Protected speech in public employment

Protected speech in public employment

Green v Board of County Commissioners, USCA, 10th Circuit, Docket 05-6297

The general rule applied in cases where a public employee’s allegation that his or her right to free speech has been violated is that while an employee's freedom of speech regarding matters of “public concern” may not be restricted by a public employer, the employer may prohibit an employee from speaking “in an official capacity.” The Green case involved the analysis and application of this general rule.

Jennifer Green was employed at Canadian County, Oklahoma's Juvenile Justice Center as a drug-lab technician and detention officer. As part of her job, she performed drug-screening tests. She was concerned that some of the samples tested produced “false-positive” results. As the Center did not have a confirmation testing policy, she raised the issue of “false positive” test results with her immediate supervisor, William Alexander. Alexander was not responsive.

Without Alexander’s knowledge, Green contacted the manufacturer of the drug-testing equipment used at the Center and asked questions about confirmation testing. In addition, she spoke with representatives of the Department of Human Services about the need for a confirmation test. Ultimately, Green arranged for a caseworker to transport a sample that had tested positive for drugs to a hospital for confirmation testing. The confirmation test indicated that the Center's initial test of the sample produced a false-positive result. Green communicated this information to Mr. Alexander. Soon thereafter, the Center adopted a formal confirmation testing policy.

Green complained following this episode her employer treated her less fairly and she was subsequently dismissed from her position. She sued, contending that her employer’s actions violated the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1983 [Civil action for deprivation of rights], and state-law. A federal district court judge dismissed her petition and Green appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals.

One element of Green’s complaint alleged that the County’s actions violated her Constitutional right to free speech.

Addressing the “free speech” aspect of her appeal, the Circuit Court concluded that Green’s First Amendment rights had not been violated because Green’s “free speech” allegations did not involve communicating with newspapers or her legislators or performing some similar activity.

Green disagreed with her supervisors' evaluation of the need for a formal testing policy and her unauthorized obtaining of the confirmation test to prove her point. However, the Circuit Court, citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 195 [at 1960], said that a government employee’s First Amendment rights do “not invest them with a right to perform their jobs however they see fit.” Accordingly, there is no “judicial oversight of communications between and among government employees and their superiors in the course of official business” and “displacement of managerial discretion by judicial supervision.”

Here, said the court, Green's communications with third parties about confirmation testing are the types of communications that would be attributable to the Center and thus the Center has an interest in controlling them. Accordingly, in the eyes of the Circuit Court, Green’s speech was not “protected speech.”

Sustaining the lower court’s dismissal of Green’s petition, the Circuit ruled that with respect to the unauthorized confirmation test arranged for by Green and her related communications to third parties, Green did not speak or act in her capacity as a citizen, but rather was acting as a government employee and thus did not exercise protected free speech.

Free speech issues raised by public employees have been considered by the U.S. Supreme Court in a number of instances. Essentially public officers and employees enjoy “protected speech” in connection with their public comments concerning a State or municipal employer's activities that are a matter of public concern.

In contrast, comments by a public officer or employee concerning his or her personal unhappiness with a public employer, such as complaints about working conditions or his or her personal disagreement concerning internal operations of the department or agency which do not rise to the level of a “public interest,” are not protected by the Constitution.

Typically, the resolution of such “free speech” cases turns on the court’s view as to whether the employee’s comments address a matter of “public concern” or a matter of “personal interest.”

Equal pay for equal work and “red lined” positions

Equal pay for equal work and “red lined” positions

Fenton v St. Lawrence County, 36 AD3d 1102

Deanna Fenton and C. Kevin McDonough both served as personnel technicians with St. Lawrence County. Fenton’s annual salary, however, was significantly less than McDonough’s annual salary.

Fenton’s salary was based on a grade-step salary schedule contained in a Taylor Law contract while McDonough's salary reflected the salary he was receiving of his previous higher salaried position – Personnel Director – when he was “downgraded” to a lower grade position. When McDonough was downgraded, his salary was “red lined.”

In response to Fenton’s complaining about this salary discrepancy, her supervisors had a “desk audit” of her position performed. As a result, Fenton’s position was allocated to a higher salary grade but this did not resolve the underlying salary discrepancy between Fenton and McDonough.

Fenton filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC] alleging the difference between her salary and McDonough’s constituted a violation of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (29 USC § 206 [d]. Fenton also complained that after filing her complaint with EEOC she had been subjected to retaliation.

Eventually EEOC issued a right to sue letter and Fenton brought and action in State Supreme Court seeking compensation for gender discrimination. Supreme Court issued an order summarily dismissing Fenton’s petition. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s action.

