema" credit, so named for the sponsor of the bill that provided for this calculation of credit.**

A certified teacher [Petitioner] in elementary education and special education was employed by the School District as a permanent substitute teacher in a general education kindergarten class during the 2008-2009 school year. She subsequently taught as a probationary special education teacher during the 2009-2010, 2010-2011, and 2011-2012 school years in first and fourth grade integrated co-teaching classes.

On May 22, 2012, based on the recommendation of the Superintendent of Schools, the  School District’s Board of Education terminated Petitioner's employment without a hearing effective June 22, 2012. Petitioner, contending that she had attained tenure by estoppel and thus could not be terminated without a hearing, commenced a CPLR Article 78 proceeding in the nature of mandamus seeking a judgment compelling her reinstatement as a tenured teacher by the School District with back pay.

The Supreme Court denied the petition and dismissed the proceeding, concluding that the Petitioner did not establish that she had acquired tenure by estoppel and thus was not entitled to a hearing before her employment could be terminated. As to attaining tenure by estoppel, in McManus v Board of Education, Hempstead UFSD, 87 NY2 183, the Court of Appeals held that "Tenure may be acquired by estoppel when a school board accepts the continued services of a teacher or administrator, but fails to take the action required by law to either grant or deny tenure prior to the expiration of the teacher's probationary term."

The Appellate Division said that Supreme Court properly concluded that Petitioner did not acquire tenure by estoppel,*** explaining:

1. Petitioner did not acquire tenure by estoppel in the special education tenure area, as the Petitioner did not teach in that area for a period of time exceeding the three-year probationary period required for gaining tenure.

2. Probationer was not entitled to Jarema credit for the additional year she taught general-education kindergarten, as such service was not in the same "subject" area as special education.

3. Petitioner failed to establish that she acquired tenure by estoppel in the elementary education tenure subject area as during the 2009-2010, 2010-2011, and 2011-2012 school years, Petitioner was employed as a probationer in the special education tenure subject area, not the elementary tenure subject area and she taught as a special education teacher in co-teaching classrooms along with general education teachers.

4. Petitioner failed to establish that she devoted at least 40% of her time to teaching elementary education in the co-teaching classes, as opposed to teaching special education in those classes.

Thus, said the Appellate Division, the record does not support Petitioner’s contention that she was entitled to tenure by estoppel as an elementary education teacher.

* See http://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2015/04/amendments-to-education-law-included-in.htmland http://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2015/07/education-department-posts-proposed.htmlfor recent amendments to tenure requirements.

**  Jarema credit cannot exceed two years and the service as a substitute teacher must be continuous for at least one school term.

*** “Tenure by estoppel” is sometimes referred to as “tenure by acquisition,” “tenure by default,” or “tenure by inaction.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_04847.htm

Advisory opinions of the New York City Corporation Counsel

Advisory opinions of the New York City Corporation Counsel

2015 NY Slip Op 05887, Appellate Division, First Department

In this action a trustee [Trustee] on the Police Pension Fund (PPF) Board of Trustees sought a court order prohibiting the New York City Corporation Counsel from providing statutory interpretation and legal direction to the New York City Police Pension Fund Medical Board regarding the application of Administrative Code of City of NY §13-254. §13-254 sets out a mechanism for a police officer retired on disability to be reexamined by the Medical Board with an eye toward returning to City employment, either at the pensioner's own request or by application of the Board of Trustees.

The Appellate Division said that the Medical Board is the Corporation Counsel’s client and that such a communication falls well within his broad duty to "conduct all the law business of the city and its agencies,” rejecting Petitioner's argument that such communication was barred by attorney-client privilege attaching to either the Board of Trustees or Trustee individually.

Further, said the court, the Board of Trustees is empowered to differ with its counsel on matters of statutory interpretation and reach its own position on such questions, citing Seiferheld v Kelly, 16 NY3 561.

In the words of the court, "… the trustees should weigh the advice of the City's Law Department in deciding the question, but the decision is theirs, subject to appropriate judicial review."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_05887.htm

A member of the NYS Employees’ Retirement System must file a timely application in order to be eligible to receive a disability retirement allowance

A member of the NYS Employees’ Retirement System must file a timely application in order to be eligible to receive a disability retirement allowance

2015 NY Slip Op 04907, Appellate Division, Third Department

A correction officer [Officer] employed by the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision [DOCCS] received two notices of discipline and, as a result of those notices, was suspended without pay.

In February 2012, Officer entered into a settlement agreement [Settlement] with DOCCS in full satisfaction of both notices of discipline. The Settlement provided that, for a two-week period, Officer would be both placed on administrative leave with pay and "on [the] payroll." The parties also agreed that the Settlement did not provide for or allow petitioner, during that two-week period, to perform any of the services for DOCCS for which he had been hired.

During that two-week period and in March 2012, Officer applied for disability retirement benefits and performance of duty disability retirement benefits. A Hearing Officer found that both of the applications submitted by Officer were untimely as a matter of law. The Comptroller adopted the findings of the Hearing Officer and rejected both the Officer’s applications for disability retirement benefits and his application for performance of duty disability retirement benefits.

The Comptroller found that Retirement and Social Security Law [RSSL] §507-a(b)(2) required that "an application be filed within three months from the last date the member was being paid on the payroll" includes the requirement that such a member be receiving payments for services rendered while working. Notably, the courts have held that the same phrase "on the payroll," used in RSSL §605(b)(2) contains a requirement that payments “are for services rendered while working.”

