Exhausting of Taylor Law contract remedies
Kaufmann v Rochester CSD, App. Div., Fourth Dept., 275 AD2d 890
The Rochester Board of Education attempted to have Susan K. Kaufmann’s lawsuit dismissed on the theory that Kaufmann had not exhausted her administrative remedies because she did not file a contract grievance concerning her complaint.
The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, quickly disposed of the district’s argument by pointing out that Kaufmann did not allege that the district had violated her rights under the collective bargaining agreement but rather she alleged that the district had violated her rights under Section 2585(2) of the Education Law.
Accordingly, said the court, Kaufmann was not required to file a grievance under the collective bargaining agreement concerning her complaint.
Education Law Section 2585(2) addresses situations involving the abolishment of one position and the creation of another position having similar duties and provides that the individual encumbering the abolished position shall be appointed to the office or position thus created without reduction in salary or increment, provided the record of such person has been of faithful, competent service in the office or position he has filled.
NYPPL
Summaries of, and commentaries on, selected court and administrative decisions and related matters affecting public employers and employees in New York State in particular and possibly in other jurisdictions in general.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE [AI] IS NOT USED IN COMPOSING NYPPL SUMMARIES OF JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL DECISIONS.
Dec 10, 2010
Responding to Freedom of Information requests
Responding to Freedom of Information requests
McKethan v NY-NJ Port Authority, Appellate Division, First Dept., 277 AD2d 15
William McKethan obtained a court order pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law directing the New York-New Jersey Port Authority [New York Branch] to provide him with certain information. In a subsequent proceeding, State Supreme Court Judge Paula Omansky determined that the Authority had adequately respond[ed] to the court’s prior order. Not satisfied with the court’s determination, McKethan appealed.
The Appellate Division sustained Judge Omansky’s decision, holding that the Authority adequately established the nonexistence of additional records requested by [McKethan].
The reasoning of the court:
Once the Authority’s records access officer certified that respondent had provided McKethan with all responsive documents in its possession, McKethan was required to articulate a demonstrable factual basis to support his contention that the [further] requested documents existed and were within the [Authority’s] control.
Citing Gould v New York City Police Department, 89 NY2d 267, in support of its position, the Appellate Division ruled that McKethan has not met that burden.
NYPPL
McKethan v NY-NJ Port Authority, Appellate Division, First Dept., 277 AD2d 15
William McKethan obtained a court order pursuant to the Freedom of Information Law directing the New York-New Jersey Port Authority [New York Branch] to provide him with certain information. In a subsequent proceeding, State Supreme Court Judge Paula Omansky determined that the Authority had adequately respond[ed] to the court’s prior order. Not satisfied with the court’s determination, McKethan appealed.
The Appellate Division sustained Judge Omansky’s decision, holding that the Authority adequately established the nonexistence of additional records requested by [McKethan].
The reasoning of the court:
Once the Authority’s records access officer certified that respondent had provided McKethan with all responsive documents in its possession, McKethan was required to articulate a demonstrable factual basis to support his contention that the [further] requested documents existed and were within the [Authority’s] control.
Citing Gould v New York City Police Department, 89 NY2d 267, in support of its position, the Appellate Division ruled that McKethan has not met that burden.
NYPPL
Loss of a required license or certification bars the incumbent from performing the duties of the position
Loss of a required license or certification bars the incumbent from performing the duties of the position
Agriculture and Markets v Public Employees Federation, App. Div., Third Dept., 277 AD2d 564
Holding a valid license is sometimes an essential element to performing the duties of the position. What happens if the employee losses his or her license?
This was the issue when Sahedou Ousman, an assistant farm products inspector assigned to inspect eggs pursuant to an agreement with the US Department of Agriculture [USDA] lost his Federal egg product inspection license.
According to the decision, Ousman’s license was revoked by the USDA because of his failure to consistently follow instructions, adhere to established procedures and repeated instances of tardiness and unauthorized absences from his place of employment during his normal tour of duty.
Agriculture and Markets [A&M] terminated Ousman’s employment on the grounds that his loss of his license resulted in his being unqualified to perform the duties of an assistant farm products inspector.
A&M, pursuant to an agreement with the Public Employees Federation, Ousman’s collective bargaining representative, subsequently reinstated him. It then placed Ousman on administrative leave and initiated disciplinary action against him under the contract disciplinary procedure set out in a Taylor Law agreement.
The charge: incompetence in that he failed to maintain his Federal egg product inspection license that was required for his continued employment as an egg inspector.
Ultimately an arbitrator ruled that the Federal egg product inspection license was not a prerequisite for the position of an assistant farm products inspector and there were employment opportunities within that title to which Ousman could have been assigned that did not require Federal licensure at that time. The arbitrator’s conclusion: Ousman should not have been terminated.
The arbitrator’s ruling is consistent with the court’s ruling in the Lekkas case [Martin ex rel Lekkas, 86 AD2d 712]. Here the issue concerned Lekkas’ lack of license to practice medicine in New York State although he had been appointed to the position of Assistant Clinical Physician with a State agency. In Lekkas the Appellate Division ruled that although an employee who does not possess a valid license required to perform the duties of the position may be summarily discharged without notice and hearing, it determined that Lekkas was performing administrative duties rather than practicing medicine. Thus, said the court, Lekkas was not required by law to hold a license to practice medicine even though he held the title Assistant Clinical Physician. Accordingly, he could not be summarily removed from the position merely because he was not a licensed physician.
The arbitrator directed A&M to restore Ousman to pay status with all rights and benefits effective July 1, 1997, back pay to be adjusted to reflect any income or unemployment compensation benefits received since that time.