The Appellate Division said that in order to maintain a cause of action under the Equal Pay Act, the plaintiff must “establish a prima facie case of wage discrimination by demonstrating that:

(1) The employer pays different wages to employees of the opposite sex:

(2) The employees perform equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility; [and]

(3) The jobs are performed under similar working conditions” citing, Aldrich v Randolph Cent. School Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 524, cert denied 506 US 965.

St. Lawrence County conceded that Fenton had established a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination, Accordingly, the burden of going forward shifted to it to demonstrate that the pay disparity was justified – i.e. the differences in the wages paid to Fenton and to McDonough was due to a factor “other than sex”

The County contended that it had met its burden by establishing that Fenton’s salary was lower than McDonough's because McDonough’s salary reflected the compensation he had been receiving in his former, higher grade position, and his salary rate had been “red lined” or “red circled” for legitimate business reasons.

The Appellate Division said that it agreed and dismissed Fenton’s appeal.

The court explained that:

“The term 'red circle' rate is used to describe certain unusual, higher than normal, wage rates which are maintained for reasons unrelated to sex” such as reclassification or reallocation of position as a result of reorganization or for other legitimate administrative purposes. Where a position is red circled for legitimate business reasons, it may result in the maintenance of an employee's salary at a higher rate despite a decrease in the employee's responsibilities or duties.” This constitutes a “factor other than sex” and thus qualifies as an affirmative defense under the Equal Pay Act.”

In this instance St. Lawrence County “red circled” an incumbent’s salary to avoid financially injuring the downgraded employee. The court noted that the County had red circled the salaries of both male and female employees affected by its reorganization.

This evidence established the requisite affirmative defense, shifting the burden to Fenton to raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether County’s' red circling of these position was a pretext for gender discrimination.

In the court’s view, Fenton “failed to meet” her burden of rebutting the County’s affirmative defense by proving that its reason was “mere pretext” for unlawful discrimination.

Administrative adjudications

Administrative adjudications

Brzostek v Syracuse Fire Dept., 238 AD2d 947; Leave to appeal denied, 92 NY2d 102

In the Brzostek case, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, was asked to review an administrative adjudication. In an earlier appeal concerning the parties, the court ruled that Brzostek was entitled to a determination on the merits of his request for General Municipal Law Section 207-a (2) benefits [Brzostek v City of Syracuse, 238 AD2d 947; Leave to appeal denied, 92 NY2d 1026].*

Instead of holding a hearing, thereby creating “an administrative record for judicial review,” the City and Brzostek agreed upon a “set of stipulated facts” which were submitted to Supreme Court. Supreme Court then reviewed the matter “de novo.”

The Appellate Division ruled that such a procedure was incorrect. It said that an administrative determination must be made by the appropriate agency in the first instance, and Brzostek had the burden of proving that he was eligible for Section 207-a benefits.

The court said that the department had to determine the merits of Brzostek's application and remanded the matter to it for this purpose. Once the administrative agency makes its determination, if the individual objects, he or she may appeal the decision.

An administrative agency's administrative determination is subject to judicial review in a CPLR article 78 proceeding. The traditional test applied by the courts is such instances: is the administrative determination supported by substantial evidence in the record.

* General Municipal Law Section 207-a provides significant benefits to firefighters who are disabled as the result on an injury sustained in the line of duty.

Bill targeting pension abuse passed by State Legislature

Bill targeting pension abuse passed by State Legislature

The New York State Legislature passed legislation* on June 20, 2011 to enhance State Comptroller Thomas P. DiNapoli’s ability to catch those who abuse the state pension system.

The bill grants the Comptroller’s office access to State Department of Taxation and Finance's wage reporting system to identify New York State and Local Retirement System retirees working for local governments in order to determine if any exceed the retirement earnings limitation set out in the Retirement and Social Security Law. If a state or local government employee earns more than those limits, the Comptroller has the authority to suspend and recoup any excess payments made with respect to the pension portion of the individual’s retirement allowance.

The Retirement and Social Security Law (RSSL) places limits on the amount that may be earned by a retiree who returns to public employment with the State as an employer, or with a political subdivision of the State, without it affecting his or her retirement allowance.** Most retirees are covered by Section 212 of the RSSL, which allows retirees under age 65 to earn up to $30,000 per calendar year without any penalty with respect to the pension portion of his or her retirement allowance.

Currently, the Retirement System annually compares retiree information with payroll data for state employees.  However, no similar mechanism existed to check payroll information of the thousands of local public employers statewide.