Officer appealed the Comptroller’s determination.

The Appellate Division sustained the Comptroller’s decision explaining that “[t]he Comptroller is vested with the exclusive authority to resolve applications for any form of retirement benefits.”  If the Comptroller's application and interpretation of the relevant statutes are not irrational, unreasonable or contrary to the statutory language, his determination will be upheld by the court.

Considering the events giving rise to this action, the court said that Comptroller's interpretation of RSSL §507-a(b)(2) “is consistent with this Court's construction of the identical phrase in RSSL§605(b)(2) and legislative history supports the conclusion that the identical phrases in those two provisions should be given the same construction.” Thus, said the court, the Comptroller’s interpretation of RSSL §507-a(b)(2) as requiring payment for services rendered while working is not irrational, unreasonable or contrary to the statutory language.

Citing Officer’s concession that he did not render “any services while working” after August 2009, the “Appellate Division confirmed the Comptroller’s determination” that Officer’s March 2012 application for disability retirement benefits was untimely.

The court reach the same conclusion regarding Officer's application for benefits pursuant to RSSL §507-b, whereby "[t]o be effective, an application for performance of duty disability retirement under [RSSL] §507-b . . . shall be filed within two years after the member is first discontinued from service, as provided . . . under . . . subdivision a of [RSSL §] 63" and a member is only entitled to a retirement allowance if the application is timely in relationship to the member being "[a]ctually in service upon which his [or her] membership is based."

As Officer “did not perform the services that entitled him to membership after August 2009,” the Appellate Division also confirmed the Comptroller’s determination that his March 2012 application for performance of duty disability retirement benefits was untimely.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_04907.htm

Employee terminated because of a pattern of aggressive and inappropriate workplace conduct

Employee terminated because of a pattern of aggressive and inappropriate workplace conduct

2015 NY Slip Op 05422, Appellate Division, First Department

The Administrative Law Judge [ALJ] sustained three charges of misconduct against the employee [Petitioner] and Petitioner was terminated from his employment. Petitioner initiated an action pursuant to CPLR Article 78 challenging the ALJ’s findings, which Supreme Court transferred to the Appellate Division as the decision to dismiss Petitioner was made following an administrative hearing.

The Appellate Division sustained the ALJ’s decision, finding that substantial evidence supports the determination that Petitioner committed the charged acts of misconduct. The record, said the court, shows that Petitioner engaged in a pattern of aggressive and inappropriate workplace conduct, and there exists no basis to disturb the credibility determinations made by the ALJ.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_05422.htm

_____________

A Reasonable Disciplinary Penalty Under the Circumstances - a 442-page volume focusing on determining an appropriate disciplinary penalty to be imposed on an employee in the public service in instances where the employee has been found guilty of misconduct or incompetence. Now available in two formats - as a large, paperback print edition, and as an e-book. For more information click on

http://booklocker.com/books/7401.html

_____________

Employer required to consider providing a reasonable accommodation after employee placed on workers’ compensation leave

Employer required to consider providing a reasonable accommodation after employee placed on workers’ compensation leave

2015 NY Slip Op 05147, Appellate Division, Second Department

An employee [Employee] was injured on the job and as a result of her injury she was unable to work and was placed on leave of absence without pay pursuant to Civil Service Law §71, Workers’ Compensation Leave.*

About a year after being placed on leave pursuant to §71, the appointing authority sent Employee “a notice of proposed termination” of her employment** pursuant to Civil Service Law §71. Employee challenged the proposed termination and sought reinstatement prior to the effective date of her termination.

The appointing authority [Agency] denied Employee’s request, without ordering a new independent medical examination, on the grounds that the Employee [1] had failed to demonstrate that she was medically fit to return to work and [2] had failed to provide the appointing authority with a date by which she would be able to return to full duty. Ultimately Employee was terminated.

In an action to recover damages for unlawful discrimination in employment on the basis of disability and retaliation in violation of Executive Law §296, Employee appealed so much of an order of the Supreme Court dismissing her first cause of action in which she had alleged discrimination in employment on the basis of disability.

The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s granting the Agency motion for summary judgment dismissing Employee’s first cause of action in which she alleged unlawful discrimination in employment on the basis of disability, holding that the motion should have been denied.

Civil Service Law §71, Workers’ Compensation Leave, provides that an individual injured on the job and unable to perform the duties of his or her position is entitle to at least one year of leave without pay unless his or her disability is of such a nature as to permanently incapacitate him or her for the performance of the duties of his or her position.

Employee commenced this action, contending that the Agency discriminated against her because of her disability by failing to provide a reasonable accommodation in the form of light duty or additional time for recovery.

In the words of the Appellate Division, "The employer has a duty to move forward to consider accommodation once the need for accommodation is known or requested," explaining that:

1. An employer normally cannot obtain summary judgment on a disability discrimination claim pursuant to Executive Law §296 "unless the record demonstrates that there is no triable issue of fact as to whether the employer duly considered the requested accommodation; and 

2. An employer cannot present such a record "if the employer has not engaged in interactions with the employee revealing at least some deliberation upon the viability of the employee's request.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Employee, the Appellate Division found that the Employee’s responses to the notice of proposed termination could reasonably have been understood as a request for accommodation which Agency rejected by terminating the Employee’s employment based on her inability to return to work within the one year permitted under Civil Service Law § 71.