The decision also directed A&M to offer Ousman the next available position within title or, in the alternative, continue him on paid administrative leave and file charges against him based upon his unsatisfactory performance of his duties as a State employee prior to April 15, 1997.
The Appellate Division rejected A&M’s attempt to annul the arbitration award on the grounds that the award was wholly irrational and violated a fundamental public policy regarding civil service appointment requirements and the State’s compelling interest in ensuring a safe food supply to the public.
Noting that the notice of discipline filed by A&M limited the arbitrator’s inquiry to whether Ousman’s loss of his Federal license rendered him unqualified to perform the duties of an assistant farm products inspector warranting his dismissal, the Appellate Division ruled that the arbitrator’s determination did not require A&M to reinstate Ousman to another food inspection position since it allowed it the alternative of continuing Ousman on administrative leave and filing the appropriate disciplinary charge reflecting his general incompetence and lack of qualifications for any position within his title of employment.
The Appellate Division’s conclusion: the arbitration award simply extends to Ousman the protection of the collective bargaining agreement that A&M agrees is applicable and cannot be said to be violative of any strong public policy or the State constitutional mandate that civil service appointments be based on merit.
It is well settled that where a statute requires an individual to have a valid license or certification or permit in order to practice his or her profession or duties, the loss, expiration, revocation or failure to obtain or maintain the required license or certification or permit in a timely fashion means that the individual is not authorized to perform the duties of the position as a matter of law.
For example, the courts have little difficulty in upholding the immediate suspension of a teacher without pay where the educator is unable to present a valid license or certification when asked to do so.
Although such a person may continue to be qualified to perform the duties of the position, he or she is typically barred from doing so unless and until a valid license or permit is obtained. In such situations the courts have upheld the employer summarily suspending the employee without pay as was the case in Meliti v Nyquist, 41 NY2d 183. The rationale in such cases: it is unlawful to continue a tenured but unlicensed teacher on the payroll as he or she is barred from performing his or her teaching duties and to retain such a person on the payroll as a teacher would constitute an unconstitutional gift of public monies.
There is nothing, however, that would prevent the appointing authority from placing such an individual in another position for which he or she is qualified and for which a license is not required as an alternative to dismissal or removal from the payroll.
Another common situations that result in a bar to continued employment in a position: the expiration, suspension or revocation of a driver’s license when the duties of the position require the incumbent of the position to drive a motor vehicle.
NYPPL
Agriculture and Markets v Public Employees Federation, App. Div., Third Dept., 277 AD2d 564
Holding a valid license is sometimes an essential element to performing the duties of the position. What happens if the employee losses his or her license?
This was the issue when Sahedou Ousman, an assistant farm products inspector assigned to inspect eggs pursuant to an agreement with the US Department of Agriculture [USDA] lost his Federal egg product inspection license.
According to the decision, Ousman’s license was revoked by the USDA because of his failure to consistently follow instructions, adhere to established procedures and repeated instances of tardiness and unauthorized absences from his place of employment during his normal tour of duty.
Agriculture and Markets [A&M] terminated Ousman’s employment on the grounds that his loss of his license resulted in his being unqualified to perform the duties of an assistant farm products inspector.
A&M, pursuant to an agreement with the Public Employees Federation, Ousman’s collective bargaining representative, subsequently reinstated him. It then placed Ousman on administrative leave and initiated disciplinary action against him under the contract disciplinary procedure set out in a Taylor Law agreement.
The charge: incompetence in that he failed to maintain his Federal egg product inspection license that was required for his continued employment as an egg inspector.
Ultimately an arbitrator ruled that the Federal egg product inspection license was not a prerequisite for the position of an assistant farm products inspector and there were employment opportunities within that title to which Ousman could have been assigned that did not require Federal licensure at that time. The arbitrator’s conclusion: Ousman should not have been terminated.
The arbitrator’s ruling is consistent with the court’s ruling in the Lekkas case [Martin ex rel Lekkas, 86 AD2d 712]. Here the issue concerned Lekkas’ lack of license to practice medicine in New York State although he had been appointed to the position of Assistant Clinical Physician with a State agency. In Lekkas the Appellate Division ruled that although an employee who does not possess a valid license required to perform the duties of the position may be summarily discharged without notice and hearing, it determined that Lekkas was performing administrative duties rather than practicing medicine. Thus, said the court, Lekkas was not required by law to hold a license to practice medicine even though he held the title Assistant Clinical Physician. Accordingly, he could not be summarily removed from the position merely because he was not a licensed physician.
The arbitrator directed A&M to restore Ousman to pay status with all rights and benefits effective July 1, 1997, back pay to be adjusted to reflect any income or unemployment compensation benefits received since that time.
The decision also directed A&M to offer Ousman the next available position within title or, in the alternative, continue him on paid administrative leave and file charges against him based upon his unsatisfactory performance of his duties as a State employee prior to April 15, 1997.
The Appellate Division rejected A&M’s attempt to annul the arbitration award on the grounds that the award was wholly irrational and violated a fundamental public policy regarding civil service appointment requirements and the State’s compelling interest in ensuring a safe food supply to the public.
Noting that the notice of discipline filed by A&M limited the arbitrator’s inquiry to whether Ousman’s loss of his Federal license rendered him unqualified to perform the duties of an assistant farm products inspector warranting his dismissal, the Appellate Division ruled that the arbitrator’s determination did not require A&M to reinstate Ousman to another food inspection position since it allowed it the alternative of continuing Ousman on administrative leave and filing the appropriate disciplinary charge reflecting his general incompetence and lack of qualifications for any position within his title of employment.
The Appellate Division’s conclusion: the arbitration award simply extends to Ousman the protection of the collective bargaining agreement that A&M agrees is applicable and cannot be said to be violative of any strong public policy or the State constitutional mandate that civil service appointments be based on merit.