* Assembly 7911; Senate 5460

** See §210 et. seq. of the Retirement and Social Security Law..

Broadbanding of positions

Broadbanding of positions

Ensley v Diamond, 258 AD2d 263, Leave to appeal denied 93 NY2d 814

The Ensley case contrasts two different position classification concepts: (1) “reclassification” of positions and (2) “broadbanding” of positions.

According to Charles Ensley, the New York City Department of Citywide Administrative Services' Resolution 98-12, adopted on November 12, 1998, reclassified a number of existing positions. He contended that the resolution was null and void because the City failed to comply with Section 20 of the Civil Service Law before adopting the resolution.

The city, on the other hand, argued that it had not reclassified any position but had, instead, “created new titles, each of which encompassed more than one assignment.” The Appellate Division, First Department, in its decision, characterized the city's action challenged by Ensley as “broadbanding.”*

First, some background: Section 20.1 of the Civil Service Law requires each municipal commission to adopt rules “for the jurisdictional classification of positions” and “for the position classification of such offices and employment....”

Section 20.2 makes such rules, and any amendment to such rules, subject to a public hearing and the approval of the State Civil Service Commission.

Unless placed in a different jurisdictional class by the legislature, all positions in the classified service are automatically in the competitive class. Jurisdiction classification concerns the placement of a position in a different jurisdictional class: the exempt, noncompetitive or labor class.

In contrast, position classification of positions is based on the duties and qualification to be performed by the incumbent. A position is reclassified when it is determined that the actual duties being performed are substantially different from those initially set out as the “job description” that recites the duties of the position.

Reclassification is commonly used to correct “out-of-title” work situations or to reflect basic changes in the duties and responsibilities of the position in general or an individual in particular. Reclassification may, or may not, involve a change in the salary grade to which the position is allocated.

The Appellate Division decided that Ensley failed to prove that the city's action in adopting Resolution 98-12 involved the “reclassification” of positions. It then described the city's action as involving the broadbanding, rather than the reclassification, of positions. Having reached this conclusion, it sustained the Supreme Court's dismissal of Ensley's petition.

The court described broadbanding as an action involving the consolidation of assignments under the same title, with no additional examinations required to move between assignments within the title. As to the legal basis for broadbanding, the Appellate Division said that broadbanding was permitted under the Civil Service Law, citing Kitchings v Jenkins, 85 NY2d 694, as authority for this conclusion.

 * In a different context, the term "broadbanding" is sometimes used to describe the process of "zone scoring" a written test.

Direct dealing

Direct dealing

Stillwater Teachers Assoc. v Stillwater CSD, 32 PERB 4914

In labor relations, the term “direct dealing” is used to describe a situation where the employer deals directly with an individual concerning the individual’s terms and conditions of employment instead of dealing with the employee’s collective bargaining representative.

The Stillwater Teachers Association charged the district with an unfair labor practice - direct dealing. The association alleged that the school superintendent had advised a unit employee that if he resigned, the district would reemploy him at a higher salary than permitted by the collective bargaining agreement between the parties.

Administrative Law Judge Susan A. Camenzo concluded that the charge of direct dealing was unsubstantiated. The decision notes that other unit members unhappy with their salary had been told of the possible effects of resignation such as loss of tenure, seniority and were given no promise of reemployment. 

Here, said Camenzo, the employee assessed the risks and “decided on his own to resign and reapply for his old position at a higher contractual salary.

Employment agreements

Employment agreements

Dillon, et al, v City of New York, 238 AD2d 302; Leave to appeal denied, 90 NY2d 811

Typically, an individual is given a letter of appointment upon initial employment setting out the effective date of appointment and other important facts such as title and salary.

In some instances, the parties may enter into a contract. The employment of a school superintendent by a school district is an example of this.

The Dillon case concerns another type agreement that the parties may enter -- one in which the employee agrees to perform service for a specified period of time.

John T. Dillon, Jr. and his co-plaintiffs were appointed as Assistant District Attorneys in Bronx County. Prior to being hired, and as a condition of employment, they each signed a statement acknowledging that: “Assistant District Attorneys are required to abide by a commitment to give four years of initial service to the Office of the District Attorney. Failure to honor that commitment may result in a loss of benefits and an unfavorable termination from the Office.”

This four-year commitment was subsequently changed to three years. Dillon, Michael Newman and Eileen Koretz each submitted their resignations before completing their three-year service obligations. These resignations were apparently disregarded by the District Attorney and notations indicating “Terminated - Did Not Fulfill Commitment” were placed in their respective personnel files. In other words, their separation was deemed a termination, not a resignation.