The Appellate Division concluded that Agency failed to establish, prima facie, that it had engaged in a good faith interactive process that assessed the needs of Employee and the reasonableness of her requested 

* §71 permits an employee to use any and all available leave credits until exhausted in order to remain on the payroll while on Workers’ Compensation Leave.

** §71 provides for the reinstatement of the employee after separation for disability if the individual applies for such reinstatement within one year of the termination of his or her disability [Duncan v NYS Developmental Center, 63 NY2d 128].

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_05147.htm

_____________

Disability Leave for fire, police and other public sector personnel - a 1098 page e-book focusing on administering General Municipal Law Sections 207-a/207-c and providing benefits thereunder. For more information click on http://booklocker.com/books/3916.html

_____________

Courts do not have discretion to hear an untimely Article 75 action challenging an administrative determination

Courts do not have discretion to hear an untimely Article 75 action challenging an administrative determination

2015 NY Slip Op 05406, Appellate Division, First Department

Supreme Court denied a petition seeking to vacate an arbitration award upholding an administrative determination made after a hearing conducted pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between the Employee's union and the employer terminating the employee from her position and confirmed the arbitration award, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

The Appellate Division held that Supreme Court properly held this special proceeding, commenced pursuant to CPLR Article 78, was in the nature of a CPLR article 75 proceeding challenging the award rendered by the arbitrator pursuant to the grievance procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreement with Petitioner's union.

Accordingly, Supreme Court had properly dismissed the petition on the ground that it was untimely filed pursuant to the applicable 90-day statute of limitations set out in CPLR §7511[a]), based on Petitioner's admission that she received formal notice of the arbitration award on July 6, 2012.

The fact that Petitioner's pro sestatus in this action, said the Appellate Division, is not a basis to reach the merits of her claim.

An individual who is acting as his or her own attorney in a court action is said to be acting “pro se.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_05406.htm

Appellate Division, Fourth Department, hold employer’s decision not to hire an individual because the individual was pregnant a form of unlawful discrimination

Appellate Division, Fourth Department, hold employer’s decision not to hire an individual because the individual was pregnant a form of unlawful discrimination

2015 NY Slip Op 05384, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

A part-time school guidance counselor [Counselor] alleged that the School District [District] had discriminated against her on the basis of "sex/pregnancy" when it declined to renew her employment contract shortly after learning that she was pregnant.

Counselor was employed as a part-time counselor for the District for the 2011-2012 school year and the District invited her to apply for a position for the following school year. Counselor did apply for continued employment with the District and also requested a "pregnancy/disability leave" from the end of August 2012 through January, 2013. Counselor said that she was then notified that she would not be hired because of her anticipated absence.

Counselor filed a complaint with the State Division of Human Rights [SDHR] alleging the District had unlawfully discriminated against her on the basis of "sex/pregnancy." SDHR found “no probable cause” and dismissed Counselor’s complaint without a hearing.

Counselor commenced a CPLR Article 78 proceeding seeking to annul SDHR finding that there was no probable cause to believe that the District had unlawfully discriminated against her. Supreme Court granted Counselor’s petition and remitted the matter to SDHR for a hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling.

The court said that "Where, as here, a determination of no probable cause is rendered [by SDHR] without holding a public hearing pursuant to Executive Law §297(4)(a), the appropriate standard of review is whether the determination was arbitrary and capricious or lacking a rational basis." However, explained the Appellate Division, “[t]he complainant's factual showing must be accepted as true on a probable cause determination.” Although the court’s “standard of review” is highly deferential to SDHR’s determination, in this instance the Appellate Division agreed with Supreme Court that SDHR’s determination "was not rationally based upon the evidence presented."

Executive Law §296 prohibits an employer from refusing to hire or employ an individual based on the individual's gender. Rejecting the District’s argument that it decided not to rehire Counselor because of her unavailability and its concern for continuity of counseling services for its students, the Appellate Division, noting that Counselor would be unavailable to work because of her pregnancy, said “we conclude that discrimination could be inferred from the record before us.”

The court observed that the District had relied on Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. v State Div. of Human Rights, 72 AD2d 808, in support of its argument that it did not unlawfully discriminate against Counselor. However, said the Appellate Division, “to the extent that Roslyn holds that a decision not to hire an individual because the individual is pregnant is not a form of discrimination,” it declined to follow it.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_05384.htm

Free Webinar addressing the taxation of accumulated sick and leave pay for retiring employees

Free Webinar addressing the taxation of accumulated sick and leave pay for retiring employees

Source: Federal, State and Local Government Newsletter [IRS]

Webinar to be held on July 30, 2015; 2 p.m. (Eastern)

Topics to be addressed:

Determining when accumulated sick and vacation pay are subject to federal employment taxes

Determining when taxation can be deferred to a later year

Defining an elective employee contribution

Defining a non-elective employer contribution

Click here to Register for this event.

NOTE: You will use the same link to attend the event.

If you have any questions or comments, click her to send us an e-mail.