It is well settled that where a statute requires an individual to have a valid license or certification or permit in order to practice his or her profession or duties, the loss, expiration, revocation or failure to obtain or maintain the required license or certification or permit in a timely fashion means that the individual is not authorized to perform the duties of the position as a matter of law.
For example, the courts have little difficulty in upholding the immediate suspension of a teacher without pay where the educator is unable to present a valid license or certification when asked to do so.
Although such a person may continue to be qualified to perform the duties of the position, he or she is typically barred from doing so unless and until a valid license or permit is obtained. In such situations the courts have upheld the employer summarily suspending the employee without pay as was the case in Meliti v Nyquist, 41 NY2d 183. The rationale in such cases: it is unlawful to continue a tenured but unlicensed teacher on the payroll as he or she is barred from performing his or her teaching duties and to retain such a person on the payroll as a teacher would constitute an unconstitutional gift of public monies.
There is nothing, however, that would prevent the appointing authority from placing such an individual in another position for which he or she is qualified and for which a license is not required as an alternative to dismissal or removal from the payroll.
Another common situations that result in a bar to continued employment in a position: the expiration, suspension or revocation of a driver’s license when the duties of the position require the incumbent of the position to drive a motor vehicle.
NYPPL
Dec 9, 2010
Collective bargaining after the Taylor Law Agreement expires
Collective bargaining after the Taylor Law Agreement expires
Local 2562 v PERB, App. Div., Third Dept., 276 AD2d 184, Motion for leave to appeal denied, 96 NY2d 711
In the Local 2562 case, the Appellate Division sustained a Public Employment Relations Board [PERB] ruling that held that a nonmandatory subject of collective bargaining, if continued after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement [CBA] under the Triboro Doctrine [Civil Service Law Section 209-a(1)(e)], is converted into a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.
The Triboro Doctrine essentially requires a public employer to continue all terms of an expired collective bargaining agreement -- whether mandatory or nonmandatory subjects -- until the parties reach a new agreement.
Uniform Firefighters Local 2562 [City of Cohoes] appealed a PERB decision holding that certain otherwise nonmandatory proposals made by the City in the course of negotiating a successor to an expired CBA are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.
Local 2562 sued, contending that PERB’s determinations departed from its prior precedent and redefined what may constitute a mandatory subject of negotiation upon the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement between police officers and firefighters and their municipal employers.
In particular, Local 2562 objected to PERB’s rulings concerning the City’s proposal to delete or alter certain terms in the expired CBA relating to staffing composition and job assignment and the City’s proposal affecting General Municipal Law Section 207-a disability benefits.
Agreeing to the Section 207-a proposal, said the union, would require its members to give up certain statutory rights and privileges. In addition, Local 2562 complained that the City’s staffing proposals concerned officer replacement procedures and the obligation of firefighters to engage in snow removal and were previously viewed as managerial prerogatives deemed nonmandatory subjects of negotiation prior to their inclusion in the parties’ previous CBA.
According to the decision, PERB’s overruling its long-standing precedent meant that once nonmandatory subjects have been incorporated into a CBA involving police officers and firefighters, such items become mandatory subjects of negotiation for the purposes of negotiating a subsequent agreement in a Triboro Doctrine situation.
PERB also ruled that proposals concerning the terms and conditions of employment that would require an employee organization or its members to waive or modify statutory rights and privileges are also mandatorily negotiable, unless bargaining as to those matters is foreclosed by clear legislative intent or public policy.
PERB’s explanation: its new interpretation corrects an imbalance resulting from the enactment of Section 209-a(1)(e) of the Taylor Law which codified the so-called Triboro Doctrine.
The Appellate Division said that PERB provided “a detailed explanation for its decision to depart from its previous analysis on the ground that it intended to create a more equal bargaining posture between the parties in order to foster productive negotiation....”
Accordingly, said the court, recognizing the deference to which PERB’s determinations are entitled in the realm of improper labor practices, it found that its action was neither arbitrary nor irrational.
As to PERB’s determining the negotiability of proposals alleged to flow from a statutory right or benefit, in the past PERB automatically categorized such proposals as nonmandatory without analysis of whether negotiations concerning particular proposals would be consistent with the applicable statute’s legislative intent, public policy, or the furtherance of the objectives of the Taylor Law. Under its new policy, PERB would consider such demands on a case-by-case basis.
The Appellate Division said that PERB’s approach -- reviewing each such proposal case-by-case -- appears to be substantially the same as the method used to determine whether proposals of employee organizations that implicate the rights of public employers are mandatorily negotiable.
The court rejected Local 2562’s argument that by requiring that proposals relating to the waiver of statutory rights be subject to negotiation, PERB is effectuating the involuntary waiver of those rights. It said that although the Taylor Law clearly provides that the obligation to negotiate concerning terms and conditions of employment it does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.
The bottom line: the court affirmed the Supreme Court’s dismissal of Local 2562’s challenge to PERB’s determinations, indicating that they were neither arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion nor affected by an error of law.
NYPPL
Local 2562 v PERB, App. Div., Third Dept., 276 AD2d 184, Motion for leave to appeal denied, 96 NY2d 711
In the Local 2562 case, the Appellate Division sustained a Public Employment Relations Board [PERB] ruling that held that a nonmandatory subject of collective bargaining, if continued after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement [CBA] under the Triboro Doctrine [Civil Service Law Section 209-a(1)(e)], is converted into a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.
The Triboro Doctrine essentially requires a public employer to continue all terms of an expired collective bargaining agreement -- whether mandatory or nonmandatory subjects -- until the parties reach a new agreement.
Uniform Firefighters Local 2562 [City of Cohoes] appealed a PERB decision holding that certain otherwise nonmandatory proposals made by the City in the course of negotiating a successor to an expired CBA are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining.