Among the claims made by Dillon and the others in this litigation was that they had been defamed because of the characterization of their respective departures as a termination rather than a resignation. A State Supreme Court justice denied the district attorney's motion for summary judgment. In considering the district attorney's appeal from this ruling, the Appellate Division, with respect to Dillon's “employment commitment,” said:

“To allow an employee who contractually commits to work a number of years, which is common in many prosecutors' offices, to “resign” prior to satisfaction of the commitment period, and then threaten to sue for defamation if the employer characterizes the employee's departure as termination, would render meaningless the contractual commitment.”

The Appellate Division rejected Dillion's contention that the District Attorney's own, unilateral, reduction of the commitment period from four years to three years, abrogated the contractual commitment. The court said this argument was meritless as the district attorney's action only reduced the extent, and not the obligation, of employees' time commitments.

Exhausting administrative remedies

Exhausting administrative remedies

Jardim v PERB, 265 AD2d 329

The Jardim case demonstrates the importance of exhausting one's administrative remedies before initialing litigation challenging an administrative determination.

A Public Employment Relations Board administrative law judge [ALJ] dismissed improper practices charges filed by Leroy Jardim. Jardim claimed that he had been subjected to disciplinary action as a result of his performing his union duties.

In effect, Jardim alleged that he had been disciplined for performing “protected activities” within the meaning of the Taylor Law -- an unfair labor practice. The ALJ decided that the disciplinary action had not been taken against him because of his union activities.

Jardim then filed a petition with a State Supreme Court appealing the ALJ's determination. This proved to be a fatal procedural error. His petition was dismissed because the court determined that Jardim had not exhausted his administrative remedies. It seems that Jardim elected to file a petition appealing the ALJ's decision in State Supreme Court pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules instead of filing his “exceptions” to the ALJ's ruling with PERB.

The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the lower court's ruling. The court said that “administrative review” was available to Jardim. Thus, the dismissal of his petition by the Supreme Court was appropriate.

The court pointed out that PERB's rules provided for such an administrative review, citing Section 204.10 [4 NYCRR 204.10] of the rules. Section 204.10(a) permits a party to appeal a determination by an ALJ to the board, provided such an appeal -- referred to as “exceptions” to the ALJ's determination -- is filed within 15 working days after the individual has received the ALJ's decision.

Section 204.10 (b)(4) of the rules requires the party filing exceptions to specifically state them in the appeal. Any basis for an exception to a “ruling, finding, conclusion or recommendation” made by the ALJ “which is not specifically urged is waived”.

Not being familiar with the rules not a valid excuse for failure to follow procedures

Not being familiar with the rules not a valid excuse for failure to follow procedures

Broome Co. Sheriff's Law Enforcement Supervisors v Sheriff's Department, 32 PERB 3054

Binghamton Police Supervisors Association v City of Binghamton, 32 PERB 3055

Ignorance or a misunderstanding of PERB's rules is not an acceptable excuse as the Law Enforcement Supervisors and Binghamton Police Supervisors decisions illustrate.

The Broome County Sheriff's Law Enforcement Supervisors Association filed a representation petition with PERB's Director of Employment Practices and Representation. The Association wanted to have the Broome County Sheriffs PBA decertified and the Association designated as the collective bargaining representative for a unit consisting of supervisory officers.

PERB’s director of representation dismissed the Association's petition after finding that the “showing of interest” [SOI] simultaneously filed with its petition “did not include a description of the unit the Association alleged to be appropriate....” The section of the Association's SOI form to be used to describe the unit the Association sought to represent was blank. This, said the director, meant that the SOI was not “on a form prescribed by the director” and therefore did not meet the requirements set out in Section 201.4(b) of PERB's' rules [4 NYCRR 201.4(b)].

The Association filed an exception to the director's ruling, contending that it had not been promptly notified of the deficiency and thus was prevented from correcting it in a timely fashion. In addition, the Association's representative said that the representation forms he received from PERB “had not included any form for an SOI petition.”

PERB sustained the director's determination. It said that the rules clearly set out the requirement. “A party who is ignorant of a requirement under the Rules is no differently situated than a person who is mistaken in his or her understanding of the meaning or application of the Rules.”

As an alternative argument, the Association claimed that it used a “floppy disk” of PERB forms that PERB created and offered for sale to the public but that the disk did not contain an SOI petition. PERB rejected the claim, noting that the disk included the SOI petition and “the Association's representative apparently used that computer version of the form to file a corrected SOI petition with the director.”

Commenting that it applies its rules strictly, “especially the Rules pertaining to showing of interest requirements,” PERB sustained the director's dismissal of the Association's representation petition.