Fair Chance Hiring Application Revisions and Statewide Employment Application

Fair Chance Hiring Application Revisions and Statewide Employment Application

NYS Department of Civil Service General Information Bulletin No. 15-02

Scott DeFruscio, New York State Department of Civil Service Director of Staffing Services, announced the publication of NYS Department of Civil Service General Information Bulletin No. 15-02 addressing the Department’s Fair Chance Hiring Application Revisions and Statewide Employment Application

The Bulletin is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.cs.ny.gov/ssd/Manuals/SPMM/GIBS/GIB15-02.cfm

Selected reports and information issued by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli issued during the week ending July 11, 2015

Selected reports and information issued by New York State's Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli issued during the week ending July 11, 2015

[Click on text highlighted in color to access the full report]

Department of Agriculture and Markets - Food Safety Monitoring

An audit report issued in January 2014 found the department was unable to meet the demands of its inspection frequency schedule, and identified instances of both existing and new establishments preparing food prior to obtaining the required inspection. In addition, the department’s staff of 82 inspectors was below recommended staffing levels. In a follow-up, auditors found department officials made significant progress in addressing the problems identified in the initial audit. Of the three prior audit recommendations, two were implemented and one was partially implemented. http://osc.state.ny.us/audits/allaudits/093015/15f10.pdf

Division of the Budget - Quality of Internal Control Certifications

In 2012, auditors conducted a series of audits at 12 state agencies focusing specifically on their 2011-2012 Internal Control Certifications submitted to the Division of the Budget (DOB). Auditors examined whether these agencies submitted their certifications on time, answered all the questions with the appropriate level of detail, and maintained documentation supporting the answers given. The initial audit reports concluded that improvements were needed to the quality of Internal Control Certifications at 10 of the 12 agencies. In a follow-up report, auditors found agency officials made significant progress in addressing the problems identified. http://osc.state.ny.us/audits/allaudits/093015/15f7.pdf

Department of Health -Overpayments of Hospitals’ Claims for Lengthy Acute Care Admissions
An initial audit report issued in July 2013 identified $7.8 million in Medicaid overpayments. The overpayments occurred primarily because hospitals billed Medicaid for higher (and more costly) levels of acute care when, in fact, patients received lower-cost non-acute care. In a follow-up, auditors found DOH officials recovered the overpayments identified in the initial report, notified hospitals of the correct way to bill inpatient claims, and modified its contractor’s sampling plan to select and review similar claims at high risk of overpayment. http://osc.state.ny.us/audits/allaudits/093015/15f12.pdf

Roswell Park Cancer Institute - Security Over Electronic Protected Health Information

The institute has taken many steps to safeguard its electronic protected health information (ePHI) and meet security requirements. In addition, auditors found the institute has adequate protection policies in place and a plan to make mandatory notifications when ePHI is lost or stolen. However, auditors identified some improvement opportunities. http://osc.state.ny.us/audits/allaudits/093015/14s67.pdf

State Universityof New York - Selected Procurement and Contracting Practices

SUNY officials have generally established good internal controls over procurement and have effectively communicated these procedures to the campuses. Tests at seven campuses and system administration, however, found they don’t consistently follow some of these procurement policies. For example, of 924 procurements reviewed, 97 inthe $500 to $250,000 range and totaling more than $1.1 million lacked required documentation to demonstrate that the price was reasonable. Auditors also identified some campus practices that go beyond SUNY’s requirements to manage cost and could serve as best practice examples if more widely shared among the campuses. http://osc.state.ny.us/audits/allaudits/093015/14s19.pdf

A limitation on an arbitrator’s discretion to fashion a remedy must be contained, either explicitly or incorporated by reference, in the arbitration clause

A limitation on an arbitrator’s discretion to fashion a remedy must be contained, either explicitly or incorporated by reference, in the arbitration clause
Matter of Town of Scriba (Teamsters Local 317), 2015 NY Slip Op 05316, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

Teamsters Local 317 (Union) appealed from an order and judgment of Supreme Court granting the application of the Town of Scriba [Scriba] to vacate an arbitration award. 

The stipulated issue submitted to the arbitrator asked "[w]as the suspension and termination of the [g]rievant, … for just cause? If not, what shall be the remedy?"

Among other things, the arbitrator had determined that, although maintaining a commercial driver's license (CDL) was a minimum standard for employment, the terms of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) did not mandate the employee's discharge from employment upon forfeiture of his CDL and, thus, Scriba did not have just cause to terminate the grievant.

The arbitrator fashioned a remedy whereby the grievant would be suspended without pay, and Scriba could terminate his employment only if he did not regain a valid CDL on or before a particular date.

Scriba appealed to the Supreme Court seeking an order vacating the arbitration award on the ground that the award exceeded the scope of the arbitrator's power.  Union filed a cross petition seeking to confirm the award pursuant to CPLR 7510. Supreme Court granted the Scriba’s motion to vacate the arbitration award.

Union appealed the Supreme Court’s decision and the Appellate Division agreed with the Union that Supreme Court erred in vacating the arbitration award, concluding that the arbitration award should have been confirmed.

The court said that it agreed with Union that the arbitrator did not exceed a specifically enumerated limitation on his authority, explaining that "It is well established that an arbitrator has broad discretion to determine a dispute and fix a remedy and that any contractual limitation on that discretion must be contained, either explicitly or incorporated by reference, in the arbitration clause itself."