Local 2562 sued, contending that PERB’s determinations departed from its prior precedent and redefined what may constitute a mandatory subject of negotiation upon the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement between police officers and firefighters and their municipal employers.
In particular, Local 2562 objected to PERB’s rulings concerning the City’s proposal to delete or alter certain terms in the expired CBA relating to staffing composition and job assignment and the City’s proposal affecting General Municipal Law Section 207-a disability benefits.
Agreeing to the Section 207-a proposal, said the union, would require its members to give up certain statutory rights and privileges. In addition, Local 2562 complained that the City’s staffing proposals concerned officer replacement procedures and the obligation of firefighters to engage in snow removal and were previously viewed as managerial prerogatives deemed nonmandatory subjects of negotiation prior to their inclusion in the parties’ previous CBA.
According to the decision, PERB’s overruling its long-standing precedent meant that once nonmandatory subjects have been incorporated into a CBA involving police officers and firefighters, such items become mandatory subjects of negotiation for the purposes of negotiating a subsequent agreement in a Triboro Doctrine situation.
PERB also ruled that proposals concerning the terms and conditions of employment that would require an employee organization or its members to waive or modify statutory rights and privileges are also mandatorily negotiable, unless bargaining as to those matters is foreclosed by clear legislative intent or public policy.
PERB’s explanation: its new interpretation corrects an imbalance resulting from the enactment of Section 209-a(1)(e) of the Taylor Law which codified the so-called Triboro Doctrine.
The Appellate Division said that PERB provided “a detailed explanation for its decision to depart from its previous analysis on the ground that it intended to create a more equal bargaining posture between the parties in order to foster productive negotiation....”
Accordingly, said the court, recognizing the deference to which PERB’s determinations are entitled in the realm of improper labor practices, it found that its action was neither arbitrary nor irrational.
As to PERB’s determining the negotiability of proposals alleged to flow from a statutory right or benefit, in the past PERB automatically categorized such proposals as nonmandatory without analysis of whether negotiations concerning particular proposals would be consistent with the applicable statute’s legislative intent, public policy, or the furtherance of the objectives of the Taylor Law. Under its new policy, PERB would consider such demands on a case-by-case basis.
The Appellate Division said that PERB’s approach -- reviewing each such proposal case-by-case -- appears to be substantially the same as the method used to determine whether proposals of employee organizations that implicate the rights of public employers are mandatorily negotiable.
The court rejected Local 2562’s argument that by requiring that proposals relating to the waiver of statutory rights be subject to negotiation, PERB is effectuating the involuntary waiver of those rights. It said that although the Taylor Law clearly provides that the obligation to negotiate concerning terms and conditions of employment it does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.
The bottom line: the court affirmed the Supreme Court’s dismissal of Local 2562’s challenge to PERB’s determinations, indicating that they were neither arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion nor affected by an error of law.
NYPPL
Timely appeal to the Commissioner of Education provides the pre-litigation Section 3813 Notice of Claim that must be filed with a school district
Timely appeal to the Commissioner of Education provides the pre-litigation Section 3813 Notice of Claim that must be filed with a school district
Mennella v Uniondale UFSD, Supreme Court, 287 AD2d 636, Motion for leave to appeal denied, 98 NY2d 602
As a general rule, Section 3813 of the Education Law requires that in order to sue a school district the plaintiff must file a timely notice of claim if he or she plans or expects to sue the district. Such notices are usually required with respect to claims related to or involving personnel decisions.
The Mennella case, for example, concerned the termination of a probationary employee and turned on whether the court should excuse a late filing of such a claim pursuant to Section 3813(2-a) of the Education Law.
As a condition precedent to commencement of an action against a school district, Education Law §3813(1) requires that a written verified claim be delivered to the school district within three months of accrual of the claim. The Section 3813 notice must set out the nature of the claim, and the “essential facts underlying the claim.” Citing Matter of Board of Educ. v Ambach, 81 AD2d 691, the Appellate Division noted that “a petition to the Commissioner of Education can constitute the functional equivalent of a notice of claim.”
In this instance, Mennella filed a petition with the Commissioner of Education challenging the school district’s decision terminating him from employment within a week of the district’s action. The petition included allegations that the acting principal made certain statements indicative of racial discrimination. In the proceedings before the Commissioner of Education, the school district asserted that the allegations of racial discrimination were "baseless."
Accordingly, the Appellate Division concluded that Mennella’s petition to the Commissioner of Education constituted the functional equivalent of a notice of claim for the purposes of Education Law Section 3813 insofar as his going forward with litigation regarding his allegations of racial discrimination is concerned.
NYPPL
Mennella v Uniondale UFSD, Supreme Court, 287 AD2d 636, Motion for leave to appeal denied, 98 NY2d 602
As a general rule, Section 3813 of the Education Law requires that in order to sue a school district the plaintiff must file a timely notice of claim if he or she plans or expects to sue the district. Such notices are usually required with respect to claims related to or involving personnel decisions.
The Mennella case, for example, concerned the termination of a probationary employee and turned on whether the court should excuse a late filing of such a claim pursuant to Section 3813(2-a) of the Education Law.
As a condition precedent to commencement of an action against a school district, Education Law §3813(1) requires that a written verified claim be delivered to the school district within three months of accrual of the claim. The Section 3813 notice must set out the nature of the claim, and the “essential facts underlying the claim.” Citing Matter of Board of Educ. v Ambach, 81 AD2d 691, the Appellate Division noted that “a petition to the Commissioner of Education can constitute the functional equivalent of a notice of claim.”