In a similar case, Binghamton Police Supervisors Association v City of Binghamton, 32 PERB 3055, PERB rejected the Association's representation petition because, it also, “did not include a description of the unit the Association alleged to be appropriate....”

Determining the “future income” of a disabled public officer or employee

Determining the “future income” of a disabled public officer or employee

Iazzetti v City of New York, 93 NY2d 808

The Court of Appeals' ruling in the Iazzetti case is of importance to public employees, and, in the case of death, their survivors, who are injured while performing their duties.

Mario Iazzetti, an employee of the New York City Department of Sanitation, was injured on the job and was awarded accidental disability retirement benefits - a pension equal to 3/4 of his last annual salary.

Iazzetti and his wife, however, sued the City claiming it was responsible for his disability. A jury awarded them $200,000 in past lost earnings and benefits, $25,000 in past pain and suffering, $750,000 in future lost earnings and benefits, $250,000 in future lost pension, and $25,000 in future pain and suffering. The jury apportioned 80 percent of the responsibility for the accident to the City and 20 percent to Iazzetti.

The City moved to have the award for past and future loss of earnings and for “future lost pension” modified. A State Supreme Court justice ruled that Section 4545(b) of the Civil Practice Law and Rules [CPLR] allowed the City to offset the jury's award for past loss of earnings by the amount Iazzetti had received from his accident disability retirement pension but said the jury's award for future losses could not be similarly reduced. The basis for the ruling: CPLR 4545(b) does not allow defendants to offset future losses.

The City appealed, contending that Section 4545(c) of the CPLR, rather than 4545(b) applied in Iazzetti's case. The Appellate Division agreed with the city. This resulted in a significant difference to the Iazzetties since unlike subdivision (b), subdivision (c) allows the employer to offset both past and future economic losses in such situations. Iazzetti asked the Court of Appeals to review the Appellate Division's ruling.

After a highly technical analysis of the impact of an amendment to the CPLR on its exiting provisions, the Court of Appeals determined that CPLR Section 4545(b) had not been repealed by implication when the Legislature amended the CPLR by adding a new subdivision (c) to Section 4545 and reversed. It ruled that “the Appellate Division erred in applying CPLR 4545(c) to reduce [Iazzetti's] jury verdict for future lost earnings.”

The significance of this ruling: Court and jury awards for future economic losses are permitted where the public employer is held liable, in whole or in part, for the injury or death of its employee.

Election of a remedy

Election of a remedy

Appeal of A.D. – Decisions of the Commissioner of Education, Decision No. 15,492

A tenured math teacher attempted to appeal a personnel matter to the Commissioner of Education. The Commissioner declined to assume jurisdiction in the matter pointing out that the appeal concerned a matter that had earlier been considered under a contract grievance procedure involving the same parties.

The Commissioner said that a school employee who elects to submit an issue for resolution through a contractual grievance procedure may not bring an appeal to the Commissioner for review of the same matter. As the record reflects that A.D. brought a grievance “on the very same issues that are the subject of this appeal and the grievance resulted in a final determination reached on January 29, 2006,” that decision precluded review by the Commissioner. 

The Commissioner cited Appeal of Coughlin, 41 Ed Dept Rep 484 and Decision No. 14,751 in support of his ruling.

Employee not entitled to interest on back pay due upon reinstatement to his or her former position pursuant to court order

Employee not entitled to interest on back pay due upon reinstatement to his or her former position pursuant to court order
Miller v Nassau County Civ. Serv. Commn. 2011 NY Slip Op 05033, Appellate Division, Second Department

Roberta Miller sued the Nassau Civil Service Commission, seeking reinstatement to her former position and for back pay.

Miller appealed Supreme Court’s failure to award her predecision interest.*
 
The Appellate Division rejected her claim for “predecision interest,” noting that the award of back pay to in this instance is derived from Civil Service Law §77, "and that statute does not provide for predecision interest." Citing Matter of Bello v Roswell Park Cancer Inst., 5 NY2d 170.

§77, in pertinent part, provides that “Any officer or employee who is removed from a position in the service of the state or of any civil division thereof in violation of the provisions of this chapter, and who thereafter is restored to such position by order of the supreme court, shall be entitled to receive and shall receive from the state or such civil division, as the case may be, the salary or compensation which he would have been entitled by law to have received in such position but for such unlawful removal, from the date of such unlawful removal to the date of such restoration, less the amount of any unemployment insurance benefits he may have received during such period….” 

.* See http://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/2011/06/jurys-decision-in-favor-of-plaintiff.html for a summary of the earlier determination by the Appellate Division giving rise to this appeal.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:  
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2011/2011_05033.htm