The Appellate Division said that the relevant part of the collective bargaining agreement [CBA] stated only that "[i]f the dispute [regarding a grievance] cannot be satisfactorily resolved, the issue may be submitted to final and binding arbitration."  The court concluded that the CBA provided no "specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power" and that "the remedy sought was expressed in open-ended terms that certainly did not limit the arbitrator's power to grant any specific relief."

 

The court also agree with the Union that the award was not irrational, explaining that "An award is irrational if there is no proof whatever to justify the award” and so long as an arbitrator offers “even a barely colorable justification for the outcome reached” the arbitration award must be upheld.

Here, said the Appellate Division, “the language of the CBA is ‘reasonably susceptible of the construction given it by the arbitrator’ and the arbitrator offered a ‘colorable justification for the outcome reached.'”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_05316.htm

Placement on involuntary leave as the result of disability not work-related under color of Civil Service Law §72.5

Placement on involuntary leave as the result of disability not work-related under color of Civil Service Law §72.5

2015 NY Slip Op 05318, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

In August 2011, a firefighter [Firefighter] was removed from active duty because of an on-the-job hypoglycemic incident caused by his diabetes. Although Firefighter, his union, and the City's Fire Department subsequently engaged in negotiations regarding Firefighter's status, Firefighter was not formally notified that he had been placed on an immediate involuntary leave of absence pursuant to Civil Service Law §72.5 until April 2012.*

Firefighter challenged the decision. Ultimately a hearing officer determined that Firefighter had been properly placed on immediate involuntary leave, but additionally determined that he should be allowed to return to work and granted Firefighter some remedial relief.

In September 2013 the Fire Department Chief, reviewed the Hearing Officer's determination and decided that Firefighter should remain on involuntary leave, with no remedial relief. Firefighter appealed that determination to the County Department of Personnel, which affirmed the Fire Chief’s decision.

Firefighter filed a CPLR Article 78 petition in Supreme Court seeking to annul the determination that he was unfit for active duty as a firefighter because of his inability to manage his diabetic symptoms. Supreme Court transferred the matter to the Appellate Division pursuant to CPLR 7804 (g).

The Appellate Division agreed with Firefighter that the Fire Department did not strictly comply with the procedural requirements of the Civil Service Law, concluding that the procedural protections contained in Civil Service Law §72.1 apply to proceedings brought pursuant Civil Service Law §72.5 based on the language in §72.1 that the provisions of notice and hearing therein apply to employees "placed on leave of absence pursuant to this section" (emphasis in the opinion), "which includes Civil Service Law §72.5."

The court explained that these procedures are necessary "to afford tenured civil servant employees... procedural protections prior to involuntary separation from service," citing Sheeran v NYS Department of Transportation, 18 NY3d 61. The Appellate Division said that "[b]ecause of the significant due process implications of the statute, strict compliance with its procedures is required."**

Here it was undisputed that Fire Department did not strictly comply with the procedures set out in §72 for placing petitioner on immediate involuntary leave inasmuch as it was not until April 2012 that Firefighter was provided with "[w]ritten notice of the facts providing the basis for the judgment of the appointing authority that [Firefighter was] not fit to perform the duties of" his position. Although the parties had engaged in negotiations during the period before the Fire Department provided Firefighter with written notice, the Department conceded that at no time did Firefighter waive his rights under section §72.

The absence of strict compliance with these procedural requirements renders Firefighter’s alleged leave a nullity prior to September 30, 2013, when the Fire Chief issued his final determination after reviewing the Hearing Officer's decision. Accordingly, said the Appellate Division Firefighter is entitled to back pay and the restoration of benefits from August 26, 2011 until September 30, 2013.

However, said the court, it concluded that the determination that Firefighter was unfit for active duty is supported by substantial evidence that Firefighter “was rendered unfit to serve as an active duty firefighter because of his inability to manage his diabetic symptoms.

However, the Appellate Division said that as the Fire Department had “violated lawful procedure after initially determining that [Firefighter] was unfit for active duty in August 2011,” it said that Firefighter was entitled to a hearing, should he request one, to determine his current fitness to be reinstated, provided that his application for reinstatement is made within one year of our decision herein”, explaining that while  Firefighter “is not within the one-year time period for seeking reinstatement … [Fire Department is] estopped from asserting that [Firefighter] is time-barred from seeking such relief because the delay was caused by [Fire Department’s] failure to comply with the procedures.”

* An individual unable to perform the duties of his or her position as the result of an occupational injury or disease is placed on Workers' Compensation Leave pursuant to Civil Service Law §71.

** Termination of an employee placed on leave pursuant to Civil Service Law §72 is effected pursuant to Civil Service Law §73 as a matter of the exercise of discretion by the appointing authority.

N.B. An employee terminated from a “§72” leave pursuant to Civil Service Law §73 “may, within one year after the termination of such disability, [emphasis supplied],  make application to the civil service department or municipal commission having jurisdiction over the position last held by such employee for a medical examination to be conducted by a medical officer selected for that purpose by such department or commission” rather within one year of the effective date of the employee’s termination from a §72 leave pursuant to §73. The same is true with respect to an employee terminated from service while on §71 Workers' Compensation Leave.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_05318.htm

_____________

Disability Leave for fire, police and other public sector personnel - a 1098 page e-book focusing on administering General Municipal Law Sections 207-a/207-c and providing benefits thereunder. For more information click on http://booklocker.com/books/3916.html

_____________

Employee terminated after being found guilty of inflicting corporal punishment on pupils

Employee terminated after being found guilty of inflicting corporal punishment on pupils

2015 NY Slip Op 05787, Appellate Division, First Department

The New York City Chancellor of Education's Regulation A-420 prohibits inflicting corporal punishment on a student. Corporal punishment is defined as "any act of physical force upon a pupil for the purpose of punishing the pupil."