In this instance, Mennella filed a petition with the Commissioner of Education challenging the school district’s decision terminating him from employment within a week of the district’s action. The petition included allegations that the acting principal made certain statements indicative of racial discrimination. In the proceedings before the Commissioner of Education, the school district asserted that the allegations of racial discrimination were "baseless."
Accordingly, the Appellate Division concluded that Mennella’s petition to the Commissioner of Education constituted the functional equivalent of a notice of claim for the purposes of Education Law Section 3813 insofar as his going forward with litigation regarding his allegations of racial discrimination is concerned.
NYPPL
Medical experts and conflicting medical opinions
Medical experts and conflicting medical opinions
Harper v McCall, App. Div., Third Dept., 277 AD2d 589
Pauline Harper challenged the rejection of her applications for ordinary and accidental disability retirement benefits by the New York State Employees’ Retirement System, contending that the Comptroller should have considered the expert medical opinion of her physician in making his determination.
Harper, a school bus driver, claimed that she was permanently disabled due to a neck condition. Her personal physician said that Harper was permanently incapacitated from performing the duties of a school bus driver as a result of a degenerative arthritic condition in her neck that was asymptomatic prior to a 1994 work-related accident that aggravated the condition.
The retirement system’s expert testified that, while Harper exhibited pain and discomfort when he examined her in 1997, he could find no objective evidence of neurological disease or injury that would cause her subjective symptoms, and he concluded that petitioner could perform the duties of a school bus driver.
The Appellate Division rejected Harper’s appeal, commenting that “[i]t is well settled that [the Comptroller] has the authority to resolve conflicts in medical opinion and to credit the testimony of one expert over that of another and may rely on an expert opinion based on a review of medical records and a physical examination is generally credible evidence.”
NYPPL
Harper v McCall, App. Div., Third Dept., 277 AD2d 589
Pauline Harper challenged the rejection of her applications for ordinary and accidental disability retirement benefits by the New York State Employees’ Retirement System, contending that the Comptroller should have considered the expert medical opinion of her physician in making his determination.
Harper, a school bus driver, claimed that she was permanently disabled due to a neck condition. Her personal physician said that Harper was permanently incapacitated from performing the duties of a school bus driver as a result of a degenerative arthritic condition in her neck that was asymptomatic prior to a 1994 work-related accident that aggravated the condition.
The retirement system’s expert testified that, while Harper exhibited pain and discomfort when he examined her in 1997, he could find no objective evidence of neurological disease or injury that would cause her subjective symptoms, and he concluded that petitioner could perform the duties of a school bus driver.
The Appellate Division rejected Harper’s appeal, commenting that “[i]t is well settled that [the Comptroller] has the authority to resolve conflicts in medical opinion and to credit the testimony of one expert over that of another and may rely on an expert opinion based on a review of medical records and a physical examination is generally credible evidence.”
NYPPL
Dec 8, 2010
Complimentary Webinar - Assessing the Risks of Moving to "The Cloud"
Complimentary Webinar - Assessing the Risks of Moving to "The Cloud"
Source: Virtual LegalTech
A one-hour webinar entitled, "Addressing and Assessing the Risks of Moving to the Cloud," will offered by Virtual LegalTech on December 14, 2010 from 1:30 – 2:30 PM ET.
The webinar will discuss the merits and pitfalls of the cloud, examining the issues surrounding chain of custody, legal hold and review capabilities in the event of an e-discovery request and how well will privacy be maintained.
Participants in the webinar are eligible for CLE in certain jurisdictions.*
Registration is complimentary. Follow this link to register.
The full schedule for these CLE accredited sessions* at Virtual LegalTech on December 14, 2010 follows:
9:00 – 10:00 am ET – Information Governance: Managing your Information to Reduce the Costs of Discovery
9:30 – 10:30 am ET – Ethical and Privilege Issues for Pharmaceutical Whistleblowers Counsel
10:00 – 11:00 am ET – Facing the Legal Dangers of Social Media1
2:15 – 1:15 pm ET – Frontiers of E-Discovery: What you Need to Know about Predictive Coding
1:30 – 2:30 pm ET – Addressing and Assessing the Risks of Moving to the Cloud
3:00 - 4:00 pm ET – Ethical Considerations in the New Era of Whistleblower Claims Under Dodd-Frank and Other Statutes
3:45 – 4:45 pm ET – Back to the Future: The Most Important 2020 E-Discovery Cases, and a Look Ahead to 2011
If you have additional CLE questions, please contact Virtual LegalTech at 212.457.7912 or via e-mail at ljackson@alm.com .
* Complimentary CLE is approved by the responsible authorizing agencies in New York, California and Illinois. Approval of CLE credit is pending in Florida.
Source: Virtual LegalTech
A one-hour webinar entitled, "Addressing and Assessing the Risks of Moving to the Cloud," will offered by Virtual LegalTech on December 14, 2010 from 1:30 – 2:30 PM ET.
The webinar will discuss the merits and pitfalls of the cloud, examining the issues surrounding chain of custody, legal hold and review capabilities in the event of an e-discovery request and how well will privacy be maintained.
Participants in the webinar are eligible for CLE in certain jurisdictions.*
Registration is complimentary. Follow this link to register.
The full schedule for these CLE accredited sessions* at Virtual LegalTech on December 14, 2010 follows:
9:00 – 10:00 am ET – Information Governance: Managing your Information to Reduce the Costs of Discovery
9:30 – 10:30 am ET – Ethical and Privilege Issues for Pharmaceutical Whistleblowers Counsel
10:00 – 11:00 am ET – Facing the Legal Dangers of Social Media1
2:15 – 1:15 pm ET – Frontiers of E-Discovery: What you Need to Know about Predictive Coding
1:30 – 2:30 pm ET – Addressing and Assessing the Risks of Moving to the Cloud
3:00 - 4:00 pm ET – Ethical Considerations in the New Era of Whistleblower Claims Under Dodd-Frank and Other Statutes
3:45 – 4:45 pm ET – Back to the Future: The Most Important 2020 E-Discovery Cases, and a Look Ahead to 2011
If you have additional CLE questions, please contact Virtual LegalTech at 212.457.7912 or via e-mail at ljackson@alm.com .
* Complimentary CLE is approved by the responsible authorizing agencies in New York, California and Illinois. Approval of CLE credit is pending in Florida.
Disciplinary charges must sufficiently specific so as to permit the accused to prepare his or her defense
Disciplinary charges must sufficiently specific so as to permit the accused to prepare his or her defense
Wolfe v Kelly, 2010 NY Slip Op 08847, decided on December 2, 2010, Appellate Division, First Department
Eric Wolfe, a New York City Police Department detective, was served with disciplinary charges alleging that He was guilty of perjury and the confiscation of drugs and money for personal gain involving Wolfe’s “stopping unidentified individuals in unspecified locations and confiscating unspecified amounts of narcotics and cash for his own personal gain on four occasions that occurred on unspecified dates at some time during a 24-month period between January 1998 and December 1999.”
Terminated from his position, Wolfe contended that he was denied due process of law, and that the lack of specificity in the charges prevented him from preparing any type of defense other than offering a general denial of any wrongdoing.
The Appellate Division, noting that Wolfe’s disciplinary hearing was held some six to eight years after the alleged acts of misconduct occurred, agreed.
Specification 1 alleged that "on two separate occasions between January 1998 and December 1999," Wolfe "stopped two individuals who were traveling in cabs and confiscated, without affecting [sic] an arrest and for personal monetary gain, a quantity of heroin from one, and a quantity of prescription drugs from the other."
Specification 2 alleged that "on two separate occasions between January 1998 and December 1999," Wolfe "stopped two individuals and confiscated, for personal monetary gain, a quantity of United States currency."
Specification 3 alleged that on or about and between April 23, 1998, and December 17, 1998, Wolfe testified falsely while under oath during an official court proceeding, in violation of Penal Law §210.15.
The Appellate Division explained that “It is well settled that the principles of due process applicable to criminal trials apply to government administrative proceedings, citing Matter of Murray v Murphy, 24 NY2d 150” and that the requirements of due process of law applied here because Wolfe has a constitutionally protected property interest in continued public employment.
Further, said the court, due process requires that the accused employee be provided with the notice of the charges that are "reasonably specific, in light of all the relevant circumstances, to apprise the party whose rights are being determined of the charges against him . . . and to allow for the preparation of an adequate defense," citing Matter of Block v Ambach, 73 NY2d 323.
While the specificity of the notice of charges required varies from case to case, but it must be specific enough to give actual notice to the party being charged.
The Appellate Division agreed with Wolfe that indicating a general time frame that spanned two entire years was not reasonably specific so as to satisfy due process requirements.*
The Appellate Division characterized the Department’s rebuttal of Wolfe’s claims to the effect that Wolfe could have offered an alibi defense by testifying about "any times during those two years when . . . he was not partners with [New York City police officers Julio] Vasquez or [Thomas] Rachko"** as “an incomprehensible — and inane — argument, and one that impermissibly shifts the burden of proof” to Wolfe.
In addition, the court commented that:
Equally incomprehensible is that, in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss for violation of due process, the ADC stated that "the unique nature of events alleged, the places where the misconduct occurred and the witnesses present, provided the defense with ample opportunity to prepare." The alleged incidents could only be assumed as "unique" if [Wolfe] was, indeed, guilty as charged. Otherwise, as the record reflects, there was nothing at all unusual or "unique" about any of the circumstances surrounding the alleged misconduct.
Annulling the Commissioner’s determination as to Specifications 1 and 2, the Appellate Division then rejected Wolfe’s arguments with respect to Specification 3 “given the low threshold in a substantial evidence analysis” and affirmed the Commissioner's determination that Wolfe was guilty of Specification 3.
As the penalty imposed on Wolfe, termination from his position, the court remanded the matter to the Department for its reconsideration based the court's annulling Specifications 1 and 2.
* The Appellate Division said that Wolfe’s alleged misconduct in specifications one and two applied to three or four discrete incidents and was therefore “not an offense of an ongoing/continuing nature.”
** In November 2003, Vasquez and Rachko were arrested for the theft of $169,000 from a narcotics merchant who was under federal surveillance. Both subsequently entered into cooperation agreements with federal authorities, the terms of which required them "to testify at any proceeding in the Eastern District of New York or elsewhere as requested by the [U.S. Attorney's] Office." They were required to testify at Wolfe’s hearing. The decision notes that “In exchange for their testimony, Vasquez and Rachko were given the possibility of lighter sentences, and the Manhattan District Attorney's office agreed not to prosecute them for any crimes they may have committed in New York County. Both former officers were facing terms of life imprisonment at the time of petitioner's administrative hearing but had not been sentenced.”
The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_08847.htm
Wolfe v Kelly, 2010 NY Slip Op 08847, decided on December 2, 2010, Appellate Division, First Department
Eric Wolfe, a New York City Police Department detective, was served with disciplinary charges alleging that He was guilty of perjury and the confiscation of drugs and money for personal gain involving Wolfe’s “stopping unidentified individuals in unspecified locations and confiscating unspecified amounts of narcotics and cash for his own personal gain on four occasions that occurred on unspecified dates at some time during a 24-month period between January 1998 and December 1999.”
Terminated from his position, Wolfe contended that he was denied due process of law, and that the lack of specificity in the charges prevented him from preparing any type of defense other than offering a general denial of any wrongdoing.