An individual [Petitioner] employed by the New York City Board of Education was charged with, and found guilty of, inflicting corporal punishment on  pupils by the arbitrator and the penalty imposed was termination from service.

Petitioner challenged the arbitration award and Supreme Court vacated the penalty imposed and remanded the matter “for determination of a lesser penalty.”

The Appellate Division unanimously reversed the Supreme Court’s decision, on the law, and entered a judgment confirming the award.

The court said that the “penalty of termination does not shock our sense of fairness,” noting that Petitioner had committed four separate acts of corporal punishment, in violation of Chancellor's Regulation A-420, three of these acts having occurred after he  had been formally warned that any recurrence of his misconduct would result in further disciplinary action and he had been referred to a mandatory training workshop on "appropriate behavior intervention strategies." The court also that the pupils who suffered the corporal punishment were “non-verbal autistic children, incapable of protecting themselves or reporting what happened to them.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_05787.htm

Resigning from one’s position for “good cause” is critical to the individual’s eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits

Resigning from one’s position for “good cause” is critical to the individual’s eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits

2015 NY Slip Op 05542, Appellate Division, Third Department

An applicant for Unemployment Insurance Benefits [Claimant] resigned from her position as the circulation coordinator at a public library after seven years of service. She was denied benefits and an administrative law judge [ALJ] sustained the administrative ruling following a hearing.

Claimant appealed and the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board reversed the ALJ’s determination and found that Claimant was, indeed, entitled to receive benefits. The employer appealed the Board’s decision.

The Appellate Division said that "'Whether a claimant has good cause to leave his or her employment is a factual determination to be made by the Board, and its decision will not be disturbed when supported by substantial evidence.'"

Here, said the court, Claimant testified to an ongoing conflict with the technology coordinator at the library, which testimony was supported by another employee. When Claimant brought these facts, along with other facts regarding the technology coordinator actions, to her supervisor’s attention, the supervisor offered no assistance to Claimant. Claimant then sought assistance from management, but was told that she would not receive assistance without the support of her supervisor.

Deferring to the Board's credibility determinations regarding the testimony of the witnesses at its hearing, the Appellate Division explained that there was substantial evidence for the Board's findings that Claimant's employer failed to take “even minimal steps to confirm or refute the alleged report that the technology coordinator had been inappropriately monitoring” Claimant's whereabouts and activities during Claimant's breaks.

The court said that it found no reason to disturb the Board's determination that such inaction by the employer provided good cause for claimant to leave her employment.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_05542.htm

Membership in the New York State Employees’ Retirement System is critical to an employee’s earning member service credit

Membership in the New York State Employees’ Retirement System is critical to an employee’s earning member service credit

2015 NY Slip Op 05532, Appellate Division, Third Department

Retirement and Social Security Law §102 (e) provides that “In the event that a disability retiree is restored to active service of an employer, at a salary less than his [or her] final salary but equal to or in excess of the current minimum salary for the position from which he [or she] was last retired for disability, such person, if he [or she] so elects, shall again become a member of the retirement system and his [or her] retirement allowance shall cease. He [or she] thereafter shall contribute to the retirement system in the same manner as and at the same rate that he [or she] paid prior to his [or her] disability retirement. The total service credit, to which he [or she] was entitled at the time of such retirement, again shall be credited to him [or her]. Upon his [or her] subsequent retirement, he [or she] shall be credited, in addition, with all member service earned by him subsequent to his [or her] last restoration to membership.*

A member of the New York State Employees’ Retirement System [NYSERS] employed by a State agency retired due to illness in 1980 and was receiving an ordinary disability retirement allowance. In 1985 the individual’s [Retiree] health improved and she was reemployed by her former agency. However, upon returning to employment Retiree did not rejoin the Retirement System** and continued to receive her disability pension benefit as authorized Retirement and Social Security Law §102(e) in addition to her receiving her salary.

In 1995 Retiree asked NYSERS to provide her with her service credit in the System and she was informed that she had accumulated 10 years, 7 months and 15 days of service credit between 1969 and 1980. In addition, Retiree was expressly told that she was not "receiv[ing] service credit for time worked after retirement while [she was] also receiving pension benefits."

In 2006 Retiree wrote to NYSERS inquiring as to whether she had in fact applied to be "restored to membership" in the System and, further, whether it was possible to retroactively obtain service credit for her postretirement work.

After being advised that she could not simultaneously collect her disability pension benefit and be an active member of NYSERS earning service credit., the matter proceeded to an administrative hearing. The Hearing Officer found, among other things, that Retiree was not entitled to additional service credit. The Comptroller adopted the Hearing Officer's findings in this regard and Retiree initiated a CPLR Article 78 proceeding challenging the Comptroller's determination.

The Appellate Division sustained the Comptroller decision, noting that “the Comptroller “is charged with the responsibility of determining service credits for retirement purposes and his determination will be upheld if rational and supported by substantial evidence."