The Appellate Division, noting that Wolfe’s disciplinary hearing was held some six to eight years after the alleged acts of misconduct occurred, agreed.
Specification 1 alleged that "on two separate occasions between January 1998 and December 1999," Wolfe "stopped two individuals who were traveling in cabs and confiscated, without affecting [sic] an arrest and for personal monetary gain, a quantity of heroin from one, and a quantity of prescription drugs from the other."
Specification 2 alleged that "on two separate occasions between January 1998 and December 1999," Wolfe "stopped two individuals and confiscated, for personal monetary gain, a quantity of United States currency."
Specification 3 alleged that on or about and between April 23, 1998, and December 17, 1998, Wolfe testified falsely while under oath during an official court proceeding, in violation of Penal Law §210.15.
The Appellate Division explained that “It is well settled that the principles of due process applicable to criminal trials apply to government administrative proceedings, citing Matter of Murray v Murphy, 24 NY2d 150” and that the requirements of due process of law applied here because Wolfe has a constitutionally protected property interest in continued public employment.
Further, said the court, due process requires that the accused employee be provided with the notice of the charges that are "reasonably specific, in light of all the relevant circumstances, to apprise the party whose rights are being determined of the charges against him . . . and to allow for the preparation of an adequate defense," citing Matter of Block v Ambach, 73 NY2d 323.
While the specificity of the notice of charges required varies from case to case, but it must be specific enough to give actual notice to the party being charged.
The Appellate Division agreed with Wolfe that indicating a general time frame that spanned two entire years was not reasonably specific so as to satisfy due process requirements.*
The Appellate Division characterized the Department’s rebuttal of Wolfe’s claims to the effect that Wolfe could have offered an alibi defense by testifying about "any times during those two years when . . . he was not partners with [New York City police officers Julio] Vasquez or [Thomas] Rachko"** as “an incomprehensible — and inane — argument, and one that impermissibly shifts the burden of proof” to Wolfe.
In addition, the court commented that:
Equally incomprehensible is that, in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss for violation of due process, the ADC stated that "the unique nature of events alleged, the places where the misconduct occurred and the witnesses present, provided the defense with ample opportunity to prepare." The alleged incidents could only be assumed as "unique" if [Wolfe] was, indeed, guilty as charged. Otherwise, as the record reflects, there was nothing at all unusual or "unique" about any of the circumstances surrounding the alleged misconduct.
Annulling the Commissioner’s determination as to Specifications 1 and 2, the Appellate Division then rejected Wolfe’s arguments with respect to Specification 3 “given the low threshold in a substantial evidence analysis” and affirmed the Commissioner's determination that Wolfe was guilty of Specification 3.
As the penalty imposed on Wolfe, termination from his position, the court remanded the matter to the Department for its reconsideration based the court's annulling Specifications 1 and 2.
* The Appellate Division said that Wolfe’s alleged misconduct in specifications one and two applied to three or four discrete incidents and was therefore “not an offense of an ongoing/continuing nature.”
** In November 2003, Vasquez and Rachko were arrested for the theft of $169,000 from a narcotics merchant who was under federal surveillance. Both subsequently entered into cooperation agreements with federal authorities, the terms of which required them "to testify at any proceeding in the Eastern District of New York or elsewhere as requested by the [U.S. Attorney's] Office." They were required to testify at Wolfe’s hearing. The decision notes that “In exchange for their testimony, Vasquez and Rachko were given the possibility of lighter sentences, and the Manhattan District Attorney's office agreed not to prosecute them for any crimes they may have committed in New York County. Both former officers were facing terms of life imprisonment at the time of petitioner's administrative hearing but had not been sentenced.”
The decision is posted on the Internet at:
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2010/2010_08847.htm
Placement on a preferred list
Placement on a preferred list
Bratge v Stockbridge Valley CSD, Decision of the Commissioner of Education #14454
The Bratge case demonstrates the importance of complying with all statutory and contractual procedures relevant to personnel actions.
The Stockbridge Valley Central School District appointed Katrina Bratge as an Assistant Building Principal/Guidance Counselor [K-12]. Bratge’s appointment was subject to a three-year probationary period.
In March 1999 School Superintendent Charles Stratton met with Bratge. According to Bratge, the superintendent told her that the district intended to eliminate her position in favor of creating a new full-time guidance counselor position and converting a part-time business administrator position to a full-time position.
Stratton, on the other hand, said that he had told Bratge that he intended to terminate her probationary employment but that she would be allowed to resign rather than be terminated.
In August 1999 Bratge wrote to the school board indicating that she did not intend to resign her position and requested it place her name on the preferred eligibility list for appointment as a guidance or administrative position should one become available in accordance with Sections 2510(3) and 3013(3) of the Education Law.
In response, the district wrote to Bratge advising her that because she had voluntarily resigned from her position and had returned to a position with the Rome City School District ... she had no recall rights. Bratge wrote the district to clarify the events that had led to her asking to be placed on a preferred list and repeated her request. When the district failed to act, Bratge asked the Commissioner to order it to place her on a preferred list.
Although the Commissioner ruled that Bratge’s appeal had to be dismissed because it was untimely, he elected to comment on the merits of her appeal.
The Commissioner pointed out that the problem resulted because the district did not provide Bratge with a clear and unambiguous notice of its intentions. Although the district claims that Bratge agreed to resign and asked for her letter of resignation, it never actually received a written resignation from her.
Despite not having received Bratge’s written resignation, the Commissioner noted, the district did not take the procedural steps required to terminate her probationary employment.* This, according to the Commissioner, left Bratge unsure of her exact status and the district believing that the position was vacant as of the beginning of the 1999-2000 school year.