Retiree, said the court, as the party seeking additional service credit bore the burden of demonstrating her entitlement to such credit.” In this instance the court said that §102 governs postretirement employment by disability pensioners and dictates, based upon the disability retiree's final salary following his or her return to active service, whether membership in the Retirement System is mandatory or optional. The evidence presented at the hearing showed that Retiree's salary upon returning to active service did not make membership in the System mandatory and while Retiree explored the possibility of becoming, once again, a member of the System, she never actually exercised her option to do so.

In the words of the Appellate Division: “Absent membership in [NYSERS] following her return to service in 1985, and in light of her continued receipt of disability pension benefits, [Retiree] simply was not entitled to earn additional service credit."

The decision also notes that despite Retiree’s arguments to the contrary, “the Comptroller was not under an affirmative duty to either apprise [Retiree] of all available options relating to her retirement benefits or ensure that she selected the most advantageous benefit.”

Accordingly, the Appellate Division found that the Comptroller's determination denying Retiree additional service credit was supported by substantial evidence and dismissed her appeal.

* In contrast, §102 d of the Retirement and Social Security Law provides as follows: In the event that a disability beneficiary is restored to active service of an employer, at a salary equal to or in excess of his [or her] final salary, his retirement allowance shall cease. Such person thereupon again shall become a member of the retirement system. He thereafter shall contribute to the retirement system in the same manner as and at the same rate that he [or she] paid prior to his [or her] disability retirement. The total service credit, to which he [or she] was entitled at the time of such retirement, again shall be credited to him [or her]. Upon his subsequent retirement, he [or she] shall be credited, in addition, with all member service earned by him subsequent to his [or her] last restoration to membership.

**  An individual’s membership in NYSERS ceases upon his or her retirement.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2015/2015_05532.htm

“Scam” Emails Involving Notices to Appear in Court

“Scam” Emails Involving Notices to Appear in Court

Source: New York State Unified Court System

It has come to the attention of the New York State Unified Court Systemthat scam emails, purporting to be coming from the New York State Court System, directing recipients to report to court and to open an attachment for more information, are infecting recipients’ computers with a virus.

The New York State Unified Court System has posted the following warning on the Internet::

“These scam emails typically instruct recipients to report to court on a specific day and time, and they often direct the recipient to bring documents and witnesses with them. They also typically warn that the court may proceed in their absence and that they will be sanctioned if they do not appear. The emails also instruct recipients to read a court notice that is attached. The attachment contains a computer virus. Do not open the attachment. Delete the email.

“Be on the alert. If you are not involved in a court proceeding and have not supplied the NYS courts with an email address for receiving court notifications, the courts do not communicate with you by email. The court system does not send unsolicited emails or requests for personal information. The court system does not send emails threatening sanctions if you do not appear in court. Nor does the court system send emails that ask you to open attachments in order to obtain additional information.

“If you have a question about a notice you have received from the New York State Unified Court System, please call 1-800-Court-NY.”

For more information about online scams, contact the NYS Office of the Attorney General:
http://www.ag.ny.gov/internet/common-online-scams

and/or the United States Federal Trade Commission:
http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0003-phishing

Remember, if you are unsure of the origin of a message, don’t open it, don’t reply to it and don’t click on any links within the message - delete the message.

Education Department posts proposed Probationary Appointments and Tenured Teacher Disciplinary Hearing Regulations

Education Department posts proposed Probationary Appointments and Tenured Teacher Disciplinary Hearing Regulations

EMERGENCY/PROPOSED RULE MAKING - NO HEARING(S) SCHEDULED
I.D. No. EDU-27-15-00006-EP filed June 6, 2015 effective June 23, 2015

The Education Department said that the proposed rule is necessary to conform the Commissioner’s Regulations to changes in the Education Law enacted in Subparts D and G of Part EE of Chapter 56 of the Laws of 2015, relating to probationary appointments and tenured teacher hearings.It is anticipated that the proposed rule will be presented for adoption as a permanent rule at the September 16-17, 2015 Regents meeting, which is the first scheduled meeting after expiration of the 45-day public comment period prescribed in the State Administrative Procedure Act for State agency rule makings.

Full text is posted at the following State website:

http://www.regents.nysed.gov/meetings/2015/2015-06/higher-education

The following is a summary of selected parts of the proposed rule:

§30-1.3 is amended to provide that for appointments of classroom teachers and building principals made on or after July 1, 2015, the board resolution must reflect that, except to the extent required by the applicable provisions of Education Law §§2509, 2573, 3212 and 3014, in order to be granted tenure, the classroom teacher or building principal shall have received composite or overall annual professional performance review ratings pursuant to Education Law §§ 3012-c and/or 3012-d of either effective or highly effective in at least three (3) of the four (4) preceding years and if the classroom teacher or building principal receives an ineffective composite or overall rating in the final year of the probationary period he or she shall not be eligible for tenure at that time.

The Title of Subpart 82-1 and §82-1.1 are amended to provide that Subpart 82-1 applies to hearings on charges against tenured school employees pursuant to §3020-a of the Education Law that are commenced by the filing of charges on or after August 25, 1994 and prior to July 1, 2015.

A new Subpart 82-3 is added, relating to hearings on charges against tenured school employees pursuant to §3020-a of the Education Law that are commenced by the filing of charges on or after July 1, 2015. §82-3.1, Application of this Subpart, provides that Subpart 80-3 applies to hearings on charges against tenured school employees pursuant to §§3020-a and 3020-b of the Education Law that are commenced by the filing of charges on or after July 1, 2015.

§82-3.10 establishes procedures for probable cause hearings related to suspensions without pay of employees charged with misconduct constituting the physical or sexual abuse of a student.

Other sections provide for requesting a hearing; sets forth the requirements andprocedures for requesting a hearing;  the appointment of hearing officer in standard andexpedited §3020-a proceedings and similar procedural matters addressing disciplinary actions taken against educators and administrators.

Text of rule and any required statements and analyses may be obtained from: Kirti Goswami, State Education Department, Office of Counsel, State Education Building, Room 148, 89 Washington Ave., Albany, NY 12234, (518) 474-6400, email: legal@nysed.gov

Data, views or arguments may be submitted to Peg Rivers, State Education Department, Office of Higher Education, Room 979 EBA, 89 Washington Ave., Albany, NY 12234, (518) 486-3633, email: regcomments@nysed.gov

Public comment will be received until 45 days after publication of this Notice. [Notice was published in the NYS Register dated July 8, 2015.]

Recent decisions by New York City’s Office of Administrative Tribunals and Hearings Administrative Law Judges

Recent decisions by New York City’s Office of Administrative Tribunals and Hearings Administrative Law Judges

The material highlighted inblue links to the full text of the decision

Absence on Family Medical Leave - In 2008 respondent was granted leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and was instructed to provide a certificate of clearance from his doctor before returning to duty. After his leave was exhausted, respondent failed to return to work. He was charged with being AWOL and was demoted without a hearing. Respondent subsequently reported to work in 2009 and presented medical documentation that he was fit to return to work. Respondent was advised that he was not cleared for duty and that the agency would get back to him. Five years later, the agency charged respondent with being AWOL between 2009 and 2014. Administrative Law Judge Alessandra F. Zorgniotti found that the agency did not prove the charges because respondent made several attempts to return to work and that the agency left his employment status in an indeterminate state.   DOITT v. Anonymous, OATH Index No. 051/15.

Off-duty assault - Respondent, a civilian employee working as a cement mason in a City jail, was charged with misconduct for two alleged off-duty assaults. Respondent presented testimony from his therapist showing that he suffers from bipolar disorder, and he has taken substantial steps to keep his disorder under control with medication and therapy. Administrative Law Judge [ALJ]. Kevin F. Casey found that only one of the assaults was proven. ALJ Casey found that termination of employment would be excessive, since misconduct was attributable to respondent's disability. He recommended a 45-day suspension without pay, with credit for time served.   Dep't of Correction v. A.A., OATH Index No. 2757/14.

Use of excessive force by a correction officer -  A correction officer was charged with using excessive force against an inmate on two occasions. Administrative Law Judge John B. Spooner found that one set of charges was barred by the 18-month statute of limitations in the Civil Service Law. Regarding the second set of charges, which were timely, the Department proved that the officer hit an inmate in the head, while escorting him on a gurney, and had submitted a false report denying that he had used force. The recommended penalty was a forty-day suspension without pay.   Dep't of Correction v. Arias, OATH Index No. 920/15, [adopted.] 

Making a false statement - A correction officer was charged with failing to comply with the Department's undue familiarity rules and making false statements. Respondent notified the Department that a "family member" was housed in a City jail and that she would be posting his bail and sending mail and money to him. The inmate was later transferred to a state prison and, for a year, respondent failed to notify the Department that she would have similar contact with the inmate while he was in the state facility. At trial respondent acknowledged that the inmate is her significant other with whom she had lived with for more than seven years. Administrative Law Judge [ALJ] Tynia D. Richard recommended that false statement charges be sustained but the undue familiarity charges be dismissed. The ALJ found that respondent provided sufficient notification to comply with the undue familiarity rules, and her identification of the inmate as a "family member" was not misleading since Department rules do not require a more detailed description. The ALJ recommended a penalty of 15-day suspension for false statements.   Dep't of Correction v. Caldwell, OATH Index No. 2702/14.

Throwing an object at a co-worker - An employee was charged with raising her voice to a co-worker stating "you messed up" and "I am tired of this", and throwing a binder clip at the co-worker. The employee admitted that she had raised her voice and that she threw the binder clip in the co-workers' direction, but did not mean to hit her with the clip. Administrative Law Judge [ALJ] Kara J. Miller found the employee's testimony to be credible and ruled that she could only be disciplined for throwing the binder clip in the co-workers' direction. Statements made during the argument did not constitute misconduct as it was not shown that the disagreement, which was brief, disrupted the office. ALJ Miller recommended a five-day suspension, with credit for time served in pre-hearing suspension.   Dep't of Education v. Collins-Jackson, OATH Index No. 832/15. 

Videotape evidence - Administrative Law Judge [ALJ] Faye Lewis found that a correction officer used unnecessary and excessive force against an inmate. Videotape evidence, documentary proof of the inmate's head injuries and testimony from an officer who witnessed the incident, proved that the officer struck the inmate in the head without provocation and stomped the inmate's head two times while he was lying on the floor. Respondent's claim that he used force because he reasonably believed that the inmate had a weapon and he feared for his life, was not supported by any evidence other than respondent's testimony, which ALJ Lewis found to be incredible. Termination of employment was recommended.   Dep't of Correction v. Victor, OATH Index No. 388/15, [adopted,]