The Commissioner also took the opportunity to point out that personnel decisions must comply with all applicable legal and contractual requirements. In the event the district provides an employee with an option of resigning in lieu of termination, it must comply with all statutory and contractual notification requirements if it then wishes to terminate an employee who does not voluntarily submit his or her written resignation.
One issue not addressed by the Commissioner: assuming that Bratge had a right to have her name place on a preferred list, would her returning to a position with the Rome City School District have any impact on her status on such a list?
Here are some points to keep in mind regarding preferred lists:
1. Typically the most senior individual on the list may be passed over or, under certain circumstances, have his or her name removed from the list, only if he or she actually declines the appointment.
2. The name of an individual may not be removed from a preferred list if he or she merely declines appointment to a different position for which certification of the preferred list was not mandated or deemed appropriate.
3. The individual is not required to seek information concerning the existence of any vacancy for which he or she could be certified.
4. While an appointing authority is not required to fill a vacant position, if it elects to do so, it must use the appropriate preferred list if one exists. (Under certain circumstances, a public employer may be required to use other types of preferred lists such as a special military list.)
5. If an individual accepts other employment, his or her name is to remain on the preferred list until it may otherwise be lawfully removed. For example, Jones is laid off from Position A and subsequently accepts a position to a lower rank position for which the preferred list was certified. If Position A is reestablished and Jones is eligible for certification from the preferred list and is the most senior person on the list, Jones must be certified for appointed to the newly created position.
* The fact that the district did not take the procedural steps required to terminate Bratge’s probationary employment suggests that had Bratge filed a timely appeal the Commissioner might have found that she had attained tenure by estoppel.
____________________________________
For information about PELP's electronic handbook Layoff, Preferred Lists and Reinstatement of public employees in New York, go to: http://nylayoff.blogspot.com/
____________________________________
NYPPL
Bratge v Stockbridge Valley CSD, Decision of the Commissioner of Education #14454
The Bratge case demonstrates the importance of complying with all statutory and contractual procedures relevant to personnel actions.
The Stockbridge Valley Central School District appointed Katrina Bratge as an Assistant Building Principal/Guidance Counselor [K-12]. Bratge’s appointment was subject to a three-year probationary period.
In March 1999 School Superintendent Charles Stratton met with Bratge. According to Bratge, the superintendent told her that the district intended to eliminate her position in favor of creating a new full-time guidance counselor position and converting a part-time business administrator position to a full-time position.
Stratton, on the other hand, said that he had told Bratge that he intended to terminate her probationary employment but that she would be allowed to resign rather than be terminated.
In August 1999 Bratge wrote to the school board indicating that she did not intend to resign her position and requested it place her name on the preferred eligibility list for appointment as a guidance or administrative position should one become available in accordance with Sections 2510(3) and 3013(3) of the Education Law.
In response, the district wrote to Bratge advising her that because she had voluntarily resigned from her position and had returned to a position with the Rome City School District ... she had no recall rights. Bratge wrote the district to clarify the events that had led to her asking to be placed on a preferred list and repeated her request. When the district failed to act, Bratge asked the Commissioner to order it to place her on a preferred list.
Although the Commissioner ruled that Bratge’s appeal had to be dismissed because it was untimely, he elected to comment on the merits of her appeal.
The Commissioner pointed out that the problem resulted because the district did not provide Bratge with a clear and unambiguous notice of its intentions. Although the district claims that Bratge agreed to resign and asked for her letter of resignation, it never actually received a written resignation from her.
Despite not having received Bratge’s written resignation, the Commissioner noted, the district did not take the procedural steps required to terminate her probationary employment.* This, according to the Commissioner, left Bratge unsure of her exact status and the district believing that the position was vacant as of the beginning of the 1999-2000 school year.
The Commissioner also took the opportunity to point out that personnel decisions must comply with all applicable legal and contractual requirements. In the event the district provides an employee with an option of resigning in lieu of termination, it must comply with all statutory and contractual notification requirements if it then wishes to terminate an employee who does not voluntarily submit his or her written resignation.
One issue not addressed by the Commissioner: assuming that Bratge had a right to have her name place on a preferred list, would her returning to a position with the Rome City School District have any impact on her status on such a list?
Here are some points to keep in mind regarding preferred lists:
1. Typically the most senior individual on the list may be passed over or, under certain circumstances, have his or her name removed from the list, only if he or she actually declines the appointment.
2. The name of an individual may not be removed from a preferred list if he or she merely declines appointment to a different position for which certification of the preferred list was not mandated or deemed appropriate.
3. The individual is not required to seek information concerning the existence of any vacancy for which he or she could be certified.
4. While an appointing authority is not required to fill a vacant position, if it elects to do so, it must use the appropriate preferred list if one exists. (Under certain circumstances, a public employer may be required to use other types of preferred lists such as a special military list.)
5. If an individual accepts other employment, his or her name is to remain on the preferred list until it may otherwise be lawfully removed. For example, Jones is laid off from Position A and subsequently accepts a position to a lower rank position for which the preferred list was certified. If Position A is reestablished and Jones is eligible for certification from the preferred list and is the most senior person on the list, Jones must be certified for appointed to the newly created position.
* The fact that the district did not take the procedural steps required to terminate Bratge’s probationary employment suggests that had Bratge filed a timely appeal the Commissioner might have found that she had attained tenure by estoppel.
____________________________________
For information about PELP's electronic handbook Layoff, Preferred Lists and Reinstatement of public employees in New York, go to: http://nylayoff.blogspot.com/
____________________________________
NYPPL
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Editor in Chief Harvey Randall served as Director of Personnel, State University of New York Central Administration; Director of Research, Governor's Office of Employee Relations; Principal Attorney, Counsel's Office, New York State Department of Civil Service; and Colonel, JAG, Command Headquarters, New York Guard.